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VEDANTA ence at the beginning of time, as the very basis of world experience and ego consciousness, it can go out of existence again. If it were truly existent (sut, “real beyond changes") it could never be dispelled, and there would be no experience of ĀtmanBrahman as the sole reality; there would be no Vedānta. But on the other hand, if ignorance were non-existent it would not display all these effects. The only thing that can be found out about it, therefore, is that this "something” is “antagonistic to knowledge, incompatible with wisdom," 154 for it vanishes, with all its modifications, at the dawn of knowledge; and furthermore, that the gunas are inherent in it,155 for it cannot be separated from them any more than a substance from its attributes.
The proof of its existence, finally, is the simple awareness, "I am ignorant."
Like all phenomena, ignorance can be viewed in either of two ways: 1. comprehensively (sam-asty-abhiprāyena), as a whole; or 2. analytically (uy-asty-abhi prayena), as composed of numerous distinct units.156 The word samasti means "an aggregate made up of parts that constitute a collective unit," whereas vyasti specifies the units of an aggregate. For example, when a number of trees are considered as an aggregate (samasti) they are denoted as one, that is to say, as "a forest"; or a number of drops of water may be called a "pond,” “lake,” or “reservoir," depending on the size and nature of their aggregation. When taken as units (vyaşli), however, they are so many trees or drops (or gallons).167 In the same manner, “ignorance" (avidyā) can be regarded either as an all-pervading, universal aggregate, or as a multitude of separate occurrences. That is to say, the obvious diversity of ignorance in distinct individuals can be viewed as itself but an aspect of ignorance (which is like saying, “There
154 lb. 155 Ib. For a discussion of the guņas, cf. supra, pp. 295-297, 398-402. 186 Vedantasära 85. 187 Ib. 86.
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