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1. Here is given the difinition of valid knowledge. The term 'definitive cognition (nirņītih'
in the definition stands for that cognition which is devoid of the characteristic of doubt, indecision and indeterminate cognition. And the term 'as it is (yathāvad l' excludes illusory cognition (bhrāntiḥ or viparyayaḥ which cognises the object as it is not, as for
example cognition of silver in shell. 2. In the systems of Indian philosophy the question as to how the cognition itself is
cognised is discussed. The Jaina and the Buddhist thinkers maintain that cognition is self-cognised or self-revelatory. Cognition cognises both the object and its own self. Like a lamp it reveals both the object and its own self. The Nyāya-Vaiseșika philosophers maintain that cognition is cognised by another cognition which is perceptual (called anuvyavasāya or after-cognition). According to the Sankhya-Yoga thinkers cognition ljñāna) which is an attribute of citta is seen (darśana) by puruṣa. Kumārila maintains that cognition is cognised by means of an inference where cognizedness (jñātata) produced in the object by the concerned cognition acts as probans, that is, by means of an inference of the type where the existence of a cause is inferred from that of the effect (karya-hetuka käraņa-visayaka anumāna). The Jaina thinkers refute those who do not hold cognition as self-cognised. They point out that it is quite impossible for a cognition to cognise an object if it itself is not cognised. It cannot be maintained that the cognition is cognised by the second cognition, since the latter, too, being equally uncognised cannot cognise the first cognition in question. If a third cognition is requisitioned for the purpose, it will lead to a regressus ad infinitum, the third being in the same situation with the second quâ uncognised will require a fourth and the fourth a fifth and so on if no cognition is supposed to be self
cognised or self-revelatory. 3. Activity of the form of knowledge or cognitive activity viewed from the standpoint of
subject or knower is an organ of knowledge (pramāna) and the same activity viewed from the standpoint of object is a resultant cognition (pramiti). In another man same knowledge activity can be viewed as an organ and a resultant from the different angles. When viewed as an illumination of an object it is considered to be an organ and when viewed as the removal of ignorance about the object concerned it is considered to be a resultant.
