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62 : Applied Philosophy of Jainism is; and in Parsvanātha's code, it is even more extensive and comprehensive, since it includes the vow of celibacy too, which is separated in Mahāvīra's fivefold scheme. However, 'bahirdhādāna' is the synonym of parigraha. But the Jaina scriptures clearly point out that sheer non-acceptance of something external is meaningless unless it is dissociated from what is called 'mūrcchā, 'mamatva' or desire, cleaving or attachment. In Daśavaikālika, parigraha is identified with 'mūrcchà. In the Tattvārtha-sūtra" too Umāsvāti has precisely pointed out that parigraha is nothing but 'mūrccha. This desire being the root of parigraha is the root of suffering. As soon as it overcomes, the suffering comes to an end. The Uttarādhyayana-sūtra tells that desires are as endless as the sky hence instead of trying to satisfy them over and over again, they should be destroyed from their very roots; so mere non-acceptance of external objects is meaningless, if the desire is existent. As Amstacandra points out, he who is unable to root out mūrcchāor attachment to his belongings, cannot be said to have been established in the vow of nonpossession, even if he gives up all his belongings, along with his clothes. It is only mūrcchā which is the true essence of parigraha. Thus, anything for which one has attachment is parigraha; whether it is a living or non-living being (Jada and cetanā), visible or invisible (rūpi and arūpī), big or small (sthūla and aņu). With these broad implications of parigraha it is mainly classified into two kinds, i.e. apparent and real (bāhya and ābhyantara). These include all objects of attachment that retard liberation. By real or ābhyantara-parigraha, is meant the inner attitude of attachment towards worldly objects, living or non-livings. This inner attitude may be constituents of various stages such as mithyātva (wrong notions), avirati (reluctance to accept the moral principles), pramāda(negligence) etc. Basically real parigraha arouses from within, it pertains more to thoughts and attitudes than to objects. On the other hand, apparent or bāhya-parigraha is aroused from without. External objects are more obvious causes of apparent or bāhya parigraha, they then lead to inner involvement in the objects culminating into ābhayantara-parigraha. These external objects (or bāhya parigrahas) are grossly classified into two types, living and non-living (cetanā and jada), jada-parigraha means attachment
