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THE PROBLEM OF ERROR
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distinctive features of it are not cognized. It is perceived as shining white something. This perception produces recollection of silver previously cognized elsewhere. Thus, there is fusion of two cognitions. In cases of error two distinct cognitions—the perception and recollection arise, their distinction is missed. As a result of this nondiscrimination of non-relation identity judgement of the form "This is silver arises.
It is clear that Prabhākāras though are prepared to admit error, according to them, all experiences are valid and so called cases of error are only undiscriminated fusions of cognitions. In other words, in accordance with their realistic stand, they want to suggest that all knowledge is valid and that there is no error in the logical sense. The sublating cognition does not contradict the illusion but simply recognizes the distinction between two cognitions.
However, this view can also be included under the view that error is apprehension of a thing as something else.
All the above views are either inadequate to account for the error or they can be safely included in the theory known as anyathākhyāti or viparitakhyāti propounded by Nyāya and Jainism.
Nyāya theory of Error : Anyathākhyātivāda or Viparitakhyātivāda :
Nyāya realism recognizes complete difference between the object and the subject. So it is faced with the problem of truth and error. If the known object is wholly different from cognizing knowledge, the question of bridging the gulf
