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NYÁYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
as error”.
This kind of naive realism which denies that there is a gap between evidence and conclusion is not accepted by Nyāya and Jainism and, therefore, both recognize possibility of error. This position is not inconsistent with their realism. Both Jaina and Nyāya views lay emphasis on objectivity and do not explain the error away.
Problem of Negation
The problem of negation is an epistemological problem though it involves ontological considerations as well. Some of the Indian schools like Sānkhya, Buddhism and Cārvāka challenge the reality of negation while Mīmāṁsaka and Vedānta accept non-apprehension as a distinct source of knowledge.
Nyāya accepts the reality of existence as well as nonexistence as things which are independent in themselves. Nyāya realism, though regards negation as an ontological reality, does not admit negation as a distinct way of knowing. It elevates negation to a coordinate status with positive being. It is an object of perception and, therefore, non-apprehension as a distinct source of knowledge is not required to be recognised. Nyāya holds that it is wrong to assume that a negative fact is known only by means of a negative source. Negation in Nyāya is always of something. In Nyāya terminology, it is negation of its counter positive. Like cognition negation is negation of something. The Nyāya emphasis on objective content of cognition is significant. Negation is not merely a mental act of denying and, therefore, negative statements are not trivial but informative
