________________
CONCLUSION
205
Jaina realists for recognising such forms of knowledge.
Problem of Truth and Validity of Knowledge
In Indian philosophy, pramāņa is considered as a valid means of knowledge. There is initial agreement among philosophers of different schools as regards the definition of pramāņa as the source of valid knowledge but as regards the nature of knowledge, its causes, etc. philosophers differ.
In Jainism, as in Nyāya, pramāņa is taken as valid cognition itself. Nyāya, however, emphasises sense-object contact in the act of knowledge. Here, there is sharp contrast between Jaina and Nyāya logicians. Jainas do not agree with Nyāya in maintaining that sense-object contact is important. They seem to emphasise the fact that knowing is a conscious and this conscious cognition only can illumine the object. The unconscious sense-contact cannot possibly do so. Jaina view, therefore, is that only a conscious cause can generate conscious knowledge.
The idealistic view of some schools that object and its cognitions are non-different is not accepted by Jaina and Nyāya realists.
They regard object external and independent of mind. Jaina and Nyāya definition of pramāņa is realistic but while Jainas hold that knowledge illumines both self and the object. Nyāya realists hold that it illumines object alone and cannot illumines itself. In Jainism, the relation between the self and its knowledge is such that knowledge is different as well as non-different from the self. The Nyāya view of complete difference between knowledge and self is rejected by the Jainas because knowledge according to them is the
