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character and has its basis in objective facts.
It is sometimes held that theory of errors as 'nondiscrimination'-akhyātivāda-is more consistent with realism because according to it, there is no error in logical sense. However, it is rightly pointed out that "the Naiyāyikās would answer in the affirmative, the question 'Is error possible in realism ? and would explain the possibility of error by showing how a real substantive and a real attribute may be erroneously correlated when they are presented in cognition and, thus, save realism itself from being ruined by conceding the possibility of error”.Nyāya and Jaina realism are right when they exphasise the fact that an unreal object can never be experienced. Illusion is an error of perception and not of memory and, therefore, cannot be the result of non-discrimination but it is cognition of a thing different from what it is. Again, the other theories can be reduced to Viparitakhyātivāda. Though it introduces some subjective element in the apprehension of error, it combines objectivism with subjectivism which is compatible with realism. This theory also seems to be in conformity with the view held by some of the modern realists like Alexander. It is no exaggeration to say that the theory of error as misapprehension of a thing is the most scientific theory not inconsistent with realistic standpoint.
Annotations : 1. Chatterjee, S. : The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge, p. 34. 2. Bhattācharya, H. : Pramānanayatattvālokālańkāra of Vadi
Devasūri, I. 9. tr. and comm. 0. 38. 3. Kuppuswamy Sastri, S. : A Primer of Indian Logic, p. 136. 4. Alexander : Essays in Critical Realism, p.135-36.
