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for its validity. They cannot accept the view that what you know subjectively is also true objectively by itself. For them, knowing a thing is different from being of it. Subjective condition cannot be sufficient guarantee for its objectivity unless it is verified subsequently and hence they are one in concluding that validity of knowledge depends upon certain extrafactors. As realists, they are committed to correspondence theory of truth and underline the thesis that validity of knowledge is not inherent in knowledge itself. That truth is intrinsic to all knowledge is not admitted by them but that truth of some cases of knowledge is selfevident is admitted by some of the Nyāya and Jaina philosophers.
Annotations : 1. Chatterjee S. : The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge, p. 98-99. 2. J. N. Mohanty : Gangeśa's Theory of Truth, p. 27. 3. Vācaspati : Nyāya darsana, p. 16. 4. Mohanty, J. N. : Gangeśa's Theory of Truth, p. 40. 5. Ibid. p. 42. 6. Ibid. p. 43. 7. Mohanty, J. N. : Gangeśa's Theory of Truth, p. 45-47. 8. Mohanty, J. N. : Gangeśa's Theory of Truth, p. 49. 9. Ibid. p. 52. 10. Vādi Devasūri : Pramānanayatattvālokālankāraḥ, I. 20. 11. Bhattāchārya. H. : Pramāṇanayatattvālokālankāraḥ of Vādi,
Devasūri, Eng.Tr. and commentary. p. 75.
