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CHAPTER II विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम्। अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्ति वाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥32॥ virodhānnobhayaikātmyam syādvāda-nyāya
vidvişām, avāchyatāikānte'pyuktirnāvāchyamiti yujyate.
32. The particular view of those who are antagonistic to the doctrine of Syādvāda that a thing can have both aspects together (cannot stand) as it is an impossibility. The view of those who hold that a thing is inexpressible cannot stand, being indescribable.
COMMENTARY
Akalanka explains this verse as follows: It is not possible that an object possessing qualities should have two natures opposed to each other existing at the same time. For example, existence and non-existence, oneness or many-sidedness, cannot be jointly predicated of the same thing, as one will oppose the other and existence of both will be self-contradictory; barren woman and a child cannot be connected together.1
Again, those who maintain the avaktavya view, viz., that everything is unknowable, are inconsistent with themselves. Some knowledge about a thing must exist before we can call it unknowable. So Jainism urges that uncertainty in knowledge is not an acceptable position.
अनपेक्षे पृथक्त्वैक्ये ह्यवस्तुद्वयहेतुतः।
dai Tera o FITAS: HTETT TETT 1133 il anapekṣe prthaktvaikye hyavastu dvayahetutaḥ, tadevaikyam pộthaktvaṁ cha svabhedaiḥ
sādhanam yathā. 1. “अस्तित्वनास्तित्वैकत्वानेकत्ववत् पृथक्त्वेत्तर-परस्परप्रत्यनीकस्वभावद्वयसंभवोऽपि मा
भूद्विप्रतिषेधात्। न खलु सर्वात्मना विरुद्धधर्माध्यासोऽस्ति तदन्योन्यविधिप्रतिषेधTAYICI&FEZITUACI" Astašati.
