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Chapter VII
अन्तरङ्गार्थतैकान्ते बुद्धिवाक्यं मृषाखिलम् । प्रमाणाभासमेवातस्तत्प्रमाणादृते कथम् ॥79॥
antarangārthataikānte buddhivākyaṁ mṛṣākhilam, pramāṇābhāsamevātas-tat pramāṇādṛte katham.
79. In the ekanta view of the reality of thought alone, anumāna and agama must be false. From it there will be a fallacy, but how can there be a fallacy without pramāṇa?
COMMENTARY
This verse refutes the view of Vijñānādvaita-vādins among the Buddists who hold that thought only is real. In that view there is no necessity of any play of knowledge, deriving from external objects either through the process of inference or through agama. For everything else than thought, is un-real. You cannot urge that we accept these as fallacies. We reply that they must first accept pramānas (anumāna, agama etc.) before our accepting their fallacies. "The opposite of it is ābhāsa of the same." There must first be acceptance of the nature, number, object and result of pramāņas before we can proceed to speak the opposite of the same. But by denying the reality of anything beyond one's own knowledge, the necessity of the existence of pramāņa itself is denied. So fallacies of the same must also be said to be non-existent. Consequently this ekānta view of the Vijñānavādins is not tenable.
The view of the Vijñānandins is that the inward world is only real. This world consists of five groups (skandhas),
1. Parnikṣāmukha, VI, 1.
