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ĀPTA-MĪMĀSĀ 55. The view of those who do not follow the logic of Syādvāda and hold that opposites can be inherent in a substance, is not tenable as it is self-contradictory. The view of those who accept the view of indescribableness without any limitation is also not tenable.
COMMENTARY It cannot be urged by the Buddhists to escape the absurdity of their position that permanence and nonpermanence should jointly be accepted. For this would be impossible as simultaneous existence of life and death. Absurdity will arise in accepting indescribability as in the case of a man who says “I am under the vow of silence and never speak.”2
नित्यं तत्प्रत्यभिज्ञानान्नाकस्मात्तदविच्छिदा।
fordi manara a realora: 115611 nityam tat-pratyabhijñānānnākasmāttadavichchhidā, kṣaṇikam kālabhedāt te buddhyasañcharadoştaḥ.
56. That (jīva etc.) is permanent, from pratyabhijñāna. It is not sudden, having a connection. Owing to difference in time they are momentary, for otherwise there would be the fault of non-flowing of knowledge.
COMMENTARY
After refuting the view of Ekāntavādins, the Anekānta view is now established. We see a man named Devadatta and subsquently we recognise him as such. This process is pratyabhijñāna. The seven tattvas of Jainism, jīva, ajīva, āsrava, bandha, samvara, nirjarā and mokṣa are eternal. These are recognised by pratyabhijñāna when the same is without
1. "Aid Chlutar 4stohet, farteng yoyillanuevaa" Astašati. 2. “सर्वथानभिलाप्यं तत्त्वम् इत्यभिलपत एव वचनविरोधात् सदा मौनिवतिकोऽहम्
Fruitcaa" Aștasahasri.
