Aspect of Jainology Part 3 Pandita Dalsukh Malvaniya

SR No.: 012017
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: M A Dhaky, Sagarmal Jain
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1991
Total Pages: 572
Language: English, Hindi
Classification: Smruti_Granth & Articles
File Size: 12 MB

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Nagin ). Shah
The first avayava means that x exists from the viewpoint of its own nature'. X exists as x. The second implies that x does not exist from the viewpoint of 'foreiga nature'. X does not exist as other-than x. The third predicates of x both existence and non-existence in succession. This avayava is a compound of the first and the second. It is not unitary and primary. The fourth means that both existence cannot be predicated of x simultaneously due to the limitation of language. But it does not mean that they are not present in x simultaneously. We may say that the third is a mixture or combination of the first and the second while the fourth is a concrete synthesis of the first and the second, it is sui generis (jatyantara ) and hence unitary and primary. Vidyānanda ( c early 9th cent.A.D.) notes that the fourth is the joint and simultaneous affirmation and denial ( of existence in x)? The fifth is a compound one combining the first and the fourth, the sixth is a compound one combining the second and the fourth, and the seventh is a compound one combining the third and the fourth. These seven avayavas exhaust all the mathematical possibilities with regard to one character. When they are taken as seven constituent parts of a vākya ( statement or judgement), they together present an integrated and comprehensive true description of a real thing with regard to one particular point or character ( dharma ). And as there are infinite characters in a real thing, there are infinite such saptabhangi vākyas (seven-fold judgements).
Evolution of Anekāntavāda :
Doctrine of relative judgement (nayavāda ) is traceable to the Āgamas. In the Vyākhyā-prajñapti Jina Mahāvīra states that jiva ( soul ) and pudgala ( matter) are both permanent and changing, permanent from the point of view of substance ( dayvatthayāe ) and changing from the point of view of modes (bhāvatthayāe ).8 Thus, here one fundamental pair of standpoints is referred to. In the Anuyogadvārasūtra we come across a passage referring to seven standpoints, namely naigama etc. Again, it states that the different parts of a physical aggregate might be characterised by anupūrvi, anānupūrvi and avaktavya. This can very well be regarded as a mention of three primary avayavas or bhangas of a saptabhangi vākya. Upadhye has found a reference to the three primary avayavas in tbe Vyākhyā-prajñāpti.' In the Avašyakaniryukti, definitions of seven viewpoints ( naigama etc. ) are given. Again, it mentions three pairs of dravyārthika-paryāyārthika, vyavahāra-niscaya and jñāna-kriya. In the Satkhandagama we find the neat employment of the doctrine of nayas. Umāsvāti (c. 4th cent. A. D.) devotes two aphorisms to the doctrine of nayas.10 He speaks of the traditional seven nayas and the contemporary literature is full of references to them. He does not make any explicit mention of the seven avayavas of saptabhangt. Till the time of Umāsvāti, while dealing with the doctrine of nayas no explicit reference to non-Jaina schools of philosophy is made, nor can it be said that such a reference is implicitly present. The viewpoints are not studied with their supporting arguments, nor are they examined and criticised. With Umāsvāti ends