Sagarmal Jain Abhinandan Granth

SR No.: 012014
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Shreeprakash Pandey
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1998
Total Pages: 974
Language: Hindi, English
Classification: Smruti_Granth & Articles
File Size: 31 MB

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Aspects of Jainology: Volume VI
commences from the period of Akalanka, who for the first time expounded Smrti, Pratyabhijña and Tarka as independent Pramanas. The Jaina theory of Nyaya was given a new direction in the c. 8th A. D. Akalanka not only established Smrti, Pratyabhija and Tarka as independent Pramana but also revised the definitions or meanings of Perception, Inference and Agama, given by Siddhasena and Samantabhadra. In his definition of Pramana, he introduced a new term avisamvadi in place of svapara-avabhāṣaka. Most probably, this characteristic of changing definitions was borrowed from the Buddhist tradition. It was an especiality of Akalanka that he logically evaluated even the pre-established conceptions, hence rightly called the father of Jaina Nyaya. His works Laghiyastraya, Nyayaviniscaya, Siddhiviniscaya and Pramanasangraha are related to the Jaina Nyaya. Pramanasangraha is the Akalanka's last work in which matured Jaina Nyaya, especially Pramāṇa-śāstra, is elaborately discussed. Though in his earlier works he mentioned Smrti, Pratyabhijña and Tarka as Pramana yet as independent Pramaņas, these are established only in this work. As such from the point of view of the history of Jaina Pramāṇaśāstra this is a valuable work giving new dimension to the concept of pramana.
In the history of Indian logic the Jaina logicians, in the c. 8th A. D., for the first time accepted memory (Smṛti), recognition ( Pratyabhijñā) and induction (Tarka) as a Pramana. This is Jaina's special contribution to the field of Indian Pramanaśastra. Not even a single tradition of Indian logic accepts memory (smrti) as an independent Pramana. Only Vedanta-paribhasa, a work of c. 16th A. D., mentions Smrti as Pramana. Though Naiyayikas had accepted recognition (pratyabhijñā) as a kind of perception (pratyakṣa pramāņa) yet neither they regarded it as an independent Pramana nor accepted Smrti as its cause (hetu ). Jainas maintained, in case
Smrti is not Pramāṇa, how recognition (Pratyabhija) can be accepted as Pramana because in absence of memory (Smrti). Pratyabhijita is not possible. If memory (Smrti) is not Pramana, Pratyabhijña also a combination of past memory and present perception can not be considered as Pramaņṇa, because Pratyabhij is based on Smrti. Similarly, Jainas established Tarka as independent pramāņa because in the absence of Tarka Pramāṇa, Vyapti (universal relation) is not possible and without Vyapti, inference (Anumana) is quite impossible. To solve this problem Naiyayikas accepted Samanya Lakṣaṇa Pratyasatti (generic nature of individuals). Jainas accepted Tarka Pramana at the place of Naiyayika's Sämanya Laksana Pratyasatti which is more extensive than that and may be called Inductive leap agamana ). Jainas maintained induction (agamana) and deduction (nigamana ) of Western Logic and introduced them in the name of Tarka and Anumana as an independent Pramana, respectively. An independent Tarka Pramāṇa was needed because acquisition of Samanya (generality) through perception is not possible and without Samanya, Vyāpti is not possible. Similarly in absence of Vyapti, Inference (anumana) is impossible. Since in Jainism, Samanya Laksana Pratyasatti is no where mentioned as a kind of perception, Jainas established Tarka as independent Pramāņa to solve the problem of Vyapti. As Pratyabhijñā was needed for Tarka and Smrti for Pratyabhijña, Jainas accepted all these three as independent Pramāņa
It was Akalanka (c. 8th A. D.) who for the first time referred these three types of independent Pramana in Digambara tradition. Before Akalanka, his predecessors Samantabhadra (c. 5th A. D.) and Pujyapada (c. 6th A. D.) do not make any mention of it. In Svetambara tradition, Siddhasena Divakara (c. 4th A. D. ), Jinabhadra (c. 6th A. D. ), Siddhasena Gani (c. 7th A. D.) and Haribhadra (c. 8th A. D.)