Outlines of Jaina Philosophy

SR No.: 011084
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Jain Mission Society Bangalore
Publication Year: 1954
Total Pages: 195
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 7 MB

Page 40

16
OUTLINES OF JAINA PHILOSOPHY
sensa.'
provision for any mediation of ideas between mind and nature. While Neo-Realism insists like other Realists that things are independent, it also asserts that when things are known, they become immediate objects of knowledge. These immediate objects of knowledge are technically called So things are nothing else than sensa' in a certain relation. The NeoRealist does not postulate mind as a self-conscious substance. He conceives mind as a cross-section of the physical world. Neo-Realism seems to be an ally to Naturalism and Pragmatism as it accepts like Naturalism the truth of the results of physical science and like Pragmatism the practical and empirical character of knowledge. Let us, now, turn to a brief discussion of the conception of knowledge recognised by Neo-Realism.
"
(a) THEORY OR IMMANENCE
The Neo-Realist suggests by his Theory of Immanence that things and minds are not to be regarded as two independent realities but rather as ' relations' into which knowledge as a fact must necessarily enter. As has been observed by Perry: 'Instead of conceiving of Reality as divided absolutely between two impenetrable spheres, we may conceive it as a field of interpenetrating relationships.'
12
(b) THEORY OF INDEPENDENCE
The suggestion of the Theory of Independence is that things are directly experienced, and that in the act of direct experience the things remain as they are without being affected by experience. Experience gives us immediate knowledge of things as they are presented to it but does not determine them.
From the above statement it follows that according to the Theory of Independence, things being independent of one another, the relations which exist amongst things are also external and real, and not subjective and internal. Just as things are outside of mind, so is the relation. This view is quite similar to the Nyaya-Vaiseṣika conception of the external existence of relations. THEORY OF CRITICAL REALISM
If all knowledge were immediate grasp of things then there remains no provision for distinction between true and false
1 Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 271
2 ibid, p. 311.