Outlines of Jaina Philosophy

SR No.: 011084
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Jain Mission Society Bangalore
Publication Year: 1954
Total Pages: 195
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 7 MB

Page 131

THEORY OF KXOWLEDGE
107 RECOGNITION
Recognition is a synthetic judgment born of observation and recollection as typified by such forms as 'that necessarily is it,'
it is like that,' 'that is dissimilar to that, this is different from that,' and the like.1
Observation is perceptual cognition. Recollection is an act of memory. These two are the conditions of recognition which is a kind of synthetic judgment. 'This is necessarily that jar,' and the like are the cases of judgment of identity. “This is like that,' e.g., 'the gayal (gatava) is like the cow' is the judgment of similarity (analogy ). This is dissimilar to that,' e.g., 'the buffalo is different from the cow' is the judgment of dissimilarity. * This is less than, more than, farther than, nearer than,' etc., are examples of the judgment of difference. Recognition is neither perception alone nor analogy exclusively. INDUCTIVE REASONING
Inductive reasoning is the knowledge of universal concomitance conditioned by observation (upalambha) and non-observation (anupalambha )
Observation means the knowledge of existence of the major term (sādhva ) on the existence of the middle term (linça).
Non-observation stands for the knowledge of non-existence of the middle term where there is no major term.
Now, it should not be maintained that such knowledge of universal concomitance is derived exclusively from perceptual cognition. It is beyond the capacity of perception to derive the knowledge of universal concomitance, since our empirical perception is limited, whereas the knowledge of universal concomitance is unlimited. In other words, perception is not discursive and owes its genesis to the influence exerted by a datum that is present in a limited sense.
Nor can it be maintained that such knowledge is obtained by inference, since inference itself is not possible in the absence of
i Darśanasmaranasabhavan tadecedar tatsadyśani tadvilaksanavi
tatpratrvogitrādısankalanari pratyabhijñānam. Pramāņa-mimāmsā,
I, 2, +. 2 C palambhānu halainbhanumittarit t''äptiānamihah. ibid., 1, 2, 5.