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SHANKAR AND SYADVAD. rejoins, it is not right on your part to say all that ; for, every thing being admitted to be instinct with a multiplicity of nature, without having any check or rest any where, the determination of the nature of very determination itself through the means of 'partly-is' and partly-is-not" being not excluded it would simply result in non-determinate knowledge. And for the very reason as well the means of knowledge (HATU),objacts of knowledge (nat), the knowing subject (HATAT), and the act of knowledge (HFA fi), all would remain themselves non-determinate. And where the determinator and the result of determination, both are thus non-determinate, how can then the teacher, who is thus of indefinite opinion himself, can give definite instructions on a doctrine the matter and the principles of the epistemology of which are themselves indeterminate in their very nature and character? Again, what would prevail upon the followers of such a doctrine to actualise in life and conduct the moral principles inculcated in the same? For, if the effects of their actualisation in life and conduct be of themselves instinct
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