Jainism in Buddhist Literature

SR No.: 011023
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Bhagchandra Jain Bhaskar
Publisher: Alok Prakashan
Publication Year: 1972
Total Pages: 326
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 12 MB

Page 91

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factors are many. By nature, one is comprehensive, while the other is distributive. In number, a jar, for example, is one, while its colour and the rest are many. In this way, their functions, etc. are also different. Thus substance is not absolutely different from the successive factors. Therefore, suul and its modes are also not absolutely different. Having the characteristic of conciousness, it is eternal and constant from the view of substance, while from the view of successive factors it changes in its modes such as pleasure, pain, etc54.
The Jainas try to convince the opponents by presenting the example of Narasimha. They say that, like Narasimha, there is no self-contradiction in the dual characteristic of soul. For. the soul is impartiate nirbhäga ); therefore it exists in the joint dual form, and hence is not perceived separately 55.
The theory of soul in Jainism, as referred to by śāntarakṣita, is also referred to by Arcata in his Hetubindutika56. The arguments submitted to refute the theory also are similar. The main defect, according to them, in this theory, is the selfcontradiction, which is not accepted by the Jainas Santaraksita urged that one entity cannot have two forms He puts forward two points in support of his view. He says if there is an unmodified substance in connection with successive factors, there is no difference in it, and in that case, it is not liable to be modifieds. Oneness between substance and its modes will involve the substance to be distributed like the forms of successive factors or the successive factors themselves would be mixed into the substance. Hence there would be no difference between them and the theory will be disprovedbe. As regards Narasimha, he says, it is an aggregate of many atrims, that is why it seems dual in nature ( anekānusamahatmā sa tathaiva pratiyate 59 Thus Sāntaraksita, as well as Arcata 60, refutes the theory on the ground that one cannot have two forms. Otherwise the eternality and the dual nature would be both untrue and unreliable,
As a matter of fact, the dual characteristic of soul is based on the standpoint of non-absolutism which is ignored by the