Jaina Logic

SR No.: 011020
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: T G Kalghatgi
Publisher: Raja Krisen Jain Charitable Trust New Delhi
Publication Year: 1981
Total Pages: 111
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 4 MB

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Jains Logic
evidence in the modern sense * Similar attitude was takon in early Indian Thought. Most of the Indian Schools of thought, with the exception of cărvaka, have given prominence to anumana as a pramāņa. Jainas hold that anumana is the process of knowing an unperceived through the perception of a sign (linga) and the recollection of its invariable concomitance with the object. Hemachandra says that inference is the knowledge of the major term on the strength of the knowledge of the middle term." The knowledge of the major term (sadhya) is of the nature of authentic cognition of a real fact and which arises from the middle term (hetu). It is the middle term by which the major term is inferred to be true of the minor term (pakşa) Pakşa is the object in which we infer the existence of something. Sadhya is the object which we want to establish in the Paksa. Hetu is the reason for establishing a relation between the paksa and the sadhya. For instance, anumana leads to the knowledge of the hill having fire on the basis of the perception of the smoke on the hill."
A distinction has been made in Indian thought between svartha-anumana (inference for one-self) and pararthanumana (inference for others) In the pramāņa-mimamsa similar distinction has been made". pararthanumana is expressed in the form of syllogism. There are five members (avayava) in the Nyāya Syllogism. 1. Pratijna : Statement of what is to be proved.
Fire on the hill. 2. Hetu-reason : There is smoke. 3. Udaharaña - Example : Where-ever there is smoke,
there is fire E s. Kitchen.
92. Vinacke (L. E). The Psychology of Thinking (McGraw Hill 1952)
pp 57-59 93 Pramana-mimamsa 1, 2, 7 94. Kafghatgi (T G.): Some Problems in Jaina Psychology : pp. 111-124. 95 Pramaņa-mimartsa - 2,8 and its commentary.