Tattvasangraha 01

SR No.: 010566
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Embar Krishnamacharya
Publisher: Central Library
Publication Year: 1926
Total Pages: 832
Language: Hindi, Sanskrit
Classification: Book_Devnagari
File Size: 57 MB

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FOREWORD
OXI
should be either non-existent like the lotus of the sky or be eternal. There is no third alternative. If destruction belongs to the first kind then everything must be eternal because there is no destruction. If destruction is held to be eternal then it cannot remain along with any other objects. If there are no objects how can destruction exist? Uddyotakara.
3. Because some entities are eternal and others are non-eternal it does not necessarily follow that they should always produce some effect, for an entity is not that which has the power to produce an effect (Arthakriyakarita) but only that which has an inherent existence (Sattásamaváya). So they may exist even without producing an effect and be considered as entities.
4. Even if we consider the entities momentary, the effects cannot be produced by them, either one after another or at once. If the momentary entities are capable of producing effects themselves, there will be no necessity of assisting conditions. If they are not, then, how can the assisting conditions and the cause, all being momentary, produce the effect without helping each other and without producing some particular effect on one by the other? So things cannot be considered as momentary.
Bhadanta Yogasena.
5. The recognition of a thing can also establish the nonmomentariness of entities. The recognition is also valid because it is different from memory and other kinds of invalid knowledge, as it does not feel only the thing which was already known as is the case with memory. Kumarila.
6. The Vijñâna of entities such as the sun, moon, etc. feels only the things of that moment. But the entities are always existing. These cannot be momentary, because they are entities and objects of knowledge. Bhavivikta.
7. The series of Vijñanas in respect of a thing rising one after another in succession must be the reflections of one thing which is not momentary, because its oneness with the feelings is not afterwards proved invalid by other kinds of knowledge. Uddyotakara.
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