Satapatha Bramhana Part 05

SR No.: 007680
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Julius Eggeling
Publisher: Oxford
Publication Year: 1900
Total Pages: 2017
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 44 MB

Page 1719

II ADHYÂYA, 2 PÂDA, 27.
SIT
persisting things, not of mere attributes. We therefore conclude that the manifoldness of cognitions can result from the manifoldness of things only on the condition of the thing persisting at the time of cognition. --The Satras now set forth a further objection which applies to both schools.
26. And thus there would be accomplishment on the part of non-active people also. · Thus, i.e. on the theory of universal momentariness, origination from the non-existent, causeless cognition, and so on, it would follow that persons also not making any efforts may accomplish all their ends. It is a fact that the attainment of things desired and the warding off of things not desired is effected through effort, and so on. But if all existences momentarily perish, a previously existing thing, or special attributes of it, such as after-effects (through which Svarga and the like are effected) or knowledge (through which Release is effected) do not persist, and hence nothing whatever can be accomplished by effort. And as thus all effects would be accomplished without a cause, even perfectly inert men would accomplish all the ends to be reached in this and in the next life, including final release. - Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the aggregates: : 27. Not non-existence, on account of consciousness. . Here now come forward the Yogakaras, who hold that cognitions (ideas) only are real. There is no reasonable ground, they say, for the view that the manifoldness of ideas is due to the manifoldness of things, since ideas themselves--no less than the things assumed by others have their distinct forms, and hence are manifold. And this manifold nature of Ideas is sufficiently explained by sar called vâsana. Våsanâ means a flow of ideas (states of consciousness-pratyaya) of different character. We ob serve, e.g., that a cognition which has the form of a jar (i.e. the idea of a jar) gives rise to the cognition of the two halves of a jar, and is itself preceded and produced by the cognition of a jar, and this again by a similar cognition,
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