Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

SR No.: 007609
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1939
Total Pages: 887
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 84 MB

Page 756

EXAMINATION OF THE PERSON OF SUPER-NORMAL VISION'. 1481
two similar mental images at one and the same time.-Nor is there any hostility between Pleasure and Pain. Because Pleasure and Pain are of two kinds-subjective and objective those that are subjective are associated with Hatred and Apologetic Spirit, and hence stand on the same footing as Love and Hatred, and hence are the reverse of one another; they envisage the same form of the Soul, and have their source in the idea of the same 'Soul', and they bear to each other the relation of cause and effect; hence there can be no hostility between them.-As regards the objective Pleasure and Pain, they are not restricted to different causes; hence there can be no hostility between them. Because when Pleasure proceeds from a certain thing, Pain also proceeds from the same thing when one becomes too much addicted to it; hence their causes are not necessarily different. It is not so in the case of the ideas of the 'No-soul' and 'Soul'.-Further, in the case of Pleasure and Pain, they are of equal strength, because both proceed under the influence of their objective, not so between the Path' and the 'Defects'; of which latter the Path' is the stronger, because it envisages an accomplished fact; not so the Defects'. Then again, Pleasure and Pain do not continue for a long time not so the idea of No-soul'; because having become absorbed, it never ceases; as has been explained above. Hence there is no falsity in our Premiss.-As for the two not appearing at the same time, the reason for this has been already explained.
It has been argued that even for those who have cognised the doctrine of "No-soul' through Inference, Love and Hatred, eto. do appear.-But that is not right; because the idea of No-soul' consists of a mere Idea, clear and distinct, directly envisaging soul-less things, non-conceptual ; and as envisaging well-ascertained things, it is not mistaken ; it serves to uproot the idea of the Soul' and has, on that account, been described as
hostile' to it; and it does not consist of the pondering of what has been 'heard ' (learnt). Because the Impurities, which have become firmly rooted through repeated experience from time without beginning, go on being reduced gradually by the rise of their opposites, and hence come to be destroyed only gradually ; not by merely hearing of the teaching once; as there is destruction of cold by the mere touch of Fire. When too the idea of 'No-soul', consisting of the cogitation of what has been heard, appears before one, the whole lot of Love and the rest do not remain there at all ; in view of which our Premiss could be false. Because the Buddhists always set aside the presence of Love etc. by thinking of them as evil. It is for this reason that these people become recognised as having their greatness unbesmirched. The hostility too of the Idea of No-soul' towards love, etc. is affirmed for this same reason; because they become set aside as soon as the idea of 'No-soul' presents itself. When between two sets of things, one becomes set aside at the presence of the other,--then, on the rise of the latter to its very height, the former becomes absolutely and entirely destroyed; e.g. the Fire-flame on the appearance of the rise of water and the Defects are liable to destruction in the presence of the idea of No-soul'; hence when this idea reaches its height, how could the Defects continue to exist ?
Thus our Reason is not Inconclusive'. And because it is present whenever the Probandum is present, it is not contradictory ' either.-(3338)