Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

SR No.: 007609
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1939
Total Pages: 887
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 84 MB

Page 617

1342
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXV.
TEXT (2994). THE AUTHOR OF THE Bhāşya ALSO HAS SAID THE SAME THING BY THE · MENTION OF THE ATTACK OF HUNGER, ETC. ; HENCE IT IS THROUGH SHEER DELUSION THAT THE INFINITE REGRESS HAS
BEEN URGED.-(2994)
COMMENTARY. This shown that the Mināmsaka's proposition involves self-contradiction also. For instance, the Author of the Bhäsya (Shabara) has declared as follows (Sü. 1. 1. 5, p. 8) - When the Mind or the Senso-organ becomes beset with hunger, etc., or when the external object is beset with smallness, otc.,then the Cognition turns out to be wrong; when they are not so beset, the Cognition is right; because the contact of the Sense-organ-Mind--and object is the cause of Cognition; when this contact is not present, there can be no Cognition; hence any defect in the said contact bocomes the cause of wrong Cognition when the three factors are defective, the resultant Cognition is wrong; as is clear from the fact, that on the removal of the defect, the correct Cognition is secured. If it is asked- how can it be known that the cause is dofective ? , the answer is that, if, on careful scrutiny, no defect is discovered, then there being no ground for asserting that there is defoot, we conclude that the cause is free from defect.”
In this passage, the Author of the Bhäsya has clearly stated that the validity of the Cognition is ascertained from the recognition of the flawless. ness of the cause. If this were not meant, then what wonld be the sense of the phrase 'on careful scrutiny'?
Thus this goes against the assertion that tho validity of Cognitions is self-sufficient-(2994)
It has been asked by the Mimtīmsaka, under Text 2861 et seq.-"On what grounds have the Corroborative Cognition and the Cognition of perfection been held to be superior to the initial Cognition ? "
The answer to this, so far as the Corroborative Cognition is concerned, has been explained before ; now the Author provides the answer, in regard to the Cognition of perfection:
TEXT (2995). THE VALIDITY OF THE INITIAL COGNITION IS NOT RECOGNISED, BECAUSE OF THE SUSPICION THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY DEFECTIVE CAUSES. THIS IS THE POINT IN WHICH THE 'COGNITION OX PERFECTION' HAS BEEN
REGARDED AS superior.-(2995)
COMMENTARY. Mänata 'validity.
Adyasya of the Cognition of the object itself. It is called because it comes before the Cognition of the perfection of the cause.
initial'