Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

SR No.: 007609
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1939
Total Pages: 887
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 84 MB

Page 482

"THE REVEALED WORD."
1207
ETERNAL.HENCE THE CAPACITY OF THE JAR) TO CONTAIN THE WATER CANNOT BE DUE TO THE UNIVERSAL '.-EVEN IF THE JAR ETC. WERE DIFFERENT, THERE WOULD SURELY BE ALL THESE OBJECTIONS REGARDING THE CAPACITY'; AND THE EFFECTS OF THIS CAPACITY', IN THE SHAPE OF THE containing of water, ETC. WOULD THUS HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS ETERNAL.--(2636-2639)
COMMENTARY.
* Already discarded'-in course of the examination of the Universal.
The refutation of the Universal' is briefly set forth here also : The Universal is not, etc. etc.'-You, Mimāmsaka, do not hold the universal to be a quality of the material substances, -earth, water, etc.--like their dark colour, etc., -as something distinct from those substances. --Though it is held to be visible, it is never seen.
Nor can it be right to regard it as non-different from these ; as in that case the particular material thing also like the Jarwould have to be regarded as eternal, just like its Universal.
Even when it is regarded as different from these things, it becomes open to the objection that there can be no relationship between them. Between two different things, the only relation possible is the causal onethat the one should be produced by the other; so that if the Universal were regarded as produced by the Individual things, then the Universal would become non-eternal, on account of its liability to being produced, like the Jar.
In some places, the reading is 'nityata ', 'eternality', for'anityata ', non-eternality'; the meaning in that case is as follows:- If it is held that the Jar, etc. are produced from the Universal, then the Jar, etc. would have to regarded as eternal; that is, this cause being always there, the Jar, etc. would be there at all times.
If the Universal (or the Jar) be regarded as being of the nature of both, then it becomes open to the objections that relate to both ;--and it also leads to its being deprived of its one-ness; because one and the same thing cannot be of the nature of two things. So that the two would be two distinct entities, -and not one, of the nature of both. If the thing be held to be neither the one nor the other, then it ceases to be an entity. It has also to be pointed out that one and the same thing cannot be both positive and negative.
An these objections '-in the shape of (1) absence of relationship, (2) the contingency of being eternal and so forth.-There is the additional objection that the work of containing water, etc. also would have to be regarded as eternal.-(2636-2639)
the
It has been argued by the Mimamsaka, under Text 2262, that Connection is only a kind of Potency, etc. etc.".
The answer to this is as follows: