Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

SR No.: 007609
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1939
Total Pages: 887
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 84 MB

Page 433

1158
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XXIV.
of the Apprehension of that Sound. The Author now proceeds to show that the idea of the Cognition having the nature of the Cognition of the WordSound is untenable, unless there is some connection between them.
TEXTS (2507-2509).
WHAT IS THE RELATION BETWEEN THE COGNITION AND THE WORD
SOUND, ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THE COGNITION IS HELD TO BI OF THE NATURE OF THE APPREHENSION OF THAT Sound ?-THIS RELATION CANNOT BE THAT OF IDENTITY, BECAUSE THE TWO ARE CLEARLY DIFFERENT. NOR IS THE ONE PRODUCED FROM THE OTHER ; BECAUSE THE WORD-SOUND IS (ex hypothesi) NOT PRODUCED; AND IP IT WERE PRODUCED, THEN IT WOULD APPEAR AT ALL TIMES; AND HENCE THE COGNITION OF THAT SOUND WOULD EITHER BE PRODUCED AT ALL TIMES, OR IT WOULD NOT BE PRODUCED AT ALL SUCH BEING THE UNDESIRABLE STATE OF THINGS, THE ASSUMPTION OF THE EMBELLISHMENT OF THE AUDITORY ORGAN'IS ENTIRELY FUTILE.—(2507-2509)
COMMENTARY.
There are only two kinds of relationship among things--the relation of Identity and the relation of Cause and Effect; in no third form can any help be rendered; and there can be no relationship between things which do not render some help to one another; otherwise there would be incongruities.--Neither of these two relationships is possible between the WordSound and its Cognition, and in the absence of such a relationship, how could the Cognition be of the nature of the apprehension of the Word-Sound? If it did, there would be incongruities.
It might be urged that-"When the Cognition is produced, it is in the form of the Word Sound, and it is on the basis of this that the Cognition is held to be of the nature of the comprehension of the Sound, even though there is no relationship between the two ".
This cannot be right; because Cognition has been regarded as formless ; the Mimämsakas do not admit the view that Cognitions have forms.But even if it were as asserted, the view set forth cannot be right; as in that case, the Sound would have to be regarded as imperceptible. That is, under the view, Sound would be imperceptible, not perceptible; and hence there being no means of knowing it, the idea of its Cognition having the form of the Word-Sound would itself be an impossibility. It could not be known by the presence of its effect; because it is not regarded as productive of effects.