Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

SR No.: 007609
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1939
Total Pages: 887
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 84 MB

Page 177

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XXII.
together), they must be regarded as Material Cause and Effect; as in the case of the Lamp and the Light; there is such invariable concomitance between the Body and the subjective Consciousness hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things".
The Reason adduced here is 'inadmissible for one or the other party. Because in certain cases, where the Mind-essence is devoid of material form, Subjective Consciousness is present even though thero is no body.-Nor does the argument put forward quite prove what is meant to be proved; as on the same grounds Subjective Consciousness might be regarded as the Material Cause of the Body.
The Reason adduced is Inconclusive' also; as the said concomitance is possible even when the cause is different ; as between Fire and fluidity of (melted) Copper. For instance, it is only with Fire as the contributory cause, that Copper produces Fluidity, not otherwise ; similarly, in the case in ques. tion, the Fotus, which is the material cause of the Body, produces the next body, which is the contributory cause of Subjective Consciousness ; so that the concomitance between the Body and the Subjective Consciousness is not due to the one being the material cause of the other to this extent, the Reason adduced is 'Inconclusive', 'Doubtful'.
The following might be urged :-"Even though the Subjective Consciousness appearing subsequently proceeds from each proceeding Consciousness (cognition), yet that which appears for the first time must have proceeded from the Body; hence it cannot be regarded as beginningless ".
This is not right. There is no proof in support of such an assumptionas has been explained already.-It cannot be said that "there is no proof to the contrary either" ;--because there certainly is proof to the contrary. For instance, if the Mental Cognition (Subjective Consciousness) were once at the outset produced out of the Body and then subsequently came to be produced out of each preceding homogeneous Cognition, then for ever after wards it would be produced out of preceding homogeneous cognitions, and never out of heterogeneous cognitions produced through the Eye and other organs; when once the Smoke has been produced by Fire, it is never, later on, produced from anything not homogeneous to itself. As a matter of fact, Mental Oognition is not always found to be produced by Mental Cognitions only; it is found to be produced by any Cognition that happens to go immediately before it when one thing has been found to appear immediately after another thing, the former cannot be held to proceed from anything other than the latter; as in that case, it would have to be regarded as being without cause. As regards Mental Cognition, it is found to appear immediately after the visual and other cognitions ; hence it becomes established that it can follow from any Cognition without restriction.
Further, if it is only at the earlier stage that the Body is the material cause of the Mental Cognition,-and not at the later stages,-then why should it not proceed entirely independently of the Body? It is not right that it should depend upon the Body which does not help it in any way.-It might be urged—"In your case also, where one cognition is preceded and brought about by another cognition, why should not the Cognition proceed by itself