Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

Page 648

EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF
SENSE-PERCEPTION". 653
Universal and the rest do not exist at all, and hence the Perception appre. hending them cannot be conceptual:
TEXTS (1304-1305).
AS A MATTER OF FAOT, UNIVERSAL AND THE REST DO NOT EXIST, EITHER AS NON-DIFFERENT, OR AS DIFFERENT, FROM (INDIVIDUALS),-BY VIRTUE OF WHICH THE CONCEPTUAL COGNITION OF THOSE COULD HAVE THE CHARACTER OF PERCEPTION'.- (a) (THEY CANNOT BE THE SAME AS THE INDIVIDUALS] BECAUSE THERE IS NO COMPREHENSIVENESS. (b) NOR CAN THEY BE DIFFERENT FROM THE INDIVIDUALS] BECAUSE THEY DO NOT APPEAR AS DIFFER. ENT FROM THE INDIVIDUAL.-(c) [NOR OAN THEY BE BOTH DIFFERENT AND NON-DIFFERENT] BECAUSE Difference and non-difference ALWAYS REMAIN MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE. (1304-1305)
COMMENTARY.
The Universal and the rest (if they existed) could be either (a) nondifferent from the Individuals,-or (b) different from them,-or (c) both, different and non-different.
(1) The first alternative cannot be right; because there is no comprehensiveness ; i.e. there is absence or negation of pervasion ; that form is called
Universal which pervades over several things; there is no such pervasion' among individuals, whereby they themselves could become the Universal': if there were such pervasion, the entire universe would come to be of the same form; so that there could be no Universal at all; as the Universal must subsist in several things.
(2) Nor is the second alternative possible (i.e. the Universal, etc. cannot be different from the Individuals]; because they do not appear as different from the Individuals';-the term bhedalt stands for Individuals and what does not appear cannot be perceived. This has been thus declared * Individuals do not pervade over one another; there is no other pervasive entity; how then can anything be different from Cognition !!
(3) Nor is the third alternative possible; because the two views of difference and non-difference are mutually exclusive that is to say, when two things are mutually exclusive, the negation of one must mean the affirmation of the other; and difference and non-difference are so mutually exclusive, because the nature of one is such that it must proclude the nature of the other. Hence there can be no third alternative (in addition to difference and non-difference),—(1304-1305)