Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

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602
TATTVASANGRAHA! CHAPTER XVI.
TEXTS (1179-1180)
THE STATEMENT THAT," RATHER THAN ASSUME THE EXCLUDED THING IT IS TÁR BETTER TO ASSUME THE THING ITSELT", IS SELF-CONTRADICTORY; AS IN EVERY CASE THERE IS EXCLUSION OF SOME OTHER THING' THAT THING ALONE IS ASSUMED WHICH IS MEANT TO BE SPOKEN OX; HENCE THERE IS IMPLICATION OF THAT WHICH IS MEANT TO BE SPOKEN OP; BUT ALL THINGS ARE NOT
MEANT TO BE SPOKEN OF.-(1179-1180)
COMMENTARY.
Thing itself, etc. etc. It is an Entity, not not a non-entity-meant to be spoken of, which is assumed by las, on the basis of actual cognition, to be
denoted by the word; hence when that is apprehended, there is, through Implication, the Exclusion of what is not meant to be spoken of ; so that our explanation of the word and its denotation does not fail to apply in any cuse.
In fact, it is in reference exactly to those cases where doubts are likely to arise in the mind of the dall-witted person that our Teacher has made the following statement :-Having assumed the non-cognisable, through the exclusion of that, we have the inference of the cognisable':-(1179.1180)
It has been argued (under Text 980, by Kumārila) that-" Inasmuch as the idealistic form of things has been denied, nothing internal (purely sub. jective) can be denoted by words".
The answer to that is as follows:
TEXTS (1181-1183).
AS FOE THE DENIAL OF THE Idealistic form of things, SUCH DENTAL IS
IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE THE FACT IS SELF-EVIDENT; AS AOTUALLY THERE ARE SEVERAL IMPOSITIONS WITHOUT ANY BASIC REALITY.IT HAS TO BE ADMITTED THAT THERE MUST BE SOMETHING IN THE IDEA (OR COONITION) ITSELF WHICH APPERTAINS SPECIFICALLY TO EACH OBJECT ENVISAGED BY IT, AND THAT IS PRECISELY ITS
NATURE':-AND THIS SAME NATURE OF THE IDEA HAS BEEN SPOKEN OF BY US AS 'FORM', REFLECTED IMAGE, APPEARANCE'
FIGURING, MANIFESTATION'. SO THAT THERE IS ONLY A DIFFERENCE IN THE NAME, WITHOUT ANY REAL DIFFERENCE.-(1181-1183)
COMMENTARY
Impossible-to make.
Question :-"In what way is the fact of the Thing being of the form of the Idea (cognition) self-evident ? "