Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VIII
in it, the condition being inherent (subsisting) in the Permanent Thing”,This cannot be right; this is shown in the Text with the words - Then alao, etc. Or not 80 ;-the construction being—'it is held to be inherent without being helpful. Under the first alternative, the help rendered being non-different from the Thing helped, it would come to be the same relation which has been spoken of above all that of being produced from it; and this has been just rejected.-(404-405)
If the second alternativo is accepted, then there being no distinction, everything would be inherent in everything. This is what is explained in the following
TEXT (406)
IN CASH THE INHERENT' BE NOT SOMETHING HELPFUL TO THAT WHEREIN IT INHERES, THEN ALL Tangs WOULD BE EQUALLY INHERENT, AS THERE COULD BE NOTHING TO DIFFEREN
TIATE ONE FROM THE OTHER.-(406)
COMMENTARY.
Equally', -because, in the matter of joing not helpful, it could not be differentiated from the thing that is meant by the opponent (to be infierent). -(406)
The Author next takes up the views that both (the Permanent Thing and the Conditions) are both different and non-different :
TEXT (407).
EACH OF THE TWO ALTERNATIVES—THAT THE TWO ARE Different and non-different-HAVING THUS BEEN SEVERALLY REJECTED,
THE IDEA THAT THE CONDITION IS BOTH (DIFFERENT AND NON-DIFFERENT) ALSO BECOMES DISCARD
BD.-(407)
COMMENTARY.
The rejection of each of the two alternatives naturally implies the rejection of both alternatives; as the two alternatives together do not differ from the two alternatives treated severally-Further (between two contradictories), the acceptance or rejection of one must imply the rejection or acceptance, respectively, of the other; hence it cannot be right to regard the existing thing as being both different and non-different (from the Conditions); as the same thing cannot be both affirmed and denied at the same time; otherwise it would cease to be one.-(407)
The following Text shows that this has already been explained before, in course of the examination of the doctrine of the Pudgala' (section F, chapter VII) and the rest.