Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

Page 116

THE DOCTRINE OF WORD-SOUND".
121
TEXT (133).
THE IDENTITY (OF SOUND) WITH BLUE AND OTHER THINGS BEING not figurative (BUT REAL),-WHY SHOULD NOT THERE BE COGNITIOX Op Sounil AT THE TIME THAT THE Blue AND OTHER
THINGS ARE COGNISED -(133)
COMMENTARY.
Identity of Blue, etc.- i.e. with Sounul.
At the time that the Blue and other things are cogmised that is, under the circumstances when Blue, ete. are cognised ;-why should not there be cognition of Sound -that is to say, Sound also fulfilling all the conditions of perceptibility, it is only right that there should be perception of it, just as there is of Blue and other things, -(133)
TEXT (134).
IF THERE WERE NO COGNITION OF IT (SOUND), THEN THERE SHOULD BE NONE OF THE BLUE AND OTHER THINGS ALSO; BECAUSE BOTH ARE OF THE SAME ESSENCE. IN CASE THEY HAD DIFFERENT PROPERTIES, THERE WOULD BE ABSOLUTE DIFTERENCE
BETWEEN THEM.-(134)
COMMENTARY.
If you do not admit of the Cognition of Sound (at the time of the cognition of the Blue, etc.) then there would be the absurdity of there being no cognition of the Blue, etc. also, just as there is none of Sound :--because both are of the same essence ;-that is, Blue and the rest are of the same nature as Sound. Otherwise, if the Blue, etc. be held to have properties different from those of Sound, it would have to be admitted that the two are absolutely and entirely different. -(134)
The following Text explains why it would be so :
TEXT (135).
WHAT INDICATES DIFFERENCE AMONG A NUMBER OF THINGS IS THE PRESENCE OF INCOMPATIBLE PROPERTIES; OTHERWISE, NO DIFFERENCE COULD EVEN BE ASSUMED AMONG DIVERSE
INDIVIDUALS,-(135)
COMMENTARY It cannot be right for any one object to be perceived and not perceived at the same time and by the same person ; if it were, then, the object would cease to be one. Otherwise, if, even in the presence of incompatible properties,