Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

Page 107

112
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER IV.
and time. It is olearly recognised therefore that they are dependent upon these latter, from the fact that they avoid certain places and times and appear only at special places and at special times.-(115.116)
Question—"The things in question (by their insentience) cannot have any wish; how then can they have any need for (dependence upon) the causal conditions ?"
The Answer is given in the following Text:
TEXT (117).
WHAT IS MEANT BY THEIR BEING DEPENDENT' IS THAT THEY COMIC
INTO EXISTENCE IN THAT MANNER; SO THAT IT IS THE CHARACTER OF EFFECT THAT IS SPOKEN OF AS 'DEPENDENCE! THAT THINGS COME INTO EXISTENCE IN THAT MANNER IS A PERCEPTIBLE FACT; HENCE THE SAID CAUSES
BECOME DULY ESTABLISHED.-(117)
COMMENTARY.
What is meant by the Things being so dependent' is that they come into existence at particular places and times and not at others; it does not mean that they have any 'wish' or desire'.
Objection :- "If such is their dependence on the particular points of time and place,-even so, how does it follow that they are effects of these?"
Answer: It is the character of Effect that is spolcen of as dependence',The character of the Effect is not anything else except the dependence involved in the fact that they come into existence in that particular manner.
Question :-"How is it known that they come into existence in that particular manner?"
Answer: — It is a perceptible fact. (117)
TEXT (118).
THUS THE DOCTRINE OF THE THING BY ITSELT IS DISCARDED BY PERCEPTION; SPECIALLY AS THE EXACT NATURE OF THE CAUSE' OF THINGS IS DULY ASCERTAINED THROUGH PERCEPTION
AND NON-APPREHENSION.-(118)
COMMENTARY.
Tat-Therefore, thus-or the whole expression Tatevābhāvikavādah' may be taken as a compound, meaning 'The doctrine of the Thing by Ilself in regard to the Lotus and other things' is discarded by Perception; Perception alone is mentioned here, as the non-apprehension' also of a