Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

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Epistemology of Jainas
The above mentioned systems have coined different terms to suit their conceptions of the two cognitions. The main terms are as given below:
1. Vedānta and Jainism - Nirākāra sākāra 2. Buddhism
Nirvikalpaka savikalpaka 3. Nyāya
Nisprakāra saprakāra
If we take up nirākāra and sākāra as the general terms, the above views can be summed up as follows:
1. Nirākāra has generality as its object while sākāra has particularity (Vedānta).
2. Nirākāra is particular while sākāra is general. The position is totally reversed (Buddhism).
3. Nirākāra has both, general and particular, as its object but without any relation (Pārthasārathi Misra).
4. Nirākāra means cognition of an object without any quality (Sãônkhya).
5. Nirākāra means cogpition of both, the object as well as its property, without relation (Nyāya).
6. Ākāra means class. Nirākāra means the cognition of individual without associating it with a class (Kumārila).
7. Nirākāra means absence of name (old Nyāya). Darśana in the Jaina Epistemology
The Paạnavaņā sutta divides upayoga into sākāra (articulate) and nirākāre ( inarticulate ) cognitions. The sākāra is known as jñāna while nirākāra as darśana. Darsana is devoid of judgment (vyavasāya). In the logical period it is not included into the category of pramāņa. As a matter of fact it is neither pramāņa nor apramāpa. The terms applied to valid and invalid judgments respectively. Darsana is mere awareness without any predication.
Regarding the actual nature of darśana the Jaina scholars