Concept of Matter in Jaina Philosophy

SR No.: 001663
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: J C Sikdar
Publisher: P V Research Institute Varanasi
Publication Year: 1987
Total Pages: 412
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Physics
File Size: 23 MB

Page 376

Conclusion
341
the Ethics that there can be only one substance which is causa sui, and that this single substance must be identified with the universe conceived as a whole, this unique all-inclusive totality he therefore calls God or Nature (Deus sive Natura )."1
Spinoza has so strictly defined substance that "nothing whose attributes are the effects of outside causes can be called a substance; a substance by definition is such that all its attributes or modifications, can be explained in terms of its own nature and are therefore necessary and not contingent."2
some way
According to Spinoza, "There can be only one substance so defined, and nothing can exist independently of or distinct from, this single substance; every thing which exists must be conceived as an attribute or modification of or as in inherent in, this single substance; this substance is therefore to be identified with Nature Conceived as a whole or as the totality of things. This substance must be infinite in its nature "...it possesses an infinite number of attributes each of which is itself infinite."3
The Jaina Concept of a single Dravya is a unique allinclusive totality like the single substance of Spinoza, identified with the universe conceived as a whole. That which has gunas (qualities) and paryayas (modifications) is a Dravya (Substance). Dravya is the inherent essence of all things, manifesting itself in and through infinite modifications, and it is endowed with qualities and it reveals permanence and change inherent in it to be real. And Dravya is endowed with its unchanging nature of existence.6 It possesses an infi
1. Spinoza, Stuart Hamsphire, A Pelican Book, p. 36.
2. Ibid., p. 38.
3. Ibid., pp. 38-39.
4. TS., ch. V. 37, p. 427.
5. PS., 8.
6. Pravacanasara, Pt. II, 3, p. 123.