Jaina Philosophy and Religion

SR No.: 001604
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nyayavijay
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology
Publication Year: 1998
Total Pages: 500
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Epistemology
File Size: 12 MB

Page 377

Jaina Logic
349
(1) From a certain point of view, or in a certain sense, a thing is certainly
existent. (2) From a certain point of view, or in a certain sense, it is certainly non
existent. 3) From a certain point of view, or in a certain sense, it is certainly
existent and from another point of view, it is certainly non-existent. (4) From a certain point of view, it is certainly inexpressible. 5) From a certain point of view, it is certainly existent and from another
point of view it is certainly inexpressible. (6) From a certain point of view, it is certainly non-existent and from
another point of view it is certainly inexpressible. (7) From a certain point of view, it is certainly existent, from another
point of view it is certainly non-existent, and from a third point of view it is inexpressible.
Now let us explain these seven modes.
First mode: The first mode is represented by the proposition, “From a certain standpoint a thing is certainly existent". Here, it is shown as to what a thing is. It is shown as follows. The thing is certainly existent, but from a certain standpoint. That is, it is certainly existent from the standpoint of its own substance, space, time and quality (or state). In this mode, the existence of any entity is affirmed from the standpoint of its own intrinsic characters. The existence predicated of a thing is not absolute but relative.
Second mode: The second mode is represented by the proposition, “From a certain standpoint a thing is certainly non-existent." In this mode, it is shown as to what a thing is not. It is shown as follows. The thing is certainly non-existent, but from a certain standpoint. That is, it is certainly non-existent from the standpoint of substance, place, time, quality (or state) of another thing. Here the non-existence of a thing is asserted from the standpoint of alien characters. The non-existence predicated of a thing is not absolute, unrestricted and unconditional, but relative, restricted and conditional.
If a thing were not to exist from the standpoint of its own substance, etc., it would be essenceless, mere void. And if it were not to non-exist from the standpoint of alien substance, etc., there would be confusion of things. For if a pot were not to non-exist as a piece of cloth, the pot would become the piece of cloth. That is, in that case anything would