Tattva Kaumudi

Author(s): Oriental Book Agency Poona
Publisher: Oriental Book Agency Poona
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/010561/1

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[ All rights reserved by the Publisher ] AwameoAnn Lerown. awar --comoaranno MW Text Printed by:- M. 8. Sathe, at the Prajna Press, Wai. AND Publishod by:- Dr. R. N. Sardesai for the Oriental Book Agency, 15 Shukrawar, Poons (India ) a erwerrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr -concurrerrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrreramerierweer me

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LIST OF CONTENTS Pages ... 47-49 Introduction List of Abbreviations Karika I 1 Benediction . 2 Introduction to Karika 1 ... 3 Necessity of Scientific Enquiry 4 Threefold Division of Pain... 5 Objection- loquiry Superfluous i 6 Reply i7 Auspiciousness of the beginning word... Kariki II ! 8 Objection-Adequacy of Vedic means 19 Similarity of the Vedic with the Obvious means ... 10 Impurity, Decay and Excessiveness of the Vedic means 11 The Impurity of animal slaughter in Sacrifice ... 12 Nonpermanence and Excess of the results of Vedic rites 13 Immortality from Vedic rites means long durability 14 Discriminative wisdom the only means 15 Literal interpretation of the Karika 16 Source of discriminative Knowledge ... Karika III 17 Fourfold Division of Categories 18 The Productive (1) ... 19 The Productive product (2) 20 The Products (3) 21 The non-produci-non-productive (4) Kirika IV 22 The three kinds of Proof ... 23 Proof defined... ... ... 24 The three-foldness of proof 25 Only three kinds of proof ... 26 The inclusion of all other proofs in the above-mentioned 27 Noconuty of enquiry into the different kinds of proof. 28 The order of Explanation ... Kirika v 29 Specifio definitions of be proofs 30 * Perception" defined

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(ii) .. . 31 laseatience of Buddhi .. 32 Differentiation of "Perception" from the other forms of proof 33 Final definition of perception 34 Inference, a distinct proof 35 taference defined 36 The three kinds of Inference 37 The first Division of laference .. . 38 The Negative a posteriori-Inforence 39 The Affirmative priori. loforonco 40 Definition of Valid Assertion 41 Self-evidence of Valid Assertion 42 Reliability of Kapila ... 43 Pseudo-Revelations - ... 44 Differentiation of Valid Assertion from Inferenco 45 Other kinds of proof set aside or included in above 46 "Analogy included in Valid Assertion ... 47 "Presumptioo included in Inference 48 * Absence" included in" Perception" 49 * Probability" in Inference Rumour discarded Karika VI 51 The Sphere of the Means of Cognition Knowledge of Nature &c., through lnference 53 Knowledge of others by Revelation ... Karika VII 54 Objection--Nature &c. being not amenable to the senses, are non existing . ... Different causes of pon-perception of objects by the Senses $7 Non-perception of an object, no proof of non-existence Karika VIII $8 Objection existence of Nature can be denied like that of sky. ! .. flowers-otated, and set aside : there are effects bearing .. testimony to the existence of Nature '59 Such effects mentioned ... - ... Karika Ix' 60 Differebit views with regard to the nature of an effect Impossibility of the existence of Nature being proved in accordance with the Vedanta and Bauddha tenets 62 Effect declared to be a permanent Entity . ... ... 28

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hiii) que, . 63 Bauddha viow refuted more on 64 Vedlnta view refuted in . ya ya and Vaisesika views criticised and the Sarnkhya view ostablished; the first argument in favour thoroof. 66 The second argument in favour of the effect being an entity... 67 The third argument 68 The fourth argument -69 The fifth argument ... *** 70 Proofs of the non-difference of cause of effect ... 71 The offect only a particular development of the cause 72 Objection based on the nature of the manifestation of the effect ... 73 Objection set aside as being common to both thoories 94 Production of the cloth not identical with the cloth ... 75 Nocossity of Sausal operation 76 Conclusion of the Karika . . Karika X 77 latroduction to the consideration of the Manifest 78 The Manifested as having a cause ... being non-eternal ... .. non pervading ... .. active multi-form component .. soluble .. conjunct .. dependent .87 The contrary nature of the Unmanifest Kurika XI 88 latroduction to Karika Xl ... .89 Similaritios bot woon the Manifest and the Unmanifest! ...(i) with the three attributes 90 (ii) undistinguishable ... # Qbjection based on the Bauddha idealism 92 fi) losostioni ... . 33 .fiv) Productive ... ... ... ... 4 Similarity with Nature stated ... Dissimilarity.of these bronn Spirit ... * Otajoction based on similarity of the Spirit with the Manitost... 1

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. Kariki . XII y latroduction to the consideration of the Attributes 98 Construction of the Karika 99 Character of the Attributes as pleasure, pain, delusion 160 The functions of the Attributes ... The method of operation of the attributes - Karika XIII Introduction to Karika XIII 103 Properties of "Goodness" 104 Nocessity of the properties of " Foulness" 105 Necessity of the properties of "Darkness" 06 Objection based on the impossibility of the co-operation of Attributes of contradictory properties 107 Necessity of postulating the three Attributes ... Karika XIV 108 Question of the Indiscreetness and other properties of the Attributes .. 109 Proof of the existence of such properties 110 Question of the Existence of Nature ... Karika XV 111 Why not except the atomic theory ? ... 112 Proofs of Nature's Existence-(1) initial Separation and final ' reunion of cause and effect (21-Because Evolution is due to Energy Objection: These two reasons might rest with Buddhi, * Reply: (9) from Finitenoss '.. Because of homogeneity Karika XVI 116 Oporation through the Attributes ... 117. By a blending of the Attributes ... 118 Objection: How can an attribute of uniform natuke produce in diverso effects? Reply ... Karika XVIII 119 Introduction to the Proofs of Spirit', Exibtonce ... 120 Proofs (1)-Bocause all compound objects are for other's . purpose ... 1. Objection: and reply 19 (2) Because sbore must be superintendenco: ... 123 (3) Boonuse there must be ono to fpol... : *

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... 124 A different interpretation of proof (3) 125 (4) Because of the tendency of writers and sages low * Beatitudo ... Kiriki XVIII 126 Question of the number of the Spirit raised 127 (1) From allotment of birth, death and the organs 128 (2) Since Activity is not Simultaneous 129 (3) Because the modification of the Attributos are different... Karika XIX 130 Introduction to the consideration of Spirit's Properties 131 Explanation of the force of "this" in the Karika... 132 Necessity of so many properties ... 133 Absence of the attributes leads to Emancipation... 134 Neutrality .... ... " Karika XX 135 Objection--Intelligence and Activity always coexistent e... 136 The foeling referred to by the objection must be a mistako ... Kariki XXI 137 Objection-what is the need of union ? 138 Force of the Gonotivo in "Pradhanasya" Explained 139 The need of union explained 140 The creation of Buddhi &c. Karika XXII 141 The Process of Creation ... 142 Process of the production of the Elements Karika XXIII 143 latroduction to the definition of Buddhi 144 Definition of Buddhi explained ... 145 Properties of Buddhi-Virtue &c. 146 Four kinds of Dispassion ... 147 Eight kinds of Power 148 Rovorno of the above qualities Kirika XIV 149 Definition of Ahankara ... 150 Produoto of Ahamkara ... Kirikt XV 151 Production of Senses ... ... 152 Objection : Purponelessness of Pamions; and Reply thereto .

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vi) 444 ... .. Kirik. XXVI 153 Sense defined - ". .. . ... Kariki XXVII S4 Double nature of mind - 5 Mind defined in 15,6 Qbjection : Why make mind a sense l-and Reply thereto... 7 Whence the multifarious effects from Egoism ? ... 3 Multifariousness also a modification of the Attributes * Kariki XXVIII 159 Functions of the ten sense organs Kanka XXIX 160 Reflection of Manas, Self-consciousness of Abankare and Determination of Buddhi 161 The five vital Airs common to all ... 1 Karika XXX 162 Function of the organs-a(1) Instantancous 163 (2) Gradual:.... 164, With regard to visible objects function of the intornal organs ... independent of the external ones ... Kiriki XXXI 165 Objection : Functions permanent or otherwise? ... 166 No collision of the functions of the organs ... 67 Objection: How can insentient organs comprebend aach othor's motives?-Roply thereto ... Karika XXXII hern Division of the organs introduced .. 9 The thirtocn.organs and their fungsions o Objects of these functigns... .. Kirika XXXIII 171 Sub-division of the organs introduced 172 The three laternal organs ... * * 173 The tea external organs ... 174 External orgaas operating at the present time. ' * internal at all Times ... 73 Time not. distinct principlo

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... . Kirika XXW 676 Objects of axternal organs introduced... 17 Specific and gross objects of the functions of intellectual ... organs explained 178 Do. do. organs of action Karika XXXV 179 The importance of the internal organs Karika XXXVI 180 Predominence of Buddhi ... *81 The external organs as modifications of Attributes Karika XXXVII 182 Purther grounds for the Superiority of Buddhi 83 Cbjection: absence of Mukti-Reply thereto Karika XXXVIII 184 The Subtile character of the Tanmatras 185 The gross Elements produced out of the Termatroa 186 These are Specific because soothing, terrific and doluding Karika XXXIX 187 Three sorts of Specific Objects ... 188 Subtile bodies are permanent . Karka XL 189 Subtle body unconfined and permanent 190 Objection: Two bodies unnecessary,--and reply 191 Question: How does the Subtle Body migrate ? Raply. 192 Subtle Body Dissolving at cach Pralaya .. Karika XLI 193 Existence of the Subtlo. Body proved ... Karika XLII 194 Reason and manner of the migration of the Subtle Body, 195 Power of the Subtle Body due to Nature Karika XLIII 196 karidental and Essential Dispositions ... 197 filosh, blood. &c., related to the gross body Kiriki XLW 198 Consequences of the various means introduced i 199 Virtue leads to higher planos and vice to lower ... 200 From tho rovono, the reverse-the-throcfold bomber

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(vii) 102 102 102 ... ... 103 103 104 ... 104 104 104 105 105 105 Kiriki XLV 203 Absorption into Prakrti from Dispansion 202 Transmigration from Passionate attachment 203 Nan-impediment from Power Karika XLVI 204 Error. Disability. Contentment and Perfection 205 Fifty Sub-divisions of do do Karika LXVII 206 The Fifty forms of Error ... Karika XLVIII 207 The Sub.divisions of Error Sc. introduced 208 Eight forms of Ignorance ... 209 Eight forms of Delusion ... 210 Tea forms of Extra Delusion 211 Eighteen forms of Gloom ... 212 Eighteen forms of Utter Darkness 213 The total coming to sixty-two Kirika XLIX 214 The twenty-eight forms of Disability ... 215 Etoven forms of disability, those of the sense organs 216 The sevonteen forms of disability of Buddhi Karika L 217 Nine forms of Contentment 218 Pour forms of internal Contentment 219 (1) Ambha 220 (2) Salila 221 (3) Ogha .. 222 (4) Vrati 223 Five forms of external Contentment 224 (1) Para 225 (2) Supora ... 226 (3) Parapara ... 221 (4) Aauttamambha 22 (5) Uttamambha Kiriki LI 229 Forms of Power introduced 200 The eight forms of Power ... 231. (!) Tiram Study, . 105 106 106 ... ... 106 107 107 107 108 108 108 109 109 109 109 110 110

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(ix) .. 111 - 113 114 T15 ... 32 (2) Sutara.Word 33 (3) Taratare Reasoning ... 234 (4) Ramyuka-Acquisition of Friends 111 235 (5) Sadamudita-Purity .. 111 236 The three consequent on the suppression of three kinds of pain 237 The first five forms otherwise explained 112 238 Error &c., arc hooks to the Powers ... 112 Kirika LII 239 Nocessity of twofold creation 240 Proofs of the above ... ... 113 ... 241 Objection of seciprocality set aside . . 114 Karika LIII 242 Porms of the Elemental Creation introduced 243 The eight Divine sorts ... ... 115 14 Five of the Lower Animals ... 115 .45 Mankind single... Karika LIV 246 Threefoldness of the material Evelution introduced 247 Six Heavenly Regions .. ... Karika LV 248 Evolution productive of pain ... 116 249 Imposition of pleasure and pain on Spirit 250 - Do. due to Spirit's non-discrimination .. Kurika LVI 251 Question of the Maker of the Universe introduced 252 Creation due to Nature ... ... 118 253 Creation for another's (Spirit's) sake ... ... 118 Kirika LVII 254 Objection-incapacity of insentient Nature of croation 255 Reply-instance of the flow of milk ... 256 View of a personal God overthrown ... 257 Freedom of the Samkhya theory from faults 120 Kiriki LVIII 258 "How for Spirit's purpose ?" Explained Karika LIX 259 "Whence the cossation of the operations of Nature . ..Explained. . ... ... ... ... .. . 121 - ( 117 117 od 117 119 119 119 - 120

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"uola 125 125 ... 126 ... 126 ...Karika LX Nature aote for no compensation".... Kiriki LXI No reappearance of Nature with regard to an emancipated Spirit Karika LXII 262 Objection : "emancipation and bondage not possible to uomodifying Spirit ... Reply: "Na Spirit is bound, nor migrates &c."... .. Karika LXIII 264 "Nature biods herself by seven forms &c." - Kiriki LXIV 265 "Truth" explained ... ... 266 The purity of wisdom explained 267 Objection based on the eternal tendency to false knowledge 268 The form of discriminative knowledge 269 - Completion of the knowledge ... . Karika LXV 270 Cause of the cessation of Nature's operation ... Kirika LXVI 271 Objection " though one sot of objocis has been enjoyed. ... others remain to be enjoyed" ... 272 Reply: " The Spirit having attainod to wisdom, there is no motive to further action .. Kariki LXVII 273 Objection: The body dissolving on the attainment of wisdom, "how could the bodilese Spirit behold Nature? ... 274 Body continues in obedience to the momentum imparted previous Karma ... Kiriki LXVIII 275 Final release of the Spirit ... ... Kariki LXIX 26 The procedence of Kapila ... ... Kuriki LXX 277 Importance of the Samkhya doctrin.... Kariki LXXI 278 Arya" explained .. Karika LXXII * 279 The Treatise is a whole, not a part ... 128 129 130 131 132 132

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INTRODUCTION 1. The Origin of Philosophical Enquiry In this world, the end of all activity is happiness. No. body even in his imagination likes to suffer pain even for a moment. Even those who commit suicide do so only when they are sorely disgusted with the pains inherent in Samsara. Truly has it been said by our elders, "Every one desists from pain ; every one desires happiness." But what happi. ness is cannot be very well explained by those who lack philosophical insight. The enjoyment of sense-objects which people resort to as 'pleasure' day and night and for which they put forth their utmost effort is considered by philosophers as entirely undesirable, mixed as it is always with pain. So the wise leave all worldly enjoyments even as one does honey mixed with poison and seek the highest end of human existence which alone leads to final and absolute happiness; and after they have attained it for themselves, they are moved with pity for the*creatures quivering in the well of miseries and for their good they apply themselves to the propagation of the truth attained. Thus do the wise explain the Origin of Philosophical Enquiry. II. The Significance of Samkhya Philosophy Of all the philosophical systems, Samkhya has been considered by all to be the most ancient. Nobody can gains say the fact that this occupies a prominent place in all the Sastras, since this is either supported or controverted by every philosophical system. Therefore, the importance of this S'astra is recognised by all the systems. S'ankaracarya. sayga" The doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vodanta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits the non

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sutras, such as Devala, and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the pradhana doctrine." (S. B. E.. XXXIV, p. 289). So also in the Mahabharata we read"There is no knowledge like that of Samkhya, no power like that of Yoga. You should have no doubt as to Sam. khya being the highest knowledge." (S'anti. 316, 2). Though the use of the word Simkhya is found first of all in the s'vet. Up.---TEATTUI Farmari etc., ( VI, 13), yet Samkhya reflections are found even in the Rgveda and the other Upanisads. This proves the antiquity of this S'astra. This will be made clear in detail further on. Simkhya is derived from the word samkhya. The word sankhya is used in the sense of thinking and counting. Cf. " pealt pean faarron" (Amara I. V. 3) Thinking may be with reference to basic principles or knowledge of Self. Counting refers to the twenty-four principles and as'akti, atusti, etc. The double implication of the word has been set forth by Vijnanabhiksu in his preface to Samkhya-pravacanabhasya, by a quotation from the Mbh - "saMkhyA prakurvate caiva prakRti ca pracakSate / tatvAni ca caturvizatena sAMkhyaM prkiirtitm||" So, Sankhya means knowledge of Self through right discrimination. Garbe is of opinion that the word Samkhya was originally used in the sense of counting, and it was then applied to the system of Kapila which enumerates the 25 principles. (For details and the opinion of Jacobi, sce S. P., p. 189. 2n and pp. 190-191). Jayacandra S'arma says with regard to Simkhya in Sanskrta-Candrika, a magazine which becamo defunct long ago, that the Samkhya is lawny, with doop-brown faco, and has a big bolly. He has a rosary in his hand and a staff, and keeps long nails and hair. (Adi. purana quoted. VII of 1821 S'aka, Vol. 1 and 2, p. 8). Really

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INTRODUCTION speaking, since the word Kapila stands both for a particular colour and for the founder of Samkhya Philosophy, therefore, owing to the similarity of word the writer of the Purana has indulged in conjectures of his own. It appears that the writer of the Purana at the time of writing happened to see some sage with tawny face and corpulent body and was led 10 describe his form and colour. Some scholars, seeing the rejection of Isvara in the Samkhya-system, have maintained that it is vedaviruddha, or opposed to S'ruti (S. S, p. 21 f.; S.P., 13 ff.). S'ankaracarya also, seeing that Samkhya is opposed to advaita, avers that Samkhya is not rooted in the S'rutis. "Although there are many Smstis treating of the soul. we have singled out for refutation the Samkhya and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest end of man and have found favour with many competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic p1ssage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by Samkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters' (s've. Up. VI, 13). ........., we refute by the remark that the highest beatitude is not to be attained by the knowledge of Samkhya Smrti irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice. (S. B. E, XXXIV, pp. 297-8). In deciding also the vaidika or the non-vaidika character of Samkhya, the great S'ankara says--"The scriptural passage which the purvapaksin bas quoted as proving the eminence of Kapila's knowledge would not justify us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i. c., of some Kapila ) as are contrary to scriptures, for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila (without spoci. fying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition with another Kapila, vie., the one who burned the sohs of Sagara and had the surname of Vasudova." (S BE, XKKIV. a 294).

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI Sudanly others have also maintained the opposition of Selling to Sruti. Truly speaking. Samkhya could be divided whto twomone ses' vara, the other niris'vara. Lot the theists 'not take the niris'vara-Sarkhya, propounded in the Karka, etc., as rooted in Sruti, but who can take excep tion to the paidika character of the ses'vara-Sankhya 48 propounded in the Upanisads, the Mahabharata and the Pltravas For instance, we come accross 'yatha-s'rutini. Hartana as a synonym of Samkhya in -- etAni nava sargANi tatvAni ca narAdhipa / caturvizatirukkAni yathAzrutinidarzanAt // (Mbh., S'anti, 310, 25 ) In the 313th chapter of S'antiparvan, in the section wascribing the intrinsic, extrinsic and super-natural aspects of the oibhutis of Prakrti many synonyms of the upholders of Sarkhya are met with; e. g. Atquifpania: (v. 1) meri. ta:, (2) gogara, (3) diceraria:, (4) gimaria:, (5) Turg roa:, 1 6,7,8 and 9 ) Tragalantet:, (10) gerarfare Mehmetafa: (12) quraraisia:, (13). Here the word *Yahas rutinidars'inah' being repeated four times esta. blishes the vaidika character of theistic Samkhya. Moreover, evtrithe atheistic Samkhya is vaidika in character, inasmuch as the traditional categories have been borrowed from Usparticads, etc. (Jacobi takes the atheistic Samkhya as older, entirely believes that there has been an attempt for the synthesis of the theistic and the atheistic Samkhyas in the later Upaningurds, the Bhagavadgita and portions of the Mahabharata. widt-Int. Gott p. 32). Therefore, from the presence of ko hames of the acaryas of Samkhya in the offering to Rsis, Ntray be fairly guessed that in olden times, even the most metertintich theists 'Indertook the study of Samkhya. (8. B.. A . This could not have been possible if Samkhya nas not founded on S'rutis.

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INTRODUCTION pun. Germs of Samkhya in the Vedas, etc. The presence of Samkhya categories in the Srutis in a berminall form corroborates the former guess. We do not mean y say that the principles of Samkhya in their detail are .6 be sought in the Vedas and Upanisads as propounded by Samkhya-Karika. That would be as ridiculous as trying to find out the great banyan tree in its minute seed. Tamas described in the Kgveda (X. 129, 3) " 311A1 THAT TOE 495ganci" etc., assumed later on the form of the Unmanifest. This very S'ruti, showing the dissolution of the elements and the elemental world in its cause, the darkness, points to satkaryavada. Sayana also favours this interpretation in his bhasya on this verse. Giving this very interpretation elsewhere, the Veda even explains Aja ( the unborn ) as the name of Pradhana tamidarbha prathamaM dadhra Apo yatra devAH samagacchanta vizve / ajasya' nAbhAvaghyekamarpita yasmin vizvAni bhuvanAni tasthuH / / (Rgveda, X. 82, 6) Chronologically, Jacobi has divided the Upanisads into four divisions on account of their variety, their origin in different times, and their subject matter ( Ent. Gott. p. 6 and 19; H. I. P. I, p. 28 ff; I. P. 1., p. 141 ff. ). 1. The most ancient : as, Brhadaranyaka, Chandogya, Taittiriya, Aitareya and Kausitaki. 2, Ancient : as, Kathaka, Isa, S'vetas'vatara, Mundaka and Mahanarayana. 3. Modern : as, Prasna, Maitrayani and Manlukya. 4. Most modern : the many Atharvana Uparisads. Among the most ancient ones, in the Br. Up., the Purusa is declared to be only a seer, not a door, devoid of activity in as much as he is without any association with anything. (in T. i. 2

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI reality) as in "par pe A9 HTAT transferata...... The got 9901411EFT" (IV. 3, 15 ff ). The word mahat is indicative of the Samkhya word Buddhi in", " # Jut sandhava......yato yatastvAdadIta lavaNamevaivaM vA ara idaM mahadtama jantamapAraM ramaga vaatet at 7: Agrum etc." (Br. Up. II. 4, 12 ). The term Vijnanaghana expounds the intelligent nature of Buddhi. [ Jacobi says that it is very surprising how Samkhya attributes unconsciousness to Buddhi which is by nature intelligence. vide, Ent. Gott. p. 32. In this connection, consult also the Vatsyaynna Bhasya on the Gautama-Sutra "greapumparantavata" ( 1. 15). ] In the ch. Up. (VI, 2, 1) having first introduced the theory of satkarydoada in " para FTTH Freemanfarinya" the S'ruti in the same mantra mentions the purva-paksa of asat-karyavada in "ah BPTETHETTAT TERTE HARTA TEHICHA: FOTO". It then advances in the next mantra sat karyavada that is, ( #9: Fara), as a contradiction of the previous statement, e. g., "AG FRA Faila mara # #a: F ata, Fieta F AI IQRAATISTICO" ( VI. 2, 2k. Here the difference from S'ankara-Vedanta is that it accepts the aggregate of effects as real and not unreal like miya. It maintains that this aggregate of effects exists as a reality in the cause. Thus it clearly expounds satkaryavada. The cause has been signified as real. This has also been indicated in the mantra yathA somyakena mRtpiNDena sarva mRnmayaM vijJAtaM syAdvAcArambhaNaM vikAro nAmadheyaM memoria Argo" ( ch. Up. VI. 1, 4). Thus arose the Parinamavada of the Samkhyas ( Ent. Gott., p. 14). From this reality or existence were produced fire, earth, etc. The expounding of three forms of these objects in " yadane rohitaM rUpaM tejasastadUpa. yagchu tadapAM, yatkRSNaM tadanasyApAgAdagneranitvaM vAcArambhaNaM vikAro Ahorro ito sqropa frita" (ch. Up., VI 4, 1) is only an earlier form of the Sattva, Rajas and Tamas of the Samkhya philosophy. The redness of fire indicates Rajas. Just as

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INTRODUCTION red colour colours cloth, etc., so Rajas colours citta, because of its property of activity. Even so, the whiteness of water indicates Sattva, because white water has the property of purifying things. Sattva also purifies the mind with knowledge. The dark colour of anna=Earth is an indication of Tamas. The dark colour covers everything. Even so, the insentient Tamas covers the knowledge born of Sattva. [See, Bala, p. 3. What has been propounded by Suryanarayana Sistri in contradiction of this will be found in the Introduc. tion, S. N. S. ]. This very thing is propounded in the mantra "SETI TEATRUTH (S'v. Up. IV 5; Maha. narayana Up., p. 141, Isadi ). The trivrtkarana (trebling ) S'ruti found in the (Ch. Up. VI. 4 and 5 ) also corroborates this opinion. We also see that the word, trivrta has been used in the sense of the three Attributes in " tamekanemi trivRtam etc." (s'v. Up. 1, 4 ) also. There the three-foldness of grain, etc., has been indicated by the gross, the medium and the small sizes. It appears that the three-foldness of the Attributes has also been used similarly. Jacobi has also accepted this ( Ent. Gott., p. 32 ). The Sarikhya categories are clearly stated in the later Upanisads, e.g, in Katha " HAAFT TTT JG FICAT HELA TT: ( 111, 10). Mahat is the synonym of Ahankara. Similarly we find Avyakta and Purusa in "aga: 9724 T aa: 9T: Igor qe BEAT FIPET ATT TTi siat: 11" (Ibid, Ili, 11), Prof. Radhakrishnan believes that the indifference and in. activity of Purusa have been indicated in "dvA suparNA sayujA sakhAyA samAnaM vRkSaM pariSasvajAte / tayoranyaH pippalaM svAdatti anabhanyo 379afnafirat Il" in the Mundaka Up. (III, 1) (1. P. I, 259, 1 n!. It is a well-known fact that Svetas'vatara is essentially a Sanikhya Upanisad. It abounds in the Sarikhya cate. gories. For instance in this alone, the words Sankhya and Kapila have been used for the first time. "AFFITTOI Fisela

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI TIMETA" (. 13). "Figan nga JFIHO" (V.2). In this connection, we shall show later that there is a good deal of controversy about the word Kapila. It is again in this Upanisad that the words vyakta, avyakta and jna are found, e g., "Agatie THETR Toyota Ta funt: etc." (1.8); also "$TFT ara aranaristas difit etc." (1.9). vide also the Mbh. "SETT FETISTISTAICHA: pagal:" (111. 30. 88. This whole verse is quoted in the Gauda. on the 61st Karika ). Similarly, the use of the words Pradhuna, Prakrti and gura is also found here, e. g. " MTB T798" (1, 10), "argi T ara forg" (IV, 10), "archio Fagunaren" ( 1, 13), etc. Also, the mantra a A Faza acTri parari la tragcath: 1 BTER: agara 99730 Gaming ATHEATER II" (s'v. Up. 1, 4) propounds the ca-egories of Sarikhya. The word triuria refers to the three gunas, the word sodas'anta refers to sixteen vikuras, the word s'atardhara points to the fifty varieties of pratya ya.sarga. Keith's doubt about the Sarikhya character of this verse will not bear examination ( S. S. p. 11 ). He has given up the reasonable interpretation and says, "The worth of such identifications must be regarded as uncertain and no conclusive evidence is afforded by them, as plays on numbers are much affected by the Brahmanical schools." But he has not given any different interpretation himself and is, therefore, open to the charge of leaving the present and the relevant in favour of the absent and the irrelevant. But simply on the basis of the presence of a few techni. cal terms of Sarikhya, we should not conclude that a particular Upanisad propounds Sarikhya doctrines. For instance, in places like "Argi gana a TinhTITA I 774TH" (s'v. Up. Iv, 10 ) thougk there is a technical term of Samkhya, yet it appears that it is only supporting the Vedanta doctrine. Therefore, seeing that Samkhya comes closely after Vedanta in these Upanisadas, Jacobi declares that there cannot be

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INTRODUCTION any two opinions among scholars with regard to the fact that the rise of the Samkhya and Yoga systems lies betweer. the most ancient and the ancient Upanisads. (Ent. Golt. p. 21). Among the modern Upanisads, the mention of Sativa, Rajas and Tamas by name, the exposition of the five subtle elements, the enunciation of the five gross elements and reference to the Samkhya categories of ksetrajna, sankalpa, adhyavasaya, abhimuna and linga clearly show that these Upa. nisads corne after the formulation of the Samkhya system. As-"tamo vA idamekamAsa, tatpazcAttatpareNorataM viSamatvaM prayAtyetadvai rajamo 1................Fissitsi fra: glages : FOTETTATO . ATASI: garga: etc." ( Maitrayani, Up. IV, 5), "qoam Adalara a mata par iepa etc. ( Ibid 111,2), "praat agroamar 3190191917: etc. ( Pr up IV. 8) and so on. In the Mbh, and the Puranas, we find Sanikhya philo. sophy fully reflected. At one place we find the mention of the five gross elements, the twenty-four categories in their manifested or unmanifested character and the three gunas (Mbh. III, 209, 16-21; 211, 4). The distinction between Prakrti, and Purusa has been extensively expounded in S'antiparian (285, 33-40). Here the word sattva stands for Prakrti and not Brahman. But Keith, seeing that sattva was used as the subject of comparison of a spider, erroneously maintains that sattea is referring to Brahman ( S. S., p. 17). It will be clear from the two verses quoted below that his explanation is erroneous, since it is opposed to the context :-" graf Jona, ARE kSetrajJa: paripazyati / samprayogastayoreSa sattvakSetrajJayo vaH // 37 // svabhAvAmiddhameve. tapadimAn mujate guNAn / UrNanAbhiryathA mUtraM vizeyAstantuvad guNAH // 38 // ". We find a reference in the Mbh. of Sarkhya knowledge be. ing called Vais'esika which was imparted to Janaka by Pancasikha of Parasara gotra, e. g.. " TEATEERT HET grei ori and gu" (S'anti. 330, 23a ). There again, three paths of emancipation have been described. We find there from the

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI context that leaving aside the paths of mere knowledge or action, Samkhya lays down a third kind of path, viz., a combination of knowledge and action. S'anti, 320, 38--40. In this connection, vide my article, P. O. C., Lahore, 11, 1027 f ). In the dialogue between Janaka and Sulabha, the latter uses the word Samkhya in the sense of a particular kind of a sentence , -"ATERI AJTETTAT ETT Pariz: AgIlha: 1 qozari. jAtAni vAkyamityucyate nRpa // doSANAM ca guNAnAM ca pramANaM pravibhAgata.. Place T927 AT FRENCITTATA II" (S'anti. 320, 79 and 82 ). But at one place in the Mhh., thirty qualities of a body have been metioned. This classification of qualities is not met with in the Samkhya philosophy e. g., (1) S'abda, (2) Spars'a, (3) Rasa, (4) Rupu, (5) Gandha, (6-10) the five senses, (11) Manas, (12) Buddhi, (13) Sattra, (14) Aham-karta, (15) Sumagrya. (16) Sanghata, (17) Prakrti, (18) Vyakti, (19) Drandvayoga. (20) Kula, (21-25) the five gross elements, (26) Sadbhuvayoga, (27) Asadbhavayoga, (28) Vidhi, (29) S'ukra and (30) Bala (Santi 320, 97-112 ). So it has been said "fazia cavaM hi guNAH saMkhyAnataH smRtAH / samagrA yatra vartante taccharIramiti smRtam // " (ibid, 112). There, the eight-fold varieties of Prakrti and sixteen varities of nodifications have been described in the 310th chapter of the same parvan. Again, the nine kinds of creation mentioned there are not found in Samkhya books. They are as given below : (1) The creation of mahat from avyakta, (2) from mahat there is the creation of ahamkara, (3) from the latter of manas, (4) from it, that of the five gross elements, (5) from these, that of five attributes, (6) from these, that of five senses. (7) from these, that of " connected with the senses ( aindriyaka )," (8) from this, that of the upper and oblique varieties and (9) from the oblique, there is the creation of the lower variety. Thus, there is mutual discrepancy in the doctrines expounded in the Mbh. The categorios taught by Pancas'ikha in S'anti. 219, are nowhere obtained in the

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INTRODUCTION ir Samkhya. A teaching of this very teacher, quite different from that mentioned above, is found in 321, 96-112 of the Santi. In the 274th chapter, the doctrines expounded by Devala are different from every other. But even in the midst of divergent expositions of Samkhya doctrines, all agree with regard to the exposition of Brahman or Is'vara. Even though the plurality of purusas has been accepted, Brahman has been described as the basis of all. (vide- ami geamuri a quant Trafieza," S'anti 350. 26 ). Asuri, having taught Samkhya to Pancas'ikha, got merged in Brahman, "JANE at the JESTO I stanjure afera afaga agama II" (S'anti, 218, 13 ). In the Bhagavadgita also, we do not find atheism among the Sanikhyas. Rather we find the antiquity and dualism of S@mkhya propounded in it ( Tilak's Gitarahasya, Hindi translation by Sapre, p. 514, 1917 edn.). Kapila, the pioneer of Samkhya philosophy has been described by Lord Krsna as an example of his own glory, e. g. "fagrai fai afa: " ( Bh. G. X, 26). Here the Samkhya path without karman is only a synomym of Inana. Therefore Sankaracarya explains the word krtanta as " partia njega i arra: qft. HATARI A mara: Para maall" (Bh. G. XVIII, 13). S'anka. racarya explains the word gurasamkhyana (Bh. G. XVIII, 19 ) as the system of Kapila the subject matter of which is the exposition of the three gunas, viz. Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Again in the 3rd chapter of Bhagavata Purana, the Samkhya doctrines in detail tend to propound devotion to Visnu. Among the Puranas also, the various traditional schools interpret Samkhya doctrines in their own way (see V. P. VI. 5, 2-8; VI. 4. 35 Sk. P. Prabhasa-khanda, 18, 13-15 : Brah. P. ch. 213 ff ). In the Manu-smrti also which is contemporary, with the Mbh. ( 8. 8, p. 52 ) there is a detailed description of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas (XII. 24-52 ) and reference to the three pramasas (ibid, 105 ). But the word Samkhya is not found

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI in it. Medhatithi, commenting on " 371977 fatora pria af: ve:1 (1.76), says- naionageTTEPAT TEHEHT&TY:-, and thu indicates the presence of Samkhya doctrine. In Visnusmrti the distinction of Purusa from the twenty-four categories preceded by discrimination, has been clearly described. Oni of the stanzas ( XX, 25 ) of this Smrti very closely correspond: with the comment on the second Karika by Gaudapada (s S. p. 52). In the Sankha-samhita we find twenty-five cate gories, but Purusa is identified with Visnu ( VII 21-25 ). Yajnavalkya Smrti has also been influenced by Sanikhya, e.g. buddherutpttirvyktaattto'hngkaarsmbhvH| tanmAtrAdInyahaGkArAdakottaraguNAni ca // " (III, 179 ff.). We have already said that the-Samkhya categories expounded in these books give prominence to Is'vara (See also Bh. Com. pp. 183-4, where Belvalkar points out five stages of the evolution of Sankhya doctrines. ) IV. Sumkhya Teachers Names of twenty-six Samikhya teachers are met with in the Smotis, the Mbh., the Karikas, etc. They are as follows: (1) Kapila, (2) Asuri, (3) Pancas'ikha, (4) Vindhya. vasa, or Vindhyavasaka or Vindhyavasin, (5) Varsaganya, (6) Jagisavya. (7) Vodhu, (8) Asitadevala or Devala. (9) Sanaka, (10) Sanandana, (11) Sanatana, (12) Sanatkumara, (13) Bhrgu, (14) Sukra, (15) Kas'yapa, (16) Paras ara, (17) Garga or Gargya, (18) Gautama, (19) Narada, (20) Arstisena (21) Agastya, (22) Pulastya, (23) Harita, (24) Uluka, (25) Valmiki and (26) S'uka. 1. Kapila Mentioned in the s'v. Up. ( 5, 2 ) for the first time, Kapila is known everywhere as the founder of the Samkhya philosophy. Many people think that he was not a historical personage.' But Garbe, criticising the views of Max-Muller and Colebrooke, believes that the traditionally handed down name of Kapila cannot be regarded as fictitious; there is

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INTRODUCTION 13 another support in the name of the town Kapilavastu of the Budhists ( S. Y., 2, 83 ). Keith, on the other hand, opines that Kapila was not a historical person as he is found identified with Agni or Visnu or Shiva, and is, therefore, another name for Hiranyagarbha (s. S. 9, In; Mbh. S' anti. 339, 66-67; 342, 92-93 ). Kaviraja Gopinatha also agrees with this opinion as expressed by him in the introduction to Jayamangala published by me ( p. 3 ). Balarama Udasina, in his footnotes to Yogabhasya 1. 25; " AdividvAn nirmANacittamaviSTAya kAruNyAdbhagavAn paramarSirAsuraye jijJAsamAnAya tantraM provAca / " says: " ( 1 ) AdividvAn = sargAdAvAvirbhUto hiraNyagarbhaH svayaMbhUH, nirmANacittaM = yogabalena svanirmitaM cittamadhiSThAya = svAMzena pravizya kapilAkhya paramarSirbhUtvA kAruNyA jijJAsave Asuraye tantraM provAcetyartha: // ( 2 ) RSiM prasUtaM kapilaM yastamagre jJAnairbibharti jAyamAnaM ca pazyet' iti zrutyA kapilasya jAyamAnasya jJAnaprAptiH zrUyate // ( 3 ) paJcame kapilo nAma siddhezaH kAlaviplutam / provAcAsuraye sAMkhyaM tattvagrAmavinirNayam | (Bhagavata Purana, I. 3. 11) iti smRtau paJcamAvatAratvokteviSNoravatAraH kapila iti bhAvaH / ' agniH sa kapilo nAma sAMkhyazAstra - pravartakaH' iti mahAbhArataM tu kalpabhedena neyam / kalpabhedenaiva ca kapilo brahmaputra iti smaryate // (4) bhAskarAcAryaprabhRtayastu RSiM prasUtaM kapilaM' iti kapilapadenApi hiraNyagarbha eva gRhyate // 'yo brahmANaM ityAdibahu pUrvottaramantrasaMvAdAdityAhuH // " ( Ch. S. S. p. 62 ) .. * an From a quotation in the Baudhayana ( 2, 6, 30), we learn that an asura Kapila divided the four asramas. There is other Kapila also who wrote a Kapilasmrti dealing with the s'raddha', vivaha, prayas' citta ceremonies (H. Dh. I, pp. 25, 525). S'ankaracarya also thinks that the Kapila of Sankhya is different from the Vedic Kapila ( Br. S. Bhasya II, 1, 1 ). Anandagiri, commenting on this says that the Vedic Kapila is that one who reduced the sixty-thousand sons of Sagara to ashes. He is quite different from the Samikhya teacher. But we find in the Padmapurana that one Kapila alias Vasudeva taught the Samkhya doctrines to Brahman, Bhrgu, etc., supported by the Vedas; another Kapila taught ( the Sanikhya) as opposed to all the Vedic tenets (quoted in N. B. S., II 1, 1,

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14 TATTVA-KAUMUDI p. 4 ). But according to the Bhagavata Purana ( 3. 25. 1 ) Vasudeva himself was born as Kapila from the womb of Devahuti kapilastattvasaMkhyAtA bhagavAnAtmamAyayA / jAtaH svayamajaH sAkSAdAtmaprajJaptaye nRNAm // " Thus, we find no strong proof for believing Kapila a historical person. 2. Asuri There is a difference of opinion also with regard to the reality of Asuri, the first disciple of Kapila. Kaviraja Gopinatha thinks him to be a historical person (Jay., Int., p. 3 ). But Garbe and Keith are opposed to this view (t. s. pp. 47-48; S. Y. pp. 2-3 Garbe adds that if Asura is really historical then he is different from his namesake mentioned in the S'atapatha Brahmana ). The two interesting accounts as to how Kapila taught Asuri are found in the Jayamangala and the Matharavrtti. In the Mbh., Asuri is made the teacher of Pancas'ikha 'tatra paJcazikho nAma kApileyo mahAmuni: / ... Amure: prathamaM ziSyaM etc. (S'anti, 218. 6. 10). We find only one quotation ascribed to Asuri, vrs. "vivikte dRkUpariNatA buddhau bhogo'sya kathyate / pratibimbodayaH svaccho yathA candramaso'mbhasi // " in the commentary of Hanbhadra on the Saddars' anasamuccaya ( p. 36 ). 64 3. Pancas'ikha Pancas'ikha, the disciple of Asuri is found quoted in the following works : A. Y. Bh. ( a ) " ekameva darzanaM khyAtireva darzanam " [1. 4 ] / ( A ) " AdividvAn nirmANacittamadhiSTAya kAruNyAdbhagavAn paramarSirAsuraye jijJAsamAnAya tantraM provAca " / [ 1.25 ] ( i ) " tamaNumAtramAtmAnamanuvidyA'smItyevaM tAvatsaMprajAnIte " [1.36 ] / ( u ) " vyaktamavyaktaM vA saravamAtmatvenAbhipratItya tasya sampadamanunandatyAtmasampadaM manvAnastasya vyApadamanuzocasyAt ma-vyApadaM manvAnaH sa sarvo'pratibuddhaH " [ 25 ] / (U) " buddhitaH paraM

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INTRODUCTION 15 puruSamAkArazIlavidyAdibhirvibhaktamapazyan kuryAttatrAtmabuddhiM mohena " [2.6] (R) 'syAt svalpaH saGkaraH saparihAraH sapratyavamarSaH / kuzalasya nApakarSAyAm kasmAta, kuzalaM hi me bahvanyadasti yatrAyamAvApaM gataH svarge'pyapakarSamalpaM kariSyati" [ 2, 13 ] / (R) " rUpAtizayA vRtyatizayAzca paraspareNa virudhyante, sAmAnyAni tvatizayaiH saha pravartante [ 3.13 ] / (lR ) " tulyadezazravaNAnAmekadaMzazrutitvaM bhavati " [ 3.41.] // "" Vyasa does not give the name of Pancas'ikha, but it Is Vacaspati who says so. B. S. SU. (e) " AdheyazaktiyogaH paJcazikhaH " [5. 32 ] / ( ai ) " avivekanimitto vA paJcazikhaH [ 6.68 ] " C. S. S. B. - ( o ) " satvaM nAma prasAdalAghavAbhiSvaGgaprItititikSAsantoSAdirUpAnantabhedaM samAsataH sukhAtmakam, evaM rajo'pi zokAdinAnAbhedaM samAsato duHkhAtmakam, evaM tamo'pi nidrAdinAnAbhedaM samAsato mohAtmaka mU 1. 127 ] / D. Bhamati.--' (a) " tatsaMyogahetuvivarjanAtsyAdaya mAtyantiko duHkhapratIkAraH " [brahmasUtra, 2.2.10 1. E. Gauda. ( Kar. 1 ) and Math. ( Kar. 22 ) - (ka) "paJcaviMzatitatvajJo yatra kutrAzrame rataH / jaTI muNDI zikhI vApi mucyate nAtra saMzayaH // "" This verse is ascribed to Pancas'ikha by Bhavaganes'a in his Tattvayatharthyadipana and by Haribhadrasuri in S'astravartasamuccaya (see Int. to Matharavrttu). Bhavaganes'a was the disciple of Vijnanabhiksu and flourished in the 17th century A.D. The time of Haribhadrasuri is about 725 A.D.

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18 TATTVA-KAUMUDI century A.D. ( F. O. Schrader in a letter to me from Kiel, March 1, 1927 ). In the Matharavitti we find : " Tu courrura TATATERT" a quotation from the Hastamalakastotra which is of the age of Sankaracarya (i. e. 780-812 A.D., See Int., Math., p. 5). Therefore, it is wrong to decide the age of Vindhyavasa or Is'varakrsna on the basis of the Kanaga. sattari. And, if Vyadi alias Vindhyavasin, is the author of the Hiranyasaptati, then the latter is certainly different from the Samkhykarika, and Vindhyavasin is different from Isvarakrsna. Otherwise the date of lovarkrsna will have to be pushed back to the 4th century B. C. Therefore, it is safe to conclude, as Keith also says, that there are more than one Vindhyavasins and that their dates are uncertain (s. S., 79 in; also, Karma., p. 59 ). 5. Varsaganya We are as uncertain about Varsaganya as about the former teachers of Samkhya. We find two quotations from him in the Vyasabhasya: (1) "grogaritamateriaafa gegyfraisa ardag.1" (11 53, (2) "TOTAI R ua Tenja i 17 grege TI FANT FEJFY 11 " ( Ibid. IV, 13 ) Vacaspati thinks that the latter quotation is taken from the Sastitantra. This very verse is quoted by Vacaspati in his Bhamati with the remarks : "sta CT VOTETTEN acuarea 341 FH Huarg arg. pot: 1" (on the Brahmasutrabhasya, il 1, 3). Another quotation from Varsaganya, " *99991 39' CATE FH hara anfrag: 1" is found in the Tatt. K. (on Karika 47 ). The quotation--" gcuratei Tariganal" found in the Gaud., and the Math. (Karika 17 ), is ascribed to Varsaganya by Keith ( S. S. 73, 3n ). All these lead us to the conclusion that the Chinese tradition ascribing the authorship of the Sastitantra to Pancasikha is not trustworthy. There is also considerable doubt as to Varsaganya being the author of the Sastitantra (Jay. Int. pp. 4-6; Hiriyanna: "Sastitantra and Varsaganya".

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INTRODUCTION 19 Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, April-June, 1929, pp. 107-112 ). This has been discussed in detail below. 6. Jaigisavya According to the Kurmapurana, Jaigisavya was a classfellow of Pancas'ikha ( S, S. 51 ). This Jaigisavya is quoted as an authority on Yoga ( Y. Bh., II. 55 and 11. 18). Vacas. pati also refers to him in his Nyayavartikatatparyatika as the author of Dharanas'astra (on Nyayasutra III. 2. 43). But, according to the Buddhacarita ( 12. 67 ), Aradakalama refers to Jaigisavya, Janaka and Paras'ara as persons who obtained salvation through Samkhya ( Jay., Int. p. 2, 2n. ) In the present state of our knowledge, we can say nothing more about Jaigisavya. 7. Vodhu Vodhu is also familiar by name alone. We have not come across any of his writings or quotations. In the list of the names of the sages pronounced in the Rsitarpana, we find the name of Vodhu after that of Asuri, and before that of Parcas'ikha. Tlie opinion of Weber that it is the Brahmanised form of Buddha's name, is quite untenable (see S. Y. p. 6). Keith has, however, discovered Vodhu's name before that of Asuri in one of the paris'istas of the Atharvaveda (S. S. 51). 8. Devala We find a dialogue between Asitadevala and Narada in the Mahabharata (S'anti., Ch., 274 ). There we find eight kinds of bhutas ( bhava, abhava, kala, prthhui, apas, vayu, akas'a and tejas ); and kala impelled by bhava creating all the five elements, viz., earth, air, water, wind and glow. The senses themselves are not the knowers but produce knowledge for the ksetrajna. Higher than the senses is citta, higher than the latter is manas, higher than it is buddhi and the highest of all is purusa. The ear, the skin, the eye

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI the nose, the tongue, the citta, the manas and the buddhi are the eight instruments of knowledge, etc. It is said there : puNyapApakSayArthaM hi sAMgvyajAnaM vidhIyate / tatkSaye hyasya pazyanti brahmaara mi ag ll .(Verse 39). Thus we see that this dialogue deals with theistic Sanikhya. The quotations from Devala, as found in the Apararka, a commentary on the Yajnavalkyasmrti, resemble the Tattvasarasa very much ( See Yajnavalkyasmrti, Anandasrama, Edn. II, pp. 986-7). Kane, in his H. Dh. Vol. I, p. 121, says that Devala was a contemporary of the Smrtikaras, vis., Brhaspati and Katyayana. And the age of Katyayana according to him is between the 4th and 6th centuries A.D. ( see p. 218 ). But Udayavirasastri says that as Devala is frequently alluded to in the Mahabharata, his age must be d-termined by the age of the epic in its present form. The Mahabharata according to western scho. lars ( says Mr s'astri ), assumed its present form by the 2nd century B.C. (P. O. c. Lahore, JI p. 865 ). But according to Prof. Winternitz, the epic assumed its present form by the 4th century A.D. (See H. I. L. I. Pp. 465-475 ). Devala does not seem to be much older than Isvarakrsna. The theory to the contrary does not seem to be convincing. It is based on the following quotation from the Matharvrtti : " IRITOTT prAptamidaM jJAnaM tataH pancazikhena tasmAd bhArgava-ulUka-vAlmIki-hArIta-devala matarman", (p. 84 ), where the word prabhrti is taken to indicate a wide gap between Devala and Isvarakrsna. But the traditional list found in the Matharavrtti does not tally with any other such list. Therefore, Mathara's quotation can only establish Devala's priority to Isvarakrsna and nothing else. 9-26. Sanaka, etc. Gaudapada ( on Kar. I ), quotes a verse and a half in which he anumerates the names of the seven sons of Brahman. They are: Sanaka, Sananda. Sanatana, Asuri, Kapila, Vodhu and Pancasikha. But in the Mahabharata, the list is different ( s'anti. 340, 67-69 ), vis., Sana, Sanatsujata, Sanaka,

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A INTRODUCTION Sanandana, Sanatkumara, Kapila and Sanatana. Unfortunately we find no information about Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanatana, Sana, Sanatsujata and Sanatkumara, except a reference to Sanandanacarya in liGgazarIranimittaka iti sanandanAcArya: / (S. Su VI, 69). There is a reference to a Sanatkumara, author of some Smiti, in the Nirnayasindhu and the Tristhalisetu (H., Dh, 1, 656). Similarly we find Bhrgu, S'ukra, Kasyapa, Paras'ara, Garga, Gautama, Narada, Arstisena, Agastya, Pulastya and Harita mentioned as writers of Smrtis (Ibid, index). The dialogue between Paras'ara and Janaka named the Paras'ara gita, and found in the Mahabharata ( s'anti., Chs., 290-299), deals with the duties of the varnas and as'ramas and has no vestige of Samkhya teaching in it. It is just possil le that Paras'ara came to be regarded as a teacher of Samkhya because he happened to be born in the same family as Pancas'ikha (Mbh., S'anti., 320-23). Uluka is a synonym for Kaus'ika. In the Chinese translation of the Samkhya Karika, Is'varakisna is referred to as born in the Kaus'ika family (Jay Int p. 2. 2n). We know absolutely nothing of Valmiki and S'uka as teachers of Samkhya. V. 'Standard Works on Samkhya 21 Available Of the standard works on Samkhya, only three are available. They are "Samkhya-Sutras", "Tattva-samasa' and Sambhya-Kirika ". .. - "6 44 .. Some scholars are of opinion that S. Su. are not written by Kapila. The reason is that we find many passages from other works in them. For example, 'AvRttirasakRdupadezAt " (Br. S, IV. 1, 1) = 8. Su., IV. 3; vRttayaH paJcatayyaH kliSTAkliSTAH ( Y. S., II. 46 )=. Su., III 34 and VI. 24. Again, in the sutras establishing the authority of the Vedas (S. Su., V. 40-51), the influence of the Vedanta is clearly visible. many passages from Samkhya-Kraka, Again, we find quoted in the T. i. 3

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI Sutras. Madhavacarya of the 14th century A.D., quotes from the Karikas and not Sutras in his S. D. S. The oldest commentator on the Sutras is Aniruddha who flourished in about 1500 A.D. Therefore, the Sutras must have come into existence between 1380 and 1450 A.D. (See S. Y., pp. 8-9 ). Moreover, the commentator on the Sarvopakarini, a commentory on the Samasa-Sutra, opines that Kapila, the author of " Samkhya-Sutras " is different from Kapila, the author of Samasa-Sutra (ch., s. 9., No. 246, pp. 93-94). But as the author of the S. D. S. does not quote from the Tattva-samasa even, so the antiquity of the latter also is doublful. And if the author of the s, su, is Kapila, then how did he quote Pancas'ika, etc., who were his grand-disciples and who, there. fore, must have flourished much later (See S. Su., VI. 68-69) ? But Udayavira S'astri has tried to prove that Kapila himself is the author of the S. Su., in his article " Antiquity of the Samkhya Sutras " ( P. C. C, Lahore, II, pp. 855-882 ). He is of opinion that several sutras have been interpolated in the original of Kapila. For example, in the I chapter, the sutras 20-54 are interpolated, because the 19th sutra is literally the same as the 55th sutra, and because the 53rd and 54th sutras are identical with the 15th and 16th sutras. And as we find the names of Srughna and Pataliputra in these interpolated sutras, the interpolation must have been made when these towns were famous (from 4th century B. C., to the 5th century A.D.). The sutras 79. 80 and 84-115 of the V chapter are also interpolations; the interpolation of these ( 84-115 ) is obvious as they discuss the principles opposed to Samkhya Philosophy. Thus Mr. S'astri thinks that 68 sutras are interpolated. 1, on the other hand, think that the entire book was written by some later writer and therein some interpolations might have been made. Mr. S'astri does not give any weighly or conclusive argument in support of his thesis. On the other

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INTRODUCTION 23 hand, when Sankaracarya and others quote from SamkhyaKarika only, there is no doubt that the Sutras did not exist in their time. Had the S. Su., been existent, then Sarkara. carya and others would not have deliberately left aside the composition of a rsi and quoted from the work of an ordinary mortal like Is'varkrsna Mr. S'astri further tries to prove that V. Bh., and others have borrowed from the S su. His contention is : (1) "gigracypracoiatz AISAI Sramur=#F71aGFTTTT ftragger" (V. Bh., on N. S., IV. 1, 48 )-here sa raragara is borrowed from "sorra ATEL" (. ST., I. :15). This very sutra has been quoted again by Vatsyayana in his gloss on the next N. S., vis., "gegafittingfqet: Fof arsaa raha ta". Here the insertion of the word sa shows that it is a quotation from some other work. That other work is S. Su. To this we reply--If the word wat is a sure sign of quotation from another work then why did not Vatsyayana put it after "rraTaTQ" in the first passage (V. Bh., on N. S., IV. I, 48 ) quoted above? And as regards the presence of a in the second passage, it should be noted that this word is not connected with only "S TARATA" but the whole passage, vie..-"nyeqat. Fi area 3921aTra." Here Vatsyayana merely repeats his own words with slight change. Therefore, it does not show that V. Bh. has borrowed from the & su., rather, it may be just the reverse. (2) In the Apararka, a commentary on the YajnavalkyaSmrti ( Prayas'cittadhyaya, v. 109 ), we find quotations from Devala which resemble the sutrus in S. Su very much. Therefore, Devala must have borrowed them from the S. Su. Mr. Sustri starts here on the presumption of the priority of the S. Su., to Devala, a fact which he has to prove. (3) Patanjali, in his Mahabhasya, lays down the six causes of non-perception thus--" : TETT: Fai rara -

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI palabdhirbhavati - atisannikAdativiprakarSAnmUrtyantavyavadhAnAttamasAvRtatvAdiPaveur raunara 1" On this, Kaiyyata says in his gloss Pradipa--at ja taras i lager fir 499CFE2F.Noi ai aikqara i"--According to Kaiyyala, Patanjali here quotes from some other work. It seems that he took this view from "F ragason." (s su.. I. 109 ) and " geziaragrah." (s. Su., 1, 110 ). Moreover, we find only five causes of nonperception in the s. Su., but in the Mahabhasya, there are six causes of non-perception and in the Sambhya-Karika, there are eight. Therefore, the S. ST. are the oldest of these three. Moreover, the passage of Kayyata vis.. "ara hela gru01737971 VEIC czapiirialeaniza i" seems to be hased on the two sutras quoted above. In reply to Mr. S'astri's arguments, the following may be stated. In thenfirst place, the word gta is not a necessary and sure sign of quotation from some other work or author Here, the word ira denotes conclusion of his remarks. How can one deny the possibility of these remarks being Patan jali's own? In the second place if, depending upon the word $T used by Kaiyyai2, it is even admitted that Patanjali quotes the actual words of another, what is there to prove that it is the S. Su., wherefrom, he borrowed ? It is inost probable that he borrowed the view from some other work. (See H. I. P., I, 2:8-219 ). Again, there is nothing to otlige Kaiyyata, who flourished in the 13th century A.S. (H. S. 1.. p. 431 ), to borrow from the S. Su. He might have borrowed from the Sarikhya-Kanka. Moreover, the causes of non-perception as given by Palanjali tally more with those in the Samkhya-Karika than in the S. Su. (4) The following sutras agree verlatim with the Kirikas (a) "THE CAETIA ALFTATIM fact" (s la, 1. 124 = Kar., 10). (b) "ATTA ATT gana aanzetta" (8. fu., II. 18= Kar., 25). (c) "RAFFTOgrat: 9107771 alga: 42" (s. Su., H. 31 = Kar. 29). In (a) and (b) we find different readings.

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INTRODUCTION Avyapi in (a) has not been commented upon by Aniruddha. The word pravartate in (6) is not found in the Ms. in Mr. S'astri's possession. The arguments of Mr. S'astri do not stand a close examination. If Aniruddha did not comment upon the word avyapi, then it alone does not mean that the word did not exist formerly. Moreover. Vijnanabhiksu has commented upon this word. Again, what is there to prove that the Ms. in Mr. Sastri's possession is the oldest and the only correct Ms., whose one reading should decide so inportant a question as the authorship of Kapila In his zeal to disprove the theory that "the Sutras were composed on the basis of the Karikas," Mr. S'astri says that if we change the order of words in" #TATTETULIA: 1071 ATTE: 49" and read it as "ATHIRIFrTorghat: 7107177: qua 17:" we attain anustubh metre in place of urya. But this flight of imagination, vis., changing the reading itself, is too much to be swallowed even by ordinary people. Therefore, Mr. S'astri has failed to disprove that the S. Sa are based upon the Karikas There is a tradition that Paramartha translated the Karikas into Chinese in 557-569 A.D., (Bh., Com., pp. 175-178). According to Paramartha, Buddhamitra the teacher of Vasubandhu, was vanquished in debale by Vindhyavasa, the Samkhya-teacher; Vindhyavasa died before Vasubandhu. Thus, Vindhyavasa and Vasubandhu were contemporaries. There is another tradition, according to which Vindhyavasa was a contemporary of king Baladitya and pupil of Varsaganya. A third tradition tells us that the pupil of Varsaganya composed Hiranyasaptati. But all these traditions should be taken as having no historical value. Otherwise, if Vindhyavasa, the author of Hiranyasaptati and. Isvarknsina, the author of Samkhya-Karika are both identified then it would lead to a historical confusion, as stated above. Das Gupta also thinks Is' varkyana and Vindhyavasa us two

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI different persons, see H. I. 1., 1, 218, 3n ). The only definite conclusion that we can arrive at is that Is varakrsna is older than Vasubandhu [in 300 A D., see V. A. Smith: Early History of India, 3rd edn., pp 328-334; also Kalipada Bhattacharya "Sume Problems of Samkhya Philosophy and Sankhya Literature ", 1. H. Q, Sept., 1932, pp. 519-520. According to Bhattacharya Is'varkisna flourished in the 1st century A.D ] and flourished in the second or the third century A.D). The reinark of Svapnes'vara, identifying Is' varakrsna with Kalidasa, should be rejected as mistaker. (See I, I, II, 255, In. ). The work of Is'varakrsna had 70 verses in it. But now, finding the bhusya of Gaudapada rupning upto the 69th verse only and finding that the verses following the 69th have nothing of Samkhya in them, it is believed that one of these verses is missing. The question has been discussed in detail in the foot note to 61st Karika. Mr. S S. Pathak has also attacked this problem ( see, " The Problein of the Samkhya-Karikas ', I A., Vol. LII, 1923, pp. 177-181). He says(1) In the 72nd Kariki we read the phrase "qtarjaai aang" which means "free from the opinions of others". This goes against the Karka found by the late B. G. Tilak, as the latter expounds the opinions of others in the shape of God, Soul, Time, or Nature being the causes of Creation. To this we reply : In the Karika of Mr. Tilak, the opinion of others has been merely referred to and not expounded. The phrase Tarjaaltat: means the exclusion of the expounding of others opinions and not the exclusion of mere reference even. Otherwise, "zlargfa: A fagfagfasty*:" would also be open to fault, for, here there is no exclusion of the opinion of the Mimamsakas. (2) Is varakrsna has summarised the work of Pancas'ikha in his own 'aryas. Now in the Sastitantra, there is a mention of five alternative opinions i viz., inaking one of Brahman, Purusa Sakti, Niyati. and Kala. the cause of creation ) which are to be rejected. But in ths.

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INTRODUCTION Karika of Tilak, we find only four. There is nothing to represent S'akti-To this we reply: Is'varakrsna has summarised the work of Pancas'ikha. But in the first place, it is not as yet definite that Sastitantra is the work of Panca s'ikha. Secondly, even if it were so, yet it is not binding upon Is'varkrsna to give every detail in his summary. The other points raised by Mr. Pathak are covered by the footnote alluded to above. B. Unavailable (1) Sastitantra. Something has already been said with regard to the controversy of regarding Pancas'ikha or Varsaganya as the author of Sastitantra. Here, the question is examined further. Following are the references to Sastitantra in Jay. (a) "ag a great care ia faceta geratu fiiera. ATATTETU Faia |: 1" (p. 1). (6) "fragathIAHTEYTTA' sia afecta oronala. 1977, Hargazara I" (p. 7). (c) "Pa are 1:1 Q4791:1 gadu te ofenstgaga " (p. 56), (d) "qa' frati Coastaa g179T Z 774 i samaraj afe og gafari Aa & pretui z REUTAT: 1" (p. 68 ). (e)" oferirea f* ARTIFI" (p 6?) (f) " 377 Team agarsui: asa a CAIE I" (p. 6'?). From the above passages, Prof Hiriyanna infers the following facts (See-"Sastitantra and Varsaganya", J. O R., April-- June, 1929, pp. 107-112 )-(a) Sastitantra has 60 parts, (6) its author is Pancas'ikha and (c) it deals with 60 topics, and is, therefore, called "Sastitantra". Varsaganya is not its author, as others think. As regard the verse guNAnAM paramaM rUpaM na dRSTipathamRcchati / yatta dRSTipathaM yAtaM tanmAyeva sutucchakam // which is quoted in Y. Bh., and Bhamati, Vacaspati alludes it to Sastitantra in Tatt. V., and to Varsaganya in Bhamati. On the basis of these two references, people have come to

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI the conclusion that Varsaganya is the author of Sastitantra. But the reading in the Y. Bh. is Aria C , while as the reading in the Bhamati is ATT TTESE54. The reading cannot have been deliberately altered by Vacaspati, for a scholar of his reputation would not commit such a crime. On the other hand, froin the opinions of Virsnganya as found quoted in Buddhistic works, it seems that he altered the reading. Moreover, from Bhaskara's remark, viz., **Tenerigorrarenanya: " (on Br. S, I, 1, 1), we can infer that Kapila was the author of a Sastitantra. (See also P. 0. C., Lahore, II, p. 882m where Mr. S'astri states Sastitantra is the real Samkhya-dars'ana written by Kapila. Mr. Bhattacharya also holds this view. See J. H. Q., Sept., 1932, p. 518 ). This old Sassitantra of Kapila has been enlarged by Pancas'ikha in his Sastitantra. To this we reply-One should not put implicit faith in commentators when they refer to the names of writers. For example, we see that Bhatta- Utpala, in his commentary on Bphat-Samhita, quotes the verses ( 22-30 ) from Samkhya. Karika, preceded by the remark "Aureferall:". As regards the alteration of Ara into 49a, if it is considered impossible in the case of Vacaspati, it should be still more impossible in the case of Varsaganya whom Vacaspati refers to with great reverence as arg areas. The opinion of Varsaganya, as quoted in the Buddhist work Abhidharmakos'a ( viz., nothing new comes into existence, nor anything born is ever destroyed; that what is existent, is ever existent; that what is non-existent can never become existent) is simply a statement of the sat-karya theory. It is futile to read from it the difference between the theories of modification according to Samkhya and Yoga, as Mr. Hiriyanna does. His arguments can be valid only when it is admitted that Varsaganya altered arga into arda. But that requires proof.

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INTRODUCTION 29 Therefore, the question of authorship of Sastitantra is still undecided. (2) Rajarartika. In the Tatt. K., we find the following three verses from Rajavartika " pradhAnAstitvamekatvamarthavatvamathAnyatA / pArAyaM ca tathA'nakyaM viyogo yoga eva ca // zepavRttirakartatvaM maulikArthAH smRtA daza / viparyayaH paJcavidhastathoktA nava tuSTayaH // karaNAnAmasAmarthyamaSTAviMzatidhA matam / iti paSTiH padArthAnAmaSTabhiH saha siddhibhiH" / The first verse is quoted also in the Sarvopakanni (ch. 8. S., No. 246, p. 100 ). These sixty categories resemble the sixty categories treated of in the Ahirbudhnya Samhita (Jay., int., p. 5; S. S.. pp. 70-73). It is impossible to determine the authorship of Rajavartika. Garbe thinks Bhoja is the author (s. Y. p. 7). These maulikarthas are enumerated with slight variations in Jay., Math., Samkhya-tattva-vivecana (ch., s. S., No. 245, p. 22 ), Tattva-yatharthya-dipana (ibid. p. 80 ) and Tattva-samasa-sutra-vrtti ( ibid. p. 135).

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A SYNOPSIS OF THE CARDINAL DOCTRINES OF THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY BY Ganganatha Jha The lucid writing of Vacaspati Misra does not stand in need of much in the shape of an Introduction. But under the cover of this title, I propose to give a brief synopsis of the cardinal doctrines of the Sarkhya Philosophy, in the hope that a reading of this resume would prepare the mind of the student for the reception of the abstruse truths, in which the Tattvakaumudi abounds. Any corrections or suggestions for alteration, &c., will be most gratefully received. To begin with, the Sarikhya lays down a fourfold division of categories based on their respective causal and productive efficiency. This division is into-(1) Productive (2) Productive--and-Produced (3) Produced (4) Neither-Productive-nor Produced. This classification includes all the twenly. five Principles--called Tattvas,- Prakrti or Nature being the purely productive, since the Sarikhyas allow of no other purely productive agency. The Productie-and-produced are the other Principles-Buddhi, &c. These partake of the nature of both;--thus Buddhi is productive in as much as out of it evolves Ahamkara, and it is produced in as much as it itself evolves out of Prakyti. The purely non-productive Principles are the eleven sense-organs and the five material substances. These are purely non-productive because none of these can give birth to a substance essentially different from themselves. The Purusa (Spirit) is neither productive nor produced. In fact it is without attributes. All accessories are the effects of the Gunas,*and the Spirit is by its very nature free from these and as such without any accessories. 30

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INTRODUCTION 81 Having thus classified the various principles, we now turn to the consideration of the various principles separately. First of all then we must examine the nature of the allpowerful productive agent of the Samkhyas or more properly, the productive force of the Universe. How is this force constituted? It is made up of the three Gunas--Sattva, Rajas and Tamas; and when Nature is in its quiescent state, lying dormant, these three attributes are in equilibrium. When occasion presents itself, i. c. when the Adista of the Spirits waiting to be born acts upon Nature, the equilibrium is disturbed, and it is this disturbance that gives rise to the various kinds of Products. The diversity of Products is thus rendered explicable As already mentioned, all accessories are due to the predominance of one or other of the three Gunas-the predominance of Sattva givirg rise to the kind of Product in which that attribute predominates, and so forth. The three attributes-Sattva, Rajas and Tamas,-have respectively the character of Happiness, Unhappiness and Delusion; and have their operations characterised respectively by enlightenment, activity and inertia; and are so constituied that the one always operates through the suppression of the other, and at the same line depending upon this latter. To explain this contrariety of properties-The universe would be in an unceasing round of activity, if the only operating force were Rajas; in order to provide against this, Nature provides herself with a restraining agency in the shape of Tamas which by its nature is inert. The character of the objects of the universe is thus determined in accordance with the excess of one or the other of these attributes. Again, if there were no enlightening agency in the shape of Sattva, Nature would be nothing better than a mass of blind sorce acting in a haphazard manner. Here an objector comes forward and says "How can the Attributes, endowed as they are with mutually counteracting

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI properties, cooperate and bring about such a grand and stupendous structure as our Universe ?" The answer is that it is a very common fact that two or more substances, though mutually contradictory, do cooperate towards a single end;-c.g. the wick and the oil-both taken separately are as much against the action of one another as towards fire, but when they are together they help to enliven the fire. In the same manner, though the Attributes are mutually counteractive, yet when combined, they act towards a single end, supplying each other's deficiencies. The necessity of postulating three different forces is further supported by another reason. We see that in Nature there are three distinct properties of happiness', 'unhappiness and delusion'. All other properties are reducible under these three heads. Again we find that these are properties so much opposed to one another that all could never be the product of a single cause. Thus it is necessary to postulate three different forces or constituent elements of Nature, to which severally we could trace the three distinct properties. To these three constituents of Nature we give the names_Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. We find in the universe the above three properties, and as all the properties of the Product must be a direct resultant of a like property in its cause, we arrive at - the conclusion that the cause of the Universe--Nature---muse be imbued with the three Attributes. So much for the action of the Gunas. We now turn our attention towards the all-important Prakrti, Nature-the Key-stone of the Sanikhya Philosophy. What, then, is this Prakrti, Nature? Does it stand for the Theistic God? Or for the Bauddha "Sensations"? Or does it correspond t8 the Vedantic "Maya''? To all this 'we reply-- 'It is all these, and it is none of these. It resembles the Vedantic Maya in as much as it is the one root of the Uni

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INTRODUCTION 33 verse. It is not the God; since it is said to be without intelligence, mere dead Matter equipped with certain potentialities due to the Gunas. In short, Prakrti is the one rootless Root of the Universe (objective as well as subjective) imbued with the three Attributes and evolving through these, every kind of entity-save the Purusa, Spirit. The next point that we have to consider is---How do the Sarokhyas prove the existence, the rootlessness, and eternality of this Prakrti? Is it necessary to postulate such a rootless root, itself unmanifested, and yet manifesting all objective and subjective entities? Proofs of this are given at length in all works on the Carikhya Philosophy, and it will not be altogether out of place here briefly to sum them up. But before we take up this, it is necessary to explain the Sankhya doctrine of causality, the point on which rests the whole fabric of the system. What then is the cause and how is it related to the effect? Cause is defined as a substance in which the effect subsists in a latent form.. Thus the effect must be said to be eternally existent-primarily in a latent condition, in the cause, and latterly manifesting itself and then commonly recogrized as the effect. How to prove that the effect has been lying latent in the cause and has not been newly prcduced by the cause ? Firstly.-What is a nonentity can never be made an entity. That is to say--that which has never existed can never be brought into existence. What remains to be done by the operation of the cause is the manifestation of the effect-that is to say, its manifestation as the effect of the particular causc. And this kind of manisestation we find in the produclion of oil from the different oil-seeds wherein it has been hitherto lying latent. Secondly.-We find that the effect is always in one way or the other related to the cause. Now, this relation would not be possible if the effect were a nonentity :

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI for a nonentity can have no relations. If the relation of the effect with the cause were not necessary then every effect would be possible from every cause. Since in that case there would be no restrictive qualification which would confine the operation of particular causes to particular effects. This would lead to an absurdity. Thirdly.--We cannot deny causal efficiency. Now what does this efficiency consist in? It cannot be anything other than the existence in the cause of the effect in a latent condition. For the difference of seeds, as cause of oil, from sand, lies merely in the fact that it is only in the seeds and not in the sand, that the oil subsists Foarthly. The effect is non-different from the cause; and the latter being an entity, the latter must be so also. To take an example, the cloth is non-different from the threads composing it; because it is neither heavier than the latter, nor is any other relation than that of inherence possible between the two; and it is only between two different things that any other relation as that of conjunction, etc., is possible. Nor can the cloth ever exist apart from the threads. The difference of properties and actions cannot establish any difference. For though a single thread cannot do what is done by the cloth, yet this latter is nothing more than a collection of threads; and we see that what a single man cannot do, can be done very well by a number of them together; e. g.. a single man cannot carry a palanquin, which work c.in be performed by a number of inen together. Thus then we see that the effect is nothing more than the developed cause; and the latter again is merely an undeveloped effect. This identity of cause and effect has been thus explained by Sir William Hamilton also, who says--"When we are aware of something which begins to be, we are by the necessity of our intelligence, constr ined to believe that it has a cause. But what does the expression, that it has a cause, signify?

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INTRODUCTION 55 If we analyse our thought, we shall find that it simply means, that as we cannot conceive any new existence to commence, therefore, all that now is seen to arise under a new appear. ance had previously an existence under a prior form. We are utterly unable to realise in thought the possibility of the complement of existence either increased or diminished. We are unable, on the one hand, to conceive nothing becoming something-or on the other something becoming nothing.... There is thus conceived an absolute tautology between the effect and its causes. We think the cause to contain all that is contained in the effect; the effect to contain nothing which was not contained in the cause" --Lectures on Metaphysics-XXXIX. Having thus proved the existence of the effect in the cause, the Samkhyas employ this fact in proving the existence of their Prakrti. Nature. The effect being only a developed cause, in which it has been lying latent, all entities must have their unmanifested condition in their cause. That is to say, the elements lie in Ahamkara which lies in Buddhi. Now if we go on expanding this series we would be landed in a regressus ad infinitum. In order to avoid this we must postulate the existence of a principle which must be uncaused and which must be the final substratum of the undeveloped state of all other entities. Thus we have a causeless cause which must be by its very nature unmanifested, the final cause of all;--and to this the Samkhyas give the names "Pradhana." "Prakiti"', " Avyakta." (Nature). Secondly, we find that all entities--from Buddhi downwards-are limited and are the development of some further ultimate Principle--and this latter is Prakiti. Having thus proved the Existence of Nature the Samkhya proceeds to define its properties as well as those of its Products, and to explain wherein lies their difference

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI In order to do this they first of all consider the properties of the Manifested Entities--the effects of Prakrti. These are caused, and as a necessary consequence of this-transitory. limited, mobile, many, dependent (on the activity of the Prakiti). made up of parts: these are the characteristics where the Prakrti differs from the Manifested Entities, Buddhi and the rest. For, as already explained, the Prakrti is the uncaused root of the Universe, and as such, must be eternal, And as all Universe is the result of Its evolution, It must be all-pervading; as a necessary conseque nce of this it is im. inoveable i. e., it cannot mave, in the sense of going from one place to another. And further, since it is all-prevading it must be one. It is independent--depending only on the activity of its own constituent Gunas. These are the points of difference. Those of agreement are, thal Prakrti as well as the manifested entities are the resultants of the varicus actions and interactions of the three Gunas. Secondly, being without intelligence, both must be without discrimination, since discrimination proceeds from intelligence. Thirdly, both these present objects for the enjoyment of the Spirit. Fourthly, since they are without intelligence, they can never be the observers, they must always reinain the observed, and as such common. That is to say, every object that is observed is so observed, not differently by different individuals, but is a common cbject of observation by all, and it is cominon in that sense Fisthly, they are without intelligence-the only Principle endowed with intelligence being the Spirit. Sixthly, they are prolific, i. e, endowed with evolutionary potency. The Spirits are without this. These in brief, are the points of agreement and difference between Prakrti on one hand and its Products on the other. Now we must consider the nature of the Spirits and see what the Sarikhyas have to say as to their existence, number and properties. But before we proceed with this, we must

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INTRODUCTION 37 first see if it is necessary to have a distinct principle in the shape of innumerable Spirits. And on this score, the first reason that presents itself is the fact that we have not yet got any principle that will supply the factor of intelligence, sentience. Intelligence cannot belong to the Buddhi, the Cosmic Mind, for it is material, being the product of Prakrti which is essentially insentient and what is absent in the cause cannot manifest itself in the product. So we must have a distinct Principle of Sentience. Secondly. We see in our everyday life that all that is composite is for the use of another, as a bed, a chair, &c. And we have seen before that all the entities from Prakrti downwards are composites. Though this sounds a little absurd as regards Prakrti, Buddhi and Ahamkara, yet we must not forget that the body of these apparently immaterial entities is made up of the three Gunas which are as material as anything. Such being the case, we must postulate the existence of an incorporeal entity. And this is Purusa, the Spirit, and as we have not yet had an intelligent principle, we attribute intelligence to this incorporeal Spirit. This Spirit cannot be composite because it is devoid of the three Attributes, as it is only what is made up of the Gunas that is found to be composite. Thirdly. We have in daily life found that whatever is naturally connected with either pleasure, pain or delusion, is supervised by something else; and we have also seen that all the entities from Prakyti downwards are made up of the three Gunas, and as such necessarily affected by pleasure, pain and delusion; so these must have a supervisor. And in order to escape a regressus ad infinitum this supervisor must be himself unaffected in his essence by pleasure, etc.; and as such must be something over and above Praksti. And this is Purusa, the Spirit. T. i. 4

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI Fourthly.- Praksti and the rest are objects of enjoyment and as such they necessitate the existence of an enjoyer who again must not be an object himself. And the enjoyer must be an intelligent entity. For a non-intelligent principle being devoid of consciousness can never be the enjoyer. This again must be something not made up of pleasure, etc. This can never be the case with Buddhi and the rest. -These latter being made up as they are of the three Gunas which are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be the enjoyer of these ; for that will involve the absurdity of selfcontradictory action-one-made up of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be pleased or pained ; for each of these is contradictory to the one or other phase of the constitution of Buddhi. So we must have an enjoyer over and above Prakrti and the rest. And this is Spirit. Fifthly and lastly.-All systems of Philosophy, and all the great men of the past we find striving after final Release. Now this is not possible for Prakrti or Buddhi. For these latter are, by their constitution, made up of pain and as such can never be released from this. So the object of final Release must be one who has neither pleasure nor pain nor delusion for its constituent element; and such an entity is the Spirit alone. We have thus shown the necessity of postulating a distinct entity in the shape of Purusa, over and above Prakrti. The next thing. we have to consider is--What is this Purusa!-How is it constituted?--What are its properties? -What its aim?--and finally, how and when does it attain final Release? We must take each of these questions one by one. (1) What is Purusa? It is not the thinking principle, since thinking belongs to the mind. Nor is it the determining principle, since that is allotted to Buddhi. The character of the Spirit is unique. It is none of these, and yet

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INTRODUCTION it is the necessary factor in all these. It is the principal agent of all functions, mental as well as material. It is the agent who feels, thinks and wills. Without it no functions would be possible, specially consciousness. In short, Spirit is the source of intelligence, and as such, the necessary factor in every function of the mind-feeling, intellecting and willing. (2) How is this Spirit constituted ? As a matter of fact the Spirit is constituted of intelligence or sentience pure and simple, and is free from every other qualification and encumbrance. (3) What are its properties? These are thus enunciated : it is free from the three attributes, possessed of discriminative faculties, non-objective, singular, intelligent and nonproductive. If the Spirit were not naturally free from the action of the Attributes, no liberation from metempsychosis would be possible. Since pain constitutes the very nature of the Attributes and as such cannot possibly be separated from it. And thus no liberation being possible, there would be no necessity for enquiries to which the various systems of philosophy are devoted. And lastly, if the Spirit were not equipped with discriminative faculties, it could never attain the discriminative wisdom arrived at by the philosophical systems, which would thus become purposeless. Next as to the aims of the Spirit. It has been laid down that the Spirit mistakes the fluctuations of the Attributes constituting Nature, to be His own ; and thus comes to be affected by pleasure, pain, etc., which in reality do not touch him,-under the influence of the different kinds of delusions-the modifications of Buddhi. Now the one allabsorbing aim of every Spirit is the attainment of that wisdom which would help him to discriminate between Himself and the fluctuations of the Attributes, and thus see the pleasure and pain caused by these in their true light and be no longer affected by them.

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI The next question that presents itself to us is-how does. Purusa attain to this wisdom and thence to final emancipa. fion? This wisdom arises from a constant study of the Sa mkhya Philosophy, when the Attribute of Sattva is paramount in one's constitution and the others have almost ceased to exist. The Purusa then sees Nature and its constituents in their true light and finds out His mistake and so shakes off all mistaken preconceptions about self, and thus becomes free from the self-imposed bonds of Buddhi, and finally retires from meterpsychosis and attains final Beatitude. Having thus said all that we had to say about Prakti and Purusa we must look a little into the details of the process of creation. We have already said that Prakrti is the rootless Root of the Universe. From this Prakrti emanates Buddhi, to which the technical name of Mahat or the Great Principle is given, it is the Cosmic Mind. From this Buddhi proceeds A hankura or the l-principle. From this again emanate the eleven, senses and the five subtle elements of sound, odour. taste, colour and touch. And from these latter five, proceed the five gross substances-Earth,:Water, Fire, Air and Akas'a, First in this scale comes Buddhi. This is defined as the principle of adhyavasaya. This term literally means "ascertainment" and in explaining this term, the writers exemplify it as the determination that this is to be done by me." It would thus appear that the functions of this principle are the same as those attributed by Western psychologists to will. But the Samkhya Buddhi is not mere will. It is Will and Intellect combined. For in the opinion of the majority of Western psychologists-specially of those belonging to the Kantian School -" Intellect contemplates the circumstances calling for action and provides the rule of conduct : Will controls the disposition in harmony with the dictates of intelligence." The Samkhyas attribute both these functions

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INTRODUCTION 41 to their Buddhi. That Buddhi resembles will, is further made clearer by the properties assigned to it, by the Sam. khyas. These proporties are Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power. As we have said already, will decides the course of action and as such the virtuousness or otherwise of actions must belong to this principle alone. Again we find that wisdom is described as both restrictive and directive and so to attribute the property of wisdom to Buddh is to give it the dual character of Intellect and Will. Dispassion and Power again must belong to the principle that decides on a certain course of action and in this too we find Buddhi cognate with Intellect and Will combined. We have, therefore, called it the Cosmic Mind. The principle that we have to consider next is thai of Egoism, the I-principle. It is the principle to which all notions of the "L" are duc. It corresponds with Kant's "apperception" and Hamilton's " self-consciousness:" that is to say, the notion of self in every form of consciousness : The idea that "I have the conciousness," "I feel, etc." As immediate effects of this l-principle we have the eleven sense-organs and the five subtle elements. The eleven sense-organs .consist of the five intellectual ( subjective) senses-milie eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the skin,-and the five of action (objective ) viz.--the hands, the feet, speech, the excretory organ and the organ of generation. The eleventh sense is Manas, (individual inind). The five subtle rudimentary elements are those of odour, touch, taste, colour and sound. From these latter again proceed the five gross substancesEarth, Air, Water, Fire and Akasa; and these have the subtle frudimentary elements for their essential properties. Before proceeding any further we must consider the nature of the eleventh sense-organ, the mind or the reflective principle. Here first of all we must consider why we should call mind a 'sense' at all? The answer is not far

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42 TATTVA-KAUMUDI to seek. The Samkhyas define sense as the immediate effect of the l.principle under the influence of the Sattva Attribute ; and this differentia we find in Mind as well as in the ten organs generally accepted as senses. What are the functions of this eleventh sense? Manas, mind, is the only faculty that partakes of the nature of both kinds of sensesthe objective and the subjective. If it were not so, none of the senses would act, for it is only when these are influenced by the operation of the mind that they act towards their various objects. It would not be quite accu. rate to say that the senses do not act. Act they do, but these operations are not taken cognizance of by the agent, and as such having their actions purposeless, they may, for all intents and purposes, be said to be without action. The function of this principle, Mind, is technically called in Samkhya "reflection " When we first look upon an object the first impressions in connection therewith are indefinite and without qualifications ( Anatomy ). This indefinite and vague impression is soon rendered definite, and this definiteness and the different qualifications are imparted to it by the " reflection " of the Mind. This process follows so quickly that one can scarcely mark the process and thinks that the first impression he has had was all along definite, just as he latterly comes to perceive it. The next question that is started is-whence proceeds. the action of the senses? If their action were eternal then the creation would never cease. If not eternal, what is it that causes the operations to begin? The reply given is that all these organs have a certain sort of eagerness for the fulfilment of each other's actions; and this anxiety leads to the functioning of each of them. There is no external impetus save that of the purpose-experience and subsequent discrminative wisdom and hence emancipation--of the Purusa, Spirit. If there were no functioning of the different emana

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INTRODUCTION tions of Prakyti, the Spirit would be at a loss to discriminate between himself and the inanimate Prakyti. The only impetus from without is thus supplied to the senses by the purpose of the Spirit, and thenceforward they are led on in their active path by their own inherent eagerness. Altogether then we see that there are thirteen organsthree internal, Buddhi, Ahamkara and Manas, and the ten external--the ordinary ten sense-organs. Of these the latter operate only in the present time, whereas the former act with regard to the past, present and future. Of the external organs, the five subjective senses operate towards subtle as well as gross substances, whereas the objective ones operate only towards gross ones. Of the thirteen organs, the palm of supremacy is given to the internal ones, since these are applicable to all kinde of substances, and another cause of supremacy we have already noted-118., the one with regard to time. Of thess internal organs again Budhhi is supreme, since the principles of Egoism and Reflection operate towards their objects and then present these experiences to the Buddhi, which finally presents them with its own additions and alterations to the discriminating eye of the Spirit. Thus we find that Buddhi is the chief agent of the Spirit and brings about all his worldly enjoyment finally leading to His discrimination of self from the emanations of Prakrti, and thence to final liberation. Thus of all the organs, Buddhi is supreme. Having thus described the organs, we turn our attention towards the gross substances. These are of three kinds Subtle, Parent-born and the Great' substances. Of these the first is eternal, and the second and the third are fading and transient. This "subtle body" of the Samkhyas is born before the visible body and lasts till dissolution ; and till then it remains the body of the Spirit in all its incarnations during

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI that cycle. If this were not so, the actions of one incarnation could not react upon the Spirit in the next, for the Spirit itself cannot be affected by either good or evil, and as such could not be affected by the actions of one incarnation in another. For the actions were done by the body and the organs of the former incarnation and these dying with the Body, wherein would the traces of the former actions be left? So we must postulate the existence of a substratum in the form of the "Linga-S'arira", the subtle Body, which is equipped with subtile counterparts of all the sensory and motor organs. This Linga:Sarira is imprinted with all the effects of the actions of the Spirit. And since this subtle body follows the Spirit in all its subsequent incarnations, it is but natural that the fruits of past actions should affect the Spirit ;-though the Spirit cannot be affected, yet so long as he has not attained to discriminative wisdom, he thinks all the affections of Buddhi to be his own. This subtle body thus must have traces of virtue and vice on itself so as to bring out their effects in a future incarnation. It acts also as the substratum of the different organs which are subtile in their nature, and as such could not subsist without a subtile substratum. Let us now see how the Samkhyas treat of the idea of means and consequences of actions. By means of virtue the Spirit ascends to higher regions; Vice leads the other way: Emancipation results from discriminative wisdom. This wisdom consists of deep insight into the character of Spirit and Nature, and consequent intelligent perception of the dhfference between the two-from which results the Spirit's perception of His own true nature, which is above the operation of the three Attributes, though so long He has been labouring under the self-imposed imaginary thraldom of the Attributes. No sooner has this perception been gained than the Spirit casts off His self-imposed chains and becomes free

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INTRODUCTION 45 from the Attributes, and thereby attains to His proper state, which is one of pure uninterrupted and unmixed sentience. By mere dispassion is gained a state of absorption into the subtler elements of Nature. A Spirit thus transformed enjoys for a time a state of unintelligent rest, and is born again under the same restrictions and with the same bondage as before the absorption. If, on the other hand, the Spirit is under the influence of attachments proceeding from the attribute of Rajas it falls into the stingy darkness of metempsychosis from which it can be freed only by the divine ray of wisdom. We are all labouring under this category. The Samkhyas have further entered into a very elaborate enunciation of the various inanifestations of Buddhi dividing them into no less than fifty forms. These, are made up of five kinds of impediments, twenty-eight of incapacity (resulting from the disability of the organs ), nine of contentment and eight of perfection. Of these, again there are 62 forms of impediment alone. So much for 'mental creation. The 'inaterial creation comprises the eight kinds of divine celestial beings, the five of the lower animals, and one, the human kind. The various grades of creation are attributed to the excess or otherwise of one of the Attributes. Thus the Attribute of Sattva predominates among divine beings, that of Rajas among human beings, and that of Tamas in all lower creation. All this elaborate process of creation is begun by Nature solely for the sake of the Spirit's emancipation from the miseries of metempsychosis-miseries inevitable to Him when born in a body. Nature is described as a benevolent benefactress, not caring for any return of services from the Spirit, and working for His emancipation out of her own sweet will, till He comes to perceive her true character ; "When She retires from the scence like an actress who has

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI played her part and never again returns to the same Spirit, the spectator. Thus then in reality all bonds and pains are only supposed by the Spirit to be His own. By His very nature He is free from all fluctuations, in as much as He is above the Attributes, whose effect these fluctuations are. After the attainment of discriminative, wisdom, the Spirit steers clear of all notions of egoism, and attains to His own natural spiritual condition But the body continues for a time on account of the impulse previously imparted to it. And the attainment of wisdom having put a stop to the operation of all such agents as virtue, etc.,-the operation of which is a necessary cause of rebirth-the body falls, and the Spirit regains His true character, and attains to absolute and eternal beatitude, never to return to the cycles of metenipsychosis.

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tattvakaumudI. (sAMkhya.) (1) maGgalAcaraNam // ajAmekAM lohitazuklakRSNAM bahvIH prajAH sRjamAnAM namAmaH / majA ye tAM juSamANAM bhajante jahatyenAM bhuktabhogAM numastAn // 1 // kapilAya mahAmunaye munaye ziSyAya tasya cAsuraye / paJcazikhAya tathezvarakRSNAyaitAnnamasyAmaH // 2 // iha khalu pratipissitamathaM pratipAdayan pratipAdayitA'vadheyavacano bhavati prekSAvatAm / apratipitsitamarthaM tu pratipAda(2) zAstraviSayaka- yan ' nAyaM laukiko nApi parIkSaka ' iti prekSAva. jijJAsAvataraNam // / dbhirunmattavadupekSyeta / sa caiSAM pratipitsito'rthoM yo jJAtaH san paramapuruSArthAya kalpate / iti prAripsitazAstraviSayajJAnasya paramapuruSArthasAdhanahetutvAt tadviSayajijJAsAmavatArayati duHkhatrayAbhighAtAjjijJAsA tadapaghAtake hetau / dRSTe sA'pArthA cennaikAntAtyantato'bhAvAt // 1 // " duHkha-" iti / evaM hi zAstraviSayo na jijJAsyeta, yadi duHkhaM nAma jagati na syAt , sadvA na jihAsitam , jihAsitaM (3) zAstraviSayaka- vA azakyasamucchedam / ( azakyasamucchedatA ca dvedhA, jijJAsAyA Avazya. duHkhasya nityatvAt , tducchedopaayaaprijnyaanaadvaa)| katvazaGkA // zakyasamucchedatve'pi ca zAstraviSayasya jJAnasyAnu pAyabhUtasvAdvA, sukarasyopAyAntarasya sadbhAvAdvA // ta. kau. 1

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duHkhatrayam / [ sA. ta. tatra na tAvaduHkhanAsti nApyajihAsitamityuktam - "duHkhatrayAbhighAtAta" __ iti / duHkhAnAM trayaM duHkhatrayam / tat khalu AdhyA(4) trayANAM duHkhAnAM tmikam , Adhibhautikam , AdhidaivikaJca / tatrAdhyA. vyutpAdanam , tadastitva- tmikam dvividham , zArIraM mAnasaM ca / zArIraM vAtasAdhanaM ca // pittazleSmaNAM vaiSamyanimittam , mAnasaM kAmakrodhalobha mohabhayeAviSAdaviSayavizeSAdarzananibandhanam / sarvancatadAntarikopAyasAdhyatvAdAdhyAtmikaM duHkham / bAyopAyasAdhyaM duHkhaM dvedhA, Adhibhautikam , Adhidaivikanca / tatrAdhibhautikaM mAnuSapazumRgapakSisarI. sRpasthAvaranimittam , AdhidaivikaM tu yakSarAkSasavinAyakagrahAdyAvezanibandha nam / tadetat pratyAtmavedanIyaM duHkhaM rajaHpariNAmabhedo na zakyate pratyAkhyAtum / tadanena duHkhatrayeNAntaHkaraNavartinA cetanAzakteH pratikUla vedanIyatayA 'bhisambandho'bhighAta iti / etAvatA pratikUlavedanIyasvaM jihAsAheturuktaH / yadyapi na sannirudhyate duHkham , tathApi tadabhibhavaH zakyaH kartumityupariSTAdu. papAdayiSyate / tasmAdupapannam , " tadapaghAtake hetau' iti / tasya duHkhatra yasya apaghAtakaH tadapaghAtakaH' / upasarjanasyApi buddhayA sanikRSTasya 'tadA' parAmarzaH / apaghAtakazca hetuH zAstrapratipAdyo, nAnya ityaashyH|| atra zaGkate- " dRSTe sA'pArthA cet" iti / ayamarthaH / astu tarhi duHkhatrayam , jihAsitaM ca tadbhavatu, bhavatu ca taccha(5) sukarasya dRSTasyo- kyahAnam , sahatAM ca zAstragamya upaaystducchettum| pAyasya sattve zAstraviSa. tathA'pyatra prekSAvatAM jijJAsA na yuktA, dRSTasyaivo. yakajijJAsAyA vaiyya- pAyasya taducchedakasya sukarasya vidyamAnasvAt , jhaMpattiH // tatvajJAnasya tu anekajanmAbhyAsaparamparAyAsasAdhyatayA'tiduSkaratvAt / tathA ca laukikAnAmAbhANakaH, * atke4 canmadhu vindeta kimarthaM parvataM vrajet / iSTasyArthasya saMsiddhau ko vidvAn yatnamAcaret ' iti / 1. anAgatasUkSmaduHkhanivRttau tAtparyamiti kecit / 2. samAsagauNAvayavasya / 3. samAsasthatatpadena / 4. 'ata' sAtatyagamane-ityasmAdvAtoniSpanno'yaM zabda:ato'sya svarUpam ' atka' iti / arthazcAsya ' yasminsthAne satataM gacchanti lokA' iti /

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kA. 2] shaastrjijnyaasaavshyktaa| santi copAyAH zatazaH zArIraduHkhapratIkArAyeSatkarA bhiSajAM vrairupdissttaaH| mAnasasyApi santApasya pratIkArAya manojJastrIpAnabhojanavilepanavastrAlaGkArAdiviSayasamprAptirupAyaH sukaraH / evamAdhibhautikasyApi duHkhasya nItizAstrAbhyAsakuzalatAniratyayasthAnAdhyAsanAdiH pratIkAraheturISatkaraH / tathA ''dhidaivikasyApi maNimantrauSadhAdhupayogaH sukaraH pratikAropAya iti // nirAkaroti-- na " iti / kutaH ? " ekaantaatyntto'bhaavaat"| " ekAnto" duHkhanivRtteravazyambhAva:; " atyanto" (6) vaiyarthyApattinirA- nivRttasya duHkhasya punaranutpAdaH, tayoH ekAntAtyantakaraNam-parigaNito- yorabhAvaH " ekAntAtyantato 'bhAvaH " / SaSThIsthAne pAyebhya Atyantikai- saarvvibhktikstsiH| etaduktaM bhavati, yathAvidhi rasAkAntikaduHkhanivRtte- yanAdikAminInItizAstrAbhyAsamantrAdyupAyayoge'pi radarzanam / / tasya tasyAdhyAsmikAderduHnasya nivRtteradarzanAt anaikAntikatvam , nivRttasyApi punarutpattidarzanAt anAsyantikatvam, iti sukaro'pi aikAntikAtyantikadu.khanivRtterna dRSTa upAya iti nA'pArthA jijJAsetyarthaH / / ___ yadyapi duHkhamamaGgalam , tathA'pi tatparihArArthasvena (7) duHkhApaghAtakIrta- tadapaghAto maGgalameveti yuktaM zAstrAdau tatkIrtananam maGgalameva // miti // 1 // (8) vaidikasya duHkhApa- syAdetat / mA bhUdRSTa upAyaH, vaidikastu jyotikaghAtakasya sukarasya sattve. STomAdiH saMvatsaraparyanta. karmakalApastApatrayamezAstraviSayajijJAsAyAH kAntamatyantamcApaneSyati / zrutizca, " svargakAmo punarvaiyarthyApattiH // yajeta" iti / svargazca " yA duHkhena sambhinaM na ca prastamanantaram / abhilASopanItaM ca tat sukhaM svaHpadAspadam" iti / 1. etat ( vakSyamANam, AzaGkitam ) syAt-iti granthakAroktiH / athavAetat (bhavatoktam ) syAt (bhavatu), svIkRtamasmAbhiriti zaGkAkRduktiH / ubha. yathA'pi yujyte|

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dRSTavaidikopAyayossAmyam / [sAM. ta. duHkhavirodhI sukhavizeSazca svargaH / sa ca svazaktayA samUlaghAtamapahanti duH. khm| na caSa kssyii| tathA hi zrUyate-"mapAma somamamRtA abhUma" iti [atharvaziras 3] / tatkSaye kuto'syAmRtatvasambhavaH 1 tasmAdvaidikasyopAyasya tApatraya. pratIkArahetormuhUrtayAmAhorAtramAsasaMvatsaranirvartanIyasyAnekajanmaparamparAyA. sasampAdanIyAta vivekajJAnAt ISatkaratvAt punarapi vyarthA jijJAsA ityAza. kyAha dRSTavadAnuzravikaH, sa hyavizuddhikSayAtizayayuktaH / tadviparItaH zreyAn vyaktAvyaktajJavijJAnAt // 2 // " dRSTa-" iti / gurupAThAdanubhUyate ityanuzravo vedH| etaduktaM bhavati 'zrUyata eva paraM na kenApi kriyata' iti / tatra bhava Anu(9) vaidikAnAma- zravikaH, tatra prApto jJAta iti yAvat / AnuzravikopyupAyAnAM dRSTopA- 'pi karmakalApo dRSTena tulyo vartate, aikAntikAtyayaissaha tulytvm|| tikaduHkhatrayapratIkArAnupAyatvasyobhayatrApi tulyatvAt / yadyapi ca "Anuzravika" iti sAmAnyAbhidhAnaM, tathApi karmakalApAbhiprAyaM draSTavyam , vivekajJAnasyApyAnuzravikatvAt / tathA ca zrUyate- "mAtmA vA re jJAtavyaH prakRtito vivektavyaH " [ bRhadAraNyaka, 2 / 4 / 51. "na sa punarAvartate na sa punarAvartate" [chAndogya 8 / 15] iti || asyAM pratijJAyAM hetumAha- " sa hyavizuddhikSayAtizayayuktaH" iti / ___ "avizuddhiH" somAdiyAgasya pazubIjAdivasAdha. (10) dRSTavaidikayo- nato / yathA''ha sma bhagavAn paJcazikhAcArya:-" svarupAyayoHavizu. lpasaGkaraH saparihAraH sapratyavamarSaH" iti / 'sva. dvikSayAtizayayukta. lpasaGkaro' jyotiSTomAdijanmanaH pradhAnApUrvasya tvam tulyam // svalpena pazuhiMsAdijanmanA 'narthahetunA'pUrveNa saGkaraH / 'saparihAraH, ' kiyatA'pi prAyazcittena parihatuM zakyaH / atha ca pramAdataH prAyazcittamapi nAcaritaM, pradhAnakarmavipAkasamaye sa pacyate / tathA'pi yAvadasAvanathai sUte tAvat pratyavamarSeNa ( sahiSNutayA) saha vartata iti 1. aGgavaiguNyaM ca

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ko. 2] vaidikopAyasyAvizuddhatvaM, sAtizayatvaM ca / 5 "sapratyamavarSaH' / mRSyante hi puNyasambhAropanItasvargasudhAmahAdAvagAhinaH kuzalAH pApamAnopalAditA duHkhavahnikaNikAm / / na ca-- "mA hiMsyAt sarvA bhUtAni" iti sAmAnyazAstraM vizeSazAstreNa " agnISomIyaM pazumAlabheta " ityanena bAdhyata-- (11) yAjJikahiMsAyA iti yuktam , virodhAbhAvAt / virodhe hi balIyasA apyanarthahetutvasAdhanam || durbalaM bAdhyate / na cehAsti kazcidvirodhaH, bhinnaviSa yatvAt / tathA hi-" mA hiMsyAt " iti niSedhena hiMsAyA anarthahetubhAvo jJApyate, na tvakratvarthatvamapi, "bhagnISomIyaM pazumAla. bheta" ityanena vAkyena ca pazuhiMsAyAH kratvarthatvamucyate, nAnarthahetutvAbhAvaH, tathA sati vAkyabhedaprasaGgAt / na cAnarthahetutvaRtUpakArakatvayoH kazcidvirodho'sti / hiMsA hi puruSasya doSamAvakSyati, tozvopakariSyatIti / kSayAtizayau ca phalagatAvapyupAya upacaritau / kSayitvaM ca svargAdeH sattve (12) vaidikopAyasya sAta kAyatvAdanumitam / jyotiSTomAdayaH svargamAtrasya sAtizayatvapradarzanam // / sAdhanam , vAjapeyAdayastu svArAjyasyetyatizayayukta. / tvam / parasampadutkarSoM hi hInasampadaM puruSaM duHkhAkaroti // . "apAma somamamRtA abhUma" iti cAmRtatvAbhidhAnam cirasthemAnamupa lakSayati / yadAhuH- "AbhUtasamplavaM sthAnamamRtatvaM (13) amRtatvazrutiH hi bhASyate" iti (vissnnupuraanne)| ata eva ca zrutiHvirodhaparihAraH-amRta- " na karmaNA na prajayA dhanena tyAgenaikenAmRtatvamAtvasya cirasthemna upa- nazuH / pareNa nAkaM nihitaM guhAyAM vibhrAjate yadyatayo lakSakatvAt / / vizanti" iti [ mahAnArAyaNa 105] / tathA " karmaNA mRtyumRSayo niSeduH prajAvanto draviNamIhamAnAH / tathA pare RSayo ye manISiNaH paraM karmabhyo'mRtatvamAnazuH" iti ca / / 1. vidheyadvayApatteH / hiMsA yAgasAdhikA anarthazUnyA ceti vAkyabhedaH /

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zAstraviSayajJAnasya zreyastvam / [sAM. ta. tadetat sarvamabhipretyAha--" tadviparItaH zreyAn , vyaktAvyaktajJavijJAnAt" ___ iti / tasmAt (bhAnuzravikAt duHkhApaghAtakopAyAt (14) laukikavaidiko somapAnAderavizuddhAt anityasAtizayaphalAt ) pAyebhyaH zAstraviSayajJA- viparItaH vizuddhaH hiMsAdisaGkarAbhAvAt , nityaniranasya zreyastvapradarzanam // tizayaphalaH, asakRt punarAvRttizruteH / na ca kAryatvenAnityatA phalasya yuktA, bhAvarUpasya kAryasya tathAbhAvAt , duHkhapradhvaMsanasya tu kAryasyApi tadvaiperItyAt / na ca duHkhAntarotpAdaH, kAraNApravRttau kAryasyAnutpAdAt , vivekajJAnopajananaparyanta. tyAcca kAraNapravRtteH / etaccopariSTAdupapAdayiSyate // akSarArthastu-tasmAt (bhAnuzravikAt duHkhApaghAtakAt hetoH ) viparItaH (satvapuruSAnyatApratyayaH sAkSAtkAro ) duHkhApaghA. (15) " tadviparItaH tako hetuH, ata eva zreyAn / bhAnuzraviko hi vedazreyAn" itysyaakssraarthH| vihitatvAt mAtrayA duHkhApaghAtakatvAcca prazasyaH / sattvapuruSAnyatApratyayo'pi prazasyaH / tadanayoH praza. syayormadhye sattvapuruSAnyatApratyayaH zreyAn // kutaH punarasyotpattirityata Aha- " vyaktAvyaktajJavijJAnAt" iti / __ vyaktaM ca avyaktaM ca jJazca vyaktAvyaktajJAH, teSAM (16) zAstraviSayasya vijJAnam vivekena jJAnam , vyaktAvyaktajJavijJAnam / duHkhApaghAtakasya tattvajJA vyaktajJAnapUrvakamavyaktasya tatkAraNasya jJAnam / tayozca nasyotpattipradarzanam // pArAyeMnAtmA paro jJAyate, iti jJAnakrameNAbhidhA nam / etaduktaM bhavati--zrutismRtItihAsapurANebhyo vyaktAdIn vivekena zrutvA, zAstrayuktyA ca vyavasthApya dIrghakAlAdaranarantarya. satkArasevitAt bhAvanAmayAt vijJAnAditi / tathA ca vakSyati-- 1 anityatvAt / 2 abhAvarUpatvAt / 3 (66 ) kArikAyAm / 4 vyaktAvyaktayoH parArthatvena / vyaktAvyakte acetane kasyaciccetanasyArthAya vartete sa ca cetana AtmetyAdikrameNa /

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ko. 3] zAstrasaMkSepaH / " evaM tatvAbhyAsAnAsmi na me nAhamityaparizeSam / aviparyayAdvizuddhaM kevalamutpadyate jJAnam " iti [ kArikA, 64 ] // 2 // (17) zAstrArthasaMkSepa.- tadevaM prekSAvadapekSitArthatvena zAstrArambhaM samAdhAya prakRti-prakRtivikRti- zAstramArabhamANaH zrotRbuddhisamavadhAnAya tadartha saMkSe. vikRtyanubhayarUpakrameNa // pataH pratijAnIte mUlaprakRtiravikRtirmahadAdyAH prakRtivikRtayaH sapta / SoDazakastu vikAro, na prakRtina vikRtiH puruSaH // 3 // "mUla-" iti / saMkSepato hi zAstrArthasya catasro vidhAH / kazcidarthaH prakRtireva, kazcidartho vikRtireva, kazviraprakRti vikRtiH, kazcidanubhayarUpaH / tatra kA prakRtirityuktam- "mUlaprakRtiravikRtiH" iti / prakarotIti prakRtiH (18) prakRtikathanam // ra pradhAnam , sattvarajastamalA sAmyAvasthA, sA avi " kRtiH, prakRtirevetyarthaH / kuta ityuktam-, "mUleti" mUlacAsau prakRtizceti muulprkRtiH| vizvasya kAryasaMghAtasya sA mUlam , na svasyA mUlAntaramasti, anavasthAprasaGgAt / na cAnavasthAyAM pramANamastIti bhaavH|| katamAH punaH prakRtivikRtayaH, kiyatyazcetyata uktam - " mahadAdyAH prakRti(19) prakRtivikRti- vikRtayaH sapta ' iti / prakRtayazca vikRtayazca tA iti "prakRtivikRtayaH", sapta / tathA hi mahattattvam maha. kArasya prakRtiH, vikRtizca mUlaprakRteH / evamahaGkAratattvaM tanmAtrANAmindriyANAM ca prakRtiH, vikRtizca mahataH / evaM paJcatanmAtrANi tattvAni bhUtAnAmAkAzAdInAM prakRtayo vikRtayazcAhaGkArasya // matha kA vikRtireva, kiyatI cetyata uktam-"SoDazakastu vikAraH" iti / SoDazasaMkhyAparimito gaNaH SoDazakaH / 'tu' zabdo (20) vikRtikathanam / / 'vadhAraNe bhinnakramaH-paJcamahAbhUtAni ekAdaza indri yANIti SoDazako gaNo vikAra eva, prakRtiriti / yadyapi pRthivyAdInAM goghaTavRkSAdayo vikArAH, evantadvikArabhedAnAM payo. bIjAdInAM dadhyakurAdayaH, tathA'pi gavAdayo bIjAdayo vA na pRthivyAdi. kathanam //

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pramANanirUpaNam / sAM. ta. bhyastattvAntaram / tattvAntaropAdAnatvaM ca prakRtitvamihAbhipretam , iti na dossH| sarveSAM goghaTAdInAM sthUlatendriyagrAhyatA ca sameti na tttvaantrm|| bhanubhayarUpamAha-" na prakRtirna vikRtiH puruSaH" iti / etat sarvamupariSTA(21) anubhayarUpakathanam // dupapAdayipyate // 3 // tamimamarthaM prAmANikaM kartumabhimatAH pramANabhedA lakSaNIyAH / na ca (22) pramANasAmA- sAmAnyalakSaNamantareNa zakyate vizeSalakSaNam kartum / nyalakSaNam // iti pramANasAmAnyaM tAvallakSayati dRSTamanumAnamAptavacanaM ca, sarvapramANasiddhatvAt / trividhampramANamiSTaM, prameyasiddhiH pramANAddhi // 4 // " pramANamiSTam" iti / atra-ca 'pramANam' iti samAkhyA lakSyapadam / tannirvacanaM ca lakSaNam / pramIyate 'neneti nirvacanAt (23) pramANapadasya- pramA prati krnntvmvgmyte| taccAsandigdhAviparItA. nirvacanam // nadhigataviSayA cittavRttiH / bodhazca pauruSeyaH phalam pramA, tatsAdhanam pramANamiti / etena saMzayaviparyayasmRtisAdhaneSvapramANeSvaprasaGgaH / / saMkhyAvipratipattiM nirAkaroti- " trividham" iti / tisro vidhA yasya pramANasAmAnyasya tat trividham , na nyUnam , (24) pramANasaMkhyA // nApyadhikamityarthaH / vizeSalakSaNAnantaraJcaitadupapAda. yiSyAmaH // katamAH punastAstisro vidhA ityata Aha-" dRSTamanumAnamAptavacanam" va iti / etacca laukikapramANAbhiprAyam , lokavyutpAdanA. (25) pramANatraya rthatvAcchAstrasya, tasyaivAtrAdhikArAt / ArSa tu vijJAnaM nam / yoginAmUrdhvasrotasAM na lokavyatpAdanAyAlamiti sadapi nAbhihitam , anadhikArAt // 1 naiyAyikAnAmanuvyavasAya:-ghaTajJAne 'ghaTamahaM jAnamIti " -puruSagataH /

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kau. 5] pramANAnAM vizeSalakSaNam / syAdetat-mA bhUnnyUnam , adhikaM tu kasmAna bhavati ? saGgirante hi prati(26) pramANa vAdina upamAnAdInyapi pramANAni, ityata mAhasaMkhyA''dhikyazaGkA, sajana __ "sarvapramANasiddhatvAt" iti / eSveva dRSTAnumAnAptatatparihArazca // ' vacaneSu sarveSAM pramANAnAM siddhatvAt , antarbhAvA dityarthaH / etaccopapAdayiSyata ityukam // atha prameyavyutpAdanAya pravRttaM zAstraM kasmAt pramANaM sAmAnyato vizeSatazca(27) prameyavarNa- lakSayati ? ityata Aha- "prameyasiddhiH pramANAddhi" nAt prAgeva pramANa- iti / siddhiH pratItiH // nirvacanasyAvazyakatvam // (28) kArikA- seyamAryA'rthakramAnurodhena pAThakramamanAdRtyaiva vyApAThakramaparivartanahetuH // khyAtA / / 4 / / samprati pramANavizeSalakSaNAvasare pratyakSasya sarvapramANeSu jyeSThatvAt tadadhI(29) pramANAnAM natvAccAnumAnAdInAm, sarvavAdinAmavipratipattezca, vizeSalakSaNam // tadeva tAvallakSayati-- prativiSayAdhyavasAyo dRSTaM, trividhamanumAnamAkhyAtam / talliGgaliGgipUrvakam , AptazrutirAptavacanaM tu // 5 // "prativiSayAdhyavasAyo dRSTam " iti / atra " dRSTam" iti lakSyanidezaH, pariziSTaM tu lakSaNam / samAnAsamAnajAtIyavyavacchedo lakSaNArthaH / ___ avayavArthastu-viSiNvanti, viSayiNamanubadhnanti, svena rUpeNa nirUpaNIyaM kurvantIti yAvat = " viSayAH," pRthivyAdayaH sukhA(30) pratyakSa- dayazcAsmadAdInAm aviSayAH tanmAtralakSaNAH yoginAlakSaNAvayavArthaH // mUrdhvasrotasAM ca viSayAH / viSayaM viSayaM prati vartate iti prativiSayam = indriyam / vRttizca' sanikarSaH / arthasanikRSTamindriyamityarthaH / tasmin adhyavasAyaH, tadAzrita ityarthaH / madhyabasAyazca buddhibyApAro jJAnam / upAttaviSayANAmindriyANAM vRttI

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so 10 pratyakSalakSaNam / [sa. ta. satyAm , buddhastamo'bhibhave sati yaH sattvasamudrekaH so'dhyavasAya' iti / vRttiriti jJAnamiti cAkhyAyate / idaM tAvat pramANam , anena yazcetanAzakteratumAhastasphalaM pramAbodhaH / / buddhitasvaM hi prAkRtasvAdacetanam, iti tadIyo'dhyavasAyo'pya cetano, ghaTAdivat / evaM buddhitattvasya sukhAdayo'pi pariNAma(31) jJAnAnAma- bhedA acetanAH / puruSastu sukhAdhananuSaGgI cetanaH / cetanatvam // so'yaM buddhitatvavartinA jJAnasukhAdinA tatprati bimbitastacchAyApattyA jJAnasukhAdimAniva bhavatIticetano'nugRhyate / citicchAyApattyA'cetanA'pi buddhistadadhyavasAyo'pyacetanazcetanavadbhavatIti / tathA ca vakSyati " tasmAttatsaMyogAdacetanaM cetanAvadiva liGgam / guNakartRtve'pi tathA karteva bhavatyudAsInaH / / " iti [kArikA. 20 ]. bhannAdhyavasAyagrahaNena saMzayaM vyavacchinatti, saMzayasyAnavasthitagrahaNenAnizcitarUpatvAt / nizcayo'dhyavasAya iti cAnAntaram / viSaya(32) pratyakSalakSaNA- grahaNena cAsadviSayaM viparyayamapAkaroti / pratigrahaNena ntargatAnAM zabdAnAM cendriyArthasasikarSasUcanAdanumAnasmRtyAdayazca parAkRtA vyAvRttiH // bhavanti // tadevaM samAnAsamAnajAtIyavyavacchedakatvAt "prativiSayAdhyavasAya" iti (33) pratyakSasya dRSTasya sampUrNa lakSaNam / tantrAntareSu lakSaNAntarANi paryavasitaM lakSaNam // tairthikAnAM na bhUSitAni, na dUSitAni, vistrbhyaaditi|| nAnumAnampramANamiti vadatA lokAyatikenApratipannaH sandigdho viparyasto vA puruSaH kathaM pratipadheta ? na ca puruSAntaragata (34) anumAnasya ___ ajJAnasaMdehaviparyayAH zakyA aryAgdRzA pratyakSeNa pratipattum / nApi pramANAntareNa, manabhyupagamAt / anavaratAjJAnasaMzayaviparyayastu yaM kaMcana puruSaM prati vartamAno'navadheyavacanatayA pramANatvasa 1. ayamadhyavasAya eva ca pratyakSamiti shessH| 2. samAnArthakameveti /

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ko. 5 ] anumAnalakSaNam prekSAvadbhirunmattavadupekSyeta / tadanenAjJAnAdayaH parapuruSavartino 'bhiprAyabhedAdvacanabhedAdvA liGgAdanumAtavyAH, ityakAmenApyanumAnapramANamabhyupeyam // tatra pratyakSakAryatvAt anumAna pratyakSAnantaraM lakSaNIyam / tatrApi sAmAnyalakSaNapUrvakatvAdvizeSalakSaNasyAnumAnasAmAnya (35) anumAnasya tAvallakSayati- " tat liGgaliGgipUrvakam " iti / sAmAnyalakSaNam // " liGgam vyApyam / liGgi vyApakam / zaGkitasamAropitopAdhinirAkaraNena ca svabhAvapratibaddhaM vyApyam , yena pratibaddhaM tadvayApakam / liGgaliGgigrahaNena viSayavAcinA viSayiNaM pratyayamupalakSayati / dhUmAdiyAMpyo vahnayAdirvyApaka iti yaH pratyayastatpUrvakam / liGgagrahaNaM cAvartanIyam / tena ca liGgamasyAstIti pakSadharmatAjJAnamapi darzitambhavati / tadvayApyavyApakabhAvapakSadharmatAjJAnapUrvakamanumAnamityanumAnasAmAnyaM lakSitam // anumAnavizeSAn tantrAntaralakSitAn abhimatAna, smArayati- " trivi(36) anumAnasya dhamanumAnamAkhyAtam" iti / tat sAmAnyato vizeSalakSam-traividhyam pUrvavaccheSavatsAmAnyato upAsatamAnamAna vizaSatAstrAvadha, pUrvavat nulakSitamanumAnaM vizeSatastrividhaM, pUrvavat-zeSavatdRSTabhedAt sAmAnyato dRSTaJceti // tatra 'prathamaM tAvat dvividham-cItamavItaM ca / anvayamukhena pravartamAnaM (37) vItAvItarUpeNA; vidhAyakaM vItam , vyatirekamukhena pravartamAnaM niSedhanumAnasya dvaividhyam // kamavItam // tatrAvItaM zeSavat / ziSyate pariziSyate iti zeSaH, sa eva viSayatayA yasyA(38) avItani- styanumAnajJAnasya taccheSavat / yadAhaH-" prasakta pratiSedhe, anyatrAprasaGgAt ziSyamANe sampratyayaH rUpaNam parizeSa" iti [vAtsyAyana-nyAyabhASya 1. 1.5.]. bhasya cAvItasya vyatirekiNa udAharaNamagre'bhidhAsyate // 1. ekena vibhAgaprakAreNa anumAnam dvividhamiti bhAvaH / 2. atrAhU rAghavA. nandatIrthAH-"satAM sammatimAha yathAhuriti-guNatvAt pRthivyAzrayaH zabdaH syAditi prasaktasya zabdasya na pRthivIguNatvam , apAkajavizeSaguNatvAt , tadvizeSaguNena gandhena ca sahAvRttitvAt / evaM niSedhe kRte AkAzAdanyatra bhUmyAdyaSTasvaprasaGgAt, ziSyamANe AkAze eva zabdasya guNatvena samyakpratyayaH " - iti //

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vItanirUpaNam / [sAM. ta. vItaM dvedhA-pUrvavat sAmAnyato dRSTaM ca / tatraikam dRSTasvalakSaNasAmAnyaviSayaM yattatpUrvavat , pUrva prasiddhaM, dRSTasvalakSaNasAmAnyamiti (39) vItanirUpaNam yAvat , tadasya viSayatvenAstyanumAnajJAnasyeti pUrva-tadvaividhyam // vat / yathA dhUmAvahnitvasAmAnyavizeSaH parvate'numI yate, tasya vahnitvasAmAnyavizeSasya svalakSaNaM vahnivizeSo dRSTo rasavatyAm / aparaM ca vItaM sAmAnyato dRSTamadRSTasvalakSaNasAmAnyaviSayam / yathendriyaviSayamanumAnam / atra hi rUpAdivijJAnAnAM kriyAtvena karaNavattvamanumIyate / yadyapi karaNatvasAmAnyasya chidAdau vAsyAdi svalakSaNamupalabdham , tathA'pi yajAtIyaM rUpAdijJAne karaNatvamanumIyate tajAtIyasya karaNasya na dRSTaM svalakSaNaM pratyakSeNa / indriyajAtIyaM hi tatkaraNam , na cendriyatvasAmAnyasya svalakSaNamindriyavizeSaH pratyakSagocaro'rvAgdRzAm , yathA vahnitvasAmAnyasya' svalakSaNaM vahniH / so'yaM pUrvavata: sAmAnyato dRSTAt satyapi vItatvena tulyatve vishessH| atra ca dRSTaM darzanam , sAmAnyata iti sAmAnyasya, sArvavibhaktikastasil / adRSTasvalakSaNasya sAmAnyavizeSasya darzanam sAmAnyato dRSTamanumAnamityarthaH / sarvaM caitadasmAbhirvyAyavArtikatAtparyaTIkAyAM vyutpAditamiti nehoktaM vistarabhayAt // prayojakavRddhazabdazravaNasamanantaraM prayojyavRddhapravRttihesujJAnAnumAnapUrvakatvA .. cchabdArthasambandhagrahaNasya, svArthasambandhajJAnasahakAri(40) zabdapramANa Nazca zabdasyArthapratyAyakatvAdanumAnapUrvakatvamityanumAlakSaNam // nAnantaraM zabdaM lakSayati- " AptazrutirAptavacanaM tu " iti / Aptavacanamiti lakSyanirdezaH, pariziSTaM lakSaNam / AptA prAptA yuktati yAvat / AptA cAsau zrutizceti 'AptazrutiH / zrutiH vAkyajanitaM vAkyArthajJAnam // ___ tazca svataH pramANam / apauruSeyavedavAkyajanitatvena sakaladoSAzaGkAvi(41) tasya svataH- nirmukteryuktaM bhavati / evaM vedamUlasmRtItihAsapurANaprAmANyam // * vAkyajanitamapi jJAna yuktaM bhavati // 1. dRSTaM svalakSaNaM yasya sAmAnyasya-tat sAmAnyaM viSayo yasyeti vigrahaH /

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ko. 5] AptazruteranumAnAbyavacchedaH / mAdividuSazca kapilasya kalpAdau kalpAntarAdhItazrutismaraNasambhavaH, supta . prabuddhasyeva pUrvedhuravagatAnAmarthAnAmapareyuH / tathA (42) kapilasya pUrva cAvaTyajagISavyasaMvAde bhagavAna jaigISavyo dshjnmaadhiitshrutismrnnm|| mahAkalpavartijanmasmaraNamAtmana uvAca " dazasu mahAkalpeSu viparivartamAnena mayA" ityAdinA granthasandarbheNa // mAptagrahaNenAyuktAH zAkyabhikSunirgranthakasaMsAramocakAdInAmAgamAbhAsAH (43) AgamAbhAsa ___parihRtA bhavanti / ayuktatvaM caiteSAM vigAnAt vicchinnamUlatvAtpramANaviruddhArthAbhidhAnAJca kaizcideva nirUpaNam mlecchAdibhiH puruSApasadaiH pazuprAyaiH prigrhaadoddhvym| __'tu' zabdenAnumAnAbyavacchinatti / vAkyArtho hi prameyo, na tu taddharmoM (44) Aptazruteranu . vAkyam , yena tatra liGgaM bhvet| na ca vAkyaM vAkyArtha bodhayat sambandhagrahaNamapekSate, abhinavakaviracitasya mAnAyavacchedaH // vAkyasyAdRSTapUrvasyAnanubhUtacaravAkyArthabodhakatvAditi // 1. atrAhurbhAratIyatyAdayaH-"kathaM 'tu' zabdenAnumAnAyavaccheda Aptavacanasyetyata Aha - 'vAkyArthohi' iti / nanvastu tAvadvAkyArthasya prameyatvam, etAvatA kathamanumAnAd vyavacchedaH syAt , zabdasya tatkAraNatvAt , yathA dhUmena linena liGgI vahniJjayate tathA vAkyena liGgena zabdArthaliGgayanumAnaM bhavedityAzaGkayAha-'na tu taddharma' iti / dhUmasya vahnidharmatvAt talliGgatvam , na tu vAkyasya arthadharmatvam , yena talliGga vAkyaM syAditi yAvat / nanu yadyapi dhUmAgnivat vAkyavAkyArthayodharmadharmibhAvo nAsti, tathA'pi yathA dhUmo'minA sambandhinA sambandhagrahaNApekSa eva tadgamakaH, tathA vAkyamapi arthena sambandhagrahaNApekSameva tadbodhakamiti ghaTTakuTyAmeva prabhAta iti cettatrAha-' na ca' iti / aulpattikasUtre jaimininA zabdArthayonityasambandhe sAdhite'pi zabdasyaiva vRddhavyavahArataH sambandhagrahaNApekSasyaiAvabodhakatvAt , padArthapUrvakatvAttu vAkyArthasya svArthabodhakatve sambandhagrahaNApekSA nAsti / viziSTArthasapratyayo hi vAkyArthaH" iti / yadi vAkyArthajJAne'numAnaM syAt tarhi vAkya

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14 upamAnasya zabde'numAne cAntarbhAvaH / [sA. ta. (45) zAstrAntarokta- evaM pramANasAmAnyalakSaNeSu tadvizeSalakSaNeSu ca satsu, pramANAntarANAmukteSvaH yAni pramANAntarANyupamAnAdIni prtivaadibhirbhyuntrbhaavH|| peyante tAnyuktalakSaNeSveva pramANeSvantarbhavanti // tathA hi-upamAnaM tAvadyathA gaustathA gavaya iti vAkyam / tajanitA dhIrA gama eva / yo'pyayaM gavayazabdo gosadRzasya vAcaka (46) upamAnasya iti pratyayaH, so'pyanumAnameva / yo hi zabdo yatra zabde 'numAne cAnta vRddhaiH prayujyate, so'sati vRttyantare, tasya vAcakaH, rbhaavH| yathA gozabdo gotvasya / prayujyate caivaM gavayazabdo gosadRze, iti tasyaiva vAcaka, iti tat jJAnamanumAnameva / yattu gavayasya cakSuHsanikRSTasya gosAdRzyajJAnaM tat pratyakSameva / ata eva smaryamANAyAM gavi, gavayasAdRzyajJAnaM pratyakSam / na svanyadgavi sAdRzyamanyazca gavaye / bhUyo'vayavasAmAnyayogo hi jAtyantaravartI jAtyantare sAdRzyamucyate / sAmAnya. yogazcaikaH / sa cedvaye pratyakSo, gavyapi tatheti nopamAnasya prameyAntaramasti, yatra pramANAntaramupamAnaM bhavet , iti na pramANAntaramupamAnam / / vAkyArthayoApyavyApakasambandho'pekSitaH syAt / na ca tthaa| tathAhi vAkyaM pramANaM vAkyArthaH prameyaH / evaM ca vAkyaM vAkyArthasya dharmo na bhavati-yathA bhavati dhUmo vahverdharmaH / ato vAkyaM vAkyArthasya liMgaM na bhavatItyAzayaH / zAndajJAnaM ye'numAne'ntarbhAvayaMti teSAM mate-yathA vyAptijJAnapUrvakamanumAna tathaiva zabdArthasambandhajJAnapUrvakaM zAbdaM jJAnam / tatra cetthamanumAnasvarUpam-yatra yatra ghaTamAnayeti zabdaH prayujyate tatra tatra ghaTAnayanaM bodhyate-yathA mama bAlyAvasthAyAmuccaritoktazabda:-adhunA'pi sa eva zabdaH prayujyate-tasmAdadhunApi ghaTAnayanameva bodhyata iti // asyaiva matasya parihAro'tra granthe pradarzyate na ca vAkyamityAdinA / vyApyavyApakasambandhajJAnaM vinA'numAnaM naiva prasarati / zAndajJAne tvevaM. vidhazabdArtha- sambandhajJAnapUrvakatvaM na sArvatrikam-abhinavakaviracitavAkyasyAzrutapUrvatvAttatra tAdRzasambandhajJAnasyAsambhavaH / tathA ca sati pUrvapakSimatena tatra zAnadazAnaM naivasyAditi tAtparyam //

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ko. 5] arthApatteranumAne'ntarbhAvaH / evamarthApattirapi na pramANAntaram / tathA hi-jIvatazcaitrasya gRhAbhAvadarzanena ra bahirbhAvasyAdRSTasya kalpanamarthApattirabhimatA vRddhA / nAm / sA'pyanumAnameva / yadA khalvavyApakaH sajhekatra ranumAne 'ntarbhAvaH // ' nAsti tadA'nyatrAsti / yadA'vyApaka ekatrAsti tadA. 'nyatra nAstIti sukaraH svazarIre vyAptigrahaH / tathA ca sato gRhAbhAvadarzanena liGgena bahirbhAvadarzanamanumAnameva / na ca caitrasya kacitsattvena gRhAbhAvaH zakyo'pahnotum , yenAsiddho gahAbhAvo bahirbhAve na hetuH syAt / na ca gRhAbhAvena vA sattvamapahvayate, yena sattvamevAnupapadyamAnamAtmAnaM na bahiravasthApayet / tathA hi-caitrasya gRhAsattvena sattvamAtraM virudhyate, gRhasattvaM vA ? na tAvadyatra vacana sattvasyAsti virodho gahAsattvena, bhinna viSayatvAt / "dezasAmAnyena gRhavizeSAkSepo'pi pAkSika iti samAnaviSayatayA virodha" iti cet , na, pramANavinizcitasya gRhe 'sattvasya pAkSikatayA sAMzayikena gRhasattvena pratikSepAyogAt / nApi pramANanizcito gahAbhAvaH pAkSikamasya gahasattvaM pratikSipan sattvamapi pratikSeptuM sAMzayikatvaM ca vyapanetumarhatIti yuktam / 1. "dezasAmAnyapraviSTagraha vizeSamAdAya samAnaviSayatayA virodha iti zaGkate" iti rAghavAnandAH / sattvaM hi gRhabahissAdhAraNatayA sAmAnyapravRttaM vizeSagRhAsattvena viruddhamiti zaGkAkRdbhavaH / kvacidastIti kathanena sthalavizeSavinigamanAvirahAt gRhAbhAvo'pi bAdhyate, gRhasyApi kvacitpade'ntarbhAvAt , ataeva gRhasattvena virodha iti hRdayam / "dezasAmAnyeneti" sAmAnyasya sAdhAraNadharmatayA tajjJAnasya saMzayahetutayA uccastaratvajJAnena sthANutvapuruSatvayoriva gRhabahirdezayorAdheyatAsambandhena caitre saMzaye gRhatvAvacchinnaprakArakajJAnasya gRhAbhAvajJAnavirodhitayA gRhAbhAvarUpahetoJjanaM na sambhavatItyabhiprAyaH / zabdArthastu " dezasAmAnyena" dezasAmAnyajJAnena, " gRhavizeSAkSepaH" gRhAtmakavizeSasambandhaH, "pAkSikaH" saMzayaviSayaH, "samAnaviSayatayA" gRhAbhAvapratiyogitAvacchedakAvacchinnatayA, " virodhaH " ekasattve 'praasttvniymH| " pramANeti " pratiyogitAvacchedakAvacchinnaprakArakanizcayasyaivAbhAvadhIhetutayA saMzayasya na virodhitetyabhisandhiH, akSarArthastu spaSTaH /

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16 abhAvasambhavayoH pratyakSAnumAnayorantarbhAvaH / [so. ta. gRhAvacchinnena caitrAbhAvena gRhasattvaM viruddhatvAt pratikSipyate, na tu sattva. mAtram , tasya tatraudAsInyAt / tasmAdgRhAbhAvena liGgena siddhena sato bahi. A~vo'numIyata iti yuktam / etena 'viruddhayoH pramANayoviSayavyavasthayA'virodhApAdanamarthApatteviSaya' iti nirastam , avacchinnAnavacchinnayorvirodhAbhAvAt / udAharaNAntarANi cArthApatterevamevAnumAne'ntarbhAvanIyAni / tasmAnAnumAnAtpramANAntaramApattiriti siddham // evamabhAvo'pi pratyakSameva / na hi bhUtalasya pariNAmavizeSAt kaivalya. lakSaNAdanyo ghaTAbhAvo nAma / pratikSaNapariNAmino hi (48) abhAvasya sarva eka bhAvAH, Rte citizakteH / sa ca prinnaamprtyksse'ntrbhaavH|| bheda aindriyaka iti nAsti pratyakSAnavaruddho viSayo yatrAbhAvAhvayaM pramANAntaramabhyupeyeteti // sambhavastu, yathA-khAyAM droNADhakaprasthAyavagamaH / sa cAnumAnameva / (49) sambhavasyAnuH khArItvaM hi droNAdyavinAbhUtaM pratItam khAyAM droNAmAne'ntabhavaH // disattvamavagamayati / yaccAnirdiSTapravaktakaM pravAdapAramparyamAtram- ' iti hocavRddhAH, ' -isyai tihyam , yathA 'iha vaTe yakSaH prativasati' iti, (50) aitihyasya na tat pramANAntaram , anirdiSTapravaktRkatvena sAMza pramANatvAbhAvaH // yikasvAt / bhAptavaktakasvanizvaye svAgama eva / ityupapannam " trividhampramANam" iti // 5 // evaM tAvabyaktAvyaktajJalakSaNaprameya siddhayarthaM pramANAni lakSitAni / tatra vyakta pRthivyAdi svarUpataH pAMsulapAdako hAliko'pi pratya(51) pramANAnAM kSataH pratipadyate, pUrvavatA cAnumAnena ghUmAdidarzanAt zakti nirnnyH|| vahnayAdIni ceti, tadvayutpAdanAya mandraprayojanaM zAstram iti duradhigamamanena vyutpAdyam / tatra yatpramANaM yatra zatam taduktalakSaNebhyaH pramANebhyo niSkRSya darzayati-- 1. dhUlidhUsaracaraNaH halavAhI, grAmyajana iti yAvat /

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ko. 7 ] atIndriyANAmanumAnAt pratIti: / sAmAnyatastu dRSTAt atIndriyANAmpratItiranumAnAt / tasmAdapi cAsiddhaM parokSamAptAgamAt siddham // 6 // "" sAmAnyata " iti / 'tu' zabda: pratyakSapUrvavadbhayAM vizinaSTi / sAmAnyato dRSTAnumAnAdatIndriyANAM pradhAnapuruSAdInAM (52) atIndriyANAM sAmAnyato dRSTAdanumAnAt pratItiH - citicchAyApattirbuddheradhyavasAya ityarthaH pratItiH upalakSaNaM caitat zeSavadityapi draSTavyam // T: 11 kiM sarveSvatIndriyeSu sAmAnyato dRSTameva pravartate ? / tathA ca yatra tannAsti, mahadAdyArambhakrame svargApUrvadevatAdau ca tatra teSAmabhAvaH prApta ityata Aha- tasmAdapi " iti / tasmAdityetAvataiva siddhe 'ca' kAreNa zeSavadityapi samuccitam // 6 // "I (53) sAmAnyato dRSTAdanumAnAdasiddhAnAmAtAgamAt siddhiH // " syAdetat, yathA gaganakusumakUrmaromazazaviSANAdiSu pratyakSamapravartamAnam (54) pratyakSAbhAvAt tadabhAvamavagamayati, evaM pradhAnAdiSvapi / tatkathaM pradhAnAdInAmabhAvazaGkA || teSAM sAmAnyato dRSTAdibhyaH siddhirityata AhaatidUrAt sAmIpyAt indriyaghAtAnmano'navasthAnAt / saukSmyAvyavadhAnAt abhibhavAt samAnAbhihArAzca // 7 // " - 1. yathA kaumudyAM tathaiveyaM kArikA vyAkhyAtA gauDapAdenAtha jayamaGgalAyAm // idamaparamapi vyAkhyAnamupalabhyate candrikAyAm - 'sAmAnyataH ' sAdhAraNasya vastujAtasya pratItiH 'dRSTAt' pratyakSAt bhavati 'atIndriyANAM' tu pratItiH 'anumAnAt' bhavati - ' tasmAt ' anumAnAt api kecit padArthAH pratyetuM na zakyAH - : - teSAM pratItistu ' AptAgamAt ' sidhyati -- iti // ta. kau. 2

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pradhAnAdhapratyakSe hetvH| [sAM. ta. "matidUrAt" iti / anupalabdhiriti vakSyamANaM siMhAvalokananyAye (55) tannirAsaH, nAnuSaanIyam / yathA utpatan viyati patastri atidUraatidUrAtisAmI- tayA, saJcapi, pratyakSeNa nopalabhyate / sAmIpyAdityatrApyendriyaghAtamano- pyatiranuvartanIyaH, yathA locanasthamajanamatisAmIpyAna 'navasthAnasau. dRzyate / indriyaghAto'ndhatvabadhiratvAdiH / " mano'na. myavyavadhAnAbhi- vasthAnAt , " yathA kAmAdyupahatamanAH sphItAlokamadhyabhavasamAnAbhi- vartinamindriyasanikRSTamartha na pazyati / " saukSmyAt ," hArebhyaH pratyakSA- yathendriyasa nikRSTam paramANvAdi praNihitamanA api na bhAvaH // pazyati / " vyavadhAnAt ," yathA kukhyAdiSyavahitaM rAjadArAdi na pazyati / "bhabhibhavAt ," yathA'hani saurIbhirbhAbhirabhi. bhUtaM prahanakSatramaNDalaM na pazyati / " samAnAbhihArAt ," yathA toyada. vimukkAnudabindUn janAzaye na pazyati // 'ca' kAro'nuktasamuzcayArthaH / tenAnudbhavo'pi saMgRhItaH / tadyathA (56) anudbhavAdapi kSIrAyavasthAyAM dadhyAyanuvAna pazyati // pratyakSanivRttiH // etaduktaM bhavati / na pratyakSanivRttimAtrAdvasvabhAvo bhavati, matiprasaGgAt / (57) pratyakSanivRtti- tathA hi gRhAdvinirgato gRhajanamapazyaMstadabhAvaM khe nAbhAvasya kAraNam / vinizcinuyAt , na svevam / mapi tu yogyapratyakSa. api tu yogyapratyakSa nivatterayamabhAvaM vinizcinoti / na ca prdhaanpurussaanivRttiH|| dInAmasti pratyakSayogyatA, iti na tanivRttimAtrA. sadabhAvanizcayo yuktaH prAmANikAnAm iti // 7 // katamapunareteSu kAraNaM pradhAnAdInAmanulabdhAvityata mAha saunayAttadanupalabdhirnAbhAvAt , kAryatastadupalabdheH / mahadAdi tacca kArya prakRtisarUpaM virUpaM ca // 8 // 1. yathA siMhaH purato gatvA pazcAt pazyati tathA'grimapadasya yatra prAggatazabdaiH sambandhastatrAsya nyAyasya pravRttirityAdikamasmadIyanyAyalatikAyAM draSTavyam //

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19 ko.8] pradhAnasAdhanakAryam / "saukSmyAt" iti / athAbhAvAdeva saptamarasavadeteSAmanupalabdhiH kasmAtra ___bhavatItyata Aha- " nAbhAvAt " iti / kutaH ? (58) pradhAnAnupa. "kAryatastadupalabdheH" iti / 'tat' iti pradhAnaM parAlabdhau saukSmyam kAra. mRzati / puruSopalabdhau tu pramANaM vakSyati " sakA. Nam / taparArthatvAt " (kArikA 17) iti / dRDhatarapramANA vadhArite hi pratyakSamapravartamAnamayogyatvAtra pravartate iti kalpyate / saptamastu raso na pramANenAvadhArita iti na tatra pratyakSasthA. yogyatA zakyA'dhyavasitumityabhiprAyaH // kiM punastatkArya yataH pradhAnAnumAnamityata Aha-"mahadAdi tacca kAryam" iti / etazca yathA gamakam tthoprissttaaduppaadyissyte| (59) pradhAnAstiH tasya ca kAryasya vivekajJAnopayoginI sArUpyavairUpye tvasAdhanakAraNabhUtama- mAha- " prakRtisarUpaM vikAra ca" iti / ete hadAdikAryam // tUpariSTAdvibhajanIye iti // 8 // kAryAt kAraNamAtraM gamyate / santi cAtra vAdinAM vipratipattayaH / tathA hi kecidAhuH, ' asataH sat jAyate' iti, 'ekasya (60) kAryakAraNasa- sato vivartaH kAryajAtaM na vastu sat' ityapare, anye mbandhe vAdiviprati- tu 'sataH asat jAyate' iti, 'sataH sat jAyate' pattayaH // iti vRddhaaH|| tatra pUrvasmin kalpatraye pradhAnaM na sidhyati / sukhaduHkhamohabhedavatsvarUpa pariNAmazabdAcAtmakaM hi jagat kAraNasya pradhAnasya (61) satkAryapakSa pradhAnatvaM satvarajastamassvabhAvasvamavagamayati / yadi eva prdhaanaastitvsaadhkH|| punarasataH sajAyeta asabirupAkhyaM kAraNaM sukhAdirUpa zabdAyAtmakaM kathaM syAt , sadasatostAdAtmyAnupapatteH ? mathaikasya sato vivartaH zabdAdiprapancaH, tathA'pi sataH sajAyata iti na syAt / na cAsyAdvayasya prapancAramakatvam , api tvaprapamcasva prapamcAtmakatayA pratItirdhama eva / yeSAmapi kaNabhakSAkSacaraNAdInAM sata evaM kAraNAdasato janma teSAmapi sadasatorekaravAnupapattene kAryAtmakaM kAraNamiti na tanmate pradhAnasiddhiH

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satkAryapakSaviruddhapakSANAM nirAsaH [sAM. ta. (62 ) satkAryaprati- bhataH pradhAnasiddhayartha prathamaM tAvatsaskArya pratipAdanam // jAnIte-- asadakaraNAdupAdAnagrahaNAt sarvasaMbhavAbhAvAt / zaktasya zakyakaraNAt , kAraNabhAvAJca sat kAryam // 9 // " asadakaraNAt" iti / " sat kAryam "-kAraNavyApArAt prAgapIti zeSaH / tathA ca na siddhasAdhanaM naiyAyikatanayairudbhA(63.) bauddhasiddhAnta- vanIyam / yadyapi bIjamRtpiNDAdipradhvaMsAnantaramanirAsaH // kuraghaTAdyutpattirupalabhyate, tathA'pi na pradhvaMsasya ___ kAraNatvam , api tu bhAvasyaiva bIjAdhavayavasya / prabhAvAttu bhAvotpattI, tasya sarvatra sulabhatvAt , sarvadA sarvakAryotpAdaprasaGga ityAdi nyAyavArtikatAtparyaTIkAyAmasmAbhiH pratipAditam // (64) vedAntamata* * prapaJcapratyayazcAsati bAdhake na zakyo mithyeti vadi. nirAsaH tum iti // kaNabhakSAkSacaraNamatamavaziSyate / tatredaM pratijJAnam , "sat kAryam" iti / atra hetumAha "asadakaraNAt " iti / asat (65)nyaaymtniraasH| cet kAraNavyApArAt pUrva kAryam , nAsya sattvaM kartuM asataH karaNAyogyatvAt kenApi zakyam , na hi nIlaM zilpisahasraNApi pItaM sat kAryamapi prathamo katuM zakyate / 'sadasattve ghaTasya dhauM' iti cet , tathA. hetuH (1) // 'pyasati dharmiNi na tasya dharma iti satvaM tadavasthameva / tathA ca nAsatvam , asambaddhanAtadAtmanA cAsatvena kathamasan ghaTaH ? tasmAt kAraNavyApArAdUrdhvamiva tataH prAgapi sadeva kAryamiti / kAraNAcAsya sato'bhivyaktirevAvaziSyate / satazcAbhivyaktirupapanA, yathA pIDanena tileSu tailasyAvaghAtena dhAnyeSu taNDulAnAM dohanena saurabheyISu 1. dharmiNi (ghaTe) nAsattvam ( ghaTasya dharmaH ) // " asattvaM ghaTe saMbaddhaM tadAtmakaM bhavati na vA ? Aye asadAtmakasya ghaTasya asatvaM dharmo na syAt / sambandhasya tadAtmakasya ghaTasApekSatvAt sattvaM syAt ghaTasyeti sattvaM tadavasthameva / dvitIyaM pratyAha-- 'asambaddhana' iti, tasyAsatve'bhyupagamyamAne'tiprasaGgaH syAdityubhayathA'pi sattvaM ghaTasyeti " bhAratIyatyAdayaH //

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ko. 9] kAryasattvasAdhanAni / payasaH / asataH karaNe tu na nidarzanaM kiJcidasti / na khalvabhivyajyamAnaM corapadyamAnaM vA kvacidasadadRSTam // itazca kAraNavyApArAt prAk sadeva kAryam- " upaadaangrhnnaat"| upAdAnAni kAraNAni, teSA grahaNaM, kAryeNa smbndhH| sambandhAcca satkAryamiti upAdAnaiH kAryasya sambandhAditi yAvat / etaduktaM dvitIyo hetuH ( 2 ) // bhavati-kAryeNa sambaddhaM kAraNam kAryasya janakam , sambandhazca kAryasyAsato na sambhavati, tasmAditi // syAdetat-asambaddhameva kArya kAraNaiH kasmAna janyate ? tathA cAsadevo. (67) kAryakAraNa. tpatsyata ityata Aha-"sarvasambhavAbhAvAt" iti / yorniyatasambandhAbhAve asambaddhasya janyasve, asambaddhatvAvizeSeNa sarva sarvakAryakAraNabhAva. kAryajAtaM sarvasmAdbhavet / na caitadasti, tsmaanaaviplvaapttiH|| sambaddhamasambaddhana janyate api tu sambaddhaM sambaddhena, janyata iti / yathAhuH sAMkhyavRddhAH" asattve nAsti sambandhaH kAraNaiH sattvasaGgibhiH / asambaddhasya dhotpattimicchato na vyavasthitiH " iti // syAdetat-masambaddhamapi sat tadeva karoti yatra yat kAraNaM zaktam / zaktizca kAryadarzanAdavagamyate / tena nAvyavasthetyata (68) kAraNazakteH ' Aha "zaktasya zakyakaraNAt" iti / sA zaktiH zaktakAryaparatvAcca satkAryam kAraNAzrayA sarvatra vA syAt , zakye eva vA ? sarvatra (3) // cettadavasthaivAvyavasthA, zakye cet, kathamasati zakye tatra, iti vaktavyam / zaktibheda eva etAdRzo yataH kiJcideva kArya janayet na sarvamiti cet , hanta bhoH zaktivizeSaH kAryasambaddho vA'sambaddho vA ? sambaddhasve nAsatA sambandhaH iti san kAryam / asambaddhattve saivAvyavasthA, iti suSTUktaM "zaktasya zakyakaraNAt " iti // itazca sat kAryamityAha- " kAraNabhAvAcca" / kAryasya kAraNAtma(69) kAraNAtmakatvAt kasvAt / nahi kAraNAgniM kAryam , kAraNaM ca kAryasya sat kAryam (4) // sat, iti kathaM tadabhivaM kAryamasat bhavet // 1. pnycshikhaadyH|

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22 kAryakAraNAbhedasAdhanam / [sAM. ta. kAryasya kAraNAbhedasAdhanAni ca pramANAni-(1) na paTastantubhyo bhiyate, tantudharmasvAt / iha yat yato midyate tat tasya dharmoM (70) kAryakAraNA- na bhavati, yathA gaurazvasya / dharmazca paTastantUnAM, tasmAbhedasAdhanAni // mArthAntaram / (2) upAdAnopAdeyabhAvAca nArthA ntaravaM tantupaTayoH / yayorarthAntaratvam na tayorupA dAgopAdeyabhAvaH, yathA ghaTapaTayoH / upAdAnopAdeyabhAvAzca tantupaTayoH / vasmAnArthAntarasvam / (3) itazca nArthAntaratvaM tantupaTayoH, saMyogAprAptyamAvAt / arthAntaratve hi saMyogo dRSTo yathA kuNDabadarayoH, bhaprAptirvA yathA himapadvindhyayoH / na ceha saMyogAprAptI, tasmAnArthAntaratvamiti / (4) itazca paTastantubhyo na bhidyate, gurutvAntarakAryAgrahaNAt / iha yat yasmA. mitram , tat tasmAt tasya gurutvAntaraM kAyaM gRhyate, yathaikapalikasya svastikasya gurusvakAryo'vanativizeSastasmAdvipalikasya svastikasya gurutvakAryo'vanatibhedo'dhikaH / na ca tathA tantugurusvakAryAt paTagurutvakAryAntaraM dRzyate / tasmAdaminastantubhyaH paTa iti / tAnyetAnyabhedasAdhanAnyavItAni // evamabhede siddhe, tantava eva tena tena saMsthAnabhedena pariNatAH paTo, na tantubhyo'rthAntaraM paTaH / svotmani kriyAvirodhasaMba(71) kAryakAraNa. dhabuddhivyapadezArthakriyAbhedAzca naikAntikaM bhedaM sAdhayorabhedAt kAraNapari- yitumarhanti, ekasminnapi tattadvizeSAvirbhAvatiroNAmabheda eva kaarym| bhAvAbhyAmeteSAmavirodhAt , yathA hi kurmasyAGgAni tanmate virodhAdipari. kUrmazarIre nivizamAnAni tirobhavanti, niHsaramti haarH|| cAvirbhavanti / na tu kUrmatastadaGgAnyutpadyante pradhvaM. sante vA / evamekasyA mRdaH suvarNasya vA ghaTamukuTAdayo vizeSAH niHsaranta Avirbhavanta utpadyanta ityucyante, nivizamAnA. stirobhavanti vinazyantItyucyante / na punarasatAmutpAdaH satAM vA nirodhaH / pavAha bhagavAn kRSNadvaipAyanaH 1 vyatirekAnumAnAni / 2. svAtmani utpattivinAzalakSaNaviruddhakriyA, iha tantuSu paTa iti / atra tantupaTayoH sambandhasya zAnaM bhAsate tAdRzI coktirbhavati / nyapadezaH, prAvaraNArthakriyAbhedazca /

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kau. 9] kAraNavyApArAvazyakatA / "nAsato vidyate bhAvo nAbhAvo vidyate sataH" iti / (bhagavadgItA, 2016) yathA kUrmaH svAvayavebhyaH saGkocavikAsibhyo na bhinnaH, evaM ghaTamukuTAdayo'pi mRtsuvarNAdibhyo na bhinnAH / evabeha tantuSu paTa iti vyapadezo, yatheha bane tilakA' ityuppnnH| na cArthakriyAbhedo'pi bhedamApAdayati, ekasyApi nAnA. rthakriyAdarzanAt / yathaika eva vahirdAhakaH pAcakaH prakAzakazceti / nApyarthakriyAmyavasthA vastubhede hetuH, teSAmeva samastavyastAnAmarthakriyAvyavasthAdarzanAt / yathA pratyekaM viSTayo varmadarzanalakSaNAmarthakriyAM kurvanti, na tu zibikAvahanam / militAstu zibikAmudvahanti, evaM tantavaH pratyeka prAvaraNamakurvANA api militA AvirbhUtapaTabhAvAH prAvariSyanti / / syAdetat-AvirbhAvaH paTasya kAraNavyApArAt prAk san asan vA ? masaMcet prAptaM tIsadutpAdanam / atha san , kRtaM tarhi kAraNavyApAreNa / nahi (72)kAryasya kAraNapari- sati kArye kAraNavyApAraprayojanaM pazyAmaH / bhAviNAmavizeSatve kAraNa- rbhAve caavirbhaavaantrklpne'nvsthaaprsnggH| tasmAdA. vyApArasyAprayojakatvamanavasthApattizca // virbhUtapaTabhAvAstantavaH kriyanta iti rikaM vcH|| maivam / athAsadutpadyata iti mate keyamasadutpattiH ? satI, asatI (73) tatparihAraH / ukta- vA? satI cet , kRtaM tarhi kAraNaiH / asatI cet, doSasyobhayamate tulytvm|| tasyA apyutpattyantaramityanavasthA // matha 3-' utpattiH paTAmArthAntaram , api tu paTa evAsau', tathA'pi yAvaduktaM bhavati 'paTa' iti tAvaduktaM bhavati (74) paTatadutpattyoraikya- 'utpadyate' iti / tatazca 'paTa' ityukte, 'utpadyate' zaGkA-tatparihArazca // iti na vAcyama, paunarutyAt / 'vinazyati' ityapi na vAdhyam , utpattivinAzayoryugapadekatra virodhAt / / 1. tilakavRkSamayavanaviSaye yathA " iha vane tilakA" iti saGgacchate tathA tantumayapaTe'pIti ! 2. evaM ca zaGkAkRdudbhAvito doSaH samAna eva pakSadaye / tatazca naikenAparampratyudbhAvanIya iti / ythaahurbrhmsuutrkaaraa:-svpshdossaacceti-| 3. uktAnavasthAlakSaNadoSaparijihIrSayA paTotpattyoraikyaM zaGkate 'paTa evAsau' tatazca nAnavastheti zeSaH // tarhi paryAyazabdAvetAvityabhipretya pariharati ca

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24 kaarikopsNhaarH| [sAM. ta. tasmAdiyaM paTotpattiH svakAraNasamavAyo vA, svasattAsamavAyo vA,ubhayathA 'pi notpadyate, atha ca tadarthAni kAraNAni vyApAryante / (75) paTotpattau satyA- evaM sata eva paTAderAvirbhAvAya kAraNApekSepyupapanam / / mapi kAraNavyApArA- na ca paTarUpeNa kAraNAnAM sambandhaH, tadrUpasyAkriyApekSA // tvAt , kriyAsambandhitvAcca kAraNAnAm , anyathA kAraNAtvAbhAvAt // (76) kArikopa tasmAt sat kAryamiti puSkalam // 9 // sNhaarH|| " 1. paTotpattau satyAmapi kAraNavyApArasya prayojanamityabhipretyAha- 'tasmAt ' iti / nyAyamate'pi paTotpattiH svakAraNabhUtatantubhirayutasiddhA, svasattAmAtreNAyutasiddhA vA bhavitumarhati / ubhayathA'pi tu kAraNavyApAramantareNa na paTotpattirupapadyate / na cAbhivyakterapi janyatve satkAryabAdho'navasthA cetyAdi vAcyam / vyavahAropayogitattatkAryAbhivyaktestattatkAryaniSThasattvaguNarUpatayA nityatve'pi tamasA pratibaddhatvAnna vyavahAropayogitvam / abhivyaJjakasAmagrathA tu tamasaH pratibandhaH / uttejakasyApyuttejanamAtrAGgIkArAnna satkAryabAdhaH / kAryakAraNayorbhede'pi vyavahArakSamatA kAryAtmanAbhivyaktasyaiva nAnyathA ityAdi candrikAyAM spaSTam // " upasaMharati 'tasmAditi' utpattyutpatteraGgIkAre'navasthAprasaGgenAnutpannAyA apyutpatteH kAraNavyApArApekSitvavadasmanmate'pi sata eva ghaTasyAvirbhAvAya kAraNavyApArApekSA / ghaTotpattimaGgIkurvANena ghaTe kAraNavyApArApekSitvasya prayojyatvarUpasyaivAdaraNIyatayA''virbhAve eva tadaGgIkAramAtreNa nirvAhe kRtamutpatyaGgIkAreNa, yuktaM caitat , anyathotpattivAde ca kAryasyeva kAraNasApekSatayA tasya ca kriyAtvAbhAve kriyAsambandhitvaprayuktakArakatvakAraNatvavyavahArAnupapatteH satkAryavAda eva sAdhIyAnityAzayaH" iti kecit / 2. nyAyamate kAraNasya sattAyAH sakalasya sama. vAyasya nityatvAdityAzayaH / 'notpadyate', api tu Avirbhavatyeveti zeSaH / 3. bhavanmate'pIti zeSaH // 4. nanu 'asmatpakSe-paTarUpANi kAraNAni kurvanti iti saduktistvatpakSabAdhikA' iti cet , tatrAha " na ca" iti / tadrUpaM cAnityameveti bhavati tasyotpattiriti hRdayam /

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kau. 10] vyaktAvyaktasArUpyam / tadevaM pradhAnasAdhanAnuguNaM sat kAryamupapAdya yAdRzaM tat pradhAnaM sAdhanIyaM (77) vyaktAvyakta- tAdRzamAdarzayituM vivekajJAnopayoginI vyaktAvyaktasArUpyavairUpye // sArUpyavairUpye tAvadAha hetumadanityamavyApi sakriyamanekamAzritaM liGgam / sAvayavaM paratantraM vyaktaM, viparItamavyaktam // 10 // (78) vyaktAnAM sArU- - " hetumat" iti / vyaktaM hetumat , hetuH kAraNam , , pyam / tatra hetuma - tadvat , yasya ca yo hetuH tamupariSTAvakSyati // tvam // (1) (79) anitya- "anityama." vinAzi, tirobhAvIti yAvat // tvam // (2) ___ "avyApi", sarva pariNAminaM na vyApnoti / kAraNena hi kAryamAviSTam , (80) avyApi- na kAryeNa kAraNam / na ca buddhadhAdayaH pradhAnaM vevitvam // (3) SantItyavyApakAH / / " sakriyam", parispandavat' / yathA hi buddhyAdayaH upAttamupAttaM deI tyajanti dehAntaraM copAdadata, iti teSAM parispandaH / (81) sakriyatvam / / (4) zarIrapRthivyAdInAM ca parispandaH prasiddha eva / " bhanekam", pratipuruSaM buddhayAdInAM bhedAt pRthivyAdyapi zarIraghaTA(82) anekatvam / / (5) dibhedenAnekameve / / " Azritam", svakAraNamAzritam / buddhayAdikAryANAmabhede'pi katha( 83 ) Azrita- vibhedavivakSayA''zrayAzrayibhAvaH, yatheha vane tilakA tvam / / (6) ityuktam // ___ "liGgam " pradhAnasya / yathA caite buddhayAdaya pradhAnasya liGgam tatho. pariSTAvakSyati / pradhAnaM tu na pradhAnasya liGgam (84) liGgatvam // (7) puruSasya liGgambhavadapIti bhAvaH // 1. 'sakriyam ' adhyavasAyAdirUpaniyatakriyAkAritvamiti * bhASye / 2. athavA sargabhedena bhinnam / 3. ' liGgayati' anumAnena bhoktAraM jJApayatIti liGgam /

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26 vyaktAvyaktasArUpyam / [sAM. ta. "sAvayam" avayavAvayavisaMyogasaMyogi / atha vA avayavanam avayavaH, avayavAnAmavayavinAM mithaH saMzleSo mizraNam saMyoga (85) sAvayava- iti yAvat / aprAptipUrvikA prAptiH saMyogaH / tena tvam // (8) saha vartata iti sAvayavam / tathAhi pRthivyAdayaH parasparaM saMyujyante, evamanye'pi / na tu pradhAnasya buddhayAdibhiH saMyogaH, tAdAtmyAt / nApi satvarajastamasAM parasparaM saMyogaH, bhaprApterabhAvAt // " paratantram " buddhayAdi / buddhayA svakArye'haGkAre janayitavye prakRtyA pUro'pekSyate, anyathA kSINA satI nAlamahaGkAraM ( 86 ) paratantra- janayitumiti sthitiH / evamahaGkArAdibhirapi tvam / / (9) svakAryajanane / iti sarvaH svakAryeSu prakRtyA pUrama . pekSate / tena parAM prakRtimapekSamANaM kAraNamapi svakAryajanane paratantraM vyaktam / / "viparItamavyaktam"-vyakAt / ahetumannityaM vyApi niSkriyam , (87 ) avyaktasya [yadyapyavyaktasyAsti pariNAmalakSaNA kriyA tathA'pi vaiparItyam // parispando nAsti // ] ekamanAzritamaliGgamanavayavam svatantramavyaktam // 10 // (88) vyaktAvyaktayossAdhANi puruSAcca tadanena prabandhena vyaktAvyaktayo_dharmyamuktam , samprati tayorvedhamyam // __tayoH sAdharmyam, puruSAcca vaidharmyam , mAhatriguNamaviveki viSayaH sAmAnyamacetanamprasavadharmi / vyaktaM, tathA pradhAnam , tadviparItastathA ca pumAna ! 11 // (89) triguNatvam "triguNam" iti / trayo guNAH sukhaduHkhamohA prathamam sAdharmyam // asyeti triguNam / tadanena sukhAdInAmAtmaguNatvam (1) . perAbhimatamapAkRtam / 1. avayav + anaT / 2. naiyAyikAdyabhimatam /

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kau. 11 ] vyaktAvyaktasArUpyam / "aviveki " / yathA pradhAnaM na svato vivicyate, evammahadAdayo'pi na / pradhAnAt vivicyante, tadAtmakatvAt / atha vA ( 90 ) avivekitvam sambhUyakaritA'trAvivekitA / na hi kiJcidekaM dvitIyam // (2) paryAptam svakArye, api tu sambhUya / tatra naikasmAt yasya kasyacit kenacitsambhava iti // ye' tvAhuH-' vijJAnameva harSaviSAdamohazabdAdyAtmakam , na punarito 'nyastaddharmA' iti-tAn pratyAha-" viSaya" iti / ( 91 ) viSayatvam 'viSayo' grAhyaH, vijJAnAdvahiriti yAvat / ata sAmAnyatvaM ca tRtIya- eva "sAmAnyam" sAdhAraNam , bhanekaiH puruSairgRhIta. caturtha ( 3 ) (4) mityarthaH / vijJAnAkAratve tu, asAdhAraNyAdvijJAnAnAM vRttirUpANAM, te'pyasAdhAraNAH syuH / vijJAnaM pareNa na gRhyate parabuddherapratyakSatvAdityabhiprAyaH / tathA ca nartakI-bhrUlatAbhaGge ekasmin bahUnAM pratisandhAnaM yuktam / anyathA tanna syAt iti bhAvaH // ( 92 ) acetanatvam "acetanam" / sarva eva pradhAnabuddhayAdayo'cetanAH, paJcamam // (5) na tu vainAzikavat caitanyambuddherityarthaH // "prsvdhrmi"| prasavarUpo dharmoM yaH so'syAstIti prasavadharmi / [prasava( 93 ) prasavadharmitvam dharmeti vaktavye matvarthIyaH prasavadharmasya nityayogaSaSTham // (6) mAkhyAtum ] / svarUpavirUpapariNAmAbhyAM na kadAcidapi viyujyata ityarthaH // ( 94 ) uktavyaktadharmA- vyaktavRttamanyakte'tidizati, " tathA pradhAnam" NAmavyakte'tidezaH // iti / yathA vyaktaM tathA'vyaktamityarthaH // ( 95 ) vyaktAvyaktayoH tAbhyAM vaidhayaM puruSasyA''ha - " tadviparItaH puruSAt vaidharmyam // pumAn " iti // 1. vijJAnavAdino bauddhAH / 2. teSAM vijJAnAkAratve / 3. triguNatvAdisAdharmya vyaktAvyaktayoriti yAvat /

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28 guNasvarUpanirUpaNam / [mAM. ta. syAdetat-ahetumattvanityatvAdi pradhAnasAdharmyamasti puruSasya, evamane katvaM vyaktasAdharmyam, tatkathamucyate 'tadviparItaH (96 ) sAdharmya ca // pumAn ' iti ? mata mAha- " tathA ca" iti / cakAro'pyarthaH' / yadyapyahetumattvAdikaM sAdharmyam , tatrApyatraiguNyAdi vaiparItyamassyevetyarthaH / / 11 // triguNamityuktam, tatra ke te trayo guNAH, kiM ca tadupalakSaNamityata Aha- . (97) gunnniruupnnm|| prItyaprItiviSAdAtmakAH prakAzapravRttiniyamArthAH / anyonyAbhibhavAzrayajananamithunavRttayazca guNAH // 12 // " guNAH " [ parArthAH ] " sattvaM laghu prakAzakam " [ kArikA 13 ] (98 ) guNAnAM svarU- ityatra nirdekssynte| tadanAgatAvekSaNena tantrayuktyA vA pANi, sukhaduHkhayoH para- prItyAdInAM yathAsaMkhyaM veditavyam // sparAbhAvarUpatA vyudaasshc|| aitaduktaM bhavati-prItiH sukham , prItyAtmakaH sattvaguNaH; aprItirduHkham , maprItyAtmako rajoguNaH; viSAdo mohaH, viSAdAtmaka. (99) uktalakSaNasa- stamoguNaH ityarthaH / ye tu manyante "na prItirduHkhAbhA vAdatiricyate evaM duHkhamapi na prItyabhAvAdanya diti," tAn prati " Atma"-grahaNam / netaretarAbhAvAH sukhAdayaH, api tu bhAvAH, Atmazabdasya bhAvavacanatvAt / prItiH mAtmA bhAvo yeSAM te prItvAtmAnaH / evamanyadapi vyAkhyeyam / bhAvarUpatA caiSAmanubhavasiddhA / parasparAbhAvAtmakatve tu parasparAzrayApattarekasyApyasiddhe. rubhayAsiddhiriti bhAvaH // 1. ca = api / 2. ArjavazraddhAdInAM prItAvAntarbhAvaH, dveSamohavipralambhabhayAdInAM caapriitii| manvayaH //

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ko. 12 ] guNAnAM kriyaaH| 29 svarUpameSAmuktvA prayojanamAha- " prakAzapravRttiniyamArthAH" iti / yo atrApi yathAsaMkhyameva / rajaH pravartakatvAt sarvatra lagha janama yathAsaMkhyaM prakAza- sattvaM pravartayet , yadi tamasA guruNA na niyamyeta / pravRttiniyamarUpam // tamoniyatantu kvacideva pravartayatIti bhavati tamo niyamArtham // prayojanamuktvA kriyAmAha- " anyonyAbhibhavAzrayajananamithunavRttayazca" iti / vRttiH kriyA, sA ca pratyekamabhisambadhyate / (101) guNAnAM kriyAH, 'anyonyAbhibhavavRttayaH / eSAmanyatamenArthavazAduanyonyAbhibhava- anyo- bhUtenAnyadabhibhUyate / tathA hi sattvaM rajastamasI nyApekSA-anyonyApekSa- abhibhUya zAntAmAtmano vRttiM pratilabhate, evaM rajaH janana-anyonyamithuna- sattvatamasI abhibhUya ghorAm , evaM tamaH sattvarajasI vRttirUpAH // abhibhUya mRDhAmiti / 'anyonyAzrayavRttayaH' / yadyapyAdhArAdheyabhAvena nAyamartho ghaTate, tathA 'pi yadapekSayA yasya kriyA sa tasyAzrayaH / tathA hi, sattvaM pravRtti niyamAvAzritya rajastamasoH prakAzenopakaroti, rajaH prakAzaniyamAvAzritya pravRttyetarayoH, tamaH prakAzapravRttI Azritya niyamenetarayoriti / 'anyonyajananavRttayaH / anyatamo 'nyatamamapekSya janayati / jananaM ca pariNAmaH, sa ca guNAnAM sahazarUpaH / ata eva na hetumattvam , tattvAntarasya hetorasambhavAt ; nApya. nisyatvam , tattvAntare layAbhAvAt / anyonyamithunavRttayaH / anyonyasahacarAH, adhinAbhAvavRttaya iti yAvat / 'caH' samuccaye / bhavati cAtrAgamaH " anyonyamithunAH sarve sarve sarvatragAminaH / rajaso mithunaM sattvaM sattvasya mithunaM rajaH // tamasazcApi mithune te saravarajasI ubhe / ubhayoH satvarajasomithunaM tama icyate // naiSAmAdiH samprayogo viyogo vopalabhyate" // iti devI bhAgavate-38. // 12 //

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guNatrayanirUpaNam / [sAM. ta. " prakAzapravRttiniyamArthAH" ityuktam , tatra ke te itthambhUtAH kutazcetyata (102) guNatrayanirUpa. _ Nam , teSAM pRthsvbhaavshc|| sattvaM laghu prakAzakamiSTamupaSTabhbhakaM calaM ca rajaH / guru varaNakameva tamaH, pradIpavaJcArthato vRttiH // 13 // " sattvam" iti / sattvameva laghu prakAzakamiSTam-sAMkhyAcAryaiH / tatra kAryogamane heturdharmo lAghavam gauravapratidvandvi yato (103 ) sattvaguNasva- 'gnerUddhajvalanaM bhavati, tadeva lAghavam kasyacittiryabhAvaH-lAghavam , prakA- ggamane heturbhavati, yathA vAyoH / evaM karaNAnAM vRttizakatvam // paTutvaheturlAghavam , gurutve hi mandAni syuriti sattvasya prakAzAtmakatvamuktam // sattvatamasI svayamakriyatayA svakAryapravRttiM pratyavasIdantI rajasopaSTabhyete ___avasAdAt pracyAvya svakArye utsAhaM prayatnaM kAryate / (104) rajoguNasva- tadidamuktam- " upaSTambhakaM rajaH" iti / kasmA. bhAvaH-upaSTambhakatvam, dityata uktam- "calam" iti / tadanena rajasaH calatvam / / pravRttyarthatvaM dArzatam // rajastu calatayA paritasvaiguNyaM cAlayet, guruNA''vRNvatA ca tamasA tatra ( 105) tamoguNasva ... tatra pravRttipratibandhakena kvacideva pravartyate iti tata. stato vyAvRttyA tamo niyAmakamuktam- " guru bhAvaH-gurutvam Avara pavaraNakameva tamaH" iti / evakAraH pratyekaM bhinnakramaH katvam / / sambadhyate, sattvameva, raja eva, tama eveti / / nanu 'ete parasparavirodhazIlA guNAH sundopasundavat parasparaM dhvaMsanta ityeva yuktam , prAgeva tveteSAmekakriyAkartRtA'-ityata (106) parasparaviru- Aha--"pradIpavaJcArthato vRttiH" iti / dRSTameddhAnAmapi guNAnAmartha- vaitat , yathA vartitale analavirodhinI, atha milite vazAt sahavRttitvam // sahAnalena rUpaprakAzalakSaNaM kAyaM kurutaH; tathA ca vAta pittazleSmANaH parasparavirodhinaH zarIradhAraNalakSaNa1. arthAvabhAsakamiti yAvata // 2. prakAzakatvamiti yAvat / 3. dUra eva / kA kathA parasparadhvaMsakAnAmekakriyAkAritAyA iti bhaavH|

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kau. 14 ] . sattvAdiSvavivekitvAsaMbhavazaGkA / 31 kAryakAriNaH; evaM sattvarajastamAMsi mithoviruddhAnyapyanavaya'nti svakArya kariSyanti ca / ' arthata" iti puruSArthata iti yAvat , yathA ca vakSyati " puruSArtha eva heturna kenacit kAryate karaNam" iti / / [kArikA 31] atra ca sukhaduHkhamohAH parasparavirodhinaH svasvAnurUpANi sukhaduHkhamohA tmakAnyeva nimittAni kalpayanti / teSAM ca paraspara( 107 ) sugvaduHkha- mabhibhAvyAbhibhAvakabhAvAnAnAtvam / tadyathA ekaiva mohAnAM parasparaviruddhatvA. strI rUpayauvanakulazIlasampannA svAminaM sukhAkaroti; tteSAM nimittarUpeNa guNa- tatkasya hetoH ? svAminaM prati tasyAH sukharUpasamu. trayasyA ''vazyakatvam / / dbhavAt / saiva strI sapatnIvuHkhAkaroti, tat kasya hetoH ? tAH prati tasyAH duHkharUpasamudbhavAt / evaM puruSAntaraM tAmavindamAnaM saiva mohayati; tat kasya hetoH ? tamprati tasyAH moharUpasamudbhavAt / anayA ca striyA sarva bhAvA vyAkhyAtAH / tatra yat sukhahetuH tat sukhAtmakam sattvam . yat duHkhahetuH tat duHkhAtmakaM rajaH, yanmohahetustanmohAtmakaM tamaH / sukhaprakAzalAghavAnAM tvekasmin yugapadudbhUtAvavirodhaH, sahadarzanAt / tasmAt sukhaduHkhamohairiva virodhibhiH avirodhibhirekaikaguNavRttibhiH sukhaprakAzalAghavaina nimittabhedA unnIyante / evaM duHkhopaSTambhakatvapravartakatvaiH, evaM mohagurutvAvaraNaiH--iti siddhaM traiguNyamiti syAdetat-anubhUyamAneSu pRthivyAdiSvanubhavasiddhAH bhavantvaviveki( 108) ananubhavasi- tvAdayaH / ye punaH sattvAdayo nAnubhavapathamadhirohanti dveSu sattvAdiSvaviveki- teSAM kutastyamavivekitvam , viSayatvamacetanatvam tvAdiguNAsambhavazaGkA / prasavadharmitvaM ca ? ityata mAha-- 1. sattvarajastamorUpANi / 2. sattvarajastamAMsIva sukhaduHkhamohAnAm , sukhaprakAzalAghavAnAmapi bhinnAni nimittAni kasmAnnoktAnItyAzaGkayA 'ha" sukheti"| 3. tathA sukhaduHkhamohAH parasparaviruddhAH bhinnAni nimittAni sattvarajastamorUpANi kalpayAnta-na tathA sukhaprakAzalAghavAdInAmekaikaguNavRttittve kazcidvirodho'sti, yena bhinnAni nimittAni kalperan iti bhAvaH / avirodhinAmapi bhinnanimittakalpane 'navasthA'pi //

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avyaktasAdhanAni . [sAM. ta. avivekyAdeH siddhibaiguNyAttadviparyayAbhAvAt / kAraNaguNAtmakatvAtkAryasyAvyaktamapi siddham // 14 // " avivekyAdeH" iti / avivekitvamaviveki-yathA 'yekayordvivacanai kavacane' [pANinisUtra. 1 / 4 / 22] ityatra dvitvai. (109) tannirAsaH- katvayoriti anyathA byekeSviti syAt / kutaH punaraviguNatrayAvivekitvasAdha- vekitvAdeH siddhirityata Aha-"traiguNyAt" iti| yadyat nAnvayavyatireko // sukhaduHkhamohAtmakaM tattadavivekitvAdiyogi yathedamanu bhUyamAnaM vyaktam ' iti sphuTaravAdanvayo noktaH / vyatirekamAi-" tadviparyayAbhAvAt " iti / avivekyAdiviparyaye puruSe traiguNyAbhAvAt / atha vA vyaktAvyaktaM pakSIkRtyAnvayAbhAvenAvIta eva hetusnaiguNyAditi vaktavyaH // syAdetat-avyaktasiddhau satyAM tasyAvivekitvAdayo dharmAH sidhyanti / avyaktameva svadyApi na sidhyati, tatkathamavivekitvA(110) avyaktasA- disiddhirata Aha-" kAraNaguNAtmakatvAt " iti / dhanam // ayamabhisandhiH -kArya hi kAraNaguNAtmakaM dRSTam , yathA ___ tanvAdigaNAtmakaM paTAdi / tathA mahadAdilakSaNenApi kAryeNa sukhaduHkhamoharUpeNa svakAraNagatasukhaduHkhamohAtmanA bhavitavyam / tathA ca taskAraNaM sukhaduHkhamohAtmakaM pradhAnamavyaktaM siddham bhavati // 14 // syAdetat-'vyaktAt vyaktamutpadyate' iti knnbhkssaakssicrnntnyaaH|| para (111) vyaktAdeva mANavo hi vyaktAH, taizNukAdikrameNa pRthivyAdisarvakAryakAraNabhAvopapa- lakSaNaM kArya vyaktamArabhyate / pRthivyAdiSu ca kAraNaguNatteravyaktakAraNakalpanA- krameNa ruupaadyutpttiH| tasmAt vyaktAt vyaktasya tadguvaiyarthyazaGkA // Nasya cotpatteH kRtamadRSTacareNAvyaktenetyata mAha1. sattvAdayo'vivekitvAdiyoginaH traiguNyAt sugvaduHkhamohAtmakatvAditi svarUpamanumAnasya / 2, pRthivyaadi| 3. 'yatrAvivekitvAbhAvastatra traiguNyAbhAva' ityevaMrUpam /

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ko. 15 ] avyaktakAraNasAdhanAni / bhedAnAM parimANAt samanvayAt zaktitaH pravRttezca / kAraNakAryavibhAgAdavibhAgAdvaizvarUpyasya // 15 // __ " bhedAnAm" iti / bhedAnAm vizeSANAM mahadAdInAM bhUtAnAM kAryANAM (112) ttprihaarH| kAraNaM mUlakAraNamastyavyaktam / kutaH ? "kAraNakArya. avyaktakAraNasAdha. vibhAgAdavibhAgAdvaizvarUpyasya" / kAraNe sat kAryanAni / tatra kAraNa- miti sthitam / tathA ca yathA karmazarIre sansyevAkAryayovibhAgAvibhAgA- GgAni niHsaranti vibhajyante-'idaM karmazarIraM, etA. bhyAmavyaktasiddhiriti nyetasyAGgAni '-iti; evaM nivizamAnAni tasmin prathamam (1) / avyaktIbhavanti / evaM kAraNAnmRtpiNDAddhemapiNDAdvA kAryANi ghaTamukuTAdIni santyevAvirbhavanti vibhajyante / santyeva pRthivyAdIni kAraNAttanmAtrAdAvirbhavanti vibhajyante, santyeva ca tanmAtrANya haGkArAt kAraNAt , sannevAhaGakAraH kAraNAnmahataH, sanneva ca mahAn paramAvyaktAt / so'yaM kAraNAt , paramAvyaktAtU sAkSAt pAramparyeNAnvitasya vizvasya kAryasya vibhAgaH / pratisagai tu mRtpiNDaM suvarNapiNDaM vA ghaTamukuTAdayo vizanto'vyaktIbhavanti / tatkAraNarUpamevAnabhivyaktaM kAryamape. kSyAvyakta bhavati / evaM pRthivyAdayastanmAtrANi vizantaH svApekSayA tanmAtrANyavyaktayanti, evaM tanmAtrANyahaGkAra vizansyahaGkAramavyakayanti, evamahakAro mahAntamAvizan mahAntamavyaktayati, mahAn prakRti svakAraNaM vizan prakRtimavyaktayati / prakRtestu' na kvaciniveza iti sA sarvakAryANAmavyaktameva / so'yamavibhAgaH prakRtau vaizvarUpyasya nAnArUpasya kAryasya svArthikaH pyam ] / tasmAt kAraNe kAryasya sata eva vibhAgAvibhAgAbhyAmavyaktaM kAraNamasti // itazcAvyaktamastItyata Aha-" zaktita: pravRttezca iti" / kAraNazaktitaH kArya pravartata iti siddham , azaktAt kAraNAt kArya( 113) kAraNasya syAnupapatteH, zaktizca kAraNagatA na kAryasyAvyaktazaktistasmin kArya- svAdanyA / na hi satkAryapakSe kAryasyAvyaktatAyA syAvyaktatayA sthitire- 'nyasyAM zattau pramANamasti / ayameva hi sikatAbhyaveti ca dvitIyam (2) // stilAnAM tailopAdAnAnAM bhedo yadeteSveva sailamastya nAgatAvasthaM na sikatAsviti // 1 anavasthAbhayAt / 2. vaizvarUpyapade / 3. kAraNe kAryasyAvyaktarUpeNa sthitireva tasya ( kAraNa- ) zaktiritibhAvaH // sAM. kA. 3

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34 avyaktasya prvRttiprkaarH| . [sAM. ta. syAdetat-zaktitaH pravRttiH kAraNakAryavibhAgAvibhAgau ca mahata eva paramA. vyaktasvaM sAdhayiSyataH, kRtaM tataH pareNAvyaktenetyata (114 ) mahadAdiparyaH mAha - " parimANAt" iti / parimitatvAt , ntasya kAryajAtasya avyApitvAditi yAvat / vivAdAdhyAsitA mahadAdiparimitatvAcceti tRtI- bhedAbhavyaktakAraNavantaH, parimitatvAt , ghaTAdivat / yam ( 3 ) // ghaTAdayo hi parimitAH mRdAdhanyaktakAraNakA dRSTAH / uktametadyathA kAryasyAdhyaktAvasthA kAraNameveti, yanmahataH kAraNaM tat paramAvyaktam , tataH paratarAvyaktakalpanAyAM pramANAbhAvAt // itazca vivAdAdhyAsitA bhedAH avyaktakAraNavantaH- " samanvayAt " / bhinnAnAM samAnarUpatA samanvayaH / sukhaduHkhamohasa(115) samanvayAcceti manvitA hi buddhayAdayo'dhyavasAyAdilakSaNAH pratI. caturtham (4) // " yante / yAni ca yadpasamanugatAni tAni tatsvabhAvA vyaktakAraNAni, yathA mRddhemapiNDasamanugatAH ghaTamukuTAdayo mRddhemapiNDAvyaktakAraNakA iti-kAraNamastyavyaktaM bhedAnAmiti siddham // 15 // avyaktaM sAdhayitvA asya pravRttiprakAramAha- . kAraNamastyavyaktam , pravartate triguNataH samudayAzca / pariNAmataH salilavat pratipratiguNAzrayavizeSAt // 16 // " pravartate triguNataH" iti / pratisargAvasthAyAM satvaM rajastamazca sadRza pariNAmAni bhavanti / pariNAmasvabhAvA hi guNA nApa(116 ) prakRtestri- riNamayya kSaNamapyavatiSThante / tasmAt satvaM sasvarUpaguNataH pravRttiH prathamA tayA rajo rajorUpatayA tamastamorUpatayA prtisrgaa(1)|| vasthAyAmapi pravartate / tadidamuktam " triguNataH " iti // 1. anavasthApAtAcca / 2. buddhayAdInAmupacayApacayadarzanAditi bhASye /

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ko. 17 ] puruSAstitvasAdhanam / 35 pravRtyantaramAha-" samudayAcca" iti / sametya udayaH 'samudayaH' sama. vAyaH / samudayazca guNAnAm na guNapradhAnabhAvamanta(117) prakRtessamu. reNa sambhavati, na ca guNapradhAnabhAvo vaiSamyaM vinA, dayAt pravRttirdvitIyA na ca vaiSamyamupamardopamardakabhAvAdRte / iti mh(2)|| dAdimAvena pravRttiddhitIyA // syAdetat-kathamekarUpANAM guNAnAmanekarUpA pravRttirityata Aha-"pariNA mataH salilavat" iti / yathA hi vAridavimuktamuda(118) prakRteH pravRttiH kamekarasamapi tattadbhUvikArAnAsAdya nArikelatAlatApariNAmato naanaaprkaaraa|| lIbilvacirabilvatindukAmalakaprAcInAmalakakapittha phalarasatayA pariNamanmadhurAmlalavaNatiktakaSAyakaTutayA vikalpyate, evamekaikaguNasamudbhavAt pradhAnaguNAH pariNAmabhedAn pravartayanti / tadidamuktam-" pratipratiguNAzrayavizeSAt" / ekaikaguNAzrayeNa yo vizeSastasmAdityarthaH // 16 // ye tu tauSTikA adhyaktaM vA mahAntaM vA 'hakAraM vA indriyANi vA bhUtAni vA ''smAnamabhimanyamAnAstAnyevopAsate tAn (119 ) puruSAstitva. pratyAha sAdhanam // saMghAtaparArthatvAt triguNAdiviparyayAdadhiSThAnAt / puruSo 'sti bhoktRbhAvAtkaivalyArtha pravRttezca / / 17 / / " saMghAtaparArthatvAt " iti / puruSo 'sti, avyaktAdervyatiriktaH / kutaH ? "saMghAtaparArthatvAt" / avyaktamahadahaGkArAdayaH (120) saMghAtAnAM parArthAH, saMghAtatvAt , zayanAsanAbhyaGgAdivat , parArthatvAditi prathama- sukhaduHkhamohAtmakatayA vyaktAdayaH sarve sAdhanam (1) // sNghaatoH|| 1 yadarthAH saGghAtAH so'triguNavivekitvAdiyogyavazyaM syAt / sa ca puruSa ev|

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puruSAstitvasAdhanam / [ai, a. (C syAdetat-zayanAsanAdayaH saMghAtAH saMhatazarIrArthA dRSTAH, na svAtmAnamavyaktAdyatiriktaM prati parArthAH / tasmAt saMghAtAntarameva paraM gamayeyuH, ta svasaMhatAtmAnam ityata AhatriguNAdiviparyayAt " iti / ayamabhiprAyaHsaMghAtAntarArthatve hi tasyApi saMghAtatvAt tenApi saMghAtAntarArthena bhavitavyam ; evaM tena tenetyanavasthA syAt / na ca vyavasthAyAM satyAmanavasthA yuktA, kalpanAgauravaprasaGgAt / na ca ' pramANabalena kalpanAgauravamapi mRSyata ' iti yuktam, saMhatatvasya pArArthya mAtreNAnvayAt / dRSTAntadRSTaparvadharmAnurodhena tvanumAnamicchataH sarvAnumAnocchaMdraprasaGga ityupapAditaM nyAyavArtikatAtparyaTIkAyAmasmAbhiH / tasmAdanavasthAbhiyA 'syAsaMghAtatvamicchatA 'triguNatvaM vivekitvamaviSayatvamasAmAnyutvaM cetanatvamaprasavadharmitvaJcAbhyupeyam / triguNatvAdayo hi dharmAH saMhatatvena vyAptAH / tatsaMhatatvamasmin pare vyAvartamAnaM traiguNyAdi vyAvartayati brAhmaNatvamiva vyAvartamAnaM kaThatvAdikam / tasmAdAcAryeNa triguNAdiviparyayAt' iti vadatA 'saMhataH paro vivakSitaH, sa cAtmeti siddham // itazca paraH puruSo'sti - " adhiSThAnAt ", triguNAtmakAnAmadhiSThIyamAnatvAt | yadyatsukhaduHkhamohAtmakaM tatsarvaM pareNAdhiSThIya( 122 ) triguNAtmakA- mAnaM dRSTam, yathA rathAdiryantrAdibhiH / sukhaduHkhanAmadhiSThIyamAnatvAditi mohAtmakaM cedaM buddhyAdi, tasmAdetadapi pareNAdhiSThAdvitIyaM sAdhanam (2 ) // tavyam / sa ca parastraiguNyAdanya bhAtmeti // itazcAsti puruSo - "bhoktRbhAvAt " / bhoktRbhAvena bhogye sukhaduHkhe upalakSayati / bhogye hi sukhaduHkhe anukUlapratikUlavedanIye pratyAtmamanubhUyete / tenAnayoranukUlanIyena pratikUlanIyena ca kenacidapyanyena bhavitavyam / na cAnukUlanIyAH pratikUlanIyA vA buddhyAdayaH, teSAM sukhaduHkhAdyAtmaka 36 ( 121 ) saMghAtAnAM saMghAtAntarArthatve 'navasthAtriguNAdiviparya yazca // 8 ( 123 ) bhoktRbhAvAditi tRtIyam ( 3 ) // - 1. sukhaduHkhAdayo bhogAH / ato bhoktari puruSe sukhaduHkhAdyAtmakatvanna sambhavati / tasmAt puruSe traiguNyaviparyayaH //

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ko. 18 ] puruSabahutvasAdhanam / 37 tvena svAtmani vRttivirodhAt / tasmAt yo 'sukhAcAramA so 'nukUlanIyaH pratikUlanIyo vA, sa cA ''tmati // anye svAhuH-bhogyA dRzyA buddhayAdayaH / na ca draSTAramantareNa dRzyatA yuktA teSAm / tasmAdasti draSTA dRzyabuddhayAyatiriktaH, sa ( 124 ) bhoktRbhAvA- cAma cA ''smeti / bhoktRbhAvAt draSTabhAvAt , dRzyena dityasya draSTubhAvAdi. " draSTuranumAnAdityarthaH / dRzyatvaM ca buddhayAdInAM sukhA. 8 tyartho'pi sambhavati // dhAtmakatayA pRthivyAdivadanumitam // hatazcAsti puruSa ityAha- "kaivalyArthaM pravRttezca" iti / zAstrANAM maharSINAM divyalocanAnAM ca kaivalyamAtyantikaduHkhatrayaprazama(125) zAstrANAM keva- lakSaNaM na buddhayAdInAM sambhavati / te hi duHkhAcA. lyArtha pravRtteriti caturtha tmakAH kathaM svabhAvAdviyojayituM zakyante / tadatiri. sAdhanam- (4) // tasya svatadAtmanastato vipogaH zakyasampAdaH, tasmAt kaivalyArtha pravRtterAgamAnAM mahAdhiyAM cAsti buddhayAdivyatirikta bhAsmeti siddham // 17 // tadevaM puruSAstitvaM pratipAdya, sa kiM sarvazarIreSvekaH kimanekaH pratikSetramiti saMzaye, tasya pratikSetramanekatvamupapAdayati( 126 ) puruSabahutva.. sAdhanAni / / jananamaraNakaraNAnAM pratiniyamAdayugapatpravRttazca / puruSabahutvaM siddhaM traiguNyaviparyayAccaiva // 18 // jnnetyaadinaa.| "puruSabahutvaM siddham " / kasmAt ? " jananamaraNa karaNAnAM prtiniymaat"| nikAyaviziSTAbhirapUrvA( 127 ) janmamaraNa. bhirdehendriyamano'hakArabuddhivedanAbhiH puruSasyAbhipratiniyamAditi pratha- sambandho janma, na tu puruSasya pariNAmaH, tasyAparimam (1) // nnaamitvaat| teSAmeva ca dehAdInAmupAttAnAM parityAgo maraNam , nasvAtmano vinAzaH, tasya kuuttsthnitytvaat| karaNAni buddhayAdIni pryodsh| teSAM janmamaraNakaraNAnAM prtiniymomyvsthaa|

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38 puruSadharmakathanam / [sAM. ta. sA khalviyaM sarvazarIreSvekasmin puruSe nopapadyate / tadA khalvekasmin puruSe jAyamAne sarve jAyaran , mriyamANe ca mriyeran , andhAdau caikasmin sarva eva andhAdayo, vicitte caikasmin sarva eva vicittAH syurityavyavasthA syAt / pratikSetraM tu puruSabhede bhavati vyavasthA / na ca 'ekasyApi puruSasya dehopAdAnabhedAbyavasthA' iti yuktam , pANistanAdyupAdhibhedenApi janmamaraNAdivyavasthAprasaGgAt / na hi pANau vRkNe, jAte vA stanAdau mahatyavayave yuvatirmRtA jAtA vA bhavatIti // itazca pratikSetraM puruSabheda ityAha-" ayugapatpravRttezca" iti / pravRttiH prayatnalakSaNA yadyapyantaHkaraNavartinI, tathA 'pi (128 ) puruSANAma- puruSe upacaryate / tathA ca tasminnekatra zarIre prayatayugapatpravRttariti dvitI- mAne, sa eva sarvazarIreveka iti sarvatra prayateta , yam (2) // * tatazca sarvANyeva zarIrANi yugapaccAlayet / nAnAtve ___ tu nAyaM doSa iti // itazca puruSabheda ityAha-"vaiguNyaviparyayAccaiva" iti / evakAro bhinnakramaH 'siddham ' ityasyAnantaraM draSTavyaH; siddhameva nAsi(129) traiguNyaviparya- ddhm| trayo guNAstraiguNyam , tasya vipryyo'nythaatvm| yAditi tRtIyam (3) // kecitkhalu sattvanikAyAH sattyabahulAH, yatholasro tasaH; kecidrajobahulAH, yathA manuSyAH; kecittamo. bahulAH, yathA tiryagyonayaH / so 'yamIdRzasvaiguNyaviparyayo 'nyathAbhAvasteSu sattvanikAyeSu na bhavet yayekaH puruSaH syAt, puruSabhede svayamadoSa iti // 1 // (130 ) puruSadharmAH // evaM puruSabahutvaM prasAdhya vivekajJAnopayogitayA dharmAnAha-- tasmAca viparyAsAtsiddhaM sAkSitvamasya puruSasya / kaivalyammAdhyasthyaM draSTutvamakartRbhAvazca // 19 //

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ko. 19 ] puruSadharmakathanam / 39 " tasmAcca " iti / 'ca' zabdaH puruSasya bahutvena saha dharmAntarANi - samucchinoti / 'viparyAsAdasmAt ' ityukte traiguNya. ( 131 ) tasmAtpadasya viparyayAdityanantaroktaM sambadhyeta; atastamirAsAya sambandhapradarzanam // tasmAt' ityuktam / anantaroktaM hi sannidhAnAdi. damo viSayo, viprakRSTaM ca tadaH, iti viprakRSTaM trigaNamavivekItyAdi sambadhyate // tasmAstriguNAderyo viparyAsaH sa puruSasyAtriguNatvaM vivekitvamaviSayatvama __ sAdhAraNasvaM cetanatvamaprasavadharmitvaJca / tatra cetanatvenA(132 ) atraiguNyAdeH viSayatvena ca sAkSitvadraSTutve darzite / cetano hi puruSasya sAkSitvam draSTA bhavati, nAcetanaH; sAkSI ca darzitaviSayo bhavati; draSTutvaM ca // yasmai pradarzyate viSayaH sa sAkSI, tathA hi loke 'rthipratyarthinau vivAdaviSayaM sAkSiNe darzayataH, evaM prakRtirapi svacaritaM viSayaM puruSAya darzayatIti puruSaH sAkSI, na cAcenano viSayo vA zakyo viSayaM darzayitum, iti caitanyAdaviSayatvAcca bhavati sAkSI / ata eva draSTA'pi bhavati / bhatraiguNyAccAsya kaivalyam / bhAtyantiko duHkhatrayAbhAvaH kaivalyam / tacca / tasya svAbhAvikAdevAtraiguNyAt sukhaduHkhamoharahi ( 133) kaivalyam // tatvArisaddham // ata evAtraiguNyAnmAdhyasthyam / sukhI hi sukhena tRpyan duHkhI hi duHkhaM ............ dviSan madhyastho na bhavati / tadubhayarahitastu ( 134 ) mAdhyasthyam , " madhyastha ityudAsIna iti cAkhyAyate / vivekisvAakartRtvaM ca // daprasavadharmitvAccAkarteti siddham // 19 // syAdetat-pramANena kartavyamarthamavagamya 'cetano'haM cikIrSan karomi' iti (135) caitanyakartR- kRticaitanyayoH sAmAnAdhikaraNyanubhavasiddham ; tadetvayorvaiyadhikaraNyApatti- tasminmate nAvakalpate, cetanasyAkartRtvAt kartuzcAcaitazaGkA // nyAt ityata mAha

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puruSapradhAnasaMyogaH / [ sAM. ta. tasmAttatsaMyogAdacetanaM cetanAvadiva liGgam / guNakartRtve ca tathA karteva bhavatyudAsInaH // 20 // " tasmAt" iti / yatazcaitanyakartRtve bhinnAdhikaraNe yuktitaH siddhe, tasmAt (136 ) issttaapttiH| dhAntiriyamityarthaH / "liGgam ' mahadAdisUkSmaparyantaM sAmAnAdhikaraNyajJAnaM vakSyati / bhrAntibIjam tatsaMyogaH tatsavidhAnam / bhrAntivilasitam // tirohitArthamanyat // 20 // 'tatsaMyogAt ' ityuktam , na ca bhinnayoH saMyogo'pekSAM vinA, na ceya(137) puruSapradhAnayoH mupakAryopakArakabhAvaM vinetyapekSAhetumupakAramAhasaMyoge zaGkA // puruSasya darzanArtha kaivalyArtha tathA pradhAnasya / paiGgvandhavadubhayorapi saMyogastatkRtaH sargaH // 21 // " puruSasya " iti / pradhAnasyeti karmaNi SaSTI / pradhAnasya sarvasAdhAraNasya - yaddarzanaM puruSeNa tadartham / tadanena bhogyatA pradhAnasya puruSApekSA-bhoktrapekSA // darzitA / tatazca bhogyaM pradhAna bhoktAramanteNa na " sambhavatIti yuktA'sya bhoktrapekSA // "puruSasyApekSA darzayati-" puruSasya kaivalyArtham" iti| tathAhi bhogyena pradhAnena sambhinnaH puruSastataM du:khatrayaM svAtmanyabhi( 139 ) kaivalyArtha manyamAnaH kaivalyam praarthyte| tacca satvapuruSAnyatApuruSasya pradhAnApekSA // khyAtinibandhanam / na ca satvapuruSAnyatAkhyAtiH pradhAnamantareNeti kaivalyArtha puruSaH pradhAnamapekSate anAditvAcca saMyogaparamparAyA bhogAya saMyukto'pi kaivalyAya punaH saMyujyata iti yuktam // 1. guNAnAM kartRtve udAsIno'pi puruSaH karteva bhavati / na ca sa tasvataH kartetyevakArAbhiprAyaH / 2. kArikAsthAH padArthAH spaSTA evetyarthaH / 3. puruSo niSkriyatvAt ' paGguH,' pradhAnamacetanatvAt 'andham /

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41 ko. 22-23 ] sargakramakathanam / nanu bhavatvanayoH saMyogo, mahadAdisargastu kuta ityata Aha- " taskRtaH (140 ) bhogApavargArtha- sargaH" iti / saMyogo hi na mahadAdisargamantareNa meva mahadAdisargasyA- bhogAya kaivalyAya ca paryApta iti saMyoga eva bhogApavazyakatvam // vargArtha sarga karotItyarthaH // 21 // sargakramamAha prakRtermahAMstato'haGkArastasmAdgaNazca SoDazakaH / tasmAdapi SoDazakAtpaJcabhyaH paJca bhUtAni // 22 // " prakRteH" iti / prakRtiravyaktam / mahadahaGkArau / vakSyamANalakSaNau / ekA dazendriyANi vakSyamANAni, tanmAtrANi ca paJca, so (141 ) prakRtemahAni- 'yaM SoDazasaMkhyAparimito gaNaH SoDazakaH / tasmAtyAdiH sargakramaH // dapi SoDazakAdapakRSTebhyaH parasabhyastanmAtrebhya paJca bhUtAnyAkAzAdIni // tatra zabdatanmAtrAdAkAzaM zabdaguNam , zabdatanmAtrasahitAt sparzatanmAtrA dvAyuH zabdasparzaguNaH, zabdasparzatanmAnasahitApata( 142 ) tanmAtrebhyo mAtrAttejaH zabdasparzarUpaguNam , zabdasparzarUpatanmAguNakrameNa bhUtasargaH // * trasahitAdamatanmAtrAdApaH zabdasparzarUparasaguNAH, zabdasparzarUparasatanmAtrasahitAdgandhatanmAtrAcchandasparzarUparasagandhaguNA pRthivI, jAyata ityarthaH // 22 // bhavyaktaM sAmAnyato lakSitam " tadviparItamavyaktam " ( kArikA 10) ityanena; vizeSatazca "sattvaM laghu prakAzakam " ( 143 )buddhilakSaNa- ( kArikA 13 ) ityanena / vyaktamapi sAmAnyato prstaavH|| lakSitam " hetumat " ( kArikA 10) ityAdinA / samprati vivekajJAnopayogitayA vyaktavizeSaM buddhiM lakSayati adhyavasAyo buddhirdharmo jJAnaM virAga aizvaryam / ' sAttvikametadUpaM tAmasamasmAdviparyastam // 23 //

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buddherlakSaNam , dharmAzca / [sAM. ta. " adhyavasAya " iti / ' adhyavasAyo buddhiH ' kriyAkriyAvatorabhedaviva. kSayA / so byavahartA ''locya matvA 'hamatrAdhi(144 ) buddhalakSaNam kRta ityabhimatya kartavyametanmayetyadhyavasyati, tatazca adhyavasAya iti // pravartata iti lokasiddham / tatra yo 'yaM kartavyamiti binizcayazcitisannidhAnAdApanacaitanyAyA buddheH so'dhyavasAyaH, buddherasAdhAraNo vyApAraH; tadabhedA buddhiH / sa ca buddhalakSaNam samAnAsamAnajAtIyavyavacchedakatvAt // tadevaM buddhiM lakSayitvA vivekajJAnopayoginastasyA dharmAnsAtvikatAmasAnAha "dharmoM jJAnaM virAga aizvaryam sAttvikametadrUpaM, ( 145) buddheH sAttvikA tAmasamasmAdviparyastam" iti / dharmo 'bhyudadharmAH dharmajJAnavirAgaizvaryA; yaniHzreyasahetuH, tatra yAgadAnAdyanuSThAnajanito dharmoM bhidhAnAH / tatra dharmajJAna- 'bhyudayahetuH, aSTAGgayogAnuSThAnajanitazca niHzreyasa. vairAgyANAM nirUpaNam // hetuH / guNapuruSAnyatAkhyAtiJjanam / virAgo vairA gyam rAgAbhAvaH / / tasya-yatamAnasaMjJA vyatirekasaMjJA ekendriyasaMjJA vazIkArasaMjJA-iti catasraH saMjJAH / rAgAdayaH kaSAyAzcittavartinaH, (146 ) virAgasya yata- tairindriyANi yathAsvaM viSayeSu pravartyante / tanmA 'tra mAnavyatirekaikendriyava- pravartiSata viSayeSvindriyANIti tatparipAcanAyArambhaH zIkArarUpAzcatasraH prayatno yatamAnasaMjJA / paripAcane cAnuSThIyamAne keci. saMjJAH // skaSAyAH pakkAH, pakSyante ca kecit , tatraivaM pUrvAparI. bhAve sati pakSyamANebhyaH kaSAyebhyaH pakAnAM vyatire. keNAvadhAraNaM vyatirekasaMjJA / indriyapravRttyasamarthatayA pakkAnAmautsukyamAtreNa manasi vyavasthApanamekendriyasaMjJA / nautsukyamAtrasyApi nivRttirupasthiteSvapi dRSTAnuzravikaviSayeSu, yA saMjJAtrayAt parAcInA sA vazIkArasaMjJA / yAmatrabhagavAn pataJjalirvarNayAncakAra-" dRSTAnuzravikaviSayavitRSNasya vazIkArasaMjJA vairAgyam " iti [ yogasUtra-15] / so'yaM buddhidhamo, virAga iti / /

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ko. 24] ahaGkAralakSaNam / 43 aizvaryamapi buddhidhamoM, yato 'NimAdiprAdurbhAvaH / ( 1 ) atrANimASNubhAvo, yataH zilAmapi pravizati / ( 2 ) laghimA ( 147 ) aizvaryanirUpaNe laghubhAvaH, yataH sUryamarIcInAlambya sUryalokaM yati / aSTasiddhinirUpaNam // ( 3 ) garimA gurubhAva:, yato gururbhavati / ( 4 ) mahimA mahato bhAvaH yato mahAn bhavati / (5) prAptiH, yato 'GgulyapreNa spRzati candramasam / ( 6 ) prAkAmyamicchAnabhighAto yato, bhUmAbunmajjati nimajjati ca yathodake / ( 7 ) vazitvam, yato bhUtabhautikaM vazIbhavatyavazyam / Izitvam yato bhUtabhautikAnAM prabhavasthitimISTa / (8) yacca kAmAvasAyitvam mA satyasaGkalpatA, yena yathA'sya saGkalpo bhavati bhUteSu tathaiva bhUtAni bhavanti / anyeSAM manuSyANAM nizvayAH nizcetavyamanuvidhIyante yoginastu nizcetavyAH padArthAH nizcayam / iti catvAraH sAvikA buddhidharmAH // ( 148) buddhestAmasA dharmA dharmAdayaH // 1 ahaGkArasya lakSaNamAha abhimAno 'haGkAraH, tasmAd dvividhaH pravartate sargaH / ekAdazakazca gaNastanmAtrapaJcakazcaiva // 24 // (149) ahaGkArasya lakSaNam // tAmasAstu tadviparItA buddhidharmAH / adharmAjJAnAvairAgyAnaizvaryAbhidhAnAzcatvAraH ityarthaH // 23 // > 6 " abhimAna " iti / ' abhimAno 'haGkAraH ' / yat khalvAlocitammataM ca tatra ' ahamadhikRta H ', ' zaktaH khalvahamatra', 'madarthA evAmI viSayAH, matto nAnyo 'trAdhikRtaH kazcidasti', ato 'hamasmi' iti yo 'bhimAnaH so sAdhAraNa vyApAratvAdahaGkAraH / tamupajIvya hi buddhiradhyavasyati - ' kartavyametanmayA ' iti nizcayaM karoti // tasya kAryabhedamAha - "tasmAd dvividhaH pravartate sargaH" iti / prakAradvayamAha " ekAdazakazca gaNa. " indriyAhnaH tanmAtrapaJcakazcaiva / dvividha eva sarge 'haGkArAt na tvanya iti 'eva' - kAreNAvadhArayati // 24 // ( 150 ) ahaGkArasya kAryabhedAH // * "

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ahaGkArasya kAryabhedAH / [ khAM. ta. syAdetat-mahaGkArAdekarUpAtkAraNAtkathaM jaDaprakAzako gaNau vilakSaNau bhavata 44 ityata Aha -- sAttvika ekAdazakaH pravartate vaikRtAdahaGkArAt / bhUtAdestanmAtraH saH tAmasaH, taijasAdubhayam // 25 // " sAtvika " iti / prakAzalAghavAbhyAmekAdazaka indriyagaNaH sAttviko (151) ekarUpasyApya- vaikRtAdahaGkArAspravartate / bhUtAdestvahaGkArAttAmasAttahaGkArasya guNabhedAdvikAra- nmAtrI gaNaH pravartate / kasmAt ? yat ' sa tAmasaH' / bhedAH - sattvAdindriyagaNaH, etaduktambhavati ' yadyapyako 'haGkArastathA 'pi guNatAmasAttanmAtragaNaH // bhedodbhavAbhibhavAbhyAM bhinnaM kAryaM karotIti ' // "" nanu yadi sattvatamobhyAmeva sarvaM kAryaM janyate tadA kRtama kiJcitkareNa rajase9 syata Aha- 'taijasAdubhayam" iti / taijasAdrAjasAdubhayaM guNadvayaM bhavati, yadyapi rajaso na kAryAntaramasti tathA 'pi sattvatamasI svayamakriye samarthe api na svasvakAryaM kurutaH; rajastu calatayA te yadA cAlayati tadA svakAryaM kuruta iti / tadubhayasminnapi kArye araamasoH kriyotpAdanadvAreNAsti rajasaH kAraNatvamiti na vyathaM raja iti // 25 // ( 152 ) sattvatamaso :pravartakatayA rajasaH sA rthakatA // 6 " 1. bhASyamatena manasa evaikasya sAttvikatvam itareSAM dazAnAM rAjasattvameveti / 2 / 18 sUtre draSTavyam / ahaGkAratattvaM tridhA vibhaktam- 'vaikRta' - 'bhUtAdi - ' 'taijasaMsaMjJAbhedAt ' - taduktaM gauDapAdena- sattvenAbhibhUte rajastamasI yadA ahaMkAre bhavataH tadA so 'haMkAraH sAttvikaH- tasya saMjJA kRtA ' vaikRta' iti / evaM ca tamasA'bhibhUte sattvarajasI yadA 'haMkAra bhavatastadA sohaMkArastAmasaH - tasya saMjJA kRtA 'bhUtAdiH iti // evameva yadA 'haMkAre sattvatamasI rajasA'bhibhUte tadA so'haMkAro rAjasaH ' taijasa' iti saMjJAM labhate " - iti - >

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ko. 26-27 ] bAhyendriyadazakam / sAttvikamekAdazamAkhyAtuM bAhyendriyadazakaM tAvadAhabuddhIndriyANi cakSuH zrotraghrANarasanatvagAkhyAni / vAkpANipAdapAyUpasthAni karmendriyANyAhuH // 26 // buddhIndriyANi " iti / sAttvikAhaGkAropAdAnatvamindriyatvam / tacca dvividham buddhIndriyaM karmendriyaM ca / ubhayamapyetadi( 153 ) bAhyendriyadaza ndrasyAtmanazcihnatvAdindriyamucyate / tAni ca svasaMkam indriyalakSaNam pada- jJAbhizcakSurAdibhiruktAni / tatra rUpagrahaNaliGgaM cakSuH, vyutpattizca // zabdagrahaNaliGgaM zrotram, gandhagrahaNaliMgaM ghrANam, rasagrahaNaliGgaM rasanam, sparzagrahaNaliGga tvak, iti jJAnendriyANAM saMjJA / evaM vAgAdInAM kAryaM vakSyati ( kArikA 28 ) // 26 // ekAdazamindriyamAha - "C - ubhayAtmakamatra manaH, saGkalpakamindriyaM ca sAdharmyAt / guNapariNAma vizeSAnnAnAtvaM bAhyabhedAzca // 27 // 45 66 ubhayAtmakam " iti / ekAdazasvindriyeSu madhye mana ubhayAtmakam, ( 154 ) manaso buddhika- buddhIndriyaM karmendriyaM ca cakSurAdInAM vAgAdInAM ca * rmobhayAtmakatvasAdhanam // mano'dhiSThitAnAmeva svasvaviSayeSu pravRtteH // tadasAdhAraNena rUpeNa lakSayati - " saGkalpakamatra manaH " iti / saGkalpena rUpeNa ( 155 ) manaso lakSaNam -saGkalpakam, lakSa samanvayazca // sammugdhaM vastumAtraM tu prAggRhNantyavikalpitam / tat sAmAnyavizeSAbhyAM kalpayanti manISiNaH ' || iti // tathAhi, mano lakSyate / 'AlocitamindriyeNa vastvidam ' iti sammugdham ' idamevam, naivam ' iti samyakkalpayati vizeSaNavizeSyabhAvena vivecayatIti yAvat / yadAhuH 1. ' iM ' viSayAH, tAn prati dravantIti 'indriya ' zabdavyutpattiH kaizcit kriyate /

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manasa indriyatvam / [khAMta. asti jhAlocitajJAnaM prathamanirvikalpakam / bAlamUkAdivijJAnasadRzam mugdhavastujamiti // tataH paraM punarvastu dharfajAtyAdibhiryayA / buddhayA 'vasIyate sA 'pi pratyakSatvena sammatA / / so 'yaM saGkalpalakSaNo vyApAro manasaH samAnAsamAnajAtIyAbhyAM vyavacchindan mano lakSayati / / sthAdetat-asAdhAraNavyApArayoginau yathA mahadahaGkArau nendriyam , eva ___mmano 'pyasAdhAraNavyApArayogi nendriyaM bhavitumarha( 156 ) manasa indriya. tItyata Aha ---" indriyaM ca" iti / kutaH ? .. tvasAdhanam-indriyaiH " sAdhAt" / indriyAntaraH sAttvikAhaGkAro. saha sAttvikAhaGkAropA- pAdAnatvaM ca sAdharmyam nasvindraliGgatvam , mahadahadAnatvarUpasAdhAt // * kArayorapyAtmaliGgatvenendriyatvaprasaGgAt , tasmA. dvayutpattimAtramindraliGgatvam na tu pravRttinimittam / / atha kathaM sAttvikAhaGkArAdekasmAdekAdazendriyANItyata Aha-- " guNapari(157) ekasyAhaGkA- NAmavizeSAt nAnAtvaM bAhyabhedAzca" iti zabdAdyuparasya guNapariNAmavi- bhogasampravartakAdRSTasahakAribhedArakAryabhedaH / adRssttshessaatkaarybhedH|| bhedo'pi guNapariNAma eva / ( 158 ) bAhyabhedAzceti 'bAhyabhedAzca' iti dRSTAntArtham-yathA bAhya. dRSTAntArtham // bhedAstathaitadapItyarthaH / / 27 // (159) dazendriyava- tadevamekAdazendriyANi svarUpata uktvA dazAnAmapya. ttikathanam // sAdhAraNIvRttIrAha zabdAdiSu pazcAnAmAlocanamAtramiSyate vRttiH / vacanAdAnaviharaNotsargAnandAzca pazcAnAm // 28 // buddhIndriyANAM sammugdhavastudarzanamAlocanamuttam / "vacanAdAnaviharaNotsa. rgAnandAzca pannAnAm " karmendriyANAm / kaNThanAlvAdisthAnamindriyaM vAk, tasyA vRttirvacanam / jJAnendriyANAM vRttayaH spaSTAH // 28 //

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ko. 29.30] antaHkaraNavRttayaH / 47 47 antaHkaraNatrayastha vRttimAha svAlakSaNyaM vRttistrayasya saiSA bhavatyasAmAnyA / sAmAnyakaraNavRttiH prANAdyA vAyavaH paJca // 29 // " svAlakSaNyam" iti / svAlakSaNyaM vRttistrayasya / svamasAdhAraNaM lakSaNaM __ yeSAM tAni svalakSaNAni mahadahakAramanAsi, teSAM (160 ) antaHkaraNatra. bhAvaHsvAlakSaNyam , tacca svAni svAni lakSaNAnyeva / yasya svasvalakSaNarUpame- tadyathA-mahato 'dhyavasAyo 'haGkArasyAbhimAnaH vAsAdhAraNaM vRttitrayam // saGkalpo manaso vRttiApAraH // vRttidvaividhyaM sAdhAraNAsAdhAraNatvAbhyAmAha- " saiSA bhavatyasAmAnyA" ____ asAdhAraNI / " sAmAnyakaraNavRttiH prANAdyA vAyavaH (161) paJcavAyurUpA- pnyc"| sAmAnyA cAsau karaNavattizceti / trayANA. sAdhAraNI vRttiH|| mapi karaNAnAM panca vAyavo jIvanaM vRttiH, tadbhAve bhAvAt tadabhAve cAbhAvAt / tatra prANo nAsAgrahanAbhipAdAGguSThavRttiH, apAnaH kRkATikApRSThapAdapAyUpasthapArzvavRttiH, samAno hanAbhisarvasandhivRttiH, udAno hRtkaNThatAlumUrdhabhramadhyavRttiH, vyAnastvagvRttiriti paJca vAyavaH / / 29 // caturvidhakaraNasyAsyAsAdhAraNISu vRttiSu kramAkramau saprakArAvAha yugapaJcatuSTayasya tu vRttiH kramazazca tasya nirdiSTA / dRSTe tathA 'pyadRSTe trayasya tatpUrvikA vRttiH / / 30 // "yumapat " iti, dRSTe yathA--yadA santamasAndhakAre vidyutsampAtamAtrA. dvayAghramabhimukhamatisannihitaM pazyati tadA khalvasyA(162 ) caturvidhakaraNa. locanasajhalpAbhimAnAdhyavasAyAH yugapadeva prAdurbhasya pratyakSe yugpvRttiH| vanti, yatastata utplutya tatsthAnAdekapade'pasarati //

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48 kAraNAnAM prspraapekssaa| [sAM. ta. " kramazazca" yadA mandAloke prathamantAvadvastumAnaM sammugdhamAlocayati, atha praNihitamanAH karNAntAkRSTasazarasibjinImaNDalI. (163) kramazazca // kRtakodaNDaH pracaNDataraH pATaccaro'yamiti nizcinoti, atha ca mAmpratyetItyabhimanyate, athAdhyavasyatyapasarAmItaH sthAnAditi // parokSe tvantaHkaraNatrayasya bAhyendriyavarja vRttirityAha- " adRSTe trayasya tatparvikA vRttiH" iti / anta:karaNatrayasya yugapa. ( 164) antaHkara- krameNa vattidRSTapUrviketi / anumAnAgamasmRtayo hi Natrayasya parokSe vRtti- parokSe 'rthe darzanapUrvAH pravartanta naanythaa| yathA dRSTe dvayam dRSTapUrvakameva // tathA 'dRSTe 'pIti yojanA // 30 // syAdetat-caturNA trayANAM vA vRttayo na tAvanmAtrAdhInAH, teSAM madAtana (165) karaNAnA sva- tvena vRttInAM sadotpAdaprampaGgAt , Akasmikatve tu tantratve doSAH // vRttisaGkaraprasaGgo niyamahetorabhAvAdityata Aha khAM svAM pratipadyante parasparAkUtahetukAM vRttim / puruSArtha eva heturna kenacitkAryate karaNam // 31 // " svAm" iti / karaNAnIti zeSaH / yathA hi bahavaH puruSAH zAktI. kayASTIkadhAnuSkakAryANikAH kRtasaGketAH parAvaskanda(166 ) tannirAkara- nAya pravRttAH, tatrAnyatamasyAkRtamavagamyAnyatamaH Nam-parasparasApekSANye pravartate, pravartamAnastu zAktIkaH zaktimevAdatte na tu va karaNAni svasvava. yaSTayAdikam , eva yASTIko'pi yaSTimeva, na zaktyAttiSu // dikam / tathA 'nyatamasya karaNasyAkUtAt svakArya: karaNAbhimukhyAdanyatamaM karaNaM pravartate / tatpravRttezva hetutvAna vRttisaGkaraprasaGga ityuktam -" svAM svAM pratipadyante " iti / / 1. manassahakRtabAhyandriyANAm / antaHkaraNatrayANAM vA /

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kau.31-32] puruSArthasya pravartakatvam , krnnvibhaagshc| 49 syAdetat-yASTIkAdayazcetanatvAt parasparAkUtamavagamya pravartanta iti yuktam karaNAni tvacetanAni, tasmAtraivaM pravartitumutsahante / (167 ) karaNAnAmaH tenaiSAmadhiSThAtrA karaNAnAM svarUpasAmopayogAbhizena cetanatve 'pi puruSArtha- bhavitavyamityata Aha-"puruSArtha eva hetuH, na kenasyaiva pravartakatvam // citkAryate karaNam" iti / bhogApavargalakSaNaH puru SArtha evAnAgatAvasthaH pravartayati karaNAni, kRtamatra tatsvarUpAbhizena kA / etacca "vatsavivRddhinimittam " ( kArikA 57 ) ityatropapAdayiSyate // 31 // (168) karaNavi- "na kenacit kAryate karaNam" ityuktam / tatra karaNaM bhAgaH // vibhajatekaraNaM trayodazavidham , tadAharaNadhAraNaprakAzakaram / kArya ca tasya dazadhA, hArya dhArya prakAzyaM ca // 32 // "karaNaM trayodazavidham" iti / indriyANyekAdaza buddhirahaGkArazceti trayo( 169) trayodaza- dazaprakAraM karaNam | kArakavizeSaH karaNam / na ca vidhakaraNaparigaNanam / vyApArAvezaM vinA kArakatvamiti vyApArAvezamAha" tadAharaNadhAraNaprakAzakaram" iti yathAyatham / tatra karmendriyANi vAgAdInyAharanti, yathAsvamupAdadateM, svavyApAreNa vyApnuvantIti yAvat / buddhayahakAramanAMsi tu svavRttyA prANAdilakSaNayA dhArayanti / buddhIndriyANi prakAzayanti // AharaNadhAraNAdikriyANAM sakarmakatayA kiM karma katividhaM cetyata Aha(170 ) karaNavyA- "kArya ca tasya" iti / kArya tasya trayodazavidhasya pAraparigaNanam // karaNasya dazadhA, AhArya dhArya prakAzyaM ca / mAhArya vyApyam / karmendriyANAM vacanAdAnaviharaNotsargAnandAH yathAyathaM vyApyAH; te ca yathAyathaM divyAdizyatayA daza-ityAhArya dazadhA / evaM dhAryamapyanta:karaNatrayasya prANAdilakSaNayA vRtyA zarIram , tacca pArthivAdipAcabhautikam / zabdAdInAM pacAnAM samUhaH pRthivI, te ca paJca divyAdivyatayA dazeti dhAryamapi dazadhA evaM buddhIndriyANAM zabdasparzarUparasagandhA yathAyathaM vyApyAH; te ca yathAyathaM digyAdivyatayA dazeti prakAzyamapi dazadheti // 32 // sa. kau. 4

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50 trayodazavidhakaraNe 'vAntaravibhAgaH / ( 171 ) trayoda zavidhakaraNe 'vAntaravibhAgaH - bAhyAntarabhedAt // antaHkaraNaM trividhaM dazadhA bAhyaM trayasya viSayAkhyam / sAmpratakAla bAhyaM trikAlamAbhyantaraM karaNam // 33 // 8" yodazavidhakaraNe 'vAntaravibhAgaM karoti - ( 174 ) bAhyAntarakaraNayorbhedaH bAhyakaraNAnAM vartamAnakAlInatvaM, antaHkaraNAnAM trikAlInatvam // ( 172 ) antaHkaraNasya traividhyam // 'dazadhA " "6 ( 173 ) bAhya- viSayamAkhyAti viSayasaGkalpAbhimAnAdhyavasAyeSu karaNAnAM dazadhAtvam || ' kartavyeSu dvArIbhavati / tatra buddhIndriyANyAlocanena, karmendriyANi tu yathAsvaM vyApAreNa' // bAhyAntarayoH karaNayoviMzeSAntaramAha - " sAmpratakAlam " iti / vartamAnakAlaM bAhyamindriyam / vartamAnasamIpamanAgatamatItamapi vartamAnam; ato vAgapi vartamAnakAlaviSayA bhavati / " trikAlamAbhyantaraM karaNam" iti / tadyathA-nadIpUrabhedAdabhUvRSTiH; asti dhUmAdabhiriha naganikuJje, asarayupaghAta ke pipIlikANDasaJcaraNAdbhaviSyati vRSTiriti, tadanurUpAzca saGkalpAbhimAnAdhya 8 ( 175 ) sAMkhyamata kAlasya na tattvAntaratvam // antaHkaraNam" iti / antaHkaraNaM trividhambuddhirahaGkAro mana' iti; zarIrAbhyantaravartisvA dantaHkaraNam // 88 bAhyakaraNam trayasya antaHkaraNasya viSayAkhyam " 1 [ sAM. a. " 1. dvArIbhavantIti zeSaH / " vasAyA bhavanti || kAlazca vaizeSikAbhimata eko na anAgatAdivyavahArabhedaM pravartayitumarhati / tasmAdayaM yairupAdhibhedairanAgatAdibhedaM pratipadyate santu ta evopAyA, ye nAgatAdivyavahArahetavaH, kRtamatrA - targaDunA kAleneti sAMkhyAcAryAH, tasmAnna kAlarUpatattvAntarAbhyupagama iti // 33 //

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ko. 34-35] karaNaviSayavivecanam / (176 ) bAhyendri. sAmpratakAlAnAM bAyendriyANAM viSayaM vive. yaviSayavivecanam // cayati buddhIndriyANi teSAM paJca vizeSAvizeSaviSayANi / vAgbhavati zabdaviSayA zeSANi tu paJcaviSayANi // 34 // "buddhIndriyANi" iti / "buddhIndriyANi" teSAM dazAnAmindriyANA ___ mmadhye " panca" " vizeSAvizeSaviSayANi" vizeSA (177) buddhIndri. sthUlAH zabdAdayaH zAntaghoramUDharUpAH pRthivyAdi. yANAM viSayAH sthUla- rUpAH, avizeSAstanmAtrANi sUkSmAH zabdAdayaH, suukssmruupaaH|| mAtragrahaNena 'sthUlabhUtamapAkaroti / vizeSAzca bhavi zeSAzca vizeSAvizeSAH, ta eva viSayA yeSAM buddhIndriyANAM tAni tathoktAni / tatro_srotasAM yoginAJca zrotraM zabdatanmAtraviSayaM sthUlazabdaviSayaM ca, asmadAdInAM tu sthUlazabdaviSayameva / evanteSa svak sthUlasUkSmasparzaviSayA, asmadAdInAM tu sthUlasparzaviSayaiva / evamcadhurAdayo 'pi teSAmasmadAdInAM ca rUpAdiSu sUkSmasthUleSu draSTavyAH / / evaM karmendriyeSu madhye "vAgbhavati zabdaviSayA" syUlazabdaviSayA, tade. tutvAt / na tu zabdatanmAtrasya hetustasyAhakArikasvena (178) karmendriyANAM vAgindriyeNa sahakakAraNakatvAt / "zeSANi tu" viSayAH // catvAri pAyUpasthapANipAdAkhyAni " pancaviSayANi " pANyAcAhAryANAM ghaTAdInAM paJcazabdAcAtmakaravAditi // 34 // sAmprataM prayodazasu karaNeSu keSAmcitpradhAnabhAvaM sahetukamAha sAntaHkaraNA buddhiH sarva viSayamavagAhate yasmAt / tasmAttrividhaM karaNaM dvAri, dvArANi zeSANi // 35 // 1. tanmAtrapade / 2. 'bhUtabhAvinAvapAkaroti' iti pAThAntaram /

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antaHkaraNAnAM prAdhAnyam / [sAM. ta. " sAntaHkaraNA" iti / "dvAri" pradhAnam / "dvArANi" karaNAni ma bAhyendriyANi dvArANi / tairUpanItaM sarva viSayaM raNeSu antaHkaraNAnAM samano 'haGkArA buddhiH yasmAdavagAhate 'dhyavasyati prAdhAnyam tasmAdvAhyendriyANi dvArANi, dvAravatI ca sAntaH. karaNA buddhiriti / / 35 // na kevalaM bAhyAnIndriyANyapekSya pradhAnaM buddhiH, api tu ye 'pyahaGkAramanasI dvAriNI te apyapekSya buddhiH pradhAnamityAha ete pradIpakalpAH parasparavilakSaNA guNavizeSAH / kRtsnaM puruSasyArtha prakAzya buddhau prayacchanti // 36 // " ete" iti / yathA hi prAmAdhyakSaH kauTumbikebhyaH karamAdAya viSayA. ana.. dhyakSAya prayacchati, viSayAdhyakSazca sarvAdhyakSAya, sa karaNeSvapi baDheH prAdhA- ca bhUpataye; tathA bAhyendriyANyAlocya manase samarpa. nyam // yanti, manazca saGkalpyAhaGkArAya, ahaGkArazcAbhimatya buddhau sarvAdhyakSabhUtAyAM, tadidamuktam- "puruSasyArtha prakAzya buddhau prayacchanti" iti / / bAhyendriyamano'haGkArAzca "guNavizeSAH" guNAnAM satvarajastamasAM vikArA, (181) paraspara- te ta parasparavirodhazIlA api puruSArthena bhogApavargavirodhazIlAnAmapi rUpeNaikavAkyatAnItAH, yathA vartitailavahnayaH santama. guNAnA puruSArtharUpa sApanayena rUpaprakAzAya militAH pradIpaH, evamete ekakArye pravRttiH pradI. guNavizeSAH iti yojanA // 36 // pavat // kasmAtpunarbuddhau prayacchanti, na tu buddhirahakArAya dvAriNe manase cetyata mAha sarva pratyupabhogaM yasmAtpuruSasya sAdhayati buddhiH / saiva ca vizinaSTi punaH pradhAnapuruSAntaraM sUkSmam // 37 // "sarvam" iti / puruSArthasya prayojakatvAt tasya yatsAkSAtsAdhanaM tat

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sarvebhyo buddheH prAdhAnyam / 53 pradhAnam / buddhizcAsya sAkSAtsAdhanam, tasmAtsava pradhAnam / yathA sarvAdhyakSaH sAkSAdrAjArthasAdhanatayA pradhAnamitare tu grAmAdhyakSAdayastamprati guNabhUtAH / buddhirhi puruSasannidhAnAt tacchAyApattyA tadrUpeva sarvaviSayopabhogaM puruSasya sAdhayati / sukhadu:khAnubhavo hi bhogaH, sa ca buddhau, buddhizca puruSarUpaiveti, sA ca puruSamupabhojayati / yathA 'rthAlocanasaGkalpAbhimAnAzca tattadrUpapariNAmena buddhAvupasaMkrAMtAH tathendriyavyApArA api buddhereva svavyApAreNAdhyavasAyena sahaikavyApArIbhavanti, yathA strasainyena saha grAmAdhyakSAdisainyaM sarvAdhyakSasya bhavati / " sarva " zabdAdikaM " prati " ya " upabhogaH " " puruSasya " taM sAdhayati // kau. 37-38] ( 182) buddheH prAdhAnyasAdhanam - sAkSApuruSArthasAdhanatvAt // "" nanu puruSasya sarvaviSayopabhogasampAdikA yadi buddhiH tarhyanirmokSa ityata Aha--pazcAt " pradhAnapuruSayorantaraM" vizeSaM "vizinaSTi" karoti yathaudanapAkaM pacatIti, karaNaM ca pratipAdanam / nanu pradhAnapuruSayorantarasya kRtakatvAdanityasvam, tatkRtasya mokSasyAnityatvaM syAdityata Aha-- " vizinaSTi " - ' pradhAnaM savikAramanyadahamanya ' iti vidyamAnamevAntaramavivekenAvidyamAnamiva buddhirbodhayati na tu karoti, yenAnityatvamityarthaH / anenApavargaH puruSArtho darzitaH, " sUkSmam " durlakSyam tadantaramityarthaH // 37 // (183 ) puruSArthasyApa vargasya kRtakatvAdapi nAnityatvam-karaNasyAtrabAdhanArthatvAt // D - tadevaM karaNAni vibhajya vizeSAvizeSAn vibhajate- tanmAtrANyavizeSAH tebhyo bhUtAni pazca pazcabhyaH / ete smRtA vizeSAH, zAntA ghorAzca mUDhAzca // 38 // * " tanmAtrANi " iti / zabdAditanmAtrANi sUkSmANi / na caiSa ( 184 ) avizeSa - zAntatvAdirasti upabhogayogyo vizeSa iti ( sUkSma ) kathanam // mAtrazabdArthaH //

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vishesskthnm| [sAM. ta. bhavizeSAnukravA vizeSAnvaktumutpattimeSAmAha-" tebhyo bhUtAni " iti / (185) vizeSa(sthUla) tebhyastanmAtrebhyo yathAsaMkhyamekadvitricatuHpaJcabhyo kathanam-tadutpattiprada- bhUtAnyAkAzAnilAnalasalilAvanirUpANi " panca" " paJcabhyaH" tanmAtrebhyaH // sveteSAmutpattiH, vizeSasve kimAyAtamityata Aha-"ete smRtA vizeSAH' iti / kutaH-"zAnta ghorAzca mUDhAzca" / cakAra (186) bhUtAnAM sthU. eko hetau dvitIyaH samucaye / yasmAdAkAzAdiSu latve hetukathanam // sthUleSu sattvapradhAnatayA kecicchAntAH sukhAH, prakAzA laghavaH, kecidrajaHpradhAnatayA ghorAH duHkhA: anavasthitAH, kecittamaHpradhAnatayA mUDhA viSaNNA guravaH / te 'mI parasparavyAvRttyA 'nubhUyamAnA 'vishessaa'| iti ca ' sthUlAH' iti cocyante / tanmAtrANi svasmadAdibhiH parasparavyAtAni nAnubhUyante, ityavizeSAH sUkSmA iti cocyante // 38 // vizeSANAmavAntaravizeSamAha-- sUkSmA mAtApitRjAH sahaprabhUtaitridhA vizeSAH syuH / sUkSmAsteSAM niyatA, mAtApitRjA nivartante // 39 // " sUkSmA" iti / "tridhA vizeSAH syuH" iti, tAn vizeSaprakArA nAha-" sUkSmAH " sUkSmadehAH. parikalpitAH, " mAtA(187) avAntaravize- pitRjAH " SATakauzikAH / tatra mAtRto lomalohita. Sakathanam-sUkSmamAtRpi- mAMsAni, pitRtastu snAyavasthimajjAna iti SaT koshaaH| tRjabhedena // prakRSTAni mahAnti bhUtAni "prabhUtAni"-taissaha / sUkSma zarIrameko vizeSaH, mAtApitRjo dvitIyaH, mahAbhUtAni tRtIyaH; mahAbhUtavarge ca ghaTAdInAM niveza iti // , sUkSmamAtApitRjayordehayorvizeSamAha- "sUkSmAtApitRjayorbhedaH nitya steSAm" iti / vizeSANAM madhye ye te 'niytaaH'"| tvaanitytvnibndhnH|| "mAtApitRjA nivartante" iti, rasAntA vA bhasmAntA vA viDantA veti // 39 // 1. nityAH / 2. anityAH /

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kau. 40 ] sUkSmazarIravibhAgaH / 55 sUkSmazarIraM vibhajate pUrvotpannamasaktaM niyatammahadAdisUkSmaparyantam / saMsarati nirupabhogaM bhAvairadhivAsitaM liGgam // 40 // 'pUrvotpazcam' iti / " pUrvotpannam" pradhAnenAdisarge pratipuruSamekai. kamuspAditam / " asaktam" avyAhatam zilAma(189) sUkSma- pyanuvizati / " niyatam'' mA cAdisargAdA zarIropapAdanam-tasya ca mahApralayAdavatiSThate, - " mahadAdisUkSmaparyantam" lakSaNAni-(1)asakta- mahadahaGkArakAdazendriyapaJcatanmAtraparyantam / eSAM tvam-(2) nitytvm|| samudAyaH sUkSma zarIram , shaantghormuuddairindriyairvittvaadvishessH|| nanvastvetadeva zarIraM bhogAyatanaM puruSasya, kRtaM dRzyamAnena pATakauzikena (190)(1) saMsara zarIreNetyata Aha-" saMsarati" iti / upAtta. jama nibhogaca mupAttaM SATakauzikaM zarIraM jahAti hAya hAyaM copAdattetatazca SATkauzika- kasmAt iti " nirupabhogam " yataH, SATa kauzika zarIrasyAvazyakatvam // zarIraM bhogAyatanaM vinA sUkSmaM zarIraM nirupabhogaM yasmAttasmAtsUkSmaM zarIraM saMsarati // nanu dharmAdharmanimitaH saMsAraH, na ca sUkSmazarIrasyAsti tadyogaH, tatkathaM (191) dharmAdharmAdi- saMsaratItyata mAha-" bhAvairadhivAsitam" iti / bhAvairadhivAsitatvamalakaM dharmAdharmajJAnAjJAnavairAgyAvairAgyaizvaryAnaizvaryANi bhAvAHtatsaMsaraNam // tadanvitA buddhiH, tadandhitaca sUkSma zarIramiti tadapi bhAvairadhivAsitam , yathA surabhicampakakusumasamparkAdvasaM vadAmodavAsitambhavati / tasmAdbhAvairevAdhivAsitasvAtsaMsarati // kasmAt punaH pradhAnamiva mahApralaye 'pi taccharIrana tiSThatItyata mAha( 192) mahApralaye "liGgam " iti / layaM gacchatIti liGgam-hetumattvena / tasya layaM gamitatvA- cAsya liGgantvamiti bhAvaH // 40 // lliGgatvam / 1. pratyAtmabhinnamiti kecit /

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sUkSmazarIrasyAvazyakatvapradarzanam / [sAM. ta. syAdetat-buddhireva sAhakArendriyA kasmAnna saMsarati ? kRtaM sUkSmazarIreNAprAmANikenetyata Aha 'citraM yathAzrayamRte sthANvAdibhyo vinA yathA cchAyA / tadvadvinA vizeSairna tiSThati nirAzrayaM liGgam // 41 // "citram" iti / liGganAt jJApanAt buddhayAdayo 'liGgam ', tat anA. zrayanna tiSThati / janmamaraNAntarAle buddhayAdayaH pratyu( 193) sUkSmazarIra- tpannazarIrAzrayAH, -pratyutpannapaJcatanmAtravattve sati syAvazyakatvapradarzanam // buddhyAditvAt - dRzyamAnazarIravRttibuddhadhAdivat / "vinA vizeSaiH " iti, sUkSmaiH zarIrityarthaH / bhAgamazcAtra bhavati "tataH satyavataH kAyAt pAzabaddhaM vazaGgatam / aguSThamAtraM puruSaM nizcakarSa balAyamaH " ( mahAbhArata vanaparva-adhyAya 296.) isyaGguSThamAtratvena sUkSmazarIratvamupalakSayati / Atmano niSkarSAsambhavAt sUkSmameva zarIram 'puruSaH', tadapi puri sthUlazarIre zete iti // 4 // evaM sUkSmazarIrAstitvamupapAtha yathA saMsarati, yena hetunA ca-tadubhayamAha puruSArthahetukamidaM nimittanaimittikaprasaGgena / prakRtervibhutvayogAnnaTavadvyavatiSThate liGgam // 42 // "puruSArthahetukam" iti / puruSArthena hetunA prayuktam / " nimittam " dharmAdharmAdi, "naumattikam " teSu teSu nikAyeSu ( 194 ) sUkSmazarIra- yathAyathaM SATakauzikazarIragrahaH, sa hi dharmAdinimitta. sNsrnnprkaarH|| prabhavaH / nimittamca naimittikanca-tatra yaH prasaGgaH prasaktistayA " naTavadvyavatiSThate liGgam" sUkSmazarIram / yathA hi naTastAM tAM bhUmikAM vidhAya parazurAmo vA 'jAtazatrurvA 1. kecidimAM kArikAM sthUlazarIraparatayA vyAkhyAya 'liGgam ' liGgazarIraM 'vizeSaiH' sthUlazarIrauratyAhuH // anye tu 'liGgam ' liGgazarIraM 'vizeSaiH' liGgazarIrAdhiSThAnabhUtaiH sUkSmazarIraurIta / etanmate zarIratrayam-liGgazarIram , tadadhiSThAnabhUtaM sUkSmazarIram , tadadhiSThAnabhUtaM ca sthUlazarIramiti /

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kau. 42-43 ] nimittanaimittikavibhAgaH / 57 vatsarAjo vA bhavati, evantattatsthUlazarIraparigrahaNAddevo vA manuSyo vA pazuva vanaspatirvA bhavati sUkSmaM zarIramityarthaH // kutastyaH punarasyedRzo mahimetyata Aha - " prakRtervibhutvAyogAt " iti / ( 195 ) sUkSmazarIratathA ca purANam -- saMsaraNe hetuH prakRtervi - " vaizvarUpyAt pradhAnasya pariNAmo'yamadbhuta iti // 42 // bhutvam // nimittanaimittakaprasaGgena " ityuktam - tatra nimittanaimittike vibhajatesAMsiddhikAzca bhAvAH prAkRtikA vaikRtikAzca dharmAdyAH / dRSTAH keraNAzrayiNaH kAryAzrayiNazca kalalAdyAH // 43 // "C "" 1 " sAMsiddhikAzca " iti / " vaikRtikA: " naimittikAH puruSasya jAtasyo" prAkRtikAH ( 196 ) nimitta nai tarakAladevatArAdhanAdinotpannAH, svAbhAvikA bhAvAH sAMsiddhikAH / tathA hi-sargAmittikavibhAgaH dharmAdidAvAdividvAnatra bhagavAn kapilo mahAmunirdharmajJAnarUpanimittasya prAkRtika- vairAgyaizvaryasampannaH prAdurbabhUvati smaranti / vaikRtAzca vaikRtikabhAvakathanam, bhAvA asAMsiddhikAH, ye upAyAnuSThAnenotpannAH, tasya ca karaNAzrayitvayathA prAcetasaprabhRtInAmmaharSINAm / evamadharmAjJAnAvairAgyAnaizvaryANyapi || varNanam // " kAryaM zarIraM tadAzrayiNaH, tasyAvasthAH, kalalabudbudamAMsapezIkaraNDAdyaGga( 197 ) zarIragraha- pratyaGgavyuhAH garbhasthasya, tato nirgatasya bAlasya rUpanaimittikasya kAryA- bAlyakaumArayauvanavArdhakAnIti // 43 // zrayitvakathanam // ( 198 ) nimittavizeSANAM kAryavizeSanirUpaNam // avagatAni nimittanaimittikAni / katamasya tu nimittasya katamannaimi - ttikamityata Aha 1. karaNamaMtra buddhiH / 2. ' svAbhAvikAH ' yAvadvastubhAvinaH, 'vaikRtikAH ' kaadcitkvRttyH|| gauDapAdabhASye tu - 'bhAvAstridhA cintyante - sAsiddhikAH, prAkRtAH, vaikRtA zretyuktam /

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58 bandhatraividhyanirUpaNam / [sAM. ta. dharmeNa gamanamarca, gamanamadhastAdbhavatyadharmeNa / jJAnena cApavargo, viparyayAdiSyate bandhaH // 44 // "dharmeNa gamanamUrdhvam" thuprabhRtiSu lokeSu / "gamanamadhastAdbhavatyadharmeNa" (199) dharmasya Urdhva- sutalAdiSu' lokeSu / "jJAnena caapvrgH|" tAvadeva gamanaM prati adharmasyA- prkRtibhogmaarbhte na yAvadvivekakhyAtiM karoti; atha dhogamanamprati jJAnasyA- vivekakhyAtau satyAM kRtakRtyatayA vivekakhyAtimanta. pavargamprati, ajJAnasya mpuruSamprati nivartate / yathAhuHca bandhanamprati-kAraNatvam // " vivekakhyAtiparyantaM jJeyam prakRticeSTitam" iti / / "viparyayAt / ' matattvajJAnAt " iSyate bandhaH" // sa ca trividhaH-prAkRtiko vaikRtiko dAkSiNakazceti / tatra prakRtAvAtma( 200 ) bandhavaividhya. jJAnAdye prakRtimupAsate teSAM prAkRtiko bandhaH, yaH nirUpaNam prAkRtika-vai- purANe prakRtilayAn pratyucyate | kRtika-dAkSiNakarUpam // , " pUrNa zatasahasraM hi tiSThantyavyaktacintakAH" iti // vaikAriko bandhasteSAM ye vikArAneva bhUtendriyAhaGkArabuddhIH puruSadhiyopAsate, tAn pratIdamucyate " daza manvantarANIha tiSThantIndriyacintakAH / bhautikAstu zatampUrNa, sahastrantvAbhimAnikAH / / bauddhA daza sahasrANi tiSThanti vigatajvarAH / te khalvamI vidahA yeSAM vaikRtiko bandhaH" iti // . 1. bhUtaleti pAThAntaram / 2. ' bhautikAH'-ye bhUtAnyeva puruSadhiyopAsate / 'AbhimAnikAH'-ye'haGkArameva puruSadhiyopAsate / 'bauddhA. '-ye buddhimeva puruSadhiyopAsate / 3. videhAH vaikRtikabandhavatAM saMjJAntaramidam pAribhASikam /

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kau. 45-46] vairAgyAdInAM phalakathanam / ___ iSTApUrtena dAkSiNakaH / puruSatattvAnabhijJo hISTApUrtakArI kAmopahatamanA badhyate iti // 44 // vairAgyAt prakRtilayaH, saMsAro bhavati rAjasAdrAgAt / aizvaryAdavighAto viparyayAttadviparyAsaH // 45 // " vairAgyAt prakRtilayaH" iti-puruSatattvAnabhijJasya vairAgyamAtrAt prakRtilayaH, prakRtigrahaNena prakRtimahadahaGkArabhUte(201 ) vairAgyAt ndriyANi gRhyante, teSvAtmabuddhayopAsyamAneSu layaH / prakRtilayaH / __ kAlAntareNa ca punarAvirbhavati' / / " saMsAro bhavati rAjasAdAgAt" iti / ' rAjasAt ' ityanena rajaso ( 202 ) rAja- duHkhahetutvAt saMsArasya duHkhahetutA sUcitA // sAdAgAt sNsaarH| " aizvaryAdavighAta" iti-icchAyAH / Izvaro hi yadevecchati tadeva karoti / ( 203 ) aizva ma "viparyayAt" anaizvaryAt " tadviparyAsaH " sarvatreryAdicchAnabhighAtaH, . chavidhAta 3 4 cchAvighAta ityarthaH // 45 // anaishvryaacvecchaabhighaatH|| buddhidharmAn dharmAdInaSTau bhAvAn samAsabyAsAbhyAM mumukSUNAM heyopAdeyAn darzayituM prathamantAvat samAsamAha eSa pratyayasargo viparyayAzaktituSTisiddhayAkhyaH / guNavaiSamyavimardAta , tasya ca bhedAstu paJcAzat // 46 // 1. vApIkUpataDAgAdi devatAyatanAni ca / annapradAnamArAmAH pUtamarthyAH pracakSate // ekAgnikarmahavanaM tretAyAM yacca hUyate / antarvedyAM ca yaddAnamiSTantadabhidhIyate / 2. yaH prakRtilayaM gacchati /

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pratyayasargabhedAH [sAM. ta. " eSaH" iti / pratIyate 'neneti pratyayo buddhiH, tasya sargaH / tatra "viparyayaH" ajJAnamavidyA, sA 'pi buddhidharmaH ( 204 ) viparyayAdi- "azaktiH" bhapi karaNavaikalyahetukA buddhidharma eva / buddhisargasya samAsena "tuSTisiddhI" api vakSyamANalakSaNe buddhidharmAveva | kathanam // tatra viparyayAzaktituSTiSu yathAyogaM saptAnAJca dharmA dInAM jJAnavarjamantarbhAvaH; siddhau ca jJAnasyeti / / vyAsamAha- " tasya ca bhedAstu paJcAzat" iti / kasmAt ? " guNa. vaiSamyavimardAt " iti / guNAnAM vaiSamyamekaikasyA( 205 ) tasyaiva vyAsena dhikabalatA dvayordvayovI, ekaikasya nyUnabalatA dvayo. kathanam-paJcAzadbhedAH // IyorvA, te ca nyUnAdhikye mandamadhyAdhikyamAtratayA yathAkAryamunnIyete / tadidaM guNAnAM vaiSamyam tenopamardaH ekaikasya nyUnasya dvayortA'bhibhavaH / tasmAttasya bhedAH paJcAzaditi // 46 // tAneva paJcAzadbhedAn gaNayati-- paJca viparyayabhedA bhavantyazaktizca karaNavaikalyAt / aSTAviMzatibhedA tuSTirnavadhA 'STadhA siddhiH // 47 // " paJca" iti / avidyA'smitArAgadveSAbhinivezA yathAsaMkhyaM tamo. mohamahAmohatAmisrAndhatAmisrasaMjJakAH paJca viparyaya(206 ) viparyayAdInAM vizeSAH, viparyayaprabhavAnAmapyasmitAdInAM viparyayapaJcAzadbhedaparigaNanam // svabhAvatvAt / yadvA-yadavidyayA viparyayeNAvadhAryate vastu, asmitAdayastatsvabhAvAH santastadabhinivizante / ata eva paJcaparvAviyetyAha bhagavAn vArSagaNyaH // 47 // (207) viparyayAdInAM samprati pancAnAM viparyayabhedAnAmavAntarabhedamAha - pratyekamavAntarabhedakathanam-tatra prathamaM viparyaH yasya dvaassssttiH||

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viparyayabhedAnAmavAntarabhedAH / bhedastamaso'STavidho mohasya ca dazavidho mahAmohaH / tAmisro'STAdazadhA tathA bhavatyandhatAmisraH // 48 // , kau. 48 ] " bhedaH" iti / bhedastamaso'vidyAyA aSTavidhaH / aSTasvavyaktamahadahaGkAra( 208 ) avidyArUpa- paJcatanmAtreSvanAtmasvAtmabuddhiravidyA tamaH, aSTavidhaviparyayasyASTavidhatvam // viSayatvAttasyASTavidhatvam // " mohasya ca iti, atrApyaSTavidho bhedazcakAreNAnuSajyate / devA hyaSTavidhamaizvaryamAsAdyAmRtatvAbhimAnino'NimAdikamAtmIyaM zAzvatikamabhimanyante, seyamasmitA moho 'STavidhezvaryaviSayatvAdaSTavidhaH // " dazavidho mahAmohaH " iti / zabdAdiSu paJcasu divyAdivyatayA daza( 210 ) rAgarUpavi- vidhaviSayeSu ramjanIyeSu rAga AsaktirmahAmohaH sa ryayasya dazavidhatvam // ca dazavidhaviSayatvAddazavidhaH // "6 ( 209 ) asmitArUpaviparyayasyASTavidhatvam || 61 " tAmisro" dveSo " 'STAdazadhA " / zabdAdayo dazaviSayA rajjanIyAH svarUpataH, aizvaryantvaNimAdikana svarUpato rajjanI || ( 211 ) dveSarUpaviparyayam / kiM tu raJjanIyazabdAdyupAyAH / te ca zabdAdaya yasyASTAdazavidhatvam // upasthitAH paraspareNopa hanyamAnAstadupAyAzcANimAdayaH svarUpeNaiva kopanIyA bhavantIti zabdAbhirdazabhiH sahANimAdyaSTakamaSTAdazadheti, tadviSayo dveSastAmitro 'STAdazaviSayatvAdaSTAdazadheti / . ( 212 ) abhinivezarUpaviparyayasyASTAdaza vidhitvam // dazadheti || 8 tathA bhavatyandhatAmisra: " | abhinivezo 'ndhatAmisra: / tathetyanenASTAdazadhetyanuSajyate / devAH khalvaNimAdikamaSTavidhamaizvaryamAsAdya daza zabdAdIn viSayAn bhujjAnA:' zabdAdayo bhogyAstadupAyAzvANimAdayo 'smAkamasurAdibhirmopaghAniSata ' iti - bibhyati / tadidaM bhayamabhinivezo 'ndhatAmitro 'STAdazaviSayatvAdaSTA '

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aSTAviMzatiprakArakA azaktayaH / [sAM. ta. ( 213 ) viparyayAvA- so'yaM paJcavidho vikalpo viparyayo'vAntarabhedAd ntarabhedasamaSTisaMkhyA- dvASaSTiriti // 48 // dvASaSTiH // ( 214 ) aSTAviMzati- tadevaM paJcaviparyayabhedAnuktvA 'STAviMzatibhedAmaprakArakAzaktikathanam // zaktimAha-- ekAdazendriyabadhAH saha buddhibadhairazaktiruddiSTA / / saptadaza badhA buddheviparyayAttuSTisiddhInAm // 49 // " ekAdaza" iti / indriyabadhasya graho buddhibadhahetutvena, na tvazakti(215 ) ekAdazendriyabadhajanyaikAdazavidhA- ' bhedapUrNatvena " ekAdazendriyabadhAH "-- 'zaktiH // bAdhirya kuSTitA 'ndhatvaM jaDatA 'jighratA tathA / mUkatAkauNyapazutvaklaibyodAvartamandatAH / / yathAsaMkhyaM zrotrAdInAmindriyANAM badhAH / etAvatyeva tu tadvetukA buddharazaktiH svavyApAre bhavati / tathA caikAdazahenukatvAdekAdazadhA buddherazaktirucyate / hetuhetumatorabhedavivakSayA ca sAmAnAdhikaraNyam // tadevamindriyabadhadvAreNa buddherazaktimuktvA svarUpato 'zaktIrAha--" saha... buddhibadhaiH" iti / kati buddhaH svarUpato badhA ityata / mAha-" saptadaza badhA buddheH" / kutaH ? " viparyadazaktiH saptadazavidhA // 1 // yAttaSTisiddhInAm / " tuSTayo navadheti tadviparyayAsta. nirUpaNAnavadhA bhavanti, evaM sidvayo 'STAviti tadviparyayAstanirUpaNAdaSTau bhavantIti // 19 // (217) navavidhatu* STikathanam // taTinavadhetyuktam , tAH parigaNayati--

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ko. 50 ] navavidhatuSTivarNanam / AdhyAtmikAzcatasraH prakRtyupAdAnakAlabhAgyAkhyAH / bAhyA viSayoparamAt paJca,--nava tuSTayo'bhimatAH // 50 // "AdhyAtmikAH" iti / AdhyAtmikA:--'prakRtivyatirikta AtmA 'sti' iti pratipadya, tato 'sya zravaNamananAdinA viveka. (218) caturvidhA- sAkSAtkArAya svasadupadezatuSTo yo na prayatate tasyAdhyAtmikatuSTikathanam // dhyAtmikAzcatasrastuSTayo bhavanti; prakRtivyatirikta mAtmAnamadhikRtya ysmaattaastussttystsmaadaadhyaatmikaaH| kAstA ityata mAha-"prakRtyupAdAnakAlabhAgyAkhyAH", prakRtyAdirAkhyA yAsAM tAstathoktAH // taMtra prakRtyAkhyA tuSTiryathA kasyacidupadeze,-'vivekasAkSAtkAro hi prakRti( 219 ) adhyAtmi pariNAmabhedastaJca prakRtireva karotIti kRtantaddhathA. nAbhyAsena, tasmAdevamevAstu vatsa,'-iti seyamupadeSTakatuSTipu prathamA prakR vyasya tuSTiH prakRtI, sA tuSTiH prakRtyAkhyA ambha tyAkhyA ambhaH // ucyate // yA tu,-'prAkRtyapi vivekakhyAtirna, sA prakRtimAtrAdbhavati, mAbhUtsarvasya ( 220 ) dvitIyA upAH sava - yAstu sA bhavati, tasmAt pravrajyAmupAdadIthAH, pAnAmA taam|| katante dhyAnAbhyAsenAyuSmana'-iti upadeza yA tuSTaH sopAdAnAkhyA 'salilam' ucyate // yA tu,- pravrajyA'pi sadyonirvANadeti saiva kAlaparipAkamapekSya siddhinte ( 221) tRtIyA kAlA- vidhAsyati, alamuttaptatayA tava'-iti upadeze yA khyA meghaH // tuSTiH sA kAlAkhyA 'megha' ucyate / 1. atrAya saGgraha zlokaH-ambhaH salilaM megho vRSTiH pAraM tathA supAraM ca / anyacca pArApAramanuttamAmbha uttamAmbhazca' iti / 2. prakRtyA nivRttaa| 3. prakRtimAtrAdvivekakhyAtau satyA prakRteH sarva prati tulyasambandhatvAt sakalajanasya vive. kakhyAtiH syAditi hRdayam / 4. 'ogha' iti pAThAntaram /

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navavidhatuSTivarNanam / [ sAM. ta. yA tu,-'na prakRterna kAlAnnApyupAdAnAdvivekakhyAtiH, api tu bhAgyAdeva / / ata eva madAlasApatyAnyatibAlAni mAturupadezAdeva ( 222 ) caturthI bhA. gyAkhyA vRSTiH // vivekakhyAtimanti muktAni babhUvuH, tasmAkhyAdbhAgya meva heturnAnyat'-iti upadeze yA tuSTiH sA bhAgyAkhyA 'vRSTiH' ucyate // bAhyA darzayati-" bAhyAH" tuSTayaH " viSayoparamAt , paJca" / yAH khalvanAtmanaH prakRtimahadahaGkArAdInAtmetyabhimanya ( 223 ) paJcavidhabAhya- mAnasya vairAgye sati tuSTayastA bAhyAH, AtmajJAnAtuSTikathanam // bhAva satyanAtmAnamadhikRtya pravRtteriti / tAzca vairAgya sati tuSTaya iti vairAgyahetupancatvAdvairAgyANyapi panca, tatpancatvAt tuSTayaH paJceti / uparamyate 'nenetyuparamo vairAgyam , viSayAduparamo viSayoparamaH / viSayA bhogyAH zabdAdayaH panca, uparamA api paJca // tathA hi-arjanarakSaNakSayabhogahiMsAdoSadarzanahetu janmAnaH paJcoparamA ( 224 ) bAhyatuSTiSu bhavanti / tathA hi-sevAdayo dhanArjanopAyAH, te ca prathamA, pAram // sevakAdIn duHkhAkurvanti, " dRpyadurIzvaradvAHsthadaNDicaNDArdhacandrajAm / vedanAM bhAvayan prAjJaH kaH sevAsvanuSajate" // evamanye 'pyarjanopAyAH duHkhA iti viSayoparame yA tuSTiH saiSA 'pAram' ucyate / / tathA 'rjitandhanam rAjaikAgArikAgnijalaughAdibhyo vinakSyatIti tadrakSaNe (225 ) dvitIyA mahaduHkhamiti bhAvayato viSayoparame yA tuSTiH sA supAram // dvitIyA 'supAram' ucyate // tathA mahatA ''yAsenArjitandhanaM bhujyamAnaM kSIyate iti tatprakSayambhAvayatA (226 ) tRtIyA pArA- viSayoparame yA tuSTiH sA tRtIyA 'pArApAram' pAram // * ucyate // 1. ekaagaarikH-caurH|

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kau. 50-51] aSTasiddhikathanam / evaM zabdAdibhogAbhyAmAt pravardhante kAmAH, te ca viSayaprAptau kAminaM (227) caturthI, anutta- duHkhAkurvantIti bhogadoSam bhAvayato viSayoparame yA mAmbhaH // tuSTiH sA caturthI ' anuttamAmbha' ucyate // evamAnupahatya bhUtAni viSayopabhogaH sambhavatIti hiMsAdoSadarzanAdviSayo(228) paJcamI utta- parame yA tuSTiH sA paJcamI 'uttamAmbha' ucyate || mAmbhaH // evamAdhyAtmikIbhizcatasRbhiH bAhyAbhizca paJcabhiH 'nava tuSTayo 'bhi. matAH' // 50 // ( 229 ) siddhibhedaka- gauNamukhyabhedaiH siddhIrAhathanam // UhaH zabdo 'dhyayanaM duHkhavighAtAstrayaH suhRtprAptiH / dAnaM ca siddhayo 'STau, siddheH pUrvo 'GkuzastrividhaH // 51 // " Uha" iti / vihanyamAnasya duHkhasya trisvAttadvighAtAstraya itImA mukhyAstisraH siddhayaH, tadupAyatayA svitarA gauNyaH ( 230 ) siddhibhedaka paJca siddhayaH, tA api hetuhetumattayA vyavasthitAH / thanam // tatrAdyA 'dhyayanalakSaNA siddhirhetureva / mukhyAstu siddhayo hetumasya eva / madhyamAstu hetuhetumatyaH / / vidhivadgurumukhAdadhyAtmavidyAnAmakSarasvarUpagrahaNamadhyayanam prathamA siddhi. ( 231) adhyayanarUpA stAramucyate // prathamA siddhiH, tAram // tatkAryam zabdaH; 'zabda' ini padam zabdajanitamarthajJAnamupalakSayati, ( 232 ) zabdarUpA kArye kAraNopacArAt / mA dvitIyA siddhiH sutAradvitIyA, sutAram // mucyate / pAThAbhyAntadidandvidhA zravaNam // ta. kau. 5

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F aSTasiddhivarNanam / [ sAM. ta. "ahaH" tarkaH AgamAvirodhinyAyanAgamArthaparIkSaNam / parIkSaNaJca sazaya( 233 ) UharUpA- pUrvapakSanirAkaraNenottarapakSavyavasthApanam / tadidammanatRtIyA tAratAram // namAcakSate mAgaminaH / sA tRtIyA siddhistAratAramucyate // "suhRtprAptiH" / nyAyena svayamparIkSitamapyartha na zraddadhate; na yAvadguru(234 ) suhRtprAptirUpA ziSyasabrahmacAribhissaha saMvAdyate / ataH suhRdAM gurucaturthI-ramyakaH // ziSyasabrahmacAriNAM saMvAdakAnAM prAptiH suhRtprAptiH sA siddhizcaturthI ' ramyaka' ucyate // "dAnaM" ca zuddhivivekajJAnasya, 'daip zodhane' [pANini 6 / 4 / 68] ityasmAddhAtordAnapadavyutpatteH / yathAha bhagavAn pata. ( 235 ) dAnarUpA jali:-" vivekakhyAtiraviplavo duHkhatrayasya hAnopaJcamI, sadAmuditam / / * pAyaH" iti [ yogasUtra 2 / 26] / 'aviplavaH' zuddhiH, sA ca savAsanasaMzayaviparyAsAnAM parihAreNa vivekasAkSAtkArasya svacchapravAhe 'vasthApanam / sA ca ne vinA ''daranairantaryadIrghakAlasevitAbhyasaparipAkAdbhavatIti dAnena (vivekakhyAtyAH kAryeNa ) so 'pi saMgRhItaH / seyampancamI siddhissadAmuditamucyate // ( 236 ) duHkhavighAta- tisrazca mukhyAH siddhayaH pramodamuditamodamAnA, trayarUpAstisro mukhyA:- ityaSTau siddhayaH // prmodmuditmodmaanaaH|| anye vyAcakSate-vinopadezAdinA prArabhAvIyAbhyAsavazAttattvasya svayamUhanaM yat sA siddhiruuhH| yasya sAMkhyazAstrapAThamanyadIya. ( 237 ) gauNasiddhi- mAkarNya tatvajJAnamutpadyate sA siddhiH zabdaH, zabdapaJcakasya prakArAntareNa pAThAdanantarambhAvAt / yasya ziSyAcAryasambandhena vyAkhyAnam // sAMkhyazAstraM granthatA 'rthatazvAdhItya jJAnamutpadyate sA 'dhyayanahetakA siddhiradhyayanam / suhRtprAptiriti 1. " mananam amananamevAsuhRtsammatam . iti dvitIyaM mananamAha suhRtprAptiriti" iti pAThAntaram / 2. " nibiDAdeva nairantaryam" iti pAThAntaram / 3. abhyAso 'pi /

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kau. 51-52] pratyayatanmAtrobhayasargAvazyakatvam / yasyAdhigatatatvaM suhRdaM prApya jJAnamutpadyate sA zAnalakSaNA siddhistasya suhRtprAptiH / dAnaJca siddhihetuH, dhanAdidAnenArAdhito jJAnI jJAnamprayacchati / asya ca yuktAyuktatve sUribhirevAvagantavye iti kRtamparadoSodbhAvanena naH siddhAntamAtravyAkhyAnapravRttAnAmiti || siddhituSTiviparyayeNAzaktibuddhibadhassaptadazadhA dRSTavyaH / atra pratyayasagai - siddhirupAdeyeti prasiddha meva / tazivAraNahetavastu viparyayAzaktituSTayo heyA ityAha-"siddheH pUrvo yayAzaktituSTInA siddhe. 'GkuzastrividhaH" iti / 'pUrva' iti viparyayAraGkuzatvam tatazca tAsA zaktituSTIH parAmRzati / tAH siddhi kariNInAmakuzo, heyatvam siddhezvopAdeya nivArakatvAt / ataH sidviparipanthitvAt viparyayAtvam // zaktituSTayo heyA ityarthaH // 51 // syAdetat-puruSArthaprayuktA sRSTiH / sa ca puruSArthaH pratyayasargAdvA (239) ubhayasargA- tanmAtrasargAdvA sidhyatIti kRtamubhayasargeNetyata vazyakatvazaGkA // mAha na vinA bhAvairliGgaM, na vinA liGgena bhAvanirvRttiH / liGgAkhyo bhAvAkhyastasmAd dvividhaH pravartate sargaH // 52 // "na vinA" iti / ' "liGgam" iti tanmAtsargamupalakSayati, "bhAvaiH" iti ca pratyayasargam / etaduktambhavati-tanmAtra( 240 ) ubhayavidha- sargasya puruSArthasAdhanatvaM svarUpaJca na pratyayasargAdvinA sargAvazyakatvapradarzanam // bhavati, evaM pratyayasargasya svarUpaM puruSArthasAdhanatvamca na tanmAtrasargAdRte, ityubhayathA srgprvRttiH| bhogaH puruSArthoM na bhogyAn zabdAdIn bhogAyatanaM zarIradvayaJcAntareNa sambhavatItyupapanastanmAtrasargaH / evaM sa eva bhogo bhogasAdhanAnIndriyANyantaHkaraNAni cAntareNa 1. candrikAyAmanyathA varNanam- 'liGgAkhyaH' liGgyate anumIyata eva na sAkSAt kriyata-sa mahadAdyatIndriyavargaH / 'bhAvAkhyaH ' bhUyate prApyate indriyeNeti viSayavargaH prtyksssiddhH||

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tnmaatrsrgvibhaagH| [sAM. ta. na sambhavati / na ca tAni dharmAdIn bhAvAn vinA sambhavanti / na cApavargaheturvivekakhyAtirubhayasarga vinA / ityupapanna ubhayavidhaH sargaH // anAditvAcca bIjAGkuravanAnyonyAzrayadoSamAvahati, kalpAdAvapi prAcIna( 241) ubhayavidhasameM kalpotpannabhAvaliGgasaMskAravazAdbhAvaliGgayorutpatti - anyonyAzrayadoSa- nupapanneti sarvamavadAtam // 52 // prihaarH|| ( 242 ) bhUtasargaH vibhaktaH pratyasargaH / bhUtAdisarga vibhjtevibhaagH|| aSTavikalpo daivastairyagyonazca pazcadhA bhavati / mAnuSazcaikavidhaH, samAsato bhautikaH sargaH // 53 // "aSTavikalpa" iti / brAhmaH, prAjApatyaH, aindraH, paitro, gAndharvo, yAkSo, ( 243 ) tatra-(1) rAkSasaH, paizAcaH, ityaSTavidho "daivaH" sargaH // devo 'ssttvidhH|| (244) (2) tairya- "tairyagyonazca paJcadhA bhavati," pazumRgapakSisarIsRpagyonaHpaJcadhA // sthAvarAH // "mAnuSazcaikavidhaH" iti, brAhmaNatvAdyavAntarajAtibhedAvivakSayA, saMsthA nasya caturvapi varNeSvavizeSAt / iti " samAsataH" saMkSepataH " bhautikaH sargaH" / ghaTAdayastvazarIratve. ekavidhaH // 'pi sthAvarA eveti / / 53 / / (246 ) bhautikasarge bhautikasyAsya sargasya caitanyotkarSanikarSatAratamyAguNabhedAdUrvAdhomadhya - bhyAmUrdhAdhomadhyabhAvena traividhyamAha -- bhAvakathanam / Urdhva savavizAlastamovizAlazca mUlataH sargaH / madhye rajovizAlo, brahmAdistambaparyantaH // 54 //

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kau. 54-55 ] sargasya duHkhhetutaa| 69 ___ " Urdhva satvavizAlaH" iti / dyuprabhRtisatyAnto lokaH sattvabahulaH / ' tamovizAlazca mUlataH sargaH", pazvAdisthAvarAntaH ( 247 ) Urdhva sattva- so'yammohamayatvAttamobahulaH / bhuulokstu saptadvIpapradhAnAH-madhye rajaH- samudrasanivezo "madhye rajovizAlo" dharmAdharmAnuSThApradhAnAH ante tamaH naparatvAdduHkhabahulatvAcca / tAmimAM lokasaMsthitiM prdhaanaaH|| saMkSipati "brahmAdistambaparyantaH", stambagrahaNana vRkSAdayaH saMgRhItAH // 54 // tadevaM sarga darzayitvA tasyApavargasAdhanavairAgyopayoginI duHkhahetutAmAha( 248) sargasya duHkhahetutA // tatra jarAmaraNakRtaM duHkhamprApnoti cetanaH puruSaH / liGgasyAvinivRttestasmAdduHkhaM svabhAvena / / 55 // " tatra" iti / 'tatra' zarIrAdau / yadyapi vividhA vicitrAnandabhogabhAginaH prANabhRdehAH, tathA 'pi sarveSAM jarAmaraNakRtaM duHkhamaviziSTam / sarvasya khalu kRmapi maraNatrAso-' mA na bhUvam ' 'bhUyAsam ' ityevamAtmako. 'sti / duHkhaM ca bhayaheturiti duHkhammaraNam / / syAdetat-duHkhAdayaH prAkRtA buddhiguNAH tatkathamete cetanasambandhino ( 249 ) prAkRtaguNabhUta bhavantItyata Aha-" puruSa" iti / puri liGge zete duHkhAdInAM puruSeNa saha iti puruSaH, liGgaJca tatsambandhIti cetano 'pi sambandhapradarzanan // tatsambadhI bhavatItyarthaH // kuta punarliGgasambandhi duHkhampuruSasya cetanasyetyata Aha-" liGgasyA ( 250 ) puruSaprakRti- vinivRtteH " - puruSAdbhadAgrahAlliGgadharmAnAtmanyadhyavabhedAgrahanibandhanapuruSe syati puruSaH / athavA duHkhaprAptAvavadhirAGI kathyate duHkhaadhyvsaayH|| liGgam yAvanna nivartate tAvaditi / / 55 // 1. AvinivRtterityatra 'AG'-upasargeNetyarthaH /

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sRSTeH prakRtikAryatvam / [ sAM. ta. ( 251 ) sRSTikAraNavi- uktasya sargasya kAraNavipratipattInirAkarotipratipattinirAkaraNam // ityeSa prakRtikRto mahadAdivizeSabhUtaparyantaH / pratipuruSavimokSArtha svArtha iva parArtha ArambhaH // 56 // " ityeSa" iti / Arabhyate iti " mArambhaH " sargaH mahadAdibhUtaH prakR. ra tyaiva kRto nezvaraNa, na brahmopAdAno, nApyakAraNaH / " AkAramatve hyatyantAbhAvo 'tyantabhAvo vA syAt / cAmAvUSaNam / na brahmopAdAnaH citizakterapariNAmAt / nezvarAdhiSThitaprakRtikRto, nirvyApArasyAdhiSThAtRtvAsambhavAt / na hi nirvyApArastakSA vAsyAyadhitiSThati // ___ nanu prakRtikRtazcet, tasyA nityAyAH pravRttizIlAyA anuparamAt sadaiva sargaH syAditi na kazcinmucyatetyata Aha-" prati( 253 ) ninyapravRtti- puruSavimokSArtha svArtha iva parArtha ArambhaH" iti / zIlaprakRtikRtasRSTipakSe yathaudanakAma odanAya pAke pravRttaH odanasiddhau saMsRtinityatvasyAnirmo nivartate,- evaM pratyekampuruSAn mocayitampravRttA prakRkSasya ca prasaGgazaGkA tiyaM puruSammocayati tamprati punarna pravartate-tadidatannirAsazca // mAha-'svArtha iva, ' svArthe yathA tathA parArthe Arambha ityarthaH // 56 // syAdetat- svArtha parArtha vA cetanaH pravartate / na ca prakRtiracetanaivaM bhavitu - mahati tasmAdasti prakRteradhiSThAtA cetnH| na ca pravRttizaGkA / kSetrajJAzcetanA api prakRtimadhiSThAtumarhanti, teSAM prakRti svarUpAnabhijJatvAt / tasmAdasti sarvArthadarzI prakRte radhiSThAtA, sa cezvara'-ityata Aha - vatsavivRddhinimittaM kSIrasya yathA pravRttirajJasya / puruSavimokSanimittaM tathA pravRttiH pradhAnasya // 57 //

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kau. 57-58] IzvarAdhiSThAne doSAH / ___"vatsavivRddhi nimittam" iti / dRSTamacetanamapi prayoja-mpravartamAnam , ( 255) tatparihAraH- yathA vatmavivRddhayarthaM kSIramacetanam pravartate / evakSIrapravRttivattasyAH pra. prakRtiracetanA 'pi puruSavimokSaNAya pravartiSyate // vRttiH // na ca-kSIrapravRtterapIzvarAdhiSThAnanibandhanatvena sAdhyatvAnna sAdhyavyabhi cAra' iti, sAmpratamprekSAvataH pravRtteH svArthakAru( 256 ) IzvarAdhiSThita- NyAbhyAM vyAptatvAt / te ca jagatsargAvyAvartamAne prekSApradhAnasRSTau doSAH // vatpravRttipUrvakasvamapi vyAvartayataH / na hyAptasakale. psitasya bhagavato jagat sRjataH kimapyabhilaSitambhavati / nApi kAruNyAdasya sarge pravRttiH, prAk sargAjIvAnAmindriyazarIraviSayAnutpattau duHkhAbhAvena kasya prahANecchA kAruNyam ? sargottarakAlaM duHkhino 'valokya kAruNyAbhyupagame duruttaramitaretarAzrayatvandUSaNam ,-kAruNyena sRSTiH sRSTayA ca kAruNyamiti / api ca karuNayA prerita IzvaraH sukhina eva jantUn sRjenna vicitrAn / 'karmavaicitryAdvaicitryam' iti cet-kRtamasya prekSAvataH karmAdhiSThAnena, tadanadhiSThAnamAtrAdevAcetanasyApi karmaNaH pravRtyanupapattestatkAryazarIrondriyaviSayAnutpatau duHkhAnutpatterapi sukarasvAt // __prakRtestvacetanAyAH pravRtterna svArthAnugraho na vA kAruNyamprayojakamiti ( 257 ) prakRtisRSTI noktadoSaprasaGgAvatAraH / pArAyaM mAtrantu prayojakamupa padyate / tasmAt suSThUktam - " vatsavivRddhinimittam' taddoSA bhAvaH // iti || 57 // " svArtha iva" iti dRSTAntitam [ kArikA. 56 ] tadvibhajate( 258 ) puruSavimokSArtham pradhAnasya pravRttiH // autsukyanivRttyarthaM yathA kriyAsu pravartate lokaH / ' puruSasya vimokSArthe pravartate tadvadavyaktam // 58 //

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prdhaannivRttiprkaarH| [sAM. taM. ___ "autsukya-" iti / autsukyamicchA, mA khalviSyamANaprAptau niva. tate / iSyamANazca svArthaH, iSTalakSaNatvAt phalasya / dAntike yojayati"puruSasya vimokSArthampravartate tadvadavyaktam" iti // 58 // nanu bhavatu puruSArthaH prakRteH pravartakaH, nivRttistu kutastyA prakRteH (259) vivekakhyAtya- ityata mAhanantaram prdhaannivRttiH|| raGgasya darzayitvA nivartate nartakI yathA nRtyAt / puruSasya tathA ''tmAnaM prakAzya vinivartate prakRtiH // 59 // " raGgasya" iti, sthAnena sthAninaH pAriSadAnupalakSayati / 'AtmAnam ' zabdAdyAtmanA puruSAdbhedena ca prakAzyetyarthaH // 59 // syAdetat-'pravartatAmprakRtiH puruSArtham / puruSAdupakRtAtprakRtirlapsyate kazci(260) guNavatyAH prakRteH dupakAram , AjJAsampAdanArAdhitAdivAjJApayiturbhupratyupakAraM vinaiva jissyaa| tathA ca na parArtho'syA bhArambhaH' -ityata puruSopakAraH / / Aha nAnAvidhairupAyairupakAriNyanupAkariNaH puMsaH / guNavatyaguNasya satastasyArthamapArthakaJcarati // 6 // " nAnA-" iti / yathA guNavAnupakAryapi bhRtyo nirguNe 'ta evAnupakAriNi svAmini niSphalArAdhanaH, evamiyamprakRtistapasvinI guNavatyupakAriNyanupakAriNi puruSe vyarthaparizrameti puruSArthameva yatate na svArthamiti siddham // 60 //

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kau. 61] prakRterAtyantikI nivRttiH| syAdetat- nartakI nRtyampariSadbhayo darzayitvA nivRttA'pi punastadRSTikautU(261) vivekakhyAtyana- halAt pravartate yathA, tathA prakRtirapi puruSArthAyAtmAnaM ntaram pradhAnasyAtya- darzayitvA nivRttA 'pi punaH pravartyati' ityata ntikI nivRttiH|| Aha prakRteH sukumArataranna kiJcidastIti me matirbhavati / yA dRSTA 'smIti punarna darzanamupaiti puruSasya // 61 // ' " prakRteH " iti / sukumArataratA 'tipezalatA, parapuruSadarzanAsahiSNuteti yAvat / asUryampazyA hi kulavadhUratimandAkSamantharA pramAdAdvigalitasicayAcalA cedAlokyate parapuruSeNa, tadA 'sau yathA prayatate, apramattA yathainAM para 1.-asyAH kArikAyA anantaramevAnyayaikayA kArikayA bhavitavyamiti svargatasya tilakAnvayajasya bAlagaGgAdharapaNDitasya siddhAntaH / tatsaMkSepastu-- ___ " "saptatyAM kila ye'rthAH' itIzvarakRSNavacanAnurodhenAryANA saptanyA bhAvyam / kintu gauDapAdabhASye tvekonasaptatirevopalabhyate / bhASyaM caikaSaSTitamAyA upari naikasyA api tu kArikayoH / ata ekaSaSTitamAyA anantaramevAnayA luptayA kArikayA bhAvyam / bhASyagatapratIkAnurodhena caiSA kArikaivaM nirmAtuM zakyate-- kAraNamIzvarameke bruvate kAlaM pare svabhAvaM vA / prajAH kathaM nirguNato vyaktaH kAlaH svabhAvazca // asti cAsyAH kArikAyAH pUrvAparasandarbhasaGgatiH / nirIzvaratvapratipAdakatvAcca kenacidasahiSNunA cyAviteyam / kintu bhASyacyAvanamasau vismRtavAn / pUrveSAM mate svabhAvasya, kAlasya Izvarasya vA jaganmUlatvamiti zvetAzvataramantreNa dyotyate svabhAvamake kavayo vadanti kAlaM tathAnye parimuhyamAnAH / devasyaiSa mahimA tu loke yenedaM bhrAmyate bAhyacakram // " iti asyA naSTAyAH kArikAyAH pUrvArddhamasmanmatAnusAreNa tvevaM paThanIyam |-- kAraNamIzvarameke puruSaM kAlaM pare svabhAvaM vA / ' sUryanArAyaNazAstriNA ca kRtametatkArikArakhaNDanaM na sayuktikam / tanmatAnurodhenaikaSaSTitamakArikAyA bhASyasyAntime kRtaH, vRtau ca mAThareNa kRtaH sukumArataramitizabdasya parAmarzaH, prakRtakArikA vihAyAnyasyAH kArikAyA bhASyavRttyoH sambhAvanAM nirAkaroti / etadatra vicAraNIyam--

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prakRterAtyantikI nivRttiH| [sA. ta. puruSAntarANi na punaH pazyanti,-evamprakRtirapi kulavadhUto 'pyadhikA dRSTA vivekena na punadrakSyata ityarthaH // 61 // bhASyasyAdime bhAga evaM paThyate--'ahamanena puruSeNa dRSTA'smItyasya puMsaH punadarzanaM nopaiti, puruSasyAdarzanamupayAtItyarthaH / tatra sukumArataraM varNayati--' etadanantaraM bhASyacaramabhAgaH--'na punadarzanamupayAti puruSasya' iti ptthniiyH| 'sukumArataraM varNayati' ityanantaraM 'kecidIzvaraM kAraNaM bruvate' ityAdipAThastu nitarAmasaGgata eva / nahIzvarAdInAM kAraNatvaM prakRteH sukumArataratvavarNanam / ato ruvaM kenacidIzvaranirAsAsahi. SNunA kArikeyaM lopitA / anyena ca kenacidvarAkeNa bhASyametanmUlakArikAvihInamiti matvA tathaikaSaSTitamakAriphAbhASyAntanivezitaM yathA sthUladarzanairapi vibhAvyate / ata eva 'na punadarzanamupayAti puruSasya' ityetadanantaraM tena 'ata prakRteH sukumArataraM subhogyataraM na kiJcidIzvarAdikAraNamastIti me matirbhavati' iti saGgatyartha prakSiptam / yathA ca naitatsaGgacchate tathA sphuTameva / paraM ca, IzvarAdInA subhogyatvAdikathanamapi bhRzamanarthakam / evaM mATharavRttAvapi yathAkathaJcit saMgranthanameva / ato vAcaspatyAdInAM purata eva lupteyaM kArikA / yastu 'nanu IzvaranirAsAsahiSNutvaM kArikAvilope prayojakaM cet, kathaM nAma tadbhASyavilope prayojakaM na syAt ' iti sUryanArAyaNazAkhyabhiprAyastatra brUmaH-- yasya khalu kuTilamateH svAnabhimateyaM kArikA dRSTipathaM yAtA, na tasya bhASyaM dRggocarI. bhUtamiti sambhAvyate / na khalu bhASyakArikayoravyabhicAri sahAvasthAnaM, yena kArikAM nissArayan bhASyamapi bahiH kuryAt / bhASyaM cAsmadbhAgyavazAnna taddhaste patitam / atastAdRzakuTilamatyanantarabhAvibhilekhakailekhakena vA mUlakArikAvihInaM bhASyametadvilokya yathAkathaJcidekaSaSTitamakArikAbhASye niyojitamiti rAddhAntaH // adhunApi prAcInahastalikhitapustakeSu mUlagraMthaH TIkAgraMthazca pRthak pRthak lekhanAvasthititvena dRzyete / tena mUlagraMthasthitA kArikA cyAvitaiva / bhASyagraMthasya tatsamaye aprAptatvAt bhASyasya adyApi sthitirasti / [ haradattazarmA ]

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kau. 62-63] bandhamokSayoH prakRtiparatvam / 75 syAdetat-" puruSazcedaguNo'pariNAmI, kathamasya mokSaH ? mucaMbandhanavizle SArthatvAt , savAsanaklezakarmAzayAnAJca bandhanasamA( 262 ) nirguNapuruSamo. khyAnAM puruSe 'pariNAminyasambhavAt / ata evAsya ca kSasaMsArAdyasambhavazaGkA // puruSasya na saMsAraH pretyabhAvAparanAmA'sti, niSkri. yatvAt / tasmAt 'puruSavimokSArtham ' iti riktaM vacaH"-itImAM zaGkAmupasaMhAravyAjenAbhyupagacchannapAkaroti // tasmAnna badhyate 'ddhA na mucyate nApi saMsarati kazcit / saMsarati badhyate mucyate ca nAnAzrayA prakRtiH // 62 // " tasmAt " iti / addhA na kazcit puruSo badhyate, na kazcit saMsarati: na kazcinmucyate / prakRtireva tu nAnAzrayA satI ( 263 ) tatparihAraH- badhyate saMsarati mucyate ceti / bandhamokSasaMsArAH puruSeprakRtigatAnAM saMsArA- khUpacaryante yathA jayaparAjayau bhRtyagatAvapi svAmidInAM puruSe upcaarH|| nyupacaryete, taMdAzrayeNa bhRtyAnAntadbhAgitvAt , tatpha lasya ca zokalAbhAdeH svAmini sambhavAt / bhogApavargayoH prakRtigatayorapi vivekAgrahAt puruSasambandha upapAdita iti sarvampuSkalam // 62 // nanvavagatam 'prakRtigatA bandhasaMsArApavargAH puruSe upacaryante' iti / (264) prakRtyA dharmAdi- kiMsAdhanAH punarete prakRteH ? ityata AhasaptarUpaibandhanamekarUpeNa tattvajJAnarUpeNa ca mokSaNam // rUpaiH saptabhireva tu badhnAtyAtmAnamAtmanA prakRtiH / saiva ca puruSArthamprati vimocayatyekarUpeNa // 63 // " rUpaiH" iti / tattvajJAnavarja badhnAti dharmAdibhissaptabhI rUpairbhAvairiti / " puruSArthamprati" bhogApavargamprati "AtmanA''tmAnam " ekarUpeNa tatvajJAnena vivekakhyAtyA vimocayati, punarbhogApavargoM na karotItyarthaH // 63 / / 1. 'AtmanA' buddhirUpeNa, 'AtmAnam ' puruSamiti candrikA /

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7. tattvajJAnotpattikathanam / sAM, ta. bhavagatamIdRzaM tasvam , tataH kimityata AhaevantattvAbhyAsAnnAsmi na me nAhamityaparizeSam / aviparyayAdvizuddhaM kevalamutpadyate jJAnam // 64 // " evam" iti / tattvena viSayeNa tattvajJAnamupalakSayati / uktarUpaprakA(265) abhyAsAtatvajJA- ratattvaviSayajJAnAbhyAsAdAdaranairantaryadIrghakAlasevitAta notpattiH // stvpurussaanytaasaakssaatkaarijnyaanmutpdyte| yadviSayazcA bhyAsastadviSayakameva sAkSAtkAramupajanayati, - tattvavi. SayazvAbhyAsa iti tattvasAkSAtkAraM janayati / ata uktam - " vizuddham" iti // kuto vizuddhamityata Aha-"aviparyayAt " iti / saMzayaviparyayau hi . jJAnasyAvizuddhI, tadrahitam vizuddhamtadidamuktam( 266 ) tattvajJAnasya vizuddhihetuH aviparyaya __"aviparyayAta" iti / niyatamaniyatatayA gRhNan tvam // saMzayo 'pi viparyayaH, tena 'aviparyayAt ' iti saMzayaviparyayAbhAvo darzitaH / tattvaviSayasvAzca saMzayaviparyayAbhAvaH // syAdetat - ' utpadyatAmIdRzAbhyAsAt tattvajJAnam , tathA 'pyanAdinA (267) anAdermithyA- mithyAjJAnasaMskAreNa mithyAjJAnaM janayitavyam tathA jJAnasaMskArasyAdimatyA ca tannibandhanasya saMsArasyAnucchedaprasaGga ityata uktamtattvajJAnasaMskAreNa "kevalam" iti=viparyayaNAsambhinam / yadyapya samucchedaH / / nAdiviparyayavAsanA tathA 'pi tattvajJAnavAsanayAtattvaviSayasAkSAtkAramAdadhatyA ''dimatyA 'pi zakyA samucchettum / tattvapakSa- . pAto hi dhiyAM svabhAvaH, yadAhurbAhyA api " nirupadradhabhUtArthasvabhAvasya viparyayaiH / na bAdho 'yasnayasve 'pi buddhastatpakSapAtataH" iti / /

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ko. 64-65] tattvajJAnasvarUpakathanam / jJAnasvarUpamuktam - " nAsmi, na me, nAham" iti / 'nAsmi' isyA ramani kriyAmAtraniSedhati / yathAhuH 'kRbhvastayaH (268) tattvajJAnasvarUpa- kriyAsAmAnyavacanAH' iti [siddhAntakaumudI.] / pradarzanam-sarvavidhAhakA- tathA cAdhyavasAyAbhimAnasaGkalpAlocanAni cAntarANi ranivRttiH // bAhyAzca sarve vyApArA Atmani pratibaddhAni boddha vyaani| yatazcAtmani vyApArAvezo nAstyato 'naahm'| ahamiti kartapadam , aha jAnAmyahaM juhomyahandade' iti sarvatra kartuH parAmarzAt / niSkriyatve ca sarvatra kartRtvAbhAvaH / tataH suSThUktam- " nAham ' iti / ata eva " na me" / kartA hi svAmitAM labhate, tasmAt kutaH svAbhAvikI svAmitetyarthaH / athavA " nAsmi" iti " puruSo 'smi, na prsvdhrmaa"| bhaprasavadharmitvAcAkartRtvamAha-" nAham" iti / akartRtvAcca na svAmitetyata mAha-" na me" iti // ___ nanu 'etAvatsu jJAteSvapi kazcit kadAcidajJAto viSayo 'sti, tadajJAna jantUn bandhayiSyati' ityata Aha-" bhaparizeSam " (269) tattvajJAnasyA- iti / nAsti kiJcidasmin pariziSTam jJAtavyam parizeSatvam // yadajJAnaM bandhayiSyatItyarthaH // 64 / / (270) tattvasAkSAtkAra- kiM punarIdRzena tattvasAkSAtkAreNa sidhyatItyata phalam // mAhatena nivRttaprasavAmarthavazAt saptarUpavinivRttAm / prakRtim pazyati puruSa: prekSakavadavasthitaH svacchaH // 65 // "tena" iti / bhogavivekasAkSAtkArau hi prakRteH prsotnyau| tau gha prasUtAviti nAsyAH prasotavyamavaziSyata iti nivRttaprasavA prakRtiH / vivekajJAnarUpo yo 'rthastasya vazaH sAmarthyam tasmAt / atatvajJAnapUrvakANi khalu dharmAdharmAjJAnavairAgyAvairAgyaizvaryAnaizvaryANi / vairAgyamapi kevalatauSTikAnAmatasvajJAnapUrvakameva / tatra tattvajJAnaM virodhisvenAtattvajJAnamugchinatti / kAraNa 1. 'nAhamiti ' tAdAtmyaniSedha iti kecit 2. " sustha" iti pAThAntaram / 3. vizuddhakevalajJAneneti yAvat /

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78 muktapuruSamprati pradhAnasya pravRttyabhAvaH / [sAM. ta. nivRttyA ca saptarUpANi nivartanta iti " saptarUpavinivRttA prakRtiH " " avasthita" iti niSkriyaH, "svacchaH" iti rajastamovRttikaluSayA buddhayA 'sambhinnaH / sAttvikyA tu buddhayA tadA 'pyasya manAk sambhedo 'styeva, anyathaivambhUtaprakRtidarzanAnupapatteriti // 65 / / syAdetat-'nivRttaprasavAmiti na mRNyAmahe / saMyogakRto hi sarga ityuktam , (271) ekaviSayama- yogyatA ca saMyogaH, bhoktRtvayogyatA ca puruSasya pekSya nivRttAyA api caitanyam , bhogyatvayogyatA ca prakRterjaDatvam viSayaprakRtarviSayAntaraM prati tvaJca / na caitayorasti nivRttiH / na ca karaNIyApravRttizaGkA // bhAvAnivRttiH, tajjAtIyasyAnyasya karaNIyatvAt punaH punaH shbdaadyupbhogvt|'-ityt Aha dRSTA mayetyupekSaka eko, dRSTA 'hamityuparamatyanyA / sati saMyoge'pi tayoH prayojanannAsti sargasya // 66 // " dRSTA " iti / karotu nAma paunaHpunyena zabdAdyupabhogamprakRtiryayA viveka khyAtirna kRtA, kRtavivekakhyAtistu zabdAdyupabhoganna (272 ) tannirAsaH // janayati / avivekakhyAtinibandhano hi tadupabhogo, nibandhanAbhAve na tadbhavitumarhati, aMkura iva bIjAbhAve / prAkRtAn hi sukhaduHkhamohAtmanaH zabdAdIMstadavivekAt 'mamaitat ' ityabhimanyamAna AtmA bhuJjIta / evaM vivekakhyAtimapi prAkRtImavivekAdevAtmA 'madartheyam ' iti manyate / utpannavivekakhyAtistu tadasaMsargAcchabdAdInopabhoktu. mahati nApi vivekakhyAtimprAkRtImapi kartum / tato vivikta' AtmA na svArthamabhimantumarhati puruSAthoM ca bhogavivekau prakRtyArambhaprayojakAvityapuruSArthoM santau na prakRti prayojayataH / tadidamuktam-"prayojanamnAsti sargasya " iti / atha prayujyate sarge prakRtiraneneti prayojanam , tadapuruSArthe nAstItyarthaH // 66 // 1. utpannavivekakhyAtiH

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kau. 67] muktasyApi saMskAravazAccharIradhAraNam / syAdetat-" utpannatattvasAkSAtkArazcettadanantarameva muktasya tasya deha pAtaH syAditi kathamadehaH prakRtimpazyet / atha (273 ) viviktasyA- tattvajJAne 'pi na mucyate karmaNAmaprakSINatvAt ? teSAM smano dehapAtAtprakRti- kutaH prakSayaH ? ' bhogAt' iti cet , hanta bhostadarzanAsambhavazaGkA // tvajJAnAnna mokSasAdhanam-iti 'vyaktAvyaktavijJAna janmanA tattvajJAnenApavarga' iti riktaM vacaH / 'bhogena cAparisaMkhyeyaH karmAzayapacayo 'niyatavipAkakAlaH kSetavyaH, tatazcApavargaprAptiH' ityapi manorathamAtram" ityata Aha samyagjJAnAdhigamAt dharmAdInAmakAraNaprAptau / tiSThati saMskAravazAt , cakrabhramivaddhRtazarIraH // 6 // " samyak " iti / tattvasAkSAtkArodayAdevanAdirapyaniyatavipAka kAlo 'pi karmAzayapracayo dagdhabIjabhAvatayA na ( 274 ) tannirAsaH- jAtyAyu galakSaNAya phalAya kalpate / klezasalilAviviktasyApi saMskAra- vasiktAyAM hi buddhibhUmau karmabIjAnyaGkaraM prasuvate / yazAccharIradhAraNam // tattvajJAnanidAghanipItasakalaklezasalilAyAmUSarAyAM kutaH karmabIjAnAmaGkaraprasavaH ? tadidamuktam "dharmAdInAmakAraNaprAptau" iti, akAraNatva prAptApityarthaH / utpannatatvajJAno 'pi ca saMskAravazAt tiSThati, yathoparate 'pi kulAlavyApAre cakraM vegAkhyasaMskAravazAt bhramat tiSThati / kAlaparipAkavazAttaparate saMskAre nikriyambhavati / zarIra. sthitau ca prArabdhaparipAko dharmAdharmoM saMskArau / tathA cAnuzrayate-" bhogena vitare kSapayitvA 'tha sampadyate" iti "tasya tAvadeva ciraM yAvana vimokSye 'tha sampatsye" iti ca [chAndogya, 6 / 14 / 2] | prakSIyamANAvidyAsaMskArAvazeSazca saMskArastadvazAt tatsAmarthyAt pRtazarIrastiSThati // 67 / / syAdetat-" yadi saMskArazeSAdapi dhRtazarIrastathA 'pi kadA 'sya mokSo ( 275 ) zarIranAze ai. bhaviSyati ? ityata mAhakAntikAtyantikamuktiH //

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sAMkhyazAstrasya prAmANikatvam / [sAM. ta. prApte zarIrabhede caritArthatvAt pradhAnavinivRttau / aikAntikamAtyantikamubhayaM kaivalyamApnoti // 68 // "prApte" iti / anArabdhavipAkAnAntAvat karmAzayAnAM tattvajJAnAgninA bIjabhAvo dagdhaH / prArabdhavipAkAnAntUpabhogena kSaye sati, "prApte, zarIrabhede " iti-vinAze-" caritArthatvAt " iti-kRtaprayojanatvAt / pradhAnasya tampuruSamprati vinivRttau-" aikAntikam "avazyambhAvi " Atyantikam "= avinAzi-ityubhayaM "kaivalyam " duHkhatrayavigamamprApnoti puruSaH // 68 // ( 276 ) sAMkhyazAstra pramANenopapAdite 'pyatyantazraddhotpAdanAya parasya paramarSipraNItatvam marSipUrvakatvamAha puruSArthajJAnamidaM guhyamparamarSiNA samAkhyAtam / sthityutpattipralayAzcintyante yatra bhUtAnAm // 69 // "puruSa " iti / " guhyam " guhAnivAsi, sthUladhiyAM durbodhamiti yAvat / "paramarSigA" kapilena tAmeva zraddhAmAgamikatvena draDhayati" sthityutpattipralayAzcintyante yatra bhUtAnAm " iti / 'yatra ' jJAne yadartham , yathA 'carmaNi dvIpinaM hanti ' iti / " bhUtAnAm " = prANinAM " sthityutpattipralayAH " AgamaiH " cintyante " // 69 // ( 277 ) sAMkhyazA- syAdetat-" yat paramarSiNA sAkSAtkathitam tacchastrasya guruziSyaparamparA badhImahi, yatpunarIzvarakRSNena kathitam tatra kutaH kapilAdArabhya paJcazikha- zraddhA? "-ityata Ahaparyantam // etat pavitramagnyaM munirAsuraye'nukampayA pradadau / Asurirapi paJcazikhAya, tena ca bahudhA kRtantantram // 70 // " etat " iti / " etat pavitram " pAvanam- duHkhatrayahetoH pApmanaH punAtIti-" agnyam "= sarvebhyaH pavitrebhyo mukhyam, " muniH " kapilaH

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kau. 71-72 ] guruziSyaparaMparA / Asuraye 'nukampayA pradadau, Asurirapi paJcazikhAya, tena ca bahudhA kRtaM tantram " // 70 // ziSyaparamparayA ''gatamIzvarakRSNena caitadAryAbhiH / saMkSiptamAryamatinA samyagvijJAya siddhAntam / / 71 // (278 ) IzvarakRSNasya "ziSya " iti / ArAt yAtA tattvebhya ityAryA, guruziSyaparamparA // AryA matiryasya so 'yam "AryamatiH" iti // 71 // ( 279 ) saptatikAri- etacca zAstram , makalazAstrArthasUcakatvAt , na tu kANAM zAstratvam // prakaraNamityAhasaptatyAM kila ye'rthAste'rthAH kRtsnasya SaSTitantrasya / AkhyAyikAvirahitAH paravAdavivarjitAzcApi // 72 // " saptatyAm " iti / tathA ca rAjavArtikam // "pradhAnAstitvamekatvamarthavattvamathAnyatA / pArArthyaM ca tathA'naikyaM viyogo yoga eva ca // zeSavRttirakartRtvaM maulikArthAH smRtA daza / viparyayaH paJcavidhastathoktA nava tussttyH|| karaNAnAmasAmarthyamaSTAviMzatidhA matam / iti SaSTiH padArthAnAmaSTabhiH saha siddhibhiH" // iti // seyaM SaSTipadArthI kathiteti sakalazAstrArthakathanAnedamprakaraNamapi tu zAstramevedamiti siddham / ekatvamarthavattvam pArArthyaJca pradhAnamadhikRtyoktam / anyatvamakartRtvam bahutvaJcati puruSamadhikRtya / astitvam viyoge yogazcetyubhayamadhikRtya / vRttiH sthitiriti sthUlasUkSmamadhikRtya / / 72 // manAMsi kumudAnIva bodhayantI satAM sdaa| zrIvAcaspatimizrANAM kRtiH stAt tttvkaumudii|| ityakhilatantrAparatantrapratibhadvAdazadarzanaTIkAkucchrI madvAcaspatimizrakRtA sAMkhyatatvakaumudI //

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THE TATTVA-KA [SAM KHYA An English Translation. (1) We bow to the One Unborn, Red, White and Black, producing many offsprings; we bow also to those Unborn Ones Who have recourse to Her while She is active, and renounce Her on having undergone the experiences afforded by her. To the Great Sage Kapila, and to his disciple Asuri, as also to Pancas'ikha and Is'varaklsna--10 these we bow in reverence. (2) In this world, that expounder is listened to by the Introduction to audience, who offers expositions of facts Karika I whose knowledge is desired by them. On the other hand, one who expounds doctrines which no one cares for is regarded to be ignorant of worldly affairs as also devoid of the critical faculty; and such an expounder would be disregarded. The doctrine that people care to understand is just that which, on being understood, leads to the fulfilment of the highest aim of man. Consequently, as the science to be (hereafter) explained supplies the means to that final goal, the author introduces the inquiry into its subject matter : * The translation of the Tattvakaumudi was done by me as a class. exercise when I was a student of the M. A. Class at the Queen's College, Benares. The revising of it, therefore, is a debt that I owe to the world of Scholarship. This revising I have done now. Though, having been done during the busiest part of my life, it may not be much of an im. provement upon its predecessor, yet I am sending it out for what it is worth, and leave it to the mercy of competent critics. (Ganganath Jha.)

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI [13-- Karika I There being ( in this world ) an impediment caused * by the three kinds of pain ( there arises ) a desire for enquiry into the means of alleviating them. And if (it be urged that) the enquiry is superfluous on account of (the existence of) obvious means,--(we reply that it is ) not so: because these (latter) are neither absolute nor final. (3) The subject-matter of a science would not be enquirNecessity of ed into-(1) if there existed no pain in this scientific enquiry world; or (2) 1f, though extant, its removal were not desired; or (3) even if desired, its removal were impossible-such impossibility arising either from the fact of the pain being everlasting in its nature, or from the ignorance of the means of alleviating it; or (4) notwithstanding the possibility of removing it, if the subject-matter of the science did not afford the adequate means; or (5) lastly, if there were other and easier means elsewhere available. (4) Now, that there is no pain and that its removal is 'The three-fold not universally desired, are opposed to facts. division of pain This is what is meant by the words: There being an impediment caused by the three kinds of pain. The three kinds of pain constitute ( what is ordinarily called) the "triad of pain." These are : (1) the intrinsic (Adhyatmika), (2) the extrinsic (Adhibhautika) and (3) the divine or superhuman (Adhidaivika). Of these the intrinsic is twofold, bodily and mental. Bodily pain is caused by the disorder of the several humours, wind, bile and phlegm; and mental pain is due to desire, wrath, avarice, affection, fear, envy, gnel, and the non-perception of particular objects. All these are called intrinsic on account of their being amenable to internal remedies. Pains amenable to external remedies are two-fold : extrinsic and superhuman. The extrinsic are caused by men, beasts, birds, reptiles, and inanimate things; and the superhuman ones are due to the evil influence of

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-1'] planets and the various elementals (Yaksa etc.). Thus the fact that pain, which is a particular modification of the attribute of Rajas-is experienced by each soul, cannot be gainsaid. Impediment (Abhighata) is the connection of the sentient faculty with the three kinds of pain subsisting in the internal organ, which are felt to be disagreeable. It is this idea of disagreeableness which has been mentioned as the incentive to the alleviation of pain. Though pain cannot be absolutely prevented, yet it is possible to alleviate its will be explained later on. This is what is meant by (enquiry to be made) into the means of alleviating the three kinds of pain. In the compound tadapaghatake, the pronoun tat refers to the three kinds of pain; and though this forms the subordinate factor in the preceding compound (duhkhatraya etc.), yet in the mental conception it is the more proximate (and hence the following pronoun refers to it in preference to the other and primary factor of the compound).--What is meant by all this is that the means of alleviation, too, is only that which is set forth in the sciences,-none other. TRANSLATION Objection Inquiry superfluous in presence of obvious means 3 (5) An objection is raised: "On account of obvious remedies, such enquiry is superfluous. That is to say: We grant that the triad of pain is there, and also that its removal is desirable; as also that the removal is possible; we go further, and grant that the means set forth in the sciences are adequate to the removal. With all this, however, the present enquiry becomes superfluous, because we have easier and obvious means for the removal of pain; and further because of the difficult character of the means prescribed in the sciences, which consists of a full knowledge of abstruse philosophical principles, attainable only by a long course of traditional study extending over many lives. Says a popular maxim: 'When a man can find honey in a much-frequented place, wherefore should he go to the mountains? So, when

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI (16_ the object of desire has been attained, which wise man will make any further attempt?' Hundreds of remedies for bodily pain are laid down by eminent physicians; for mental pains also we have easy remedies in the shape of the attainment of the objects of enjoyment-such as women, desirable food and drink, unguents, dress, ornaments and the like. Similarly, of extrinsic pains we have easy remedies--such as expert knowledge of moral and political science, residence in sale places, etc. In the same manner, of superhuman troubles we have remedies in the shape of charms, incantations and the rest." (6) This objection is answered as follows-Not so why ? -- Because these are neither absolute Reply: Obvious thor final. Absoluteness of the means conmeans are not absolute nor final sists in the certainty of its effect; and its finality consists in the non-recurrence of the pain once removed. The absence of these two properties is. denoted by the expression, "Ekantatyantato bhavah." The universal affix tasi has a genitive force here. The upshot of the whole is this: As a matter of fact, we find that even on the employment in the prescribed manner of the remedies mentioned above, such as medicines, women, moral and political science, incantations and the rest--the various kinds of pain are not actually alleviated; hence we predicate the want of certainty of the cure effected thereby; and similarly from the recurrence of pain once cured, we infer non-permanence of the cure. Thus though easily available, the obvious means do not effect absolute and final removal of pain. Consequently, the present enquiry is not superfluous. (7) Though the mention of the word pain in the very beginning is inauspicious, yet that of the ex. Auspiciousness tirpatory means as leading to its removal is of the beginning word auspicious; and as such quite appropriate at the commencement of a treatise.

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-11] TRANSLATION pain (8) The following argument might be put forward: Obiection. Vedic "We grant the inadequacy of the obvious means adequate remedies; but we have others prescribed in to removal of the Vedas in the shape of a host of such acts as the Jyotistoma etc., which extend over the whole year; these will certainly remove the three kinds of pain absolutely and finally. Says the S'ruti : 'Desir. ing heaven one must perform sacrifices,' and Heaven is thus described : 'Happiness, unmixed and uninterspersed with unhappiness and attainable by pure longing for it is what is denoted by the word Heaven.' Heaven thus consists in such happiness as is diametrically opposed to unhappiness or pain and which by its inherent capacity extirpates pain from its very roots; nor is this happiness short-lived, --for, declares the S'ruti : "We drank the Soma and became immortal." (Atharvasiras 111]. And if the celestial happiness were short-lived how could there be ' immortality ? Hence the Vedic reme. dies for the removal of pain, which can be gone through in a moment, a few hours, a day, a month, or a year,-are far easier than discriminative knowledge, which can be attained only by a continuous effort extending over many lives. Thus again, the proposed enquiry remains superfluous." The answer to this is suggested in the following Karka. Karika II The revealed is like the obvious, since it is connected with impurity, decay and inequality. That which is contrary to that is better, proceeding from the right cognition of the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Cogniser (Spirit).* * This Karika embodies, as Davies rightly remarks, the leading principle of Kapila's philosophy according to which final emancipation is attainable not by religious rites, but by discriminative knowledge, as explained by Kapila.

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI [119(9) Anus'rava is Veda, that which is heard during the tutorial lectures of a qualified teacher and Reply : The not done ( written ). Anus'ravika 18 that Vedic is like the obvious which is related to Anus'rava or Veda, i. e. which is derived or known therefrom. The host of religious rites laid down in the Veda is equal to the obvious ( remedies mentioned before );- both being equally inefficient in the absolute and final removal of the three kinds of pain. Though the text uses the generic term " Vedic " (Anus'rvaika), yet it ought to be taken as implying only the ritualistic section of it; because discriminative knowledge also forms part of the Veda ( which of course is not what the author means). Says the S'ruti: "The Spirit should be known and discriminated from Primordial Matter." (Brhadaranyaka, 2-4-5); (bg, so doing) "the agent does not return, yea, he does not return ( into this world )". ( Chandogya, 8-15). (10) Reasons for the above assertion are given: since it is connected with impurity, decay and Because impure, excess. The impurity lies in the fact of the decaying and excessive - Soma and other sacrifices being accompanied by the killing of animals and the destruction of grains and seeds. Says the revered Pancas'ikhacarya : " It ( the sin attendant upon slaughter ) is slightly mixed, remediable and bearable." The slight mixture' meant here is that of the principle effect ( Apurva i. e. merit) of the Jyotisloma and other sacrifices, with the minor apurva due to animal-slaughter which is the source of sin. The epithet remediable' implies that the sin is removable by certain expiatory rites; but if somehow these are neglected, then at the time of the fruition of the principal karma (merit), the evil element ( denyrit caused by the slaughter ) also bears its fruits; and as long as these latter are being experienced, they are borne with patience; hence the qualification 'bearable'. Ex. perts ( in rituals ) dangling in the nectar-tanks of heaven

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-][12] TRANSLATION attained by a mass of righteous deeds, have to bear the spark of the fire of pain brought about by the element of sin ( involved in the rituals ). (11) It will not be right to argue that the generic law -"Kill not any animal," is set aside by The impurity of the specific one, "Kill the animal dedicated animal slaughter in a sacrifice to Agni-Soma "-because they do not conestablished tradict each other; and it is only when two laws are mutually contradictory, that the stronger sets aside the weaker. In the present instance, how. ever, there is no contradiction, the two laws treating of two entirely different subjects. For the negative law " Kill not etc.," only declares that killing is productive of sin or evil ( and hence pain ); but it does not deny the fact of its being necessary for the performance of sacrifices; and in the same manner, the injunction " Kill the animal etc., " declares that the killing of animal helps in the performance of sacrifice, but does not negative the fact of its being productive of sin. If it did so, there would be a syntactical split [. e. the sentence "Kill the animal etc., " would bear two predicates (1) 'The killing is helpful in the performance of sacrifice,' (2) and that it is not conducive to sin ]. Nor is there any contradiction between the productivity of sin and the capability of helping the performance of a sacrifice. Animal-slaughter can produce sin in the man, and at the same time quite consistently help the performance of the sacrifice. (12) The properties--' decay' and 'inequality '-belong really to the effect; but are here attributed Decay and ex- to the means. This liability to decay is inferred cess shown to apply to the ro- from the fact of Heaven being a positive sults of Vedic action identity and a product. Further, the Jyotistoma and other sacrifices are the means to the attainment of Heaven only, whereas the Vajapeya and others lead to the attainment of the kingdom of Heaven (or 'self

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI sovereignty'). This is what constitutes the inequality spoken of. The greatness of the magnificence of one man is a source of pain to another of lesser magnificence. 8 .. (13) In the passage "Drinking Soma, we became immortal "-immortality stands for long-dura. tion,- -as is declared elsewhere: "Immortality is duration till the final dissolution of all finite existence." Hence the S'ruti: "Neither by deeds, nor by children nor by wealth, but by renunciation alone they got immortality." [Mahanarayana Upanisad X-5], and again 'Heaven shines in a remote and secluded valley, which the ascetics alone enter; by actions did the ascetics with children, desiring wealth, come by death; while those other wise sages, who were above all action, got immortality." Immortality as a result of Vedic action is only long-durability r1118 06 is discriminative wisdom (14) With all this in view it is declared: That which is contrary to that is preferable-proceeding The only means from discriminative knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Cogniser. The term that stands for the Vedic remedy of removing pain. A method-contrary to the impure Soma sacrifice etc. bringing about unequal and short-lived results, -is pure i. e. unmixed with the evils due to animal-slaughter and leading to results not unequal. This is clear from the S'ruti precluding all return to metempsychosis for people possessing discriminative knowledge. The argument based on the said result being a caused entity cannot be urged as a ground for its non-permanence, because this holds only in the case of the effect being a positive entity; in the present case, however, the effect-the removal of pain-though a product, is a negative entity. And when the productivity of the cause (ignorance) has been destroyed (by discriminative knowledge) there can be no further effect, in the shape of more pain. For it is a fact admitted on all hands that the efficiency of the

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--1117] TRANSLATION cause lasts only till the attainment of discriminative knowledge. This will be explained later on ( under Karika LXVI). (15) The literal meaning of the words of the Karika is . as follows: The means of removing pain, Literal meaning of the Karikh consisting in the direct discriminative know ledge of the Spirit as apart from Matter, is contrary to the Vedic means, and hence is better. The Vedic remedy is good inasmuch as it is authorised by the Veda and as such capable of removing pain to a certain extent; the discriminative knowledge of the Spirit as distinct from Maiter is also good; and of these two, the latter is better, superior. (16) Question :-"Whence does such discriminative knowledge arise ? Source of discri- Answer-From the right cognition of minative know the Manifested, the Unmakifested and the ledge Cogniser. Cognition of the Manifested precedes that of its cause, the Unmanifested; and from the fact of both of these (Manifested and Unmanifested ) being for another's purpose, we infer the existence of the Spirit. Thus we find that these three are mentioned in the order of precedence of the cognition thereof. The upshot of the whole then is this : The knowledge of the distinction of Spirit from Matter arises from right cognition-consisting in meditation and contemplation uninterruptedly and patiently carried on for a long time, of the Manifested, etc., the character of these latter having been previously learnt from the Veda, the Smrtis and the Itihasas, and duly strengthened by scientific reasoning. This will be explained in detail later on in Karika LXIV. (17.) Having thus established the fact of the under .. taking of scientific enquiry being useful for Fourfold division the of categories, on the enquirer, the author, with a view to commence the work, sets down, in brief, the import of the system, in order to focus the attention of the enquirer.

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10 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [11118 Karika III Root-matter is not a product; the group of seven consisting of the Great Principle and the rest are both product and productive; and the Spirit is neither a product nor productive. Briefly, the objects treated of in the system are of four kinds: some of them are merely productive, some merely products, others both productive and products, and others, neither the one nor the other. (18) To the question-What is the productive -- the answer is--Primordial Root-matter is not a The Productive product; 'Root-matter' ( Prakrti)* is that which produces (prakaroti); it is also called * Pradhana' (Primordial), which represents the three Attributes of Sattvas, Rajas and Tamas in the state of equilibrium, - that is purely productive. Why it is so is explained by the term 'Mala', 'Root'; i. e. it is that 'Matter which is the 'Root'; it is the root of the Universe which is an aggregate product; of this Matter itself there can be no rout; or else we would be landed in an unwarranted regresus ad infinitum. (19) How many are the objects that are both prouuctive and products, and which are these? The The Productive- answer is--The group of seven consisting of Products the Great Principle and the rest are both; i.e. they are products as well as productive. The Great Principle (Buddhi) is the root of Egoism (Ahankara), and the pro. duct of Root-matter; so is Principle of Egoism the root of the * What the term prakrti' stands for has been made clear here. Henceforth, the term shall be rendered either as Root-matter' or sim. ply as 'Nature.'

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-1119] TRANSLATION five subtle Primary Substances together with the eleven senseorgans, and it is also the product of the Great Principle; and so are the five subtle Primary Substances the root of the grosser elements, Akasa and the rest, and, at the same time, the product of Egoism. (20) How many are the products, pure and simple, and what are they? Answer: The products The Products are sixteen-i. e., sixteen in number; the five gross substances ( earth etc., ) and the eleven sense-organs,--these are mere products or modifications, not productive; this is what is emphasised by the particle 'tu', which should be taken as coming after 'vikarah' (in the text ). Though the cow, the jar, the trees and the rest are products of the earth, and so are curd and Sprout, of milk and seed respectively, which latter are the products of the cow and the tree, yet these facts do not touch our position; since trees etc., do not differ from earth, in their essence, and it is the productiveness of soinething different in essence, for which the term Root, " Prakrti" stands; and that the cow, the tree etc., do not differ from each other in their essence, is proved by the fact that they have, in common, the properties of grossness and perceptibility. (21) That which is neither productwe nor product, is now described :--the Spirit is neither a product nor The non-product. productive productive. All this will be explained later on. (22) In order to prove the above statement, the different kinds of proof (Means of Right Cognition) Three kinds of have to be described. Nor can there be proofs a particular definition without a general one. Hence the definition of Means of Right Cognition in general follows:

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12 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [IV23 Karika IV Perception, Inference, and Valid Assertion are accepted as the three kinds of Means of Right Cognition; because these include all forms of Means of Cognition, It is through the Means of Cognition that the objects of Cognition are properly cognised. (23) Means of Cognition are accepted :-here the term * Means of Cognition' only states the thing Proof defined to be defined; and the explanation of the term would constitute the definition of *Means of Cognition ;' this explanation being that the Means of Cognition is that through which things are cognised. Thus the said Means comes to be recognised as the Instrument of Right Cognition. This represents a mental condition free from the contact of all that is either doubtful or wrong or unknown; what is brought about by this instrument is Right Cognition in the form of an apprehension by the human agent; and that which leads to such right notion is the Means of Cognition. Thus the 'Means of Cognition' become differentiated from all that leads to wrong notion, viz. doubt, misconception, remembrance, and the like, which (on that account) are not the 'Means of Right Cognition. (24) The author now rejects the different views with regard to the number of Pramanas: "Of three The three-fold- kinds; "--that is, of the Means of Right ness of proof Cognition in general there are three kinds -- neither more nor less. This we shall explain in detail after the particular definitions of the various Means of Right Cognition. (25) Now, there arises the question--which are the . .. three kinds of Means of Right Cognition ? Only three kinds The answer is Perception, Inference and of proof Valid Assertion. The above is an exposition of what are popular forms of Cognition; as a philosophical

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-IV 29] TRANSLATION system is expounded for the benefit of the ordinary people, who alone are capable of benefitting by it. The intuition or supernatural forms of Cognitions which appear in the great sages and adepts,-though realities, do not in any way help the ordinary people, and as such are not treated of here. (26) Objection:-"We grant that the number of Pramanas is not less than three; but wherefore should it not be more than three? The different schools do lay down others, such as Analogy (Upamana) and the rest". Reply-Because these three include all forms of Means of Right Cognition. That is, all forms of Right Cognition are included-i. e. comprehended-under these three, Perception, Inference and Valid Assertion. This is going to be explained later on, as said above. The inclusion of all other proofs in the above. mentioned 13: * (27) Question :-"Why should the philosophic system proceed with general and special definitions of the Means of Right Cognition, when it is launched forth with the express purpose of defining the Prameyas, i. e. the objects of Right Cognition ?" Answer-It is by the Means of Right Cognition that objects of Cognition can be rightly cognised. Siddhi means apprehension-Cognition. Necessity of enquiry into the different kinds of proof (28) The explanation of the Karika follows the sense, The order of ex- not the order of words. planation (29) Now on the occasion of the definition of the special Means of Cognition, the author of the Karika, first of all, defines Perception, since it precedes and is superior to other Means of Cognition, and because these latter, Inference and the rest, are dependent upon it; and lastly, because with regard to it all parties are agreed. The specific de. finition of the proofs

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14 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [V80Karika V 'Perception' is definite Cognition of particular objects through the contact of the senses; 'Inference 'has been declared to be of three kinds; and it is led up to by (based upon) the (Cognition of the) Middle Term and the Major Term; and 'Valid Assertion 'is Right Revelation. 'Perception is definite sense-cognition.'-- The term 'Perception' means what is defined; the remainder of the sentence is the definition; by which word is meant the differentiation (of the thing defined) from things of the same class, as well as from those of other classes. (30) The literal meaning (of the definition of Perception Damen de prativisayadhyavasayah ') may be thus fined as the de- explained: Visaya (object) stands for that finite cognition which bears upon the Visayin (cognition); of particular objects obtained that which impresses its own form upon the through senses Cognition. The Earth and other substances, as also Pleasure, Pain and the rest are objects' for us; but things in the form of the Elemental Substances are not 'objects' for us; though these also are 'objects' for the Yogin and the divine beings. The term ' prativisaya' denotes that which bears upon each particular objcct, i. e. the sense-organ;--' bearing upon' means contact so that what the term ' prativisaya' stands for is the sense-organ in contact with the object-,'Prativisayadhyavasaya' ('sense.cognition) is the adhyavasaya, definite cognition in i. e. through, the sense organ in contact with the object; 'adhyavasaya' is Cognition, the function of Buddhi(Will); in fact adhyavasaya stands for that exuberance of the attribute of Sattva which results from the suppression in the Will of the attribute of 'Tamas' due to the contact of the sense-organs with their respective objects:---this is what is called vrtti and also' jnana, --.e. 'Cognition. This sense-cognition is a means

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-V38] TRANSLATION of cognition and what is brought about by this means is the Right Cognition which is a form of assistance rendered to the Sentient Faculty. (31) In its essence the Buddhi is insentient, being, as it is, a product of Root Matter; consequently the Cognitions are intention Cognition which is a function of the Buddhi is also insentient, just like the Jar and such things. Similarly such other products of Buddhi also as pleasure and the rest are insentient. The Spirit, however, not being radically affected by pleasure and the rest, is sentient ; this Spirit appears as if having the Cognition and the Pleasure and such other things by virtue of the image cast therein by the reflection of the Cognition and the Pleasure which really subsist in Buddhi; also it is in this manner that the Sentient Being (Spirit) comes to be favoured ( by Buddhi ); and Buddhi as also its Cognition, though in themselves insentient, appear as if sentient by virtue of being reflected in the Sentience ( of the Spirit ). This is what is going to be described under Karika 20, below. (32) The use of the term 'adhyavasaya,' 'Definite Cognition,' in the text excludes Doubt. Differentiation of terms in the ful Cognition, as Doubt, being of the nature of definition of Per- uncertainty, is never positive; and definite ception is the same as 'positive'.--The use of the term 'visaya,' 'object,' excludes Wrong Cognition, the object of which is non-existent.-- The use of the particle 'prati' indicates the contact of the sense-organ with the object and as such excludes Inference, Remembrance and other forms of Cognition. (33) Thus it follows that prativisa yadhyavasoyo drstam, 'Perception is definite cognition of objects Final Definition ion the through the contact of the senso-organs,' is of Perception the complete definition of Perception,

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16 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [V34 excluding, as it does, all other things, those of the same kind as well as others. Other definitions provided by philosophers. have not been either defended, or criticised for fear of prolixity. (34) The Lokayatika (materialist) says that Inserence is not a Means of Cognition; if so, how could he Inference, a dis know whether the person he was addressing tinct Means of Cognition was ignorant or in doubt or perverse? Cer tainly the ignorance, doubt and perverseness of another person cannot be cognised through Sense-perception, by a person with ordinary powers of perception. Nor can they be said to be cognised by any other Means of Cognition; as the Materialist does not admit of any such means except Sense-perception.- Under the circumstances, if, without knowing whether the person addressed is ignorant or in doubt or perverse, the Materialist were to go about addressing any and every person at random-he would be despised by all intelligent persons as mad and as one whose words should not be listened to. In fact, the ignorance, doubt and perverseness of a person could only be inferred from such signs as the man's intention or words. Thus, however much he may dislike it, the Materialist has to admit of Inference as a Means. of Cognition (35) Inasmuch as Inference follows from Perception, it , is only right that it should be defined after Definition of Inference general Perception; then again, inasmuch as a defini tion of Inference in general must precede that of particular forms of it, the author provides the definition of Inference in general. It is led up to by the (Cognition of the) Middle Term and the Major Term;-the Middle Term is that which is less extensive, and the Major Term is that which is more extensive; the 'less extensive' Middle Term is that whose natural concomitance ( with the Major Term ) has been duly recognised after all suspected and assumed adventitious

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-V37] * * accidents have been eliminated; and that with which the Middle Term is so concomitant is the 'more extensive Major Term. The terms Middle Term' and 'Major Term which are really denotative of the objects (of Cognition) stand for the Cognition of those objects. Thus then, taking the case of the Inference, of Fire on the hill from the presence of Smoke, this Inference is led up to by the Cognition of the fact that the Smoke is 'less extensive than the Fire which is more extensive;'i. e. 'Wherever there is Smoke there is Fire [i. e. Smoke is invariably concomitant with Fire]-The term 'lingi' (which has been taken above as standing for the Major Term) has to be repeated and taken in the sense of that in which the 'Linga' (Middle Term) is present; that is, the cognition that the Middle Term (Smoke) is present in the Minor Term (Hill). -Thus then the definition of Inference in general comes to this-Inference is that Cognition which is led up to by (a) the Cognition of invariable concomitance between the Major Term and the Middle Term (i. e. the Major Premiss) and (b) the Cognition of the Presence of the Middle Term in the Minor Term (i. e. the Minor Premiss). Definition of particular forms of Inference TRANSLATION seu * (36) The author recalls the particular forms of Inference described under another philosophical system (Nyaya)-- Inference has been declared to be of three kinds'; i. e. Inference that has been just defined in its general form has three special forms, called (1) Purvavat, A priori, (2) 'S'esavat,' A posteriori, and (3) Samanyatodrsta, based on general observation. First division of Inference into Vita and Avita T. 2 17 (37) First of all, Inference is of two kinds-Vita and Avita; that which functions through an affirmation is the Vita-affirmative; and that which functions through negation Is the Avita, Negative.

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18 Avita, the negative Inference defined (38) Of these two, the Avita is also called 'S'esavat, Inference, A posteriori.-S'esa' is that which remains, the residue; hence that Inference is 'S'esavat' which has this residue for its object. This has been thus described (in the Nyayabhasya on 1, 1. 5)--The S'esavat Inference is that in which, with regard to an object, some of the likely properties being denied and eliminated, and there being no likelihood of their belonging to some others, we have the Cognition of that which remains (undenied and uneliminated)'. An example of this negative Avita will be cited later on (under Karika 9, Para 70). TATTVA-KAUMUDI Two kinds of Vito [V88 * (39) The Vita Inference is of two kinds-(1) The Purvavat, A Priori, and (2) the Samanyatodrsta, 'Based on general observation.' Of these the first Purvavat, has for its object that universal' of which a specific individual' has been perceived; the term 'Purvavat (contained in the name 'Purvavat') means well-known,-i. e. that 'universal' of which the specific individual' has been perceived:-and that Inferential Cognition of which such a 'universal' is the object is called Purvavat'; e. g. when, from the presence of Smoke, we infer the presence of the particular 'Universal' Fire in the Hill; and in this case this Universal' Fire is one of which a 'specific individual', in the shape of a particular Fire, has been previously perceived in the kitchen.-The second form of Vita Inference is the Samanyatodrsta, which is the inferential Cognition having for its object a 'universal' of which a specific individual' has not been perceived; e. g. when we have an Inferential Cognition of the sense-organ; what is inferred in this case is the fact of the Cognition of colour and such things being brought about by the instrumentality of an organ [i. e. 'there must be an organ by the instrumentality whereof the Cognition of Colour, or of Touch, has been brought about'];-though of * *

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-V40] TRANSLATION 10 the Universal', 'Instrument', we have seen the 'specific in. dividuals' in the form of the Axe etc.; yet that particular form of instrument' which is referred in relation to the Cognition of Colour and such things has never been perceived; that particular form of 'instrument' is that which is regarded as belonging to the 'Universal 'sense-organ,' and any 'specific individual' of that Universal sense-organ cannot be perceptible to us, persons of ordinary vision, in the way in which the particular 'individual' of the Universal Fire' is seen. This is what distinguishes the Purvavat from the Samanyatodlsta,. though both are equally 'Vita'.- In the term "Samanyato drsta, 'drsta' stands for dars'ana,' Cognition'Samanyatah stands for 'Samanyasya', of the 'Universal',--the affix 'tasil' being capable of signifying the sense of all cast-endings;--thus the term * Samanyatodssta--anumana 'stands for the 'Anu mina, ' Inferential Cognition, of that particular ' universal of which a ' specific individual' has not been perceived.-- All this has been fully explained by us in the Nya yavartikatat. paryatika, and we do not repeat it here for fear of being too prolix. Valid Assertion (40) When an experienced person, directing another experienced person, utters a few words (such Definition of as 'Bring the Cow'),--and the latter, thus " directed, acts in a certain manner (i.e. brings the cow).-the person watching all this infers that the action of the directed person was due to his understanding the sense of the words uttered by the directing person,--and therefrom he comes to recognise the connection between the words used and the action performed;-further, a word is found to express its meaning only when there is recognition of the zonnection between that word and its meaning;--from these two facts it follows that Verbal Cognition is led up to by Inference; consequently, after having defined Inference, the author de

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20 TATIVA-KAUMUDI [V41 fines Valid Assertion-- Valid Assertion is right revelation'; "Valid Assertion''aptavacana' is the term to be defined. and the rest of the sentence is its definition; the term 'aptas'ruti' means that 'S'ruti', revelation, which is 'apta': 'right"; the term 'revelation 'stands for that Cognition of the meaning of a sentence which is brought about by that sentence. (41) This Valid Assertion is self-sufficient in its authority; i. e. it is always right, in as much 'Valid Assertion as it is brought about by the words of the is self-sufficient in its authority Veda which being independent of human authorship, is free from all defects (that make words unreliable). It is for this same reason that the knowledge derived from the Itihasa and the Smrti, which are based upon the Veda, is regarded as right. (42) As regards the primeval sage Kapila (the founder of the Sarikhya Philosophy ), it is possible Reliability of the that he remembered the revealed texts that he had studied during previous time-cycles; ust as things known on the previous day are remembered on the next day, after waking from sleep. That such remembrance is possible is indicated by the conversation between Avatya, and Jaigisavya, where the revered Jaigisavya speaks of his remembering things that occurred in past lives, extending over ten Time-cycles in the text-' while I was evolving during ten Time-cycles etc., etc. (43) The introduction of the epithet 'apta' Right', in the term 'Right Revelation ('aptavacanam'); Pseudo-Revela. serves to exclude all pseudo-revelations, such tions as the scriptures of the 'S'akya-Bhiksu (Buddhist) the 'Nirgranthaka' (Jaina), the 'Samsaramocaka" (Materialist who regards killing an animal virtuous because it frees it from the pains of existence) and others. That these scriptures are not right is to be inferred from (a) internal

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-V46] TRANSLATION 21 contradictions, (6) being devoid of any sound basis, (c) containing assertions unsupported by proofs and (d) being accepted by only a few low and beast-like persons Mlecchas and others. (44) The particle 'tu' (' and ') distinguishes 'Valid Assertion' from 'Inference'. What the Sentence * Valid Assertion' expresses (the meaning) is an object cognised distinct from 'In ference' ( by means of that Sentence ); but the Sentence is not a 'property' (characteristic) of that object, and hence it could not serve as its infer. ential indication (as the Smoke :s of the Fire). Further, when the Sentence expresses its meaning it does not stand in need of a previous connection ( concomitance ) between itself and the meaning; as we find that in the case of the work of a new poet, the sentence is one never heard before and it, therefore, expresses a meaning that has never before been cognised as expressed by that sentence. [ So that there has been no previous cognition of the invariable concomitance between the Sentence and the Meaning, and without the cognition of such concomitance, there can be no Inference ]. (45) Thus then, the nature of Means of Cognition 'in c . general and of that of the particular means 'Means of Cogni. tion" posited in of cognition being as described above, -it other Systems in- follows that all the other means of cognition, cluded in those -such as * Analogy' and the rest,- which have been posited in the other philosophical systems, are all included among those that have been des. cribed above. (46) For instance, 'Analogy' has been illustrated by means of the assertion 'As the Cow so the 'Analogy 'includ... led under validegava ya'; and (in as much as this is a verbal Auertion', and assertion ), the cognition brought about by its "Inference and Perseption' means must be regarded as purely Verbal.As for the notion that 'the term gavaya is three

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22 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [V46 denotative of the animal similar to the cow' [ which has been regarded as the cognition resulting from Analogy ).--this is purely inferential; the inference being in the following. form When experienced persons use a certain term in reference to a particular thing, it should be regarded as denoting it,--specially, when there is no function other than Direct Denotation, (through which the term could be applicable to that thing )'; -as is found in the well-known case of the term 'cow' applied to the animal genus 'cow '; ( Major Premiss ). The term gavaya is used ( by experienced persons ) in reference to the animal similar to the cow :-(Minor Premiss). * Therefore, the term gavaya must be regarded as denotative of that animal.' (Conclusion ) This cognition is purely inferential. Lastly, the notion that the animal before our eyes is similar to the cow':-this is purely perceptional. Thus then, when the cow is remembered, and its remembrance is seen in the gavaya, this is perception pure and simple ; certainly the resemblance or similarity in the cow is not something different from that in the gavaya ; for it is regarded to be a case of 'Resemblance' only when the conglomeration of the component parts of the body of one animal is found to be almost the same as that in the body of another; and this same conglomeration can be one only ; so that when it has been perceived in the gavaya, it must be the same in the cow also.--Thus then, ( every notion involved in what has been regarded as Analogical Cognition being found to be either verbal or inferential or perceptional ), there is nothing left which could be regarded as the objective of a fourth means of cognition in the shape of ' Analogy'. We conclude therefrom, that 'Analogy' is not a distinct means of Cognition

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-V47] TRANSLATION 23 (47) Similarly 'Presumption also is not a distinct Means of Cognition. For instance, the Presumption' in- example of 'Presumption that has been cited cluded under ' Inference by the Ancients is the case where on finding that Caitra, who is alive, is not in the house, there is presumption of his being somewhere outside. As a matter of fact, however, this also is a case of Inference. In the case of our own body we easily recognise the premiss that 'when a finite object is not present in one place, it is present in another place, and also that when a finite object is present in one place, it is not present in another place';-when, therefore, we find that the living Caitra is not in the house,and from this Minor Premiss (taken along with the former Premiss) we deduce the conclusion that he must be some. where outside the house,-this is a clear case of Inference. The presence of Caitra somewhere in the world cannot set aside his absence in the house; and when it is not so set aside this absence in the house cannot fail to be a valid reason for his presence outside the house. [So that the Inference would not be open to the Fallacy of the 'Unknown']. Nor again does Caitra's absence in the house set aside his existence entirely; and only if it were so set aside would this existence be unable to establish itself outside the house. [So on this ground also the Inference is not fallacious]. To explainIs Caitra's non-existence in the house inconsistant with his existence itself? Or only with his existence in the house? -It cannot be the former, because there can be no inconsistency between existence somewhere and non-existence in the house; for the simple reason that the two things are entirely different. It might be argued that-"When it is asserted that he must be somewhere, his existence in some place in general being asserted (without any particular place being specified).-in as much as the House also would be included under place in general, the assertion might imply existence

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI [V4 in the house also; and in this manner the subject matter being the same, there would be an inconsistency between existence somewhere and non-existence in the House."--This, however, cannot be right. Non-existence in the house is known defini. tely and for certain, while ( even in the manner shown ) the notion of existence in the house (as implied by existence somewhere) would be only doubtful and implied, and as such this could never set aside the former definite cognition. And though the definitely ascertained non-existence in the House sets aside the implied and doubtful existence in the House, it cannot set aside the man's existence; nor can it remove the doubt ( regarding the possibility of existence in the house implied in the general notion of existence somewhere ). What is set aside by the Caitra's non-existence in relation to the House is his existence in the House; as the latter is incompatible with it; but it cannot set aside his existence in general; because there is no incompatibility with this. From all this it follows that, when on the basis of non-existence in the House, as the only ascertained reason ( Middle term ). we deduce the man's existence outside,--it is a case of Inference. This same reason disposes of also another definition of 'Presumption' as consisting in the removal of the inconsistency between two valid cognitions by relegating them to distinct spheres;' because, as a matter fact, there is no inconsistency between what is restricted ( non-existence in the House ) and what is not restricted ( existence somewhere). Other examples of Presumption may be shown, as above, to be included under Inference. From all this it follows that as a means of cognition, Presumption is not distinct from Inference,

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V50] TRANSLATION (48) Similarly, Abhava, 'Absence', is only a form of Perception. The absence of the Jar, at a ded certain place is not anything distinct from a under Percep. tion' particular modification of the place itself in the form of vacancy; all entities-with the sole exception of the Sentient Faculty, -are consequently undergoing modifications; and all these diverse modifications are perceptible by the senses; hence there can be no object, not already covered by these modifications, which could form the subject-matter of a distinct means of cognition in the form of 'Absence'. (49) 'Probability' has been regarded as a distinct means of cognition, as leading to such cognitions as . Probability that of the presence of the lesser weights included under Inference C such as the 'Drona' the Adhaka' the *Prastha' in the heavier weight the 'Khari' -This also is a case of Inference only. As a matter of fact, the heavier weight of the Khari has been found to be invari. ably concomitant with the lesser weights of the Drona etc.; and it is this concomitance that leads to cognition of the presence of these lesser weights in the heavier weights. (50) As for 'Rumour' it is a mere continuity of a vague assertion of which the original source cannot Rumour' is not be traced ; it generally appears in the form a valid means of cognition of the old people have said so and so '; such assertions for instance as 'there is a ghost living on this banyan tree:- This is not a distinct means of cognition; because, its original source being undetermined, it must remain open to doubt; and if the original source is known and known to be trustworthy, then, it is a case of * Verbal Cognition' pure and simple. Thus it becomes established that there are three Means of Cognition.

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI [VI5L (51) Thus have been defined the Means of Cognition or Proofs, necessary for the demonstration of The 'Sphere' of the existence of the Manifest ', the 'Unthe Means of Cog. nition og manifest' and the 'Knowing' (Spirit). As for the 'Manifest', in the shape of Earth and the rest -- even the dusty-footed ploughman knows it directly through Perception; he knows also such (invisible). things as the Fire (in the mountain-cave) by means of a priori Inference based upon the perception of such indicative marks as the Smoke and the like. Under the circumstances, if a philosophical system were to deal with such things, it would not be of much use. It follows, therefore, that what should be dealt with by Philosophy is what is difficult to know by the ordinary means of Knowledge.- Hence the author proceeds to show what Means of Cognition among those above described are capable of providing the knowledge of what things. - Karik VI The knowledge of supersensuous things is obtained through 'Inference, based on general observation;' that imperceptible thing which cannot be known even through that is known through Trust-worthy Revelation, (52) The particle 'tu' (in the text ) distinguishes the 'Inference based on general observation Knowledge of from 'Perception' and from the 'A priori supersensuous vous Inference'.-'The knowledge of supersensuous things things,'--such as Primordial Matter, Spint and the rest-'is obtained through Inference based on general observation; what is meant by this knowledge' is the definitive operation of the Buddhi in the form of its reflection in the Cognitive Spirit.--The mention of this particular form of Inference is only illustrative; it should be taken to include the A posteriori Inference also.

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-VII55] Things known through Revelation (53) Question-" Is it only the Inference based on general observation that is effective in bringing about the cognition of all supersensuous things? If that were so, then it would mean that no such things exist as Heaven, Unseen Force, Divinities, or the order of evolution of the Mahat and the other Principles,-in regard to which the said Inference is not applicable. "-In answer to this it is added- That inperceptible thing etc.;' what was intended to be said would have been secured by the use of the term 'Tasmat' only; hence the presence of the particle 'ca' is to be taken as meant to include the A Posteriori Inference also. (54) 'Granted all this. But the non-perception of such objects as 'sky-flowers, tortoises Objection hair, hare's horns' and the like leads to their being regarded as non-existent; in the same way we might infer the non-existence of Nature and the rest (which are, like sky-flowers, not amenable to perception). This. being the case, why should the existence of them be sought to be proved by a recourse to the various kinds of Inference?" The answer to this is as follows TRANSLATION 66 The different causes of the non-perception of objects, explained * 27 Karika VII (Non-perception of things arises) from excessive distance, proximity, destruction of the sense-organs, absence of mind, subtlety, intervention, suppression, (of other objects), and intermixture with other like objects. (55) From excessive distance -The "non-perception" of the following Karika is to be construed along with this, in accordance with the maxim of the Lion's back-ward glance'* * 4. The maxim of the lion's back-ward glance' is generally used. to mark the connection of a thing with what precedes and follows. "

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI [V7196. A bird soaring high, though existing, is yet not perceived by the eye, on account of its extreme remoteness. 'Excessive' fati) must also be taken with proximity' (samipya lm e. g. the collyrium applied to the eye is not seen, because of extreme nearness. " Destruction of organs"-e. g., blindness, deafness, etc. " From absence of mind"-e. g., a person, under the influence of love or some other strong emotion does not perceive things, even in bright day-light, though quite within the range of his senses. "From subtlety "me. 8., however much one may concentrate one's mind ( i. e., however attentively one may look ) one can never perceive atoms and such other things, though they may be under one's very eyes. " From Intervention "-e. g., one cannot see the Queen and other persons hidden behind the walls. " From suppression"-e. g., the planets and stars are not seen during the day, because they are suppressed by the brighter rays of the sun. "From intermixture"-e.g., one does not perceive drops of rain-water, disappearing in a tank. (56) The particle 'ca' in the Karika has a collective force, and it includes even those not here mentioned ; such as * non-manifestation' also becomes included ( among the causes of non-perception )--as one cannot perceive, in the milk, the curd, because the latter has not become manifested (57) The upshot of the whole then is this :-The nonexistence of a certain object cannot be inferred merely from the fact of its not being perceived; for there is danger of such a principle being unwarrantably stretched too far. For instance, a certain individual, getting out of his house, would in that case, conclude that the people in the house are non-existent, simply because he does not see them. As a matter of fact, however, it is not so. The fact is that it is only

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-711158] TRANSLATION with reference to objects capable of being perceived at the time, that their non-perception leads to the inference of their nonexistence. And this capability of being perceived can never belong to such things as Nature, Spirit and the rest (which are by their nature imperceptible); and as such it cannot be right for intelligent men to infer their non-existence merely from their non-perception. Question-Which of the above mentioned causes (of non-perception ) applies in the case of Nature etc.? The answer is Karika VIII The non-perception of these ( Nature and the rest ) The non-appre orer is due to its subtlety, not to its nonhension of Nature existence; since it is actually apprehenddue to subtelty ed through its effects. and not to non These effects existence. Its are the Great Principle, and the rest existence verified by its effects effects (some of which are similar. and (some ) dissimilar to Nature. (58) "Why should we not," continues the objector, "attribute the non-apprehension of Nature to its non-existence, as we do in the case of the seventh kind of Rasa (in eatables )?" The Author replies.--"Not due to its non-existence". Why? "Because it is apprehended through its effects." 'It' refers to Nature. The proofs of the apprehension of the Spirit will be adduced later on, in Karika XVII. If we find direct sense-perception inapplicable in the case of objects whose existence is ascertained by sound and valid means of know. ledge, what this proves is the incapacity of sense perception (and not the non-existence of the object itself).* The seventh * This statement is with reference to Nature, the existence of which is proved through its effects the proof being based on the geno. ral proposition "Every effect must have a cause." The effects, Mahat etc., are perceptible; these must have a cause and this cause is Nature.

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30 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [VI1159 Rasa, however, has not its existence ascertained by any valid means of knowledge; and hence the incapacity of sense-perception cannot be urged in its case. Such is the sense of the text. (59) Question.--"What are the effects from whose existence, you infer that of Nature ?" Answer.-" The Great Principle, and the rest are the effects." This will be explained later on (Karika XXII): Next are mentioned the similarity and dissimilarity in forms, of these effects, with Nature-the comprehension of both of which is helpful to discriminative wisdom :-"Similar and dissimilar to Nature." This will be further explained in Karka XXIII et. seq. (60) All that (the existence of) the effect indicates is Different views that there is a Cause; in regard to this subwith regard to the nature of the ef. ject (of cause and effect) there is a difference fect. (1) The Bauddha'view of of opinion among philosophers. (1) Some the effect being an people assert that the existent' (effect) ema. entity arising from non-entity: (2) The nates from the non-existent' ( cause ): Vedanta view of the whole series (2) others represent all effects as mere of effects being a : mere evolution illusory evolutions from out of a single from a single real entity. (3) The The entity, and not real entities in themselves; Nyaya and (3) others again hold that the 'non-exisVais' esika view of the effect being tent' (effect) emanates from the existent a non-entity arising from entity. (cause): (4) lastly, the revered ones declare (4) The sam that the existent' (effect) emanates from khya view of the effect being an the 'existent' (cause). entity arising from an entity

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- V11162] TRANSLATION 31 (61) Under the first three of these theories, the exis tence of Nature ( Primordial Root-Matter ) The impossibility cannot be proved. As a matter of fact, the of the existence of Nature being world is found to consist of Sound and other proved in accord. Elements which are only different forms and ance with the first three views modifications of Pleasure, Pain, and Delu sion; and it is this fact which goes to prove that the cause of the world is the Primordial Matter ( Nature ) whose 'primordiality' must consist in its being of the nature of the three Attributes, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas (which alone are the essence of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion ). Such being the case, if the existent' effect were the product of the ' non-existent' cause ( the first view above ).-then, how could the non-existent Cause which must be characterless, be of the nature of Sound and other Elements consisting of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion? As, certainly the non-existent can never be of the nature of the existent - If (as under the second view) the entire phenomenon of Sound and the rest were the illusory evolution out of a single 'existent Being.--then also it cannot be proved that the 'existent effect emanates from the existent cause '; and the second view is open to the further objection that the One Being could never constitute what is phenomenal; in fact the conception of the nonphenomenal as constituting the phenomenal must be wrong. Even under the theory of Kanada and Gautama,-that 'the nonexistent effect is born out of the existent cause,'-as there could be no identity between the 'existent' and the 'non-existent,' the effect could not be regarded as constituted entirely by (being of the same nature as) the cause; and hence, under this theory also, there could be no proof for the existence of Pri. mordial Matter (Nature). (62) Hence, in order to establish the existence of Primordial Matter (Nature), the author at the outset declares that the effect is 'existent', (even before the causal operation).

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32 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [1X63 Karika IX The effect is existent; (1) because what is 'non existent' cannot be produced; (2) because The five proofs of there is a definite relation of the cause the effect being ing (with the effect); (3) because all is not an entity possible; (4) because the efficient can do only that for which it is efficient; (5) (lastly). because the effect is of the same essence as the cause. (63) Because what is non-existent cannot be produced, etc. 'The effect is existent,'-- even before the operation of the cause,--this is what is meant. The followers of Nyaya cannot urge against this doctrine the objection that it involves the absurdity of doing what is already done' (1. e., if the Effect is already existent, the operation of the Cause must be superfluous);--such an objection cannot be raised [ for reasons to be explained later on]. [As regards the theory that 'the Existent effect emanates from the Non-existent cause'] though it is true that products like the sprout and the jar are found to be produced after the destruction of the seed and clay-lump [ so that it would appear as if the products were the outcome of this Destruction, which is non-existent].-yet the causal efficiency cannot be attributed to Destruction, which is a pure negation; it can belong only to the positive entities in the shape of the constituent particles of the seed and the clay-lump. If a positive entity were produced out of mere negation, then, in as much as such negation (of things) would be easily available everywhere, it would involve the absurd contingency of all things being produced at all places and at all times. All this has been fully explained by us in the Nyayavartikatatparyatika.

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-1X65] TRANSLATION 33 (64) [ As regards the Vedanta theory ) the belief in Th. the existence of the phenomenal world can view met ta not be said to be illusory unless we have some proof invalidating its existence.* [ Hence the effect cannot be regarded as a mere illusory evolution ']. (65) Now remains the theory of Gautama and Kanada, with reference to which the author asserts The Nyaya and " The effect is existent." Vais'e sika view In support of criticised; and the this assertion, the following proofs are adSamkhya view established niew duced -- (1) "What is non-existent cannot be produced." If the effect were 'non-existent' before the operation of the cause, it could never be brought into existence by anybody; by even a thousand artists blue can never be made yellow. If it be held that " 'existence and 'non-existence are mere properties belonging to the jar,' even so, if the object to which the property belongs is 'nonexistent', there can be no property belonging to that object; so that the question of the 'existence of the jar remains as it was (and is not affected by your assertion). Nor can 'non-existence' (be the property of the jar); because of the 'non-existence' is unconnected and non-coalescent with the jar (as it must be, the jar being now existent, ex-hypothesis), how could the jar be regarded as 'non-existent' ?-Hence it follows that, as after the causal operation so also before it, the effect must be 'existent'. Such being the case, all that remains to be done by the cause is the manifestation or unfolding of the pre-existing effect [i. e., its ernanation from the cause wherein it has been lying latent). The manifestation of something already existing is a fact quite compatible with experience; e, g. there * This is urged against the Vedanta theory of the effect being an evolution from a single real entity. T.3

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI TIX 66 is the manifestation of oil from sesamum, by pressure,-of rice from paddy by thumping.--and of milk from cows, by milking. On the other hand, we have no instance of the manifestation of what is 'non-existent'; in fact what is 'nonexistent' is never found to be either manifested or produced. (66) (2) For the following reason also should the effect be regarded as subsisting even before the operation of the cause: "Because there is a definite relation of the cause with the effect." The term 'Upadana' (in the text) stands for Cause,--and the Grahana' of the cause stands for its relation to the effect: so that the compound 'Upadanagrahanat' means 'because there is a definite relation of the cause with the effect'. What is meant is that the cause produces the effect only when in relation with it; and there could be no such relation with Che effect of the latter were 'non-existent '; hence [the effect must be regarded as `existent'] (67) Objection: "Granted all this; bul why should not the effect be produced by causes without being related to them? In that case it could be a 'non-existent' effect that would be produced." In answer to this we have the next clause (3) "Because all is not possible."--If the effect could be produced without being related to the cause, then every effect would arise from every cause ( without restriction ), as all would be equally unrelated to the cause.--But such is not the case. Hence a related effect only can be produced by a related cause, and not an unrelated effect by an unrelated cause. This is thus asserted by the teachers of Sarkhyas'Causes being always related to existent things, can have no connection with non-existent ; for one who would have an unrelated effect produced, there would be no restriction at all. (68). Objection : "Be it so: But the Cause, even though unrelated, will always produce that effect only for which it is efficient; and this efficiency could always be inferred from www

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-1870] TRANSLATION 35 actually seeing the effect brought about; so that there would be no absence of restriction ( such as has been argued above)". Answer : (4) "Because the efficient Cause can do only that for which it is efficient. "-Now then, asks our author, does this efficiency' subsist in the efficient cause operative on all things or upon that effect only which is amenable to that efficiency? If the former, then the same confusion arises; of the latter, then it has to be explained how it can operate upon what is 'non-existent'. On this point if it be asserted that "the ( causal ) efficiency itself is so constituted as to produce only certain effects, not all",-then we ask-Is this peculiarly constituted efficiency of yours connected with the particular effect or not ? In the former case, no relation being possible with what is 'non-existent', the effect will have to be regarded as 'existent '; in the latter, you have the same confusion remaining.-Thus it is rightly argued that because the cfficient cause can do only that for which it is efficient' (the effect cannot be 'non-existent'). (69) (5) For the following reason also the effect should be regarded as existent:-"Because the effect is of the same essence as the cause."--The effect is not different from the cause; and the cause is existent; then how can the effect, nonseparate from this latter, be 'non-existent'? (70) The proofs establishing the non-difference of the effect from the cause are the following: (a) Proofs of the non-The cloth ( an effect) is not different from difference of cause and effect the yarns (constituting it),--because it sub sists in the yarns;-an object differing in ats essence from another, can never subsist in it; as the cow in the horse; but the cloth does subsist in the yarns;-hence it follows that it is not different from the cause. (6) The Cloth and the Yarns cannot be different things, because the latter is the constituent cause of the former ;whore any two things are entirely different, one is never found

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36 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [IX71. to be the constituent cause of the other, e.g., in the case of the Jar and the Cloth; as between the Cloth and the Yarns, however, the Yarns are the constituent cause of the Cloth ;hence it follows that the two are not different.-(c) For the following reason also, there is no difference between the Cloth and Yarns : because there is no conjunction between them and because there is no separation between them ;'conjunction' is found 10 take place in objects different from one another, as between the well and the bucket; the same with regard to separation', as between the Himavan and the Vindhya;-in the case of the Cloth and the Yarns, however, there is neither conjunction' nor separation', - hence it follows that they are not different.-(d) For the following reason too, the Cloth and the Yarns are not different things: because the Cloth does not contain in itself any product which makes its weight different from the weight of the Yarns constituting it,-as a matter of fact, an object differing in essence from another always has a weight different from that of the latter-e.g., the lowering of the balance caused by a bracelet weighing two palas is more than that caused by the bracelet weighing a single pala ;--but we find no such difference between the effect of the weight of the Cloth and that of the weight of the Yarns constituting it;-hence the Cloth is not different from the Yarns. These are the proofs afforded by a process of negative inference-[ Avitanumana--see, Karika V] establishing the non-difference (of the Cloth and the Yarns in particular, and of cause and effect in general). (71) The non-difference between the cloth and the yarns having been thus established, it follows that the cloth is only the yarns arranged in a particular shape and that the two do not differ from each other in essence. Nor can the two be proved to be entirely different by such arguments as -(a) "If the cause and effect were not different, it would involve self-contradictory actions [ that is, when the cloth' is.

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-1871] TRANSLATION 37 torn and reduced to 'threads', it involves the action of being destroyed on the part of the cloth and that of being produced on the part of the threads or yarns; the identity of the cloth and the yarns would thus mean that the same thing is both destroyed and produced at the same time);-(b) there is notion and assertion of the cause and the effect being related (which means that the two members of the relationship are different); (c) the function of the useful purpose served by the cause is different from that served by the effect (e. g., the cloth serves the useful purpose of covering things, which purpose cannot be served by the yarns ]." These arguments, we say, cannot prove the difference between cause and effect; because all the said differences can be explained and reconciled by attributing the notions to the appearance and disappearance of certain factors: (a) For instance, the limbs of the tortoise disappear on entering its body and appear again on emerging from it; but for this, we cannot say that the limbs are either produced from, or destroyed by, the tortoise; in the same manner, the jar, the crown, and other things, which are only particular modifications of clay, gold and so forth, are said to be produced on emanating and appearing from these latter, and to be destroyed on entering them again (i. e., being formed into clay, etc.,) and disappearing. As a matter of fact, however, there can be no 'production' or birth for what is 'non-existent', nor destruction for what is 'existent';-as has been declared by the revered Krsnadvaipayana ( Vyasa in the Bhagavadgita, 2. 16 )--'There is no being for the non-existent, nor non-being for the existent.' -In the instance cited, the Tortoise is not different from its appearing and disappearing limbs; and similarly the jar, the crown and other products are not different from clay, gold and so forth.--b) The 'assertion' (of difference between the cloth and the yarns) implicit in such notions as 'This cloth is in (made up of) these yarns' is explicable, as being

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI [1872- analogous to the assertion 'There are Tilaka trees in the forest'.-(c) As for the difference in the useful purpose served, that also does not establish the difference between the cause and the effect; because one and the same thing is found to serve several useful purposes; for instance, the single thing, Fire, serves the purposes of burning, cooking and lighting. As a matter of fact, any variation of functions cannot be a ground of difference; because we find that the functions of the same things vary with their operating collectively or severally; for instance, each individual Bearer performs the furction of indicating the path, but not that of carrying the palanquin, while collectively, they carry the palanquin; in the same manner, even though the yarns severally do not serve the purpose of covering, yet on combining and thereby appearing in the form of the cloth, they can serve the purpose of covering. (72) Opponent.--"[You say that the cloth is already existent in the cause, the yarns; and when An objeccion based on the nature of it is supposed to be produced, it is only the mantestation manifested. )--Now, was this manifestation of the cffect fect of the cloth existent, before the operation of the cause ? Or was it non-existent ? If the latter, then the production of what was non-existent becomes admitted. If the former, then the causal operation is superfluous. When the effect (in the shape of the manifestation of the cloth) is already there, we see no use for the operation of the cause. If it be said that 'though the manifestation is 'existent', yet it is the manifestation of this manifestation (for which the operation of the cause is needed); -- then this would involve an endless series of 'manifestations. Thus we conclude that there is no sense in the assertion that when the cloth is produced what happens is that the yarns become manifested in the form of cloth."

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-IX77] TRANSLATION 39 (73) This is not so, we reply. Even under your own theory that the non-existent effect is produced, Reply-The objection set aside what is this production"? Is it existent or as common to non-existent ? If it is existent, then there is both theories no need for the causes. If it is non-existent, then there should be production of that 'production' also, - so that there would be an endless series of productions'. (74) If, in order to avoid the endless series of productions', you hold that the 'production' is nothing more or less than the 'cloth' itself, then the term 'cloth' would be syno. nymous with production'; so that, when the term 'cloth has been uttered, one should not utter the term 'is produced (because it would be a useless repetition); nor could one say 'the cloth is destroyed '; because destruction and production (denoted by cloth) can never co-exist. : (75) Thus, (Even under the Nyaya theory] the 'produc. tion of the cloth' must consist either in the inherence of the cloth in its cause', or in the inherence of the cloth in its Being '; in either case, the said Production cannot be produced (as Inherence is eternal); and yet for the purposes of that production' several causes have to be set into operation. And (just as you need the causes for the bringing about of the production' which is eternal), so would there be need for causes for the manifestation of the already existent products like the cloth.--The causes cannot be related to the form of the cloth; because the form is not an operation, and it is only to an operation that causes are directly related; as otherwise ( without being related to operation ) they would not be 'causes' (active) at all. (76) Thus, it has been fully established that the Effect is ever existent. (77) Having thus proved the effect to be existent', a fact favourable to the proof of the existence of Nature, the author next states the similarity and dissimilarity between the

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI [X78-- reverse of this. Manifest and the Unmanifest, a right comprehension of which is conducive to discriminative wisdom; and this is done in order to show the character of Nature, whose existence is going to be proved. Karika X The Manifest is 'with cause', 'not eternal', 'not pervasive', 'active', 'multiform', 'comPoints of dissimi. larity between ponent', 'soluble', 'conjunct' and the Unmanifest the Manifest and dependent':-The Unmanifest is the (78) 'With cause' (Product ). The question as to All the walifice. what is the cause of what, will be dealt with tions explained later on ( Karika XXII ). (79) 'Not eternal'-destructible, i.e., evanescent [being absorbed in its material cause.* ] (80) 'Not pervasive ' ,--that is to say, the Manifest does not pervade over all evolutes. It is the effect that is pervaded over by the cause,- not the cause by the effect; e. g., the Sentient Faculty (Buddhi) and other products can never pervade Nature and as such they are 'non-pervasive'. (81) 'Active'--. e., mobile. The Sentient Faculty ( Buddhi ), and the other evolutes are regarded as 'mobile', inasmuch as they are found to renounce a body they have hitherto occupied, and to occupy another ; as for the mobility of earth and such other substances, it is too well-known (to need an explanation ). (82) Multiform';-as the Sentient Faculty and other evolutes vary with each person; earth and other substances also are 'multiform' in the forms of the jars and other things. (83) 'Component',--of its cause; though the Products like the Sentient Faculty and the rest are non-different from their cause, yet the assertion that they stand to their cause in * Since the Samkhyas do not admit of an utter annihilation of a substance.

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X86] TRANSLATION 6 41 the relation of 'composite and component' has been made on the basis of some sort of assumed difference; just as in the case of such assertions as There are Tilaka trees in this forest' (when the trees have no existence apart from the forest). (84) Soluble',-into Nature. The Sentient Faculty and the rest are soluble into Nature, as is going to be explained later on.- -Nature cannot be soluble in itself though it may be so regarded in its relation to the Spirit. (85) Conjunct'.-Bearing within itself the relation of whole and parts. [ Unsatisfied with this explanation on the the ground of the relationship between the whole and its parts being eternal, the author offers another explanation].-Or, the term 'avayava' (in the compound Savayavam') may be explained as equivalent to 'avayavana', i. e., the mutual adhesion, contact,-1. e., Conjunction,-between wholes and parts. Conjunction consists in union following on disunion; " and that which has such union or contact is what is expressed by the word Savayavam. For instance, there is such mutual conjunction among earth, water and other substances; there can be no such conjunction between Nature on the one hand and (its products) Sentient Faculty and the rest; be. cause these latter are essentially the same as Nature. Nor can there be any conjunction between the three Attributes of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, because there is no disunion (absence of contact) among these. (86) 'Dependent',-the Sentient Faculty and the rest are such. In the producing of its product, in the shape of the I-principle, the Sentient Faculty requires the assistance of Nature: without such assistance it would be too weak to pro" duce the I-principle. Similarly, the I-principle and other things also require assistance in the producing of their representative products. Thus, in the producing of its product, 'everything requires the assistance of Nature. Therefore, even though efficient as a cause in the producing of its product, the Mani

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI [X8 fest is dependent, requiring, as it does, the assistance of the Supreme Nature. (87) 'The Unmanifest is the reverse, - of the Manifest. That is to say--the Unmanifest is without cause, eternal, pervasive, and inactive-[ though to Nature does belong the action of evolution, yet it can have no mobility ]-one, notcomponent, not-soluble, unconjunct and independent. (88) Having thus explained the dissimilarities between the Manifest and the Unmanifest, the author now mentions the sunilarities between these, and the dissimilarity of both of these again from the Spirit: Karika XI The Manifest is 'with the three Attributes' (Gunas). The points of "undistinguishable' (or non-separative"), similarity betweer obiective': 'common', 'insentient' and the Manifest and the Unmanifest productive'. So also is Nature. The and those of dis- Spirit is the reverse, and yet also (in similarity of these from the soul some respects ) similar. (89) With the three Attributes. --That is to say, the Manifest has the three attributes of pleasure, pain and delusion. By this assertion are set aside all those theories that attribute pleasure and pain to the Spirit. (90) Undistinguishable ;-just as Nature cannot be distinguished from itself, so also the Great Principle (Buddhi). being connate with Nature, cannot be distinguished from Nature. Or 'aviveki' may stand for non-separativeness', i e., for the character of being co-operative, among the 'manifest things, there is no one thing that is adequate by itself to produce its effect; it can do so only when in co-operation with other things; and hence it is not possible for anything to be produced out of anything taken singly by itself. (91) Some people have held that it is Idea (Vijnana) alone that constitutes pleasure, pain and An objectio: based delusion, and that there exists nothing beon the Idealism of the Bauddhas sides this Idea that could possess these (pleasure, etc.,) as its attributes.

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-X195] TRANSLATION In opposition to this view it is asserted that the Manifest is 'objective"; "objective' here stands for jection set aside 0.5- 'what can be apprehended'. That is, it is exterior to the Idea.-And because it is 'objective', therefore, 'common --i. e., apprehended ( simultaneously) by several persons. If it were nothing more or less than the Idea, then in that case,-in as much as Ideas, being in the form of 'functions', belong specially to particular individuals, all that is 'manifest' would have to belong specially to particular individuals. That is to say, as a matter of fact, the Idea of one person is not apprehended by another, the cognition of another person being always uncognisable. In the case of [ Manifest substance such as the ) glance of a dancing girl, it is found that many persons continue to stare at it at the same time. This could not be the case of it were otherwise ( i. e., if the glance were a mere Idea ). (92) 'Insentient'-Nature (Prakiti), Sentient Faculty (Buddhi) and the rest, are all insentient. That is, 'sentience' cannot belong to the Buddhi as held by the Vainas'ika (Buddhist). (93) 'Productive' ---i. e., possessed of the faculty of producing. The form of the word to be used would have been prasavadharma', but the author has used the particular possessive asfix (rin), in order to indicate the constant character of the property of productiveness as belonging to the Manifest; the sense being that the Manifest is never devoid of similar as well as dissimilar products. (94) The author attributes the properties of the Manifest to the Unmanifest-So also is Nature',-i.e., as the Manifest, so the Unmanifest (Nature). [That is, the properties of the Manifest, just enumerated, belong to Nature also). o (95) The dissimilarity of these from the Spirit is next stated. The spirit is the reverse.

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI (96) 'Objection':-"How can you assert the Spirit to be the reverse' of the Manifest and the Unmanifest; Objection-There when we see that there are points of similaare points of simi larity also beween rity between the Spirit and the Unmanifestthe soul and the such as being without cause', 'eternal' Manifest as well as the Unmanifest and so on-as also between the Spirit and the Manifest-such as being multiform' ?" 44 [X.96 Answer: 'Yet also similar';-that is to say, though there are points of similarity, such as being without cause' and the rest, yet there are points there are points of of dissimilarity also, in the form of being similarity as well as of dissimilarity devoid of the three Attributes and the rest. The objection conceded to (97) The Manifest and the Unmanifest have been described as having 'three Attributes'.* Now the question arisesWhat are these three Attributes, and what is their characteristic. The author answers this question in the following text: " *This word 'Attribute' requires some explanation It stands for the Gunas of the Samkhyas-a term denoting the constituent elements of Nature or Primordial Matter;-as says Colebrooke-" These three qualities are not mere accidents of Nature, but are of its essence and enter into its composition. On this Davies remarks- Nature or Primordial Matter is described, in the system of Kapila as formed by the Gunas, which were primarily in equilibrium, and so long as this state existed. there was no emanation into separate forms of matter." And, as we shall see later on, this inert condition of Nature is disturbed by the subsequent predominance of the Attribute of Rajas. Davies has rendered this im. portant word-'Guna'-by 'Mode'. This is apt to mislead. For Mode, as understood by Western philosophers, is an affection of a substance, quality which it may have or not, without effecting its essence or existence." The Guna of the Samkhyas, however, is almost the reverse of this-it belongs to a substance as constituting its very essence. I have preferred to translate Guna as Attribute'-using the latter term in the sense imparted to it specially, by Spinoza, who thus distinguishes between Attribute and Mode: "By Attribute, I understand that which the mind perceives of substance as constituting its essence; by Mode, I understand the affections of substances, etc." a

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-X11100] TRANSLATION Karika XII The Attributes are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion; they serve the purpose of The Character of illumination, action and restraint; and the three Attributes (Gunas)" they are mutually subjugative, and sup porting, and productive and co-operative. (98) These are called Gunus (literally, subsidiary or secondary) because they exist for the sake of others (the Spirits). The three Attributes will be named in order in the next Karika. And according to the maxim cf presight, or in allowance with a convention among writers of treatises, the *pleasure' (pain' and 'delusien ') of this Karika are to be taken in the same crder (as 'Sattua, etc.,' in the next). (99) Thus then, the meaning is that 'Priti' being Pleasure, the Sativa attribute is of the nature of pleasure; Apriti' being Pain, the Rajas attribute is of the nature of pain; and, lastly, 'Visuda' being Delusion, the Tamas attribute is of the nature of delusion. The word 'Atman', 'nature' has been added with a view to discard the theory that "pleasure is nothing more than mere negation of pain and vice versa."' As a matter of fact, Pleasure and Pain are not mere negations of one another; on the contrary, they are positive entities, and the term 'atman' 'nature' connotes positive reality, so that those things are 'prityatman', whose nature, i. e., Existence, is in the form of pleasure; similarly with the other terms (*aprityatman' and 'visadatman"). The idea of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion being positive entities, and not mere negations of one another, 13 vouched for by common experience. If they were mere mutual negations, they would be mutually dependent; and thus the non-fulfilment of one would lead to the non-fulfilment of the other. (100) Having thus described the nature of the Aetributes, the author next describes their several Their functions tions functions:-"They serve the purpose of illumi

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI [X11101... nation, action and restraint."--Here, too, the three members of the compound are to be construed in the same order as before. The Rajas-attribute, in accordance with its mobile nature, would always and everywhere be urging the buoyant Sattvaattribute to action, if it were not restrained by the sluggish Tamas-attribute-by which restraint it operates only at intervals; thus the Tamas-attribute becomes a restraining force. (101) Having thus described their functions, the author proceeds to describe the method of their The method of operation-" They are mutually subjugative their operation and supporting and productive and co-operative." The term 'vrtti' at the end of the compound is to be construed with each member of the compound (thus the compound is to be resolved into the four terms (1) anyonya. bhibhavavrtta'yah, (2) anyonyas'ra yavrttayah, (3) anyonya - jananavrttayah and (4) anyonyamithunavrttayah]. Now to explain, (1) " Mutually subjugatile "_The Attributes are so constituted that when one is brought into play for some purpose, it subjugates the other; e. g., the Sattva attrbute attains its calm state only after having subdued the Rajas and Tamas attributes. Similarly the Rajas attribute, in its turn, attains its agitated state after having subdued the Sattva and Tamas attributes; and the Tamas attribute attains its sluggish state only after having subdued the Sattva and Rajas attributes.-(2) "Mutually supporting." -Though this epithet is not applicable here, in the sense of the container and the contained, yet what is meant by support (Assraya) here is that the operation of one is dependent upon the other. For instance, the Sattva attribute helps the Rajas and Tamas attributes through the help of activity and restraint (which are the functions of the Rajas and Tamas attributes). [Or else, the Sattva attribute by itself, without the help of Rajas, would remain inert, and never be moved to action].

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-X1[108] TRANSLATION 47 Similarly the Rajas attribute helps the other two by its activity (or mobility) through the help of illumination and restraint,and the Tamas attribute helps the other two by its restraint, through the help of illumination and activity. (3) "Mutually productive." That is to say, one can produce (its effects) only when resting on the other two. By production here is meant modification, and this is always of the same character as the parent Attribute. This is the reason why this 'modification is not regarded as 'caused' (produced), what brings it about not being essentially different from itself; nor is it non-eternal, transient,--there being no merging of it into anything essentially different from itself. (4) "Mutually co-operative." That is to say, they are mutual concomitants not existing apart from one another. The particle ca has the cumulative force. In support of the above, we have the following Smrti text: "All the attributes are mutual consorts; all omnipresent; Sattva is the consort of Rajas, Rajas of Sattva, both of these again of Tamas, which latter again of both, Sattva and Rajas. The first conjunction or separation of these has never been perceived." (Devi-Bhagavata, 3. 8). (102) It has been said that the Attributes "serve the purpose of illumination, activity and restraint." Now it is going to be explained what those Attributes are, and wherefore are they so : Karika XIII The Sattva-attribute is held to be buoyant and illumiThe three stil nating; the Rajas-attribute exciting and butos named and mobile; and the Tamas-attribute sluggish their nature ex- and enveloping. Their functioning is for plained. a (single) purpose, like that of the Lamp.

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48 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [XIII103 Goodness (Sattva) (103) The Sattva-attribute, etc.-The Sattva-attribute alone has been held by the teachers of The Properties of Samkhya, to be buoyant and illuminating. Buoyancy-as opposed to sluggishness-is that which enables things to shoot up; it is to this that the up-rising of the flame of fire is due. In some cases, it is conducive to lateral motion also, as in the case of air. Thus, generally, buoyancy may be said to be that which is conducive to the efficient functioning of all instruments (causes); sluggish Buoyancy Illuminativeness ness, on the other hand, would make the instruments inefficient. The illuminative character of the Sattva-attribute has been already explained (under Karika XII). Necessity of the properties of Foulness (Rajas) -activity and excitingness (104) Sattva and Tamas, being by themselves inert, are unable to produce their effects; the driving force is supplied by Rajas, which excites them and rouses them from their natural inertia, and urges them on to the accomplishment of their respective effects. It is for this reason that Rajas is said to be exciting. This exciting character of Rajas is next accounted for-" (it is also) mobile. This shows that the operation of Rajas is necessary for all activity. Necessity of the properties of (105) On account of its mobility, Rajas would keep the triad of Attributes in a continuous whirl of activity, but for its being restrained by the Darkness (Tamas), "sluggish and enveloping" Tamas, which sluggishness and obstructs its activity, which is operative envelopingness in certain cases only. Thus, in order to be distinguished from the active Rajas, Tamas has been said to be the restrainer-" Darkness is sluggish and enveloping." The particle eva' is to be construed-not only with 'Tamas but with 'Sattva' and 'Rajas' also.

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-X11[107] TRANSLATION natures cannot (106) The enquirer objects: "Instead of co-operating for a single purpose, the Attributes, being enObjection-The dowed as they are with contradictory proAttributes of contradictory perties, would counteract each other, like Sunda and Upsunda (two wrestling champiCo-operate ons ); there can be no possibility of their combining for a single purpose." The author replies "Their functioning is for a single purpose, Reply-they can, like that of the lamp." We have all like wick and oil, in giving light observed how the wick and the oil-each, by itself, opposed to the action of fire-cooperate, when in contact with fire, for the single purpose of giving light; similarly, the three humours of the body-wind, bile, and phlegm-though possessed of contradictory properties, co-operate for the single purpose of sustaining the body. Precisely in the same manner, do the three Attributes, though possessed of mutually contradictory properties, co-operate towards a single end ;-' for the single purpose', of the emancipation of the Spnt. This will be further explained in Karika XXXI. (107) Pleasure, Pain and Delusion, being mutual con. tradictions, lead to the assumption of three Necessity of different causes connate with themselves postulating the three Attri.** respectively, (and it is these causes that we butes as causes have postulated the three Attributes ). These of pleasure, pain and delusionres- three causes also must be multiform, since, pectively by their very nature, they are mutually sup pressive. As an example (of the multiform character of these various causes of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion ), we have the following: A single girl, young, beautiful, gentle and virtuous, is a source of delight to her husband, - why?-because for him she appears in the form of Pleasure; she pains her co-wives-why?-because for them, she appears in the form of Pain; and lastly the same girl deludes or T.4

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI [X11|108 stupesies another man who is unable to get at her--why?because for him she appears in the form of Delusion. The case of this woman illustrates the nature of all things. In the above case, that which is the cause of pleasure is the Attribute of Sattva, the essence of which is Pleasure; Goodness the the cause of pain is the Attribute of Rajas, cause of Pleasure; Foulness of Pain,' the essence of which is Pain; and lastly, the and Darkness of cause of delusion is the Attribute of Tamas, Delusion the essence of which is Delusion. As regards Pleasure, Illuminativeness and Buoyancy (which are the properties attributed to The Properties of Sattva), these are not mutually contradiccach of the Attri. butes are not tory, and as such, not incapable of cocontradictory, and existing in a single substratum; in fact, they so they do not necessitate the are actually found together (subsisting in assumption of Sattva). Hence, Pleasure, Illuminative. different causes for each of them ness and Buoyancy, being mutually not contradictory, do not necessitate the assumption of three different causes (one for each of them severally) --as is done by Pleasure, Pain and Delusion which are mutually contradictory (and as such unable to cohere in a single substratum). In the same manner, Pain, Mobility and Activity (the properties of Rajas),-as also Delusion, Sluggishness, and Envelopingness (the properties of Tamas), [ do not necessitate the assumption of several causes). Thus it is established that there are three-and only three-Attributes. (108) Objection:-"As regards earth, and other things known to us, we actually perceive the Question-Indis. creetness, etc., of properties of 'undistinguishableness' and the Attributes, the rest (described in Karika XI) as belong. bow provad? 80 ing to them, and we admit them so far, But the Sattva and other Attributes can never come within the range of perceptible experience; how then, can we attri

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-X1V109] TRANSLATION 51 bute to these latter, the said properties of being 'undistin. guishable,' 'objective,' 'insentient' and 'productive' ( as described under Karika XI above)?" Answer : Karika XIV The properties of being 'undistinguishable and the rest are proved by the existence of the Two reasons for the above given. three Attributes, and by the non-existence Existence of, of these (the three Attributes) in their Nature proved absence. And the existence of the Unmanifest (Nature) too is establised on the ground of the properties of the effect being of the same nature as those of the cause. (109) By "aviveki" in the Karika is to be understood the abstract form .avivekitva'; just as 'dur' First Proof: From the existence of and 'eka'-in the Satra "Doyeka yordvivaca. the three Attri- naikavacane" (Panini I-IV-22) -stand for butes dvitva' and 'ekatva' respectively; if it were not so, then the form of the compound would be "duye kesu" (and not "duyeka yoh").* Question.--How do you prove the properties of "undistinguishableness" and the rest ?Answer:-"By the existence of the three Attributes." That is, in the case of manifested entities known to us, it has been found that 'whatever is of the nature of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion, is endowed with the properties of being undistingui. shable and the rest';--this affirmative universal proposition, implied by the text, has not been stated in so many words because it is clearly known,-- It proceeds to state the negative premiss in the next term-' by the non-existence of these in their absence'; that is, where the said properties of * For if the compound were analysed into 'dur' and `eka', the sum would be three, and would thus require a plural ending, and not the dual, which is explained by making 'dur' and 'eka' stand for .dvitra" and 'ekatva' making only two nouns, and thus having a dual ending.

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI (XIV110 being undistinguishable' and the rest are absent.--as in the Spirit,--the three Attributes of Sattva etc., are non-existent. Or, we may have the Manifest and the Unmanifest (both together ) as the subject ( minor term ) of the syllogism, and then we shall have the reasoning-"By the existence of the three Attributes"-as a purely negative inference* (Avita ), there being no other case ( besides the minor term ) where there could be an affirmation (of the reason, Middle termexistence of the Attributes). (110) Objection:-"The existence of the properties of 'being undistinguishable and the rest, cannot Question--How, be proved before the object possessing these is Nature proved to exist ? e properties ( the Unmanifest ) has been prov. ed to exist. The existence of the Unmanifest itself has nat yet been proved; how then can the existence of the said properties be proved ?". Answer :--The existence of the Unmanifest is established on the ground of the properties of the effect Reply : From the properties of the being of the same nature as those of the effect being due cause. The sense of the argument is as to those of the cause. follows : All effects are found to possess properties similar to those of their respective * The syllogism has been previously explained as-" Whatever has pleasure etc., is undistinguishable, as the perceptible, material substences." -and here we have the affirmation ( Anvaya ) of the reason in the perceptible substances " whose connotation 19 different from that of the subject of the syllogrsm," All things having pleasure etc." Now, what our author proposes is that we might explain the reasoning thus " All things besides the Spirit (the Manifest and the Unmanifest ) are undistinguishable, since they have the three Attributes, and whatever is not undistinguishable does not have the three Attributes." Thus in the latter syllogism, we have for ths, minor term The Manifest and the Unmanifest which comprehend all cases where reason (the presence of the three Attributes) could be found; for nothing besides the Manifest and the Unmanifest can be said to have the three Attributes.

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-XIVill] TRANSLATION causes; e. g., the cloth possesses properties of the same nature as those of the yarns; similarly, we find that all products, like the Great Principle and the rest are endowed with Pleasure, Pain and Delusion; from which it follows that this must be due to the presence of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion subsisting in their cause;-t is thus that the existence of this cause, in the shape of the Unmanifest, Primordial Matter ( Nature ) is established.* (111) Says the enquirer, "the followers of Kanada (the cont Vais'esikas ) and Gautama ( the Naiyayikas ) Why not accept the atomic assert that Manifest is produced out of the theory, which dis- Manifest ; According to them Atoms are cards the necessity of an manifest, and these produce the manifest Unmanifested product, from the binary compound onwards Entity ? to the Earth, Water and other substances ; and the qualities of the latter, Earth and the rest, are produced in accordance with the similar qualities in the * And consequently Nature too is proved to have the properties in question, in accordance with the proposition laid down before-"What. ever has pleasure etc., has the said properties etc., also." The reason. ing may be rendered clearer by reducing it to the form of two Aristote. lan syllogisms.-- Properties of the effect ( Intellect) are properties of the cause (Nature ). Pleasure etc., are properties of the effect ( Intellect) .. Pleasure, etc., are properties of the cause ( Nature ). And again : Whatever has pleasure, etc., has indiscreetness, etc. Nature has pleasure, etc., ( as first proved ). .. Nature has indiscreetness, etc.

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54 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [X Vild ( constituent ) atoms.* And in as much as all the Manifest along with its properties, being produced out of the Manifest what is the use of postulating an Unmanifest, an imperceptible Entity ( in the form of Nature ? )" We reply-- Karika XV (1) Because of the finite nature of specific objects, (11) because of homogeneity, (111) because Reply-we must postulate an Un- of evolution being due to the efficiency manifested Reali- of the cause, (iv) because of separation ty-reasons given between cause and its product, and because of the merging of the whole world (of effects ), --there is the Unmanifest as the cause ( next Karika). (112) "Of specific objects" i. e., of the products in the shape of the Great Principle and the First proof of the existence of rest--the cause, root-cause is the UnmaniPraksti. Since fest (Nature ). Why so ?-(iv) "because tion of cause and ord of the separation between the cause and effect effect, and reunion and because of the merging of the whole of the whole Universe Universe";-It has been established that the effect is already existent in its cause ; the there 28 separa # The atomic theory of Kanada and Gautama may be thus summed up-In the beginning there existed only atoms of various substances (Earth. Water, Fire and Air ) besides, of course, Akas'a, etc., which are in themselves eternal. These various atoms were respectively en. dued with four different sets of properties, latter'y perceived in their compounds By some agency or other mainly that of Adrsta, the Unseen ( Fate )--all homogeneous atoms combine, one with one, into couples and thus form binary compounds, which latter again combining in the same manner, but three at a time, give rise to tertiary com. pounds, and so on to the various objects of perception. These atoms are declared to be without extension in space, or else, they could not be permanent But as far as I know, no Navyayika has even yet tried to show how two things devoid of extension, can combine point which affords the strongest handle to Sankaracarya in his refutation of the atomic theory. See s'ariraka-Bhasya on the Brahma-Sutras II 11-12-17.

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-X1113] TRANSLATION 55 already existing limbs of the Tortoise emerging out of its body, become distinguished from it--'this is the Body of the Tortoise and these are its limbs' and on again entering the body, they become unmanisest, hidden; similarly, the already existing products, in the shape of the Jar or the Crown, on emerging out of the cause, in the shape of the Clay or the Gold, come to be distinguished from this cause;--similarly, the already existing products in the shape of the Earth and other subtances, emerging out of their cause in the shape of the Primary Elements (Tanmatras ) become distinguished from them ; the already existing Primary Elements on emer. ging out of their cause, the 'I-principle', come to be disting. uished from it; the already existing 'l-principle', emerging from its cause, the Great Principle, becomes distinguished from it; and lastly, the already existing Great Principle, emerging from its cause, the Highest Unmanifest ( Nature), becomes distinguished from it. This distinguishing' or separation from the final cause, the Highest Unmanifest, of the whole world of effects-related to it either mediately ( as with Earth, etc.) or immediately ( as with Great Principle ) -is what is meant by the " distinction between the cause and its product". Similarly, at counter-evolution or dissolution, the product, in the shape of the Jar or the Crown, merges into its cause, in the shape of the Clay or the Gold, and thereby disappears. i. e., becomes Unmanifest ; which means that it is a form of the cause itself which becomes unmanifest, so far as the particular product is concerned. Thus also when the Earth and the other substances merge into the Primary Elements, they render these latter 'unmanifest' in so far as the forms of those substances themselves are concerned ;-similarly, when the Primary Elments merge into the I-principle, they render these latter unmanifest' in so far as their own form concerned; - when the l.principle merges into the Great Principle, it renders the latter unmanifest in so far as its own form is

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56 TATTVA-KAUMUDI (XV118_ concerned;--and finally when the Great Principle merges into its cause, Nature, it renders this latter unmanifest. In as much as there is no merging of Nature itself into anything else, it is unmanifest pure and simple. This is what is meant by 'the non-separation or merging of the whole world of effects', of all kinds. The term 'Vais'varupya' is formed by the adding of the reflexive affix 'syan' ( to the term 'vis' varupa '). From all this it follows that, in as much as there is 'distinction' and also 'merging of the already existing product in the cause, there must be Unmanifest as the cause. (113) From the following reason also the Unmanifest is the cause-- 'Because of evolution being due Second proof Be. to the efficiency of the causc;" - It is a wellcause Evolution is due to Energy ery known fact that the evolution of the effect is due to the efficiency of the cause; for certainly, no effect can arise from an inefficient cause. This latent 'efficiency in the cause is no other than the existence therein of the effect in its unmanifested state; since, on the hypothesis of the effect being existent, there can be no other form of causal efficiency, apart from the fact of the effect being latent in the cause. The difference of sand from sesamum--the mate. rial cause of oil-lies only in the fact that it is only in the latter, not in the former, that oil exists in its unmanifested condition. (114) Objection: "The above two reasons that you have urged--the fact of evolution being due to the Objection: These efficiency of the cause and that the separatwo reasons might rest with Intelleci tion and merging of the cause and effect might be taken as proving the supreme *Unmanifest' character of the Great Principle itself. Why should we have one more Unmanifest entity beyond that?" Answer: "Because of the finite nature of specific Reply-Third objects";- parimanat stands for 'parimitatproof_" Fran vat', 'because of being measured, i.e., finite'. finitene88" (of all manifested [The reasoning is stated in the syllogistic existence ) form]-The specific objects in question, the

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-XV115] TRANSLATION Great Principle and the rest, have an Unmanifested Entity for their cause (i. e., they have a cause in which they exist in their unmanifested state),-because, they are finite, -like the jar and other things:--the jar and other things are found to have, for their cause, clay and other things, (in which inhere) the unmanifested ( state of the effects ); we have already shown that the cause is that wherein the effect already exists in the unmanifested state. Under these circumstances, the cause of the Great Principle must be that highest Uamanifest which must be the final cause, for there is no ground for postulating a further Unmanifested Reality.* (115) For the following reason also the specific objects in question must have causes wherein they lie Fourth proof, unmanifested:- Because of homogeneity":"Because of homogeneity" 'Homogeneity' consists in the similarity of the different objects. The Great Principle and the rest-manifesting themselves as 'volition' and the rest-are found to be 'homogeneous' in the sense that they consist in Pleasure Pain and Delusion. And whatever is invariably connected with a certain form must have, for its cause (wherein it inheres), something which has that form for its constituent element. Thus it becomes established that of the specific objects, the Unmanifested (Nature) is the cause.** Having proved the existence of the Unmanifest, the author next states the manner of its operation: * Because the Unmanifested Nature (the cause of the Great Principle) 18 not finite, as its effects, 'l.principle' and the rest are. And further, because, by so doing we would have to postulate causes ad infinitum. ** Thus we have in the present case: The Great Principle and the rest are invariably connected, with Pleasure, Pain and Delusion; and as such, must have, for their cause, Nature wherein they all Re unmani. fested prior to their Evolution; and this Nature has, for its constituent elements, the three Attributes which respectively consist in Pleasure. Pain and Delusion.

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58 The method of Nature's operation Karika XVI There is the Unmanifest as the cause (gone before); it operates through the three Attributes, by blending and modification, like water, on account of the difference arising from the predominance of one or the other of the Attributes. TATTVA-KAUMUDI Through the Attributes [XVI116 (116) "Operates through the three Attributes".-At the time of the cosmic dissolution, each of the three Attributes, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, continues its homogeneous modifications. Modification forms the very nature of the Attributes; and as such, they can never, for a moment, remain unmodified. Hence even at the time of dissolution, each of the Attributes, Sattva and the rest, operates through its own particular form* [This is at the period of dissolution]. By a blending of the Attributes (117) Another method of operation (which comes in at the creative period) is next stated-" By blending". The term 'samudaya' signifies samet ya udaya', appearing in combination, i. e., blending. This blending of the Attributes is not possible. without some sort of relative subserviency among them; and this relative subserviency again is not possible without some diversity among the Attributes;-this diversity again is not possible without one being suppressive of the other ( i. e., unless the Attributes are so constituted that they suppress one another).-This is the second method of operation which brings about the Great Principle and other products.** *This is the state of equilibrium of the Attributes, during which no evolution is possible. ** The various evolutions from Nature are due to the disturbance of equilibrium among the Attributes, which rouses the hitherto dormant, evolving energy of Nature, whence issue forth the various manifestations -Intellect and the rest.

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_XV1[119] TRANSLATION (118) The enquirer objects--"How can diverse methods of operation belong to the Attributes, when Objection-How each of them is of one uniform nature?" We can an Attribute of uniform nature reply--"By modification like water;"-we bring about all know how the water falling from the diverse actions clouds, though naturally of itself, having one taste, * becomes sweet, sour, saline, bitter, pungent and hot, according as it comes into contact with Reply:-" By different modifications of earth and becomes modification as water.'' transformed into the juice of fruits such as cocoanut, palm, wood-apples and so forth; in the same manner, ( owing to the blending and the mutual suppression of the Attributes), the Attributes of Nature come to be predominant one by one and thereby bring about various modifications (in the state of various products ). This is what is meant by the phrase: "on account of the difference arising from the predominance of one or the other of the Attributes." That is, by the peculiarities due to the predominance of one or the other of the Attributes. (119) There are some self-contented (Materialists) who accept, as 'Spirit', either the Unmanifest (Nature) or the Great Principle or the 'I-principle' or the Sense-organs, or the elemental substances. As against these, the Author makes the following declaration. Karika XVII (a) Because all composite objects are for another's use, (b) because there must be absence of Reason for the the three Attributes and other properties, existence of Spirit (c) because there must be control, (d) be cause there must be some one to experience and (e) because there is a tendency towards #Sweet' according to the Naiyayikas.

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60 TATTVA-KAUMUDI 'Isolation' or final beatitude, therefore, the Spirit must be there. [XVII120 The Spirit exists : because all are for another (120) The Spirit must be there, apart from the Unmanifest (Nature) and other things. (a) "Because all composite objects are for another's use"compound objects This reason, when reduced to the syllogistic form, would stand thus-Nature, the Great Principle, the 'I-principle', and other things must exist for another's use, because they are composite like the bedstead, the chair, the unguent and other things.-Nature and the rest are all composite', being composed as they are, of pleasure, pain and delusion.* (represented by the three Attributes of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas). (121) "But" an Elementary Spirit Objection: The above reasoning says the objector, the bedstead, the chair, and other composite things are found to exist for the Body which is itself a composite would only lead thing, and not for the Spirit as apart from compounds, not to Nature etc; so that the fact of Nature &c., to another set of being composite, should only lead to the inference of another composite thing-(for whose use they exist) and not to that of a non-composite Spirit. 06 We reply-" Because there must be absence of the three Attributes and other properties."-That is to Reply-Since the say, if from the fact of Nature, &c., 'being reverse of that which possesses for another's use', we were to infer only the three Attributes another composite object, then in that case, must exist we would have to assume such composite *This sounds rather absurd. But we must not forget that the whole set of material objects are mere emanations from Nature, whose constituent elements are the three Attributes, which latter consist in pleasure, pain and delusion, respectively.

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-X111121] TRANSLATION objects ad infinitum; for even this latter compound would lead to the influence of another for whose use it The view of the objector would will exist and this again to another, and so lead to compounds on ad infinitum. And when we can escape ad infinitum this regressus ad infinitum by postulating a reasonable terininus, it is not proper to multiply unnecessary assumptions (in the shape of an infinite series of composites). Nor can it be urged that "Multiplication of assumptions becomes excusable when supported by evidence" because when the 'composite character (of the bedstead) etc., is put forward in the inferential argument, it is only in so far as it is concomitant with being for another's use' (and it is not meant to include all the properties of the said composite objects); in fact if one were to insist upon the Inference to be in accord with all the properties of the corroborative instance (in this case, the bedstead &c.),--then there would be an end to all Inference (no Inference being possible ).* We have explained this in our Nyayavartika-tatparyatika.** Thus then, in order to escape the regressus ad infinitum, if we accept the non-composite nature of Spirit, we find ourselves constrained to attribute to it the properties of being "without the three Attributes", " distinguishable", "non-objective". * Because there can scarcely be found any two occurrences in nature which could be quite identical. Even in the stock example of the Naiyayikag--"Fiery, because smoking, as the culinary hearth"-we have a dissimilarity between the subject matter of the syllogism and the instance cited. Thus, in the culinary hearth the fire is for cooking food, and proceeding from a house made by men, &c. &c., whereas such is not the case with the fire in the mountain. ** This is a commentary on Udyotakara's Nyayavartika (a glogs on the Vatsyayanbhasya on the Nyayasutras of Gautama). This work with the Paris'uddhi of Udayanacarya is generally counted as olosing the epoch of ancient Nyaya.- latterly supplanted by the modern system, introduced and most extensively expounded by Ganges'a Upadhyaya, in his Tattva.Cinta mani.

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI [XV11122 must be ( subjective ), "uncommon (specific) ", " sentient", and "not productive". Because 'being with three Attributes' and other properties are always accompanied by that of 'being composite', which latter being absent in the Spirit, must lead to the inference of the absense of the three Attributes, &c., just as when a certain individual is not a ' Brahmana; he cannot be a 'katha' (a special class of Brahmanas). Hence when he laid down that "there must be absence of the three Attributes etc.," he means that there must be something which is not composite, and this is the Spirit. . (122) For the following reason also there must be a Spirit apart from Matter: "Because there must Because there be control"; that is to say, because the superintendences objects constituted by the three Attributes are such as 'are always controlled ';--as a matter of fact it is found that everything consisting in pleasure, pain and delusion, (1. e. in the three Attributes) is controlled by something else--c. g., the chariot by the charioteer; and the Great Principle and the rest have been proved to 'consist in pleasure, pain and delusion"; therefore, they must have a 'controller'--and this controller' must be beyond* the three Attributes and independent;--and this is the Spirit. (123) Again there must be the Spirit "because there . must be some one to experience". The term Because there someone to experience' indicates the must be one to objects of experience in the shape of pleasure and pain. The objects of experience are pleasure and pain, which are felt by everyone as agreeable and disagreeable respectively. That is to say, there must feel * Otherwise the Controller also will stand in need of another, for the presence of the Attributes in the former will necessarily lead to that of pleasure, &c. which again will necessitate its control by something beyond itself. And so we shall be landed in a regressus ad infinitum.

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-XVII126] TRANSLATION 63 be something other than the feelings themselves, to which they (feelings) can be agreeable or otherwise. Feelings cannot be agreeable or disagreeable to the Great Principle and other products; as that would involve the anomaly of things operating upon themselves; as the Great Principle and the rest are all themselves integrally composed of pleasure, pain and delusion.* Thus, then, something else, which does not consist of pleasure, etc., must be the one to whom things are agreeable or disagreeable; and this something else must be the Spirit. A different interpretation of the above reason (124) Others, however, interpret the above reasoning of the Karika thus: The term 'Bhogya stands for visible; and the visibility of the Great Principle and the rest not being possible without an observer, there must be one outside of, and beyond them; and this is the Spirit. What the word 'bhoktrbhavat ' of the text means is 'because the observer is to be inferred from the visible'. The visibility of the Great Principle and the rest is to be inferred from the fact of their consisting,-like the Earth and other substances,-of pleasure, pain and delusion. (125) Lastly, the Spirit must be there-"because there is tendency towards Isolation."-The 'Iso. Because of the lation' which is found in all scriptures and tendency of writers and sages is recognised by great sages and others towards beatitude possessed of divine insight as the absolute and final cessation of the three kinds of pain-can never belong to the Great Principle and other products; because, by their very nature, the pain as one of their integral components, from which, therefore, they can never be absolved, * That is to say-the Great Principle, as made up of pleasure, pain and dulness, cannot be properly said to feel pleasure etc., for that would imply the feeling of pleasure by pleasure;--or worse still-by pain; and vice versa, which is absurd.

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI [XVII[126 since a substance cannot be absolved of something that forms its constituting element. It is only when one is distinct from the Great Principle etc., and does not consist in pleasure, pain and delusion, that the said Isolation can be possible. Thus, the conclusion is that in as much as there is a tendency in all the scriptures and among all intelligent persons towards 'Isolation', there must be something beyond ( pleasure, etc., and hence ) the Great Principle and the rest, ---and this is the Spirit. (126) Having thus proved the existence of the Spirit, the author next raises the question--Is this Spirit one* ( manifesting itself ) in all bodies, or many, being different in each body? And in reply he lays down the theory of the plurality of Spirits. Karika XVIII (1) Because there is definite adjustment of birth, death, and the organs, (2) because there Plurality of is non-simultaneity of activity and (3) be. Spirits-reasons cause there is diversity due to the three Attributes--the plurality of Spirits is established. (127) "Because etc."--The plurality of Spirits is established, -why? "Because there is From allotment of definite adjustment of birth, death and the birth, death and the organs a organs. The Birth of the Spirit consists in its connection with a new set of body, sense-organs, mind, 'l.principle'. Great Principle and feeling** ( Vedana )-all these latter forming a composite * As the Vedantin asserts. ** " Vedana might be taken severally with 'body' etc., In that case the passage would be translated thus: 'bodily' sensuous, mental egoistic and intellectual cognitions ; but the translation given above is preferable, for certainly there can be no fognition through body etc., taken singly. No cognition is possible in the body alone without the aid of ( the sense organs ) mind etc., and so on with the rest.

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-XV11128] TRANSLATION 65 of a particular character; it does not mean modification; since the Spirit is essentially unmodifiable ( unchangeable ). Death also consists in the giving up of the body and the rest; it cannot mean destruction, as the Spirit is unchangeably eternal. The organs' are thirteen, beginning with the Great Principle. The definite adjustment of these-birth and the rest, stands for the fact that one set of these-Body etc., are connected with only one Spirit, and this cannot be explained on the hypothesis of there being only one Spirit; for, if the Spirit were one and the same in all bodies, then on the birth of one, all would be born.-on the death of one, all would die,-on one becoming blind or deaf, all would become blind ur deaf,-on one becoming unsound of mind, all would become unsound of mind,-so that there would be no adjustment. On the other hand, if there is a distinct Spirit, belonging to each set of Body etc., the adjustment becomes secured. Nor can one explain the above adjustment by attributing it to the single Spirit, as diversely conditioned by contact with different bodies, etc. For in that case he would land himself on another absurdity--that of attributing ( on analogous ground, the birth or death of the Spirit), in connection with the hands, the wrists and others. This, however, can never be right, for a girl does not become dead' by the derangement of her hands, or ' born 'on the appearance of her breasts or other parts of her body. 18 not simulta. neous" (128) For the following reason also, the Spirit must be different with different bodies: "Because "Since activity activity is not simultaneous." Though 'Acti a vity' in the form of effort, is a function of the internal organs, yet it is here attributed to the Spirit. If the Spirit were one, the activity of 'one man would lead to similar activity in all other men-as the Spirit would be the same; so that the moving of one man would T. 5

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60 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [XVII1139 lead to the moving of all others at the same time--a palpable absurdity, which is avoided on the hypothisis of plurality. (129) Again, the Spirits must be many--" because there is diversity due to the three Attributes." The Because the modifications of the particle 'eva" should be constructed with Attributes are siddham', not with 'viparyayat'; the sense different being that 'the plurality of Spirits must be taken as proved, not as unproved.' The term 'traigunya" stands for the three Attributes" ;--by the diversity of these is meant differentiation. Some persons abounding in the Sattva--attribute, represent aggregates of that attribute-e. g. the deities and saints; others abound in the Rajas-attribute, - such as men; othors again in the Tamas-attribute, -such as beasts. This 'diversity' or 'differentiation due to the distribution of the Attributes in the various entities, could not be explained if the Spirit were one and the same in all. On the hypothesis of plurality, however, there is no difficulty. (130) Having thus established the plurality of Spirts the author now states the properties of the Spirit--as a knowledge of these is conducive to discriminative wisdom: Karika XIX And from that contrast, it follows that the Spirit is 'Witness,' and has 'Isolation, 'NeutraThe properties lity,' and is the ' Seer,' and 'Inactive. of the Soul 'From that &c.'-- The particle "Ca,' "And connects the following properties of the Spirit with its plurality. (131) If it were said." And from this contrast." then it would refer to the aiversity due to the three Why that Attributes', of the last Karika. In order to avoid this, it is said " and from that, etc." contrast?

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-X18184] TRANSLATION dence A subject, immediately preceding, is referred to by the pro. noun this; whereas one not so immediate is denoted by that; hence the that here refers to Karika XI. (132) Thus, the contrast of the character of "having the ... three Attributes, etc.", and the rest (which The necessity of so many properties. have been set forth in Karika XI as belongTheir Inter-depen- ing to the Unmanifest, Nature, as also to the Manifest, Products.)--connotes the Spirit's property of being without the three Attributes and being 'distinguishable', 'non-objective', 'not common', 'sentient and 'non-productive'. Now the characters being 'sentient' and 'non-objective' also indicate the characters of being witness', and 'seer'. Since it is only a 'sentient' being that can be a 'seer', and one can be 'seer', and one can bea 'witness' only when the things have been shown to him; as in daily life we find the two parties of a dispute showing the object of their dispute to the witness; similarly does the Nature exhibit its creations before the Spirit, which latter, therefore, becomes the witness. And again, no object can be shown to one who is himself an object and insentient; and since the Spirit is both sentient and non-objective, it becomes the witness. For the same reasons, the Spirit is also the 'seer'. (133) Further, from the absence of the three Attributes in the Spirit follows its Isolation by which is meant the final and absolute removal of the three kinds of pain; and this properly, as belonging to the Spirit, is a necessary deduction from the fact of the Spirit being by its very, nature without the three Attributes, and hence without Pleasure, Pain or Delusion. (134) From the absence of the Attributes, again, follows neutrality; since this latter property is such as cannot belong either to the happy and satisfied, or to the sad and grumbling. It is only one who is devoid of both pleasure

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68 [XX135 and pain, who can be called neutral-also called Udasina (indifferent). Lastly, the inactivity of the Spirit follows from its being distinguishable' and 'non-productive.' TATTVA-KAUMUDI (135) Objection. We We grant all this; but in ordinary experience, we first decide, what is to be Objection-Intelli, gence and activity done by us and then think in the following always found costrain- I, who am a sentient being, wishing existent to do a certain act, am going to do it; so that, we find by our experience that sentience.' and 'activity are co-existent in the same person. And this goes against the Sankhya' tenets which make the 'Sentient being inactive and the active agent' insentient.' * 6 Answer 44 . Karika XX Reply :-The Thus from this union, the insentient apparent activity 6 of the soul due to 'Evolute appears as if sentient'; and union with Buddhi similarly, from the activity really and the apparent intelligence of the belonging to the Attributes, the Spirit, latter due to union which is neutral appears as if it were with Purusa active. . (136) The sense is that in as much as 'sentience' and 'activity' have been proved by reasons to be differently located, therefore, the feeling referred to by the objector must be a mistake. The word 'Linga Evolute', here stands for everything from the Great Principle primary elements to be described later on. the mistake is said to be the 'union i. e., Spirit with the Evolute. The rest is clear enough. down to the The cause of proximity of the

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-XXi139] TRANSLATION (137) Objection :-"You say that the feeling is due to Union, etc. But no union between two disObjection :- . tinct things is possible, without some need. What is the need of the Union ? which again is not possible without the relation (between the two things) of the helper and helped. [How is this possible in accordance with your tenets, with regard to the union of the Spirit with the Evolute ?]" In reply, the author explains the 'help' or 'benefit which forms the basis of the need. Karika XXI For the perception of Nature by the Spirit and for Reply:-The need the Isolation of the Spirit, there is union is that of final Emancipation of both, like that of the, halt and the blind; and from this union proceeds evolution. (138) In the term " Pradhanasya" the genitive affix has the accusative force, the meaning being--"for the perception by Spirit of Nature, the source of all things, "-thus implying the fact of Nature being an object--something to be enjoyed. This enjoyability, however, is not possible without an enjoyer, whose existence thus becomes needed by Nature. (139) The author next explains the need of the Spirit (for Nature )--" For the Isolation of the The need Spirit "_The Spirit, while in union with the explained ' enjoyable' Nature, believes the three kinds of pain-the constituents of Nature to be his own; and from this ( self-imposed bond ) he seeks liberation, Isola. tion; this Isolation is dependent upon due discrimination bet. ween the Spirit and the three Attributes; thus disarimination is not possible without the Nature ( and its evolutes in the shape of Buddhi and the rest, without which no knowledge

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI (XX[140 of any kind is possible );-thus it is that for his own Isolation the Spirit needs Nature. In as much as this series of unions ( between the Spirit and Nature ) is eternal, it is only right and proper that the Spirit, though he had been already united for the purposes of enjoyment', should be united with it again, for the purpose of Isolation'. (140) "Granted that there is this union between these two ; but whence the evolution of the Great The necessity of Principle and the rest ?" Answer " From the creation of Buddhi etc this union proceeds evolution." The said ' union' (of Spirit with Nature ) cannot by itself suffice either for enjoyment' or 'Isolation of the Great Principle and the rest be not there; hence the union itself brings about the Evolution for the sake of enjoyment' and * Isolation." The process of Evolution is now explained. Karika XXII . From the (Parkrti Primordial Matter, Nature) issues The process of Mahat (Buddhi, the Great Princiele) ; Evolution from from this issues Ahankara (I-principle); PrakTti down from which proceed the set of sixteen wards from five of this set of sixteen 'proceed the five elementary substances. (141) From Prakrti, etc.,- Prakrii is the Unmanifest ( Nature ); Mahat (Great Principle ) and Ahankara (1Principle ) will be described later. The set of sixteen' is made up of the eleven sense-organs, to be described later on, and thu five primary elements. Out of these sixteen, from the five primary elements, proceed respectively the five elementary substances (Akas'a, Earth, Water, Air and Fire).

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-XX11[143] TRANSLATION 71 (142) Thus, (a) from the primary element of 'sound' proceeds Akas'a, having sound as its characThe process of the teristic property; (6) from the primary production of the elements element of 'touch' as combined with that of 'sound proceeds Air, with sound and touch as its characteristic properties; (c) from the primary element of colour combined with those of 'sound' and 'touch' proceeds Fire, with sound, touch and colour for its characteristic properties; (d) from the primary element 'taste combined with those of sound', 'touch' and colour proceeds Water, with sound, touch, colour, and taste as its characteristic properties; and lastly, (e) from the primary element of 'odour' combined with those of 'sound', 'touch', colour' and 'taste" proceeds Earth with all sound, touch, colour, taste and odour as its characteristic properties. (143) The Unmanifest Nature has been already defined in general terms in Karika X, and specifically in Karika XIII; the Manifest also has been generally defined in Karika X; now the author defines Buddhi, a particular form of the Manifest, the Buddhi--the knowledge of which is helpfu towards discriminative wisdom. Karika XXIII Buddhi, the Great Principle, 'is determination' li. e. determining Principle, Will)*; Virtue, Buddhi defined. Wisdom, Dispassion and Power, constiIts properties tute its form when abounding in the Sattva-attribute,--and the reverse of these when abounding in the Tamas-Principle. stated *Though there is some difference of opinion or this point, yet I am inclined to think that Adhyavasaya means 'determining' and of all the faculties will appears to be the only determining principle in Man.

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI (XX[1[141 (144) Buddhi is described as "determination"-on the principle that there is no difference between the action (of determining) and the active agent (that which determines). It is well known that when a man has to do anything, what he does is to review the situation; he ponders over it, regards himself as entitled to do it and then makes up his mind (determines) that he should do it and then does it. Now determination consists in the notion that 'this should be done,' and it belongs to, and forms the characteristic function of Buddhi ( the Great Principle. Will ), which acquires sentience from its proximity to the Sentient Faculty (of the Spirit); and * Buddhi' is regarded as not different from the said determination' (on the principle that the action is not different from the active agent); this also constitutes the definition' (differentia) of Buddhi, in as much as it distinguishes it from all like and unlike things. (145) Having thus defined Buddhi, the author, in order to help the attainment of discriminative The properties of wisdom states the properties of Buddhi, as Buddhi-Virtue, Wisdom, Dispag- abounding in the Sattva and Tamas attrision and Power, butes: "Virtue, etc, etc.". Virtue 'leads and the reverse to prosperity and the Highest Good,--that brought about by the performance of sacrifices, charity and the like lead to the former, and that due to the practice of eight-fold Yoga lead to the latter. Wisdom consists in the knowledge of the difference between the Attri. butes (as constituting Nature) and the Spirit. Dispassion is absence of Attachment (Love). (146) Of this Dispassion there are four stages named (1) 'Yatamana-Samjna,' (2) Vyatireka-Samjna The four kinds of (3) Ekendriya-Samjna and (4) Vas'ikara Samjna. (1) Love (Attachment) and other emotions are so many impurities residing in the mind, and of these

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-XXII1147] TRANSLATION 73 they incite the sense-organs to activity towards their respective objects; in order that the sense-organs may not turn towards their objects, it is necessary that the said impurities should be cured; the effort made to effect this cure constitutes the first form of Dispassion, 'Yatamana-Samjna', the 'Endeavourstage.' (2) After this process of cure has commenced, it may be found that while some are already cured, others have still got to be cured; this sequence being there, those got to be cured have to be discriminated from those already cured; this discrimination constitutes the second stage of Dispassion, the Vyatireka-Samjna, the Discriminationstage. (3) After the sense-organs have been rendered incapable of action, the impurities that have been cured continue to lie there in the mind in the form of a mere 'longing (or eagerness); this is the third stage of Dispassion, the 'Ekendriya-Samjna', the ' One-organ stage. (4) The supression of even this longing towards all perceptible objectssensuous as well as super-sensuous-is the fourth stage called Vas'ikara-Samjna. the control-stage'; this is superior to the first three stages, this has been thus discribed by the revered Patanjali : The dispassion named Vas'ikara-Samjna ' belongs to one who has no desire for either sensuous or supersensuous objects." [Yoga-Sutra I-15].-Such is Dispassion, a property of Buddhi. 64 The eight kinds of power (147) Power also is a property of Buddhi, and it is to this that the perfections, Attenuation and the rest (Anima etc.) are due.* Of these (1) Anima (Lit. Atomic character), 'Attenuation' is the power by which one can enter the densest substances, such as stones. (2) Laghima, 'Buoyancy' is that to which There is some confusion as to the number of these perfections. As enumerated here, they appear nine; but they ought to be eight only; hence I have taken Vas'itva and Is'itva as one.

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74 TATTVA-KAUMUDI (XXII114 is due the ability to traverse the solar regions by means of the sun's rays. (3) Garima, 'Gravity' leads to heaviness; and (4) Mahima, 'Grandeur' brings greatness. (5) Prapti, * Approach is the ability to touch the moon with the fingers. (6) Prakamya, Fulfilment of desires, is such as can enable one to dip into the earth and rise again as in water. (7) Vas'itva, 'supremacy'-by this all matter and material things come under one's control; this differs from 'Ts'itva' 'sovereignity', which consits in the power to create and maintain matter and material things. (8) Kamavasayita, Infallibility of purpose is that by which all objects follow the course dictated by the will of the person. The decisions of ordinary inortals follow the course of events, where as those of the trained devotee precede them and dictate their course.' (148) These four are the properties of Buddhi, abounding in the Sattva-Attribute. Those abounding in the Tamasattribute are the reverse of these-vis., Vice, Ignorance, Passion and Weakness. The author next defines Ahankara-the 'l-Principle -- Karika XXIV The 'T-Principle' is self-consciousness; from that The principle of proceeds a two-fold evolution-the set of Ahankara defined. Its effects "eleven and the five rudimentary sub stances. (149) "The I principle is egotism" and this 'l-principle' is perceptible in such ideas as-- "To what I have observed and thought of I am entitled, --'I am able to do this --'all these things are for my use'--'there is no one else entitled to it'herce I am;"-the egotism involved in all such notions forms the characteristic function of the 'I-principle :it is through this principle that the Will performs its deter

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-XXV151] TRANSLATION 75 minative function appearing in such decisions as "this is to be done by me." (150) The different products of this Principle are next mentioned--"From that proceeds a two-fold evolution." The two forms of this evolution are next mentioned--" The set of eleven" consisting of the sense organs, and the five rudimentary substances, "-only these two forms of evolution proceed from the I-principle;--this is what has been emphasised by the particle 'eva'. Objection :-" The l-principle itself being of one uniObjetion-How form nature, how can two different kinds of kinders in evolution the dull and inert ( elements ) proceed from a and the illuminative ( the sense organs ) uniform Egotism? proceed from it ?". Answer. Karika XXV The' set of eleven' abounding in Sattva attribute, evolves out of the 'Vaikrta' form of the Reply-The dif- l-principle '; the set of Rudimentary ference due to the diversity of substances from the 'Bhutadi' form of subst the operating the 'l-principle'; and both of them from Attributes. the 'Taijasa' form of the 'l-principle.'* (151) "The set of eleven', sense-organs, being illumina tive and boyant is said to abound in the Sattva-attribute; * (a) 'Vaiksta,' (6) Bhutadi and (c) Taijasa are purely technical terms.names applied to the three forms or states of the 'I principle' When the 'I. principle' is dominated by the Sattva-attribut called Vaikrta', when it is dominated by the Tamas attribute, it is called 'Bhutadi' and when it is dominated by the Rajas-attribute, it is called 'Taijasa'. These are mere technical names, and do not connote anything-Gaudapada.

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78 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [XXV182. and it proceeds from the Vaiksta' 'I-principle'. From the 'I-principle' as dominated by the Tamas-attribute proceeds the set of Rudimentary substances. How so? Because these substances abound in Sattva-attribute. That is to saythough the I-principle is one and uniform, yet by reason of the domination or suppression of one or other of these Attributes it evolves products of diverse kinds. dona (152) Objection :--When all the necessary products are brought about by the action of the Objection. The attributes of Sattva and Tamas only, have purposelessness of Passions done with the attribute of Rajas, which serves no useful purpose. Answer :-" And both of these from the Taijasa 'form 1 of the l.principle" i. e., from the 'Taijasa Reply-Passion Form', that is from the form abounding in necessary for urging the other the Rajas-attribute, proceed both, the 'set of Attributes to eleven' as also the set of rudimentary subaction stances.' Even though there is no separate product from the Rajas-attribute exclusively by itself, yet (it is a necessary factor. as) the Sattva and Tamas attributes are, by themselves, absolutely inert and as such do not per. forin their functions at all; it is only when they are energised and moved by the Rajas-attribute, that they perform their functions; thus the Rajas-attribute is instrumental in the evolving of both the sets of products mentioned above, through the exciting of activity of the other two attributes, Sattva and Tamas. Thus it is not true that the Rajasattribute serves no useful purpose. In onder to describe the 'set of eleven' abounding in the Sattva-Attribute, the author first describes the ten external sense-organs.

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-XXVI[154] TRANSLATION Karika XXVI The 'organs of sensation' are, the Eye, the Ear, the Nose, the Tongue and the Skin; those 'of The ten External action' are, speech, hand, feet, the arms Organs and the generative organ. (153) 'Sense-organ' has been defined as that which has, for its constituent cause, the 'l-principle Sense defined abounding in the Sattva-attribute. The organs are of two kinds of sensation (sensory)' and 'of action (motor)'. Both of these are called 'Indriya', in the sense that they are characteristics of 'Indra' (the Spirit). The Sense-organs are named. "The eye etc. "-Of these, the eye is the organ for perceiving colour, Named. Functions the ear for perceiving sound, the nose for perceiving odour, the tongue for perceiving 'taste, and the skin for feeling touch. These are the names of the Sensory sense-organs. The function of the organs of speech and the rest will be spoken of later on (Karika XXVIII.) The eleventh sense-organ is next described Karika XXVII Of these (sense-organs) Mind partakes of the nature of both (Sensory and Motor): it is the The eleventh sense Observing' principle; and is called a Mind defined 'sense-organ' since it has properties common to sense-organs. Its multifariousness, as also its diverse external forms, are due to the particular modifications of the Attributes. (154) "Partakes, etc."-Among the eleven sense-organs The double nature the mind partakes of the nature of both-.e., of mind it is an organ of sensation, as well as one of action; Since the eye and the other sensory

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78 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [XXVI1155 organs, as well as speech and other motor organs are able to operate on their respective objects only when influenced by the Mind. (155) The author next gives specific definition of the Mind-It is the observing principle" --That Mind defined is to say Mind is defined by observation; when a certain object has been just vaguely apprehended by a sense-organ as 'a thing', there follows the The reflecting. , definite cognition in the form 'it is such and character of Mind explained such a thing, not that'; and it is this observing i. e., the perception of definite properties as belonging to the thing apprehended, -that is done through the Mind. This has been thus described by an ancient writer--"At first, one apprehends a certain object vaguely as a thing and then the mindful people observe-cognisemit definitely as belonging to a certain genus and possessing certain well-defined properties": -Again (says another writer) -"It is a well-known fact that on the first apprehending an object, the first idea that one has of it is that it is a thing, this idea being inderterminate and vague, like the idea in the Mind of the infant, the dumb and other people; after this the thing comes to be cognised as possessing certain properties and belonging to a certain genus; the cognition that observes and apprehends all this has also been regarded as senseperception"-- This function of observing belongs to the Mind, and as it serves to differentiate the Mind from all other like and unlike things, it serves as its differentia. (156) Objection:-"Granted all this : But we have seen that the l*principle and the Will, Objection:-Why Why having distinct functions of their own, are h make Mind a sense when it has not classed among 'sense-organs'; in the distinct function on same manner, the Mind also, having a or of its own ? distinct function of its own, should not be classod among 'sense-organs.'

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-XXVII[169] TRANSLATION 79 The author replies--" It is a sense-organ'. Why? "Because it has properties common to senseReply-It is a organs." The property meant is that consistsense in as much as it is an immediate ing in its having for its constituent cause. effect of the prin- the 'l-principle' abounding in the Sattvaciple of Egoism, m, attribute, and not in its being a characteristic as effected by a Goodness which is of Indra (Spirit): for this latter property the difinition of I belongs to the Will and the 'l-principle also; a Sense and as such these two also would have to be classed among 'sense-organs'. Thus then " being the characteristic of the Spirit" should be regarded only as an explanation of the derivation of the term Indriya; it cannot be said to form its connotation. (157) Question--"How can the eleven sense-organs proceed out of the single entity in the shape Whence the Multi- of the 'l-principle' abounding in the "Sattvafarious effects from Egoism s attribute?" Answer: "Its multifariousness as well as its diverse external forms are due to the particular modifications of the Attributes"-The diversity in the products is due to the diversity of auxiliaries in the shape of the 'Unseen Force' which brings about the experiences due to the perception of sound and other objects of sense; and the 'Unseen Force' also is only a 'modification of the Attributes. (158) The diverse external forms' has been added by way of illustration, the sense being that just as the diverse external forms, so the multifariousness also is due to the modification of the Attributes. (159) Having thus described the forms of she eleven sense-organs, the specific functions of the first ten are next described.

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI (XXIX160_ the external organs Karika XXVIII The function of the five senses, in respect to Sound, etc., is said to be mere 'perceiving '; The functions of 'speaking,' ' handling', 'walking ', 'excretion' and 'gratification' are (the functions of ) the other five. By " Perception " here is meant the primary abstract apprehension (Nirvikalpa ) through the Observation.-the function of the sensory sense-organs. "Speaking, Handling. five intellectual Walking, Excretion and Gratification are the senses Speech a functions of the other five," 1. e., of the five .. handling, walking, excretion pertain motor organs ( of action ). The vocal organ to the senses of is located in the throat, the palate, etc., and the function of this organ is 'Speaking. The functions of the sensory organs are quite clear.* action The functions of the three Internal organs' are next described: Karika XXIX Of the three (the internal organs), the functions consist of their respective characterisFunction of the internal organs tics; this is peculiar to each. The func tion common to the organs consists in the five Prana and the rest. (160) "The functions of the three consist of their respec tive characteristics." In the compound term Reflection of "Svalaksanyam', the term 'Svalaksana Manas, Self Consciousness stands for those that have their own disof Ahnkara and tinctive characteristics',- that is, the Will, determination of Buddhi the l-principle and the Mind ; 'Svalaksanya' (formed with the reflexive affix 'syan'); * That is to say they are denoted by their very names or by their definitions e. g., the car is defined as the sense for perceving ( or comprehending) sound and thus the function of the car is percoption of sound, and so with the others.

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-XXX161] TRANSLATION stands for those distinctive characteristics themselves; the sense, therefore, is that the property which serves as the distinguishing feature of each of the three internal organs, also denotes their respective functions; thus 'determination of the Will, 'egoism of the I-principle and 'observation of the Mind (161) The next sentence describes the dual character of these fuctions based on the fact of their The five vital being specific or common--" Thes, are airs, the common function of the peculiar," etc. "The five Breaths constithree internal tute the common function". The five 'vital airs' 1.e., the Life itself-forms the common function of the three internal organs; siitce the latter exists while the former do and ceases to exist when these are absent. Of these five, the 'Air' called * Prana', is located in the nape of the neck, the back, the arms and the genera. tive organ; that called Samana' in the heart, the naval and all joints; that called 'Udana', in the heart, the throat, the palate, the head and between the eye-brows; and that called 'Vyana', in the skin. These are the ' five vital airs.' organs The author now describes the order of the functions of these fourfold organs (the external organs and the three in. ternal organs). Karika XXX With regard to perceptible things, the functions of the whole set of the four organs are said The instantaneous to be simultaneous, as well as gradual; and the gradual character of these with regard to imperceptible (as well as functions perceptible) things, the functions of the three (internal organs) are preceded by that:( i. e., the cognition of some perceptible object.) T.6

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182 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [XXX162cm (162) "Simultaneous, "-" With regard to perceptible things "; e. g., when one seos in the dark Instantaneous by means of a flash of lightning, a tiger with regard to visible objects facing him, his perception (by the Eye). observation (by the Mind). Egoism or selfconsciousness (by the l-principle) and determination (by the Will) are instantaneous and accordingly he runs away from the place at once. (163) "Gradual"'; c. g., in dim-light, a person has at first only a vague perception of a certain Gradual with re- object; then fixing his Mind intently he gard to visible objects ble observes that it is a robber with his drawn bow and arrow levelled at him; then follows the self-consciousness that 'the robber is advancing against me'; and lastly follows the determination to run away from the place. (164) With regard to inperceptible things, on the other With regard to hand, the (three) internal organs operate invisible objects, without the aid of the external organs-" The the operation of the internal orga-function of the three is preceded by that," ns independent i. e., the instantaneous as well as the gradual 'of the external organs functions of the three internal organs are preceded by some perception of a visible object; since The functions of Inference, Testimony and Remembranceinternal organs which are the means of cognising imperpreceded by those of the external" ceptible things, -operate only when they ones have for their background some sort of perception (of perceptible things ). The sense is that in regard to 'perceptible as well as 'imperceptible' things the functioning of the internal organs is always preceded by the perception of some external object.

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-XXX [466] TRANSLATION 82 (165) Objection : "The functions, either of the four or of the three ( organs ), cannot depend on Objection : Func- themselves alone; for in that case, as these tions permanent or otherwise ?" organs are everlasting their functions also would be everlasting; if, on the other hand, the organs were transient, adventitious, then their functions also would be transient and adventitious, and this would lead to a commingling of the functions, as there would be nothing to regulate them." Answer : Karika XXXI They (the organs ) betake themselves to their Reply-Functions respective functions, through mutual imof the organs due to mutual impluse. pulse. The purpose of the Spirit is the Soul purposes the sole motive; by nothing (else ) is an incentive organ made to act. The word 'Karanani,' 'organs', has to be supplied (as the subject of the sentence). (166) When a number of persons wielding different weapons:--lances, sticks, bows and arrows, swords etc.,combine for suppressing a common enemy, and proceed to act, they do so only after knowing each other's 'impluse' (motive).-and in so doing the man with the lance takes up the lance only, not the stick or other weapons,--similarly the man with the stick takes up the stick only, not the lance and the other weapons. In the same manner each of the organs operates only by the reason of the 'impluse-. e., proneness to action--f the other; since this impulse is the cause ( and hence the regulating motive power) of the action of the organs, there cannot arise any commingling of the functions.

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI (XXX1|167- (167) Another objection--"The lancers, etc., being sentient beings, it is only right that they Objection--How ow should comprehend each other's 'impluse can the non-intelligont organs ( motive ) and act towards the fulfilment understand each ch thereof. The organs, on the contrary, are other's motives? all in-sentient, and as such can never act in the said manner (and hence your analogy does not apply to the case in question). Consequently the insentient organs must have an intelligent controller who is cognisant of their nature, capacity and uses.' Answer :-" The purpose of the Spirit is the sole motive, by nothing (else) is an organ made to act." Reply--Soul's What urges the organs to act is the Spirit's purpose urging them to action purpose in the shape of 'Experience' and 'Isolation ',--prior to its fulfilment; so that there is no need for the postulating of a 'Controller' cognisant of their nature. This point will be further elucidated in Karika LVII. (168) It has been declared that " by nothing is an organ made to act." The author next proceeds to classify the organs : Karika XXXII Organs are of thirteen kinds, having the functions divid. of 'seizing', 'sustaining' and 'illuminaThe organg dividod-their lunc. ting.' The objects of these are of ten tions seizing, kinds, the 'seized', the sustained' retaining and manifesting and the illumined.'

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-XXX11170] TRANSLATION 85 (169) The 'thirteen organs' consist of the eleven sense-organs, the I-principle and the Will. An organ is a particular kind of active gans--the ten external organs, agent, and nothing can be an 'active agent' Manas, Ahaikara unless it has a function ; hence the author and Buddhi. Seizing the next states the functions of the organsfunction of the "Having the functions of seizing, sustainsenses of action. Retention the ing and illuminating, respectively; that is dhe, to say, the Motor organs have the fuction of Ahankara and Manas. seizing; that is, they take up their respecManifestation- tive objects; i. e., extend their activities over of the intellectual organs them;-the Will, the l-principle and the Mind 'sustain' things through their function in the shape of the Vital Airs and the rest (mentioned before ); and lastly, the sensory organs 'illumine' (render perceptible ) their respective objects. (170) Since every action must have an object, the objects of the above-mentioned functions The objects of are next named and classified--"The these functions, tenfold 18. seized" etc. These objects to be acted upon by the thirteen organs are those that are to be seized, to be sustained and to be illumined. By 'seizure here is meant pervasion (extension). The five motor sense-organs * extend' over Speaking, Handling, Walking, Excretion and Gratification; and each of these being both 'celestial' and * non-celestial', these objects become tenfold. Similarly the object 'to be sustained by the three internal organs through their functions in the shape of the Vital Airs' etc., is the body, which is fivefold, being an aggregate of the five elementary substances; of these the Earth being an aggregate of sound, touch, colour, taste and odour. Each of these five being both. celestial and non-celestial', these objects 'to be sustained' also come to be tenfold. Similarly the objects affected by the five sensory organs are five-sound, touch,

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86 TATTVA-KAUMUDI colour, taste, and odour; and each of these being both celestial' and 'non-celestial,' the objects 'to be illumined' also become tenfold. (171) A further subdivision of the thirteen organs is next stated: Karika XXXIII The internal organs are three; and the external, ten, The organs num- exhibiting objects to the former three. bered and the difference betThe external organs act at the preween the external sent time and the internal at all the and internal in point of time three points of time. noted [XXXIII. 66 " (172) The internal organs are three:" (1) Mind, (2) I-principle and (3) Will; these are called internal because located inside the body. (173) The external-organs are ten; viz., the ten senseorgans. These latter exhibit objects to the three internal organs; i. e., they supply the means for observation, selfconsciousness and determination regarding objects;-the senseorgans doing this through perception, and the motor-organs, through their respective fuctions. The external (174) The author next states a further point of difference between the internal and external organs. senses acting at The external organs act at the present time present; the time." The internal with rehere includes also ference to all the time closely preceding and following the three divisions of immediate present; so that, Speech* also pertains to the present. 'The internal present time 66 66 *The special qualification is necessary for the case of Speech, because no two letters can be pronounced at the same moment, and, as such, no word could be uttered at the present if by this were meant the present moment only. This difficulty, however, is avoided by counting a few moments before and after the present moment as * present.

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XXXIV 177] TRANSLATION argans at all the three points of time." e. g., the idea that " there has been rain, because the river has risen-" (for the past); "there is fire in the mountain, since there is smoke" (for the present); and lastly, "unless there is something to prevent it, we shall have rain, since we see ants carrying their eggs"--(for the future). (175) According to the Vais'esikas, Time is one (in. divisible ) and hence it cannot admit of such Time--not a dis. divisions as 'past,' 'present' and 'future, cording to ac. They attribute these divisions to certain khyas 'accidents (adventitious conditions ): but what the Teachers of Sankhya hold is that these same 'accidents' themselves may be regarded as the basis of the notions. of 'future,' 'present and past, and there is no need for the postulating of an intervening entity as 'Time'. This is the reason why we do not accept Time as a distinct Entity. (176) The author next discusses the objects of the external senses operating at time present : sense touching a mannerned with fiva ahiant Karika XXXIV Of these, the five sensory organs are concerned with objects specific as well as non-specific. The intellectual Speech is concerned with sound : the rest specific as well as are concerned with five objects. unspecific objects; (177) Of the ten external organs, the five speech touching sound: the rest sensory ones are concerned with specific regarding the as well as 'non-specific' objects:--The term five objects of 'specific' here stands for the gross Sound (Touch, Colour, Taste, and Odour) in their 'calm,' 'turbulent' and 'deluding forms, as manifested in the form of Earth (Water, Air, Fire and Akasa );-and sense

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TATTVA-KAU [XXXIV178 non-specific' stands for the subtile forms of Sound etc., manifested as the Rudimentary Elements. (Tanmatras);' in this name 'tanmatra,' the particle 'matra' serves to exclude the Gross forms of the Elements. Thus the sensory organs are those that have for their objects the gross and subtile things. For instance, the Ear of deities and sages can perceive the subtile Rudimentary-Sound as also the gross Sound; but the Ear of the people like ourselves can perceive only the gross Sound; similarly the Tactile organ of those beings can perceive gross as well as subtile Touch, while our organ can perceive gross Touch only; similarly, the Eye and other organs of those beings can perceive Colour and other things in their gross as well as subtile forms, while our organs can perceive these in their gross forms only. (178) Among the Motor-organs, Speech is concerned with sound, in its gross form, because organ of Speech is the producer of such sound. The organ of Speech, however, cannot produce Rudimentary Element of sound, which is the direct effect of the l-principle ( Ahankara ); and as such has the same cause as the organ of speech itself ( which also being one of the sense-organs, proceeds directly from the l.principle ). " The rest" i. e., the four other motor-organs--the Arms, the Generative organ, the Hands and the Feet are 'concerned with five objects"; because the jar and such other objects--which are what are dealt with by those organs, are all made up of the five primary elements of Sound, Colour, Touch, Taste and Odour. Among the thirteen organs, some are described as superior to others, reasons for which are given :

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-XXXVI180] TRANSLATION 89 Karika XXXV ity of Since the Will along with the other The superiority of internal over ex. internal organs extends over all things, ternal organs these three are the 'warders', and the others are the gates. (179) Warders' 1. e., most important superior, 'Gates', i.e., mere instruments ; the external The superiority organs are mere instruments. Since the Will accounted for along with the 'I-principle' and the Mind 'extends over', (1. e., determines)--all objects exhibited by the external organs, therefore, these latter are mere 'gates (secondary organs), and the Will along with the other internal organs, is the 'warder' (chief). The Will, Buddhi is superior, not only to the external organs, but also to the other internal organs, the I-principle, and the Mind. To this effect it is said: Karika XXXVI The (external organs together with the Mind and the I-principle) characteristically differThe superiority ent from one another and being different of Buddhi over all others accounted modifications of the Atributes, resemble for a lamp in action; (and as such) having first illumined (rendered manifest) the whole of the Spirit's purpose, present it to the Will. (180) As the village-officer collects the rent from the different heads of families and delivers the collection to the Governor of the District, who again, in his turn, delivers it to the Governor of the country, who finally makes it over to the king: so, in the same manner, the external organs, having 'perceived' an object, present it to the Mind, which observes it (and thereby imparts thereto its qualifications) and pre

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI (XXXVM18L. Verse combina sents it to the * I-principle,' which lakes personal cognizance of them, and finally delivers it to the chief officer, Will. Hence it is said: "These having illumined the whole of the Spirit's purpose present it to the Will." (181) The external organs, the Mind and the l-princi ple are various modifications of the Attri'In spite of di- butes i. e., phases of Sattva, Rajas and tion of the Attri- Tamas. Even though these are mutually butos, yet the nugatory yet they are led to co-operate for internal organs co-operate to the supreme purpose of Spirit; just as the wards a single wick, oil and fire (though variously purpose like a lamp opposed to the action of one another,) yet combine, in the form of the lamp, in removing darkness, and fhus illumine (manifest) the different colours. The same is the case with the modifications of the Attributes; such is the connection. Objection :-" Why should it be said that the other Objection-Why organs present their impressions to the Will ? not make Buddhi Why should not we make it the other way : -sub-ordinate to the Will presents its impressions to the the others? l.principle and the Mind, which latter being ' superior'?" Answer : Karika XXXVII In as much as it is the Will that accomplishes the Reply: the su. Spirit's experiences, and again it is Will periority of Buddhi accounted for that discriminates the subtle difference because it direct between Nature and Spirit [it is Will ly fulfils cae soulpurpose, und bri- that is regarded as superior to the other dges the gap bet- twol. woen Spirit and Matter

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-XXXVII 183] (182) In as much as the 'purpose of the Spirit' is the only incentive to the action of the organs, that organ is supreme over others which accomplishes that purpose directly; and since it is the Will alone that does this, it is supreme. Just as the Governor of the Country is the immediate and direct agent of the king, is supreme over the village officer and other officials who are subordinate to him. By reason of its proximity to the Spirit, the Spirit becomes reflected in the Will, whereby the Will assumes the form of the Spirit and thus accomplishes the Spirit's experiencing of all things. 'Experiencing' consists in the feeling of Pleasure and Pain,this feeling takes place in the Will,-the Will has assumed the form of the Spirit -it is thus that the Will makes the Spirit go through the experience. Just as the Perception, Observation and 'Self-consciousness' of things take the form of the things and become transferred to the Will, in the same manner the functions of sense-organs also become mingled with the determining which is the function of the Will. Just as the army of the village-officer is joined with the army of the Governor,-it is thus that the Will 'accomplishes' Sadhayati -The Spirit's experience' Upa-bhoga of prati all things -Sarvam-in the shape of Sound and the rest. " TRANSLATION 91 (183) Objection- If the Will serves to accomplish the Objection-Buddhi Spirit's experience of all things then no supplying the soul with pleaemancipation (Isolation) is possible."* sure, no Mukti is possible * For Buddhi would continue to help the Spirit to its enjoyment. of pleasure, and bence this latter could never attain to final beatitudewhich consists in the total extinction of both pleasure and pain.

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92 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [XXXVI183 Answer--" It afterwards discriminates the difference Roololi letterlo between Spirit and Nature." - Descrimina. showo to the soul tes' Visinasti' here stands for 'bringing its distinction about the construction of clause ' Antarum from Matter Visinasti'--' discriminates the difference'; and is similar to that of Odanpakam pacati * (cooks the cooking of rice); and bringing about' in this context stands for showing' or 'expressing'. The objector retorts: " The difference between Spirit and Nature being thus, according to yourThe difference being caused, will sell, something that is produced, it must have end and thus an end in time ; and hence the Isolation or would emancipation cease with it Emancipation brought about by that differ. ience would also be transitory." The answer to this is contained in the word 'dis criminates"; the meaning is that the idea that Reply--the dif- 'I am one thing and Nature with its evolutes ference is perma. nent. Buddhi only is different thing is always there. serving to expose What the Will does is to make known this it to the soul's view already existing difference, which through non-discrimination, has appeared to be nonexistent; the Will does not produce the difference, whereby it would be transitory. This shows that Emancipation (Isolation) is the end or purpose of the Spirit. Subtile--the said difference is' subtile i. e., 'hard to perceive.' The organs having been described, the author next describes the specific as well as non-specific (objects): * Visinasti itself has been explained as "expresses the dif. ference", then the montion of Antaram would seem superfluous. But it is not so; it helps to intensify the meaning of the sentence.

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-XXXVII[186] TRANSLATION 93 Karika XXXVIII The Rudimentary Elements are 'non-specific;' from The division of these five proceed the five gross elements: objects into spe- these latter are said to be 'specific, cific and non-spe- becauee they are calm, turbulent and cific deluding (184) The Rudimentary Elements i. e., Sound and the rest in their subtle form; what the particle 'Matra' (in the term 'tanmatra, which is the name of the Rudimentary Elements,') connotes is that these subtle elements are devoid of that 'specific character' consisting of the calmness, turbulence and delusiveness' which would make them objects of direct experience. (185) Having thus described the non-specific things, the author, with a view to describing the specific' objects, mentions the manner of their production : " From these etc.," from the five Rudimentary Elements of Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste and Odour proceed respectively the five gross Elements--akas'a, Air, Fire, Water and Earth-these 'five' proceeding from the aforesaid 'five' Rudimentary Elements. (186) Objection :-"We grant that these are thus pro. Specific because duced; but what about their being specific". soothing terrific Answer : "These are said to be specific;" - and deluding why? because "they are calm, turbulent and deluding. The first indicates the reason ( meaning because ) and the second has the cumulative force ( meaning that the things have all the three characteristics ). The sense is that, in as much as among the gross elements, Akas'a and the rest, some abounding in the Sattva attribute, are calm, pleasing, illuminating and buoyant; others abounding in the Rajas-attribute are turbulent, painful and 'unstable; the rest abounding in the Tamas-attribute are deluded, confounded and sluggish. These gross elements. thus

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI [ XXXIX187 perceived to be distinguished from one another are said to be specific and gross. The Rudimentary Elements on the contrary cannot be similarly distinguished by ordinary people; and as such they are said to be non-specific and subtle. those great ele. A further sub-division among the specific' objects is next stated : Karika xxxix (1) The 'subtle' bodies, (2) 'those born of parents', Specific objects and (3) the 'gross elements,--these are divided into (1) Jubtle bodies. 7) the three kinds of the 'specific'. Of these bodies produced the 'subtle ' bodies are everlasting, and of parents and those born of parents' are perishable. (3) the great elements (187) "The specific objects are of three kinds", these three forms are mentioned : (1) subtle bodies which (are not visible, but) are postulated (in order to explain certain phenomena); (2) Those born of parents, 1. e., those consisting of the six 'sheaths (Kosas). Among these six, hair, blood and flesh are from the mother; and the arteries, bones and marrow from the father; these six are the six sheaths' (of the physical body): (3) The last are the 'prabhuta' i. e., the 'prakrsta', Great, 'bhuta', Elements; along with these, the other two constitute the specific'. Thus subtle bodies form the first kind of 'specific' objects, 'bodies born of parents, the second kind and the 'gross elements the third kind. Ordinary things like the jar, are included in this last. (188) The difference between the 'subtle' body and .. the body 'born of parents' is next explainedThe subtle bodies The subtle bodies are permanent and those are pormanent, those produced born of parents, perishable"; that is to say, of parents peri among the specific things, those that are shable subtle are lasting, while those 'born of

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-XL190] TRANSLATION 95 parents', are perishable, i. e., ending in (dissolving into either fluids or ash or dirt. The subtle body is described Permanent Karika XL The nergent' (subtle) body formed primevally, The Body is un- un in unconfined, lasting, composed of Will confined, perma- and the rest down to Rudimentary ing, invested with gratih Elements --migrates, is devoid of experi. dispositions ences, and is invested with dispositions. (189) * Formed primevally ;-when the emanations from Nature began, the first object to evolve Unconfined and therefrom. was the subtle Body, one for each Spirit. This body is "unconfined" untrammeled; as such, it can enter even a solid piece of stone. It is "lasting"*: since it continues to exist all the time from the first Evolution to the Final Dissolution. This Body is "composed of the Will and the rest, down to the Rudimentary Elements". That is to say, it is an aggregate consisting of the Will, I-principle, the eleven sense-organs and the five Rudimentary Elements; it is also specific, equipped with sense-organs which are 'calm, turbulent and delusive'. (190) Objection:-" This Subtle body might be the only Objection:-un. vehicle of experience for the Spirit;--what necessariness of postulating two is need of the Physical Body comprised of bodies, subtle the six 'sheaths' "'? and gross * The word niyata is differently interpreted by Narayana Tirtha (in his Sankhya.Candrika). He takes it in the sense of "restricted" i. e., the Subtle Body is restricted to one particular Spirit; and so there is a distinct subtle body for each Spirit. The interpretation of Gaudapada closely resembles that of the Kaumudi.

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96 TATTVA-KAUMUDI Answer:-"It migrates" i. e. the Subtle Body goes on deserting and occupying one six-sheathed (physical) body after the other.-"But why?" -Because it is" devoid of experience", that is to say, because the subtle body by itself. without a corresponding physical body of six sheaths to afford the vehicle of experience-would be devoid of experience; that is why it migrates. Necessity of the physical body, because the subtle body migrates (191) Objection:-" As a matter of fact, transmigration is due to Virtue and Vice; and these have no connection with the Subtle Body (belonging as they do primarily to the Will, and then, by reflection, to the Spirit): then how can this Subtle Body migrate ?" Objection: -How can the subtle Body migrate, being without dispositions? * Reply-It has dispositions? Answer: Because) "it is invested with dispositions. The dispositions' are Virtue and Vice, Wisdom and Ignorance, Passion and Dispassion, Power and Weakness; and it is the Will which is endowed, that is, directly connected with them; and the Subtle Body is connected with the Will; hence the Subtle Body becomes invested with those dispositions: just as a piece of cloth becomes perfumed with the fragrance of the Campaka flowers by coming into contact with them. Thus then, it is because it is invested with dispositions, that the Subtle Body migrates. [XL 191 * (192) Question:-" Why should not the Subtle BodyThe subtle Body like Nature-last even after the Final Dissolution?" dissolving at each pralaya 64 Answer:-( Because it is) mergent, that is to say, because it dissolves (into Nature). This mergent character of the Subtle Body is inferred from the fact of its being a product; i. e., having a cause it must merge into it. ".

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-XL1193) TRANSLATION 97 Objection :-"We grant all this. But why not attribute migration to the Will itsclf as equipped Objection-Wny not attribute mit with the l-principle and sense organs? There gration to Buddhi is no need for the postulating of the Subtle Body, for which there is no authority, Answer : etc.? Karika XLI As a painting stands not without a ground, nor a shadow without a solid object like the Reply-the Bud- pillar,--so neither does the 'Linga' (Will dhi cannot rast rale etc) subsisi supportless, without 'Speci. fis Bodies'. (193) The term 'Linga' here stands for the Will, the I-principle and the Rudimentary Elements, because they are the means of knowing ( li! ganat) and these cannot subsist without a substrate.* In support of this the author puts forth a syllogism-During the time intervening between death and re-birth, Will and the rest must have sone sort of evolved body for their receptacle, because they are such Will and the rest as are equipped with thc five Rudimentary Elements; like the Will etc., found in the ordinary physical body. "Without specific bodies" 1. e., without Subtle Bodies. In support of this assertion, we have the pollowThe existence of the Subtle Body" ing scriptural text (from the Mahabharata ). corroborated by "Then Yama extracted from Satyavan's harata body the thumb-sized body which he had entrapped and under his control." Here the mention of the extracted body as "thumb-sized" implies the fact of its having been the Subtle Body, since it is impossible that the Spirit * Cf. The Pancikarana-vivarana-Tattvacandrika - where a similar explanation of the word is given. T. 7 the Mahabharata

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98 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [XLII194- could have been so extracted. 'Purusa' in the above extrast, stands for the Subtle Body, in the sense that it sleeps (lies--s'ete ) in the body (puri ). Having thus proved the existence of the Subtle Body, the author states the reason and method of its migration . Karika XLII Formed for the sake of Spirit's purpose the Subtle Body acts like a dramatic actor, on Reasons and manner of the account of the connection of 'causes and migration of the effects' and by union with the all-emSubtle Body bracing power of Nature. (194) "Pormed for the Spirit's purpose", the Subtle Body acts like a dramatic actor, on account of its connection with the causes' in the shape of Virtue, Vice, etc., and 'effects' in the shape of the taking up of different kinds of physical bodies, the latter being the effects of Virtue, etc, That is to say, just as a dramatic actor, playing different parts, acts like Paras'urama or Yudhisthira or Vatsaraja, so does the subtle body, occupying various physical bodies, act like a man or a brute or a tree. (195) Question :-"Whence this capacity of the Subtle Ime Body ?" Answer:-" By union with the The capacity of the Subtle Body all-embracing Power of Nature." As is is due to the Po- declared in the Purana:-"All this wonderwer of Nature ful evolution is the all-embracing Power of Nature." It has just been said that the Subtle Body acts "on account of connection with causes and effects"; the author next describes the causes and effects :

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-XL113197) TRANSLATION 99 consequences nate Karika XLIII Virtue and other dispositions are--a) natural, which are innate and (b) incidental, and these The means and are related to the 'cause '; and the Dharma, etc. ovum etc., related to the effect. '* (196) 'Incidental,' adventitious; i. e., brought about 1. Incidental dis- after the man's birth, by the subsequent propositions pitiating of the deities and such other causes. "The natural dispositions are innate," e. g., it is declared that at the beginning of the Evolution the i Essential, in. revered primeval sage Kapila emerged into existence fully equipped with Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power. The 'incidental dispositions, on the other hand, are not innate; that is to say, they are brought about by the personal effort of the man; such Virtue etc. are those belonging to Valmiki and other great sages. The opposites of the same is to be understond with regard to Dharma etc., similarly explained ** Vice, Ignorance, Passion and Weakness. (197) The aggregate formed of the ovum, foetus, flesh, blood, etc., of the child in the mocher's Flesh, blood, etc., womb is related to the gross physical related to the Gross Body body; that is to say, they are particular states of the latter; so also are the childhood, youth and old age of the person after the birth.** * It may be pointed out that Davies has quite misunderstood this Karika. In the first place he renders Samsiddhikah by 'trans. cendental" the very reverse of what it does mean. Secondly, he renders Karanas'ruyinah by "including cause," though in reality the compound means "located in organs"-as explained by the Kaumudi as well as the Candrika. ** Gaudapada has taken the karika as setting forth three kinds of dispositions-(1) * Sarsiddhika' innate. (2) Prakrtika' natural due to the operation of Nature, Primordial Matter and (3) 'Vaikrtika incidental.

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100 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [XLIII198- (198) Question :-" We have understood what are 'causes' and ' effects in general ; what are the particular effects of particular causes ?" Answer : Karika XLIV By virtue (is obtained) ascent to higher planes, Consequences of by vice, descent to the lower; from the various means wisdom (results) the Highest Good; and bondage from the reverse. (199) "By virtuc ctc"1.0., to the Heaven and other Virtue leads to regio higher planes "By vice, etc," 1. C., to the nether regions known as Vice to lower Sutala etc. " From wisdom, the Highest Goodl." Nature ministers to the experience of the Spirit only so long Wisdom brings about beatitude as discriminative wisdom is not brought about; after, however, this has been accomplished, Nature finds its work in connection with that particular Spirit entirely fulfilled, and accordingly retires from activity so far as that Spirit is concerned. As is declared, "The Operations of Nature continue only till the attainment of discriminative knowledge." " From the reversc, etc." i. e., from wrong knowledge, results bondage. (200) This bondage is of three kinds : Natural 'Evolutional' and Personal', (1) The From the reverse Natural' bondage is that of those who of the above, res.. pectively, contra. worship Nature as the Spirit, with reference dictory results. to such men, who are called "Prakrtika' The three kinds of bondage (Merged into Nature'), it is said in the Purinas : " The contemplators of the Un.

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-XLIV200] TRANSLATION 101 manifest ( Nature ) continue (in the chain of metempsychosis) till a hundred thousand years "; (2) The 'Evolutional' bondage is of those who worship the various evolutes of Nature, the elements, the sense-organs, the l-principle, and the Willas Spirit. With regard to these it is said. "The contemplators of the sense-organs continue till ten Manvantaras , those of the elements, till a hundred Manvantaras, those of the I-principle till thousand, and lastly, those of the Will, do away with all feverish excitement, and continue +ll ten thousand Manvantaras. Those labouring under this incidental bondage are Videhas. (3) The 'Personal 'bondage is due to Istaparta ( actions like charities, sacrifices, digging of tanks etc., done with the cole motive of personal gains here. after ). Those performing such actions, having their minds influenced by desire, are ignorant of the true nature of the Spirit, and as such undergo bondage. Karika XLV From Dispassion results 'mergence* into Nature'; from Attachment which abounds in the Consequences of of Rajas-attribute, transmigration ; from Power, non-impediment, and from the reverse, the contrary. various means * Davies takes the Hindu commentators to task, and remarks "It (the Samkhya) does not recognise any absorption of the subil. body into Nature, until the soul is entirely free ... Hence the meaning is that by the destruction of passion the influence of the material world 19 destroyed, and the soul is independent, though not yet finally like rated." All this is quite truc; but it is not clear how this affects the position of the Hindu Commentators,' who, at least Vacaspati Misra, do not assert the final absorption of the bodies into Nature ; all that they mean is that by dispassion, the soul-or more properly, its seat, the subtle body-is absorbed into Nature and rests there till it is forn again.

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102 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [XLV2:}- (201) "From Dispassion results Mergence into Nature.'' Those who are free from passion, but are I Absorption ignorant of the true nature of the Spirit, into Prakrti from dispassion om become merged into nature. 'Nature' here stands for the whole set consisting of Nature, Will, I-principle, the elements, and the sense-organs. Those who worship these as 'Spirit', become absorbed into these (1.0, those mistaking the senses for the Spirit become absorbed in the senses, and so on ), that is to say, they rest there till, in the course of time, they are born again. (202) "From attachment which abounas in the Rajasil Transmigia. attribute, results transmigration." The epithet tion from passion-" Rojasa " implies the painful character of ate attachment mem transmigration, because ( as has been previously described ) the Rajas attribute is the source of pain. (203) "Frum power, non-impediment", 1. l., the nonu Non imperdie obstruction of desires. A man with power ment from power can do whatever he likes. "From the reverse",, e., from absence of Power "the IV Obstruction contrary "ne, the obstruction of one's de. of desires from weakness sires everywhere With a view to describe collectively as well as severally the eight dispositions of the Will-Virtue, Vice etc., -In order to show which of these are to be adopted, and which relinquished, by those desiring Isolation-the author first describes them collectively : Karika XLVI Such is the volitional' (Subjective ) Evolution distinguished by Error, Disability, ConThe intellectual creation described tentment and Success. By reason of the mutual suppression of the Attributes due to their inequalities, the different forms of this Evolution become fifty.

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-XLVI30] 4 TRANSLATION (204) Pratyaya' is that by which anything is known i. e., Will; and' pratyayasarga' is the 'sarga' 'evolution' proceeding from the Will i. e.. 103 I. E... II. Disability III. Contentment the volitional or 'Subjective evolution. IV. Success $6 "Error" 1. e., ignorance, illusion, is a property of the Will; so is also disability which results from the incapacity of the sense-organs;-" contentment" and "success" also are properties of the Will, as will be described later on. Of these, the three former,-error." disability and "contentment"-include Virtue and the other six Virtue &c., inclu- dispositions leaving aside Wisdom which Is included in success". ded in the above four Subdivisions of the above are fifty "" (205) These properties are next described severally. "The forms of these are fifty." How so? "By reason of the mutual suppression of the Attributes due to their inequalities." This 'inequality' may consist either in the individual strength of the c.e in comparison with the other two, or of two conjointly with that of the third, or in the individual weakness of the one in comparison with the other two, or of the two conjointly with that of the third. The various grades of this inequality' are assumed in accordance with the requirements of particular cases, and it leads to the suppression of Attributes by one another or by one of them of the other twothus giving rise to the fifty forms of Subjective Evolution.' The 'fifty forms' are next enumerated: Karika XLVII There are five forms of Error; twenty eight of 5 forms of Error. Disability, arising from the imperfection 28 of Disability. of the organs; Contentment has nine forms; and Success eight. 9 of Contentment, 8 of Perfection

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104 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [XLVI1206 (206) The five forms of Error are ignorance, egotism, love, hate and clinging, respectively named 'obscurity' (Tamas), delusion' (Moha), 'extreme delusion' (Mahamoha) gloom' (Tumisra) 'blind gloom' (Andhatamisra). Egotism and the rest partake of the nature of 'Error'; though, as a matter of fact, they are the products of Error. Or. the idea may be that it is only after a certain thing has become the object of Error that Egotism and the rest also, partaking of the nature of Error, come to bear upon that same thing. It is for this reason that the revered Varsaganya has declared that "Ignorance is five-jointed.' (207) The author next describes the sub-divisions of the five forms of Error: Karika XLVIII Of Error there are eight forms; as also of Delusion, . Extreme Delusion is ten-foid ; Gloom is Sixty-two subdivisions of Erroreighteen-fold, and so is also 'Blind Gloom'. (208) "Of Error"; 2. c., of Ignorance. "there are eight of Ignorance eight forms Of Darkness .i. e., Ignorance, there are eight forms; Eight of Delusion it consists in the notion of 'Spirit' with *** regard to (1) Nature, (2) Will, (3) l-principle, (4-8) the Five Rudimentary Elements,--all eight of which are not-Spirit, it is this eight-fold notion that constitutes Darkness' or Ignorance. (209) The particle 'ca' connects 'eight forms' with Dclusion also. The Deities having attained the eight occult powers, regard themselves as immortal, and their several powers--' anima' and the rest-also to be everlasting; this is the error of Egotism, and since this appertains to the eight Powers it is said to be eight-fold.

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-XLVIII214] (210) 'Extreme Delusion is ten-fold". By Extreme Delusion is meant the attachment to the Ten of Extreme objects of sense, sound, odour and the rest-- which are ten-fold, each of the five being earthly and heavenly; and having these ten for its object, Extreme Delusion is said to be ten fold. Delusion 66 Eighteen of Gloom 44 (211) Gloom", 1. e, Hatred, is eighteen-fold." The ten objects of sense, sound, &c are loveable by themselves; the eight occult 'powers-Attenuation &c., however are not lovcable, by themselves, but only as means to the attainment, of the various objects of sense. And the objects of sense, being mutually suppressive, the means to the attainment,-in the shape of Attenuation and the other Powers also become obstructed. So that the eight Powers together with the ten objects of sense become eighteen, and these being the objects of Gloom or Hatred, make it eighteen fold. (212) TRANSLATION Eighteen of Utter Darkness So is Blind Gloom "- Blind Gloom' stands for Clinging]. The word tatha applies eighteen-fold-ness to Blind Gloom. The deities having attained the eight occult powers-Attenuation and the rest-and enjoying in consequence, the ten objects of sense,-Sound and the restlive in continual dread of these ( powers and objects) being wrested away from them by the Raksasas; and this dread constitutes the Clinging' or solicitude which is Blind Gloom'; and this latter having for its objects the aforesaid eighteen thing-the eight powers and the ten objects-s said to be eighteen-fold. 105 .. * 1 (213) Thus the five forms of Error which is a sort of Fancy, with their sub-divisions becane sixty two. (214) Having thus described the five forms of Error, the author next describes the twenty-eight forms of Disability.

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106 TATTVA-KAUMUDI Twenty-eight forms of Disability Karika XLIX The injuries of the eleven-organs, together with those of the Will are pronounced to constitute Disability; the injuries of the Will (itself) are seventeen-due to the reversion of contentment and success'. [XLIX2 " sense-organs ness, (215) The injuries of the organs are mentioned only as causes of so many injuries of the Will, The eleven caused and not as, by themselves. independent by injuries to the forms of Disability. These injuries-Deafinsensibility to touch, blindness, numbness of tongue, insensibility of the olfactory nerves, dumbness, palsy of hands, lameness, impotency, intestinal paralysis and idiocy,--consequent on the failure of the several sensc-organs-auditory and the rest-are the eleven forms of disability. The disability of the Will in regard to its own function also due to the said injuries of the scnses, is of eleven kinds, as it is due to eleven causes. These two have been mentioned together with those of Buddhi (itself) in cordance with the theory of non-difference of cause and effect. (216) Having thus described the disabilities of the Will, arising from the of the senseby the reversion organs, the disabilities of the Will by itself are next descubed.-" With injuries of the ac injury Seventeen caused of contentment and success Will." Question- How many Disabilities are there of the Will itself ?" Answer "Seventeen are the injuries of the Will;" why? "due to the reversion of contentment and success. Contentment being nine-fold, the disabilities caused by its reversion are also nine-fold; and similarly success being eight-fold,-the disability caused by its reversion is eightfold, thus making the seventeen disabilities proper of the Will. (217) The author next enumerates the nine forms of Contentment:

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-L220] TRANSLATION 107 Karika L The nine forms of Contentment have been held to be the following:-Four internal named Nine forms of ms of 'Prakrti' (Nature ), (2) Upadana Acquiescence (Means), (3) 'Kala', (Time) and (4) 'Bhagya' (Luck ); and five external due to the abstinence from objects. (218) The four 'internal forms of Contentment belong to those who have understood that the Spirit The four internal is different from Nature, but being illadvised, forms do not make further attempts to obtain the direct apprehension of that difference.by such means as * Hearing'. 'Contemplating' and the like;- these forms are called internal (Adhyatmika) because they presuppose the difference of Atman (Spirit) and Prakrti (Nature). It being asked--which are these?-the reply is--those "named 'Nature', "Mouns', 'Time' and 'Luck' 1. e., whose names are * Nature and the rest (219) The Contentment called "Nature" consists in thot feeling of satisfaction which the disciple 1. Ambha has on being told that 'discriminative wisdom is only a modification of Nature and, as such, would come to everyone in the natural course of events, and there is no need of having recourse to the practice of meditation, &c. So, my child, remain as you are! This Contentment is called ' Ambha'. (220) The second form of Contentment arises from the Solile following instruction; 'wisdom cannot be attained in the ordinary course of nature ; because, if it were so, then everybody would attain to wisdom at all times as the course of nature sunctions equally for all individuals ; such wisdom can only be attained through

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108 TATTVA-KAUMU [L2214 Renunciation, and so, O long living one, thou must have recourse to Renunciation and give up all practice of meditation. The satisfaction arising from this instruction is named 'Upadana' ( Means ), also called 'Salila." (221) The Contentment that follows upon the feeling w. Oeha of satisfaction arising from the instruction that ". Renunciation' also cannot bring about Emancipation at once, Renunciation also will bring you success only when the time is ripe for it; there is no need for undergoing the troubles of 'Renunciation.'". This is the Contentment named 'Time', also called 'Ogha' . (222) The fourth form of Contentment is the feeling of satisfaction arising from the following ; IV Vrst: "" Discriminative wisdom proceeds neither from nature nor from any other nicans (such as Renunciation) nor does it depend solely upon time, but it comes only by luck; thus it was through mere luck that the children of Madalasa obtained wisdom in their infancy through their mother's instructions and thereby attained Emancipation. This form of contentment is named. Luck' also called . Vrsti'. (223) The external forms of Contentment are next described The external forms are five, The five external arising from abstinence from sound, odour, forms etc.,--the five objects of sense. These belong to those who are free from all attachment, but regard the non-Spirits Nature, Will, I principle and the rest to be Spirit. These forms are called external because they presuppose the existence of Spirit, without knowing what it is; and apperta'n to what is not-Spirit. In as much as these forms of Contentment appear only when there is absence of attachment.--and as the sources of such absence are five, - the absence also is five-fold; and as the absence of attach:

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-L227] TRANSLATION 109 ment is five.fold, the forms of Contentinent in question also are five in number.-The term 'Uparama' here stands for absence of attachment; and the compound Visayoparama' means 'absence of attachment to objects'. So that the objects of sense being five, the 'abstinence' from these must also be five-fold. These five Abstinences are due to the preception of defects in the process of sense-enjoyment, involving as it does the trouble of earning, saving, wasting, pleasures and killing. (224) To explain - The means of acquiring wealth 1. Pura consist of service etc., and these are sources of pain to the servants;---as is declared in the following words -" who would ever be atiracted towards service, when one thinks of the pain caused by the insults suffcred at the hands of the wardens of a haughly and wicked master ?" Similar is the case with other ineans of acquiring wealth. The contentment resuluing from the abstinence from objects of sense due to the consideration of such troubles, is called " Para.' (225) And then, the wealth having been acquired, it Suure brings with it further trouble of saving it from the ravages of the king, thieves, floods and fire;-the contentment due to abstinence arising from such considerations is the second one called ' Supura '. (226) Thirdly, the wealth having been acquired with o ru pise great effort (and safely hoarded ), there arises the fear of its being spent up,-this consideration gives rise to the third form of abstinence leading to contentment called " Parapura (227) Fourthly, when one becomes addicted to sense e objects, one's desires for Pleasure increase; IV. Anuttamambha uttamamona the non-fulfilment of these desireso brings about the abstinence that leads to the fourth form of contentment called ' Anuttamambha'.

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108 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [L221 Renunciation, and so, O long living one, thou must have recourse to Renunciation and give up all practice of meditation. The satisfaction arising from this instruction is named 'Upadana' ( Means ), also called 'Salila.' (221) The Contentment that follows upon the feeling m. Och of satisfaction arising from the instruction that " Renunciation also cannot bring about Emancipation at once, Renunciation also will bring you success only when the time is ripe for it; there is no need for undergoing the troubles of 'Renunciation. This is the Contentment named 'Time', also called 'Ogha. (222) The fourth form of Contentment is the feeling of sausfaction arising from the following ; IV Vrst "Discriminative wisdom proceeds neither from nature nor from ariy other means (such as Renunciation) nor does it depend solely upon time, but it comes only by luck; thus it was through mere luck that the children of Madalasa obtained wisdom in their infancy through their mother's instructions and thereby attained Einancipation. This form of contentment is named Luck' also called Vrsti'. (223) The external forms of Contentment are next described. The external forms are five, The five external arising from abstinence from sound, odour, etc.,--the five objects of sense. These belong to those who are free from all attachment, but regard the non-Spirits--Nature, Will, I principle and the rest to be Spirit. These forms are called external because they pre. suppose the existence of Spirit, without knowing what it is; and appertain to what is not-Spirit. In as much as these forms of Contentment appear only when there is absence of attachment, and as the sources of such absence are five, -the absence also is five-fold; and as the absence of attach forms

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-L227] TRANSLATION 109 ment is five-fold, the forms of Contentment in question also are five in number. --The term * Upara ma' here stands for absence of attachment, and the compound 'Vusayoparama " means ' absence of attachment to ohjects'. So that the objects of sense being five, the 'abstinence' from these must also be five-fold. These five Abstinences are due to the preception of defects in the process of sense-enjoyment involving as it does the trouble of earning, saving, wasting, pleasures and killing. (224) To explain -The means of acquiring wealth 1. Pura consist of service etc., and these are sources of pain to the servants,-as is declared in the following words --" who would ever be attracted towards service, when one thinks of the pain caused by the insults suffered at the hands of the wardens of a haughty and wicked master ?" Similar is the case with other means of acquiring wealth. The contentment resulting from the abstinence from objects of sense due to the consideration of such troubles, is called ' Para.' (225) And then, the wealth having been acquired, it II Supuru Su brings with it further trouble of saving it from the ravages of the king, thieves, floods and fire;-the contentmert due to abstinence arising from such considerations is the second one called 'Supura'. (226) Thirdly, the wealth having been acquired with as more great effort (and safely hoarded ), there arises the fear of its being spent up,--this consideration gives rise to the third form of abstinence leading to contentment called ' Parapura'. (227) Fourthly, when one becomes addicted to sense objects, one's desires for Pleasure increase; IV. A nuttamambha amona the non-fulfilment of these desires brings about the abstinence that leads to the fourth form of contentment called 'Anuttamambha'. w

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110 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [L1228 (228) Lastly, there arises the notion that there can be no enjoyment of things without the cruel V. Uttamamla "process of killing animals; and contentment due to the abstinence arising from this perception of cruelty of the process, is the fifth one, called 'Uttamambha'. Thus the five external forms of Contentment, along with the four internal ones, make up the nine forms mentioned above. (229) The author next describes the primary and secondary forms of success: Karika LI The eight forms of success are--(1) reasoning. (2) oral instruction, (3) study, (4-6) The eight powers three-fold suppression of pain, (7) acqui. sition of friends, and (8) purity. The three before-mentioned are checks to success. (230) The most important 'Success' among those enumerated above is the three-fold suppression of pain--three fold, on account of the three kinds of the pains to be suppressed. The other successes ' mentioned are only the means to said suppression of pain, and as such are regarded as secondary in relation to it. And these five are both causes and effects ; e. g., of these study is only a cause ; those of the more important kind are only effects ; while the rest, of the middle class are both cause and effect. (231) The first study consists in reading in due form with the teacher, of the philosophical texts; (1) Tara this is also called 'Tara'..

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-L1239] TRANSLATION 111 (232) Following from this last is oral instruction, which 12) Sutira term implies the comprehension of the mean ing of the texts studied--the cause ( distinction ) standing for the effect ( comprehension of the meaning). This constitutes the second success also called 'Sutara'. - These two-reading of the text and comprehension of the meaning together constitute the 'Sravana' (Hearing ) (which along with manana and nididhyasana is the means of realising the highest Truth.] (233) Reasoning consists in the investigating of the (3) Taratara meaning of the scriptures by a process of acara reasoning not inconsistent with the scriptures reas themselves. This 'investigation' consists in establishing the ultimate Truth by setting aside all doubts and",objections with regard to it. This process is also called 'Manana' (meditation) by writers on the Vedas. This success is called 'Taratura'. (234) The fourth is the acquisition of friends. Even though one has arrived at the truth by the 14) Kamyaka right process of reasoning, yet one has no confidence in lus conclusions until he has discussed them with, and won the agreement of, his teacher and fellowstudents. Hence the 'acquisition of such 'friends' as the teacher and fellow-students is said to be the fourth success called 'Ramyaka'. (235) By dana here is meant purity, of discriminative ... wisdom-the word being derived from the (5) Sadamudita Sadamudita root 'Darp', to purify. This 'purity' has been thus described by the revered Patanjali: "An unimpeded discriminative knowledge is the means to the suppression of pain" (Yoga-Sutra 11--26). By unimpededness in the Sutra is meant purity, by which again is meant the process of placing discriminative wisdom on a clear basis, after having destroyed all doubts and mistaken notions mixed with

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112 TATTVA-KAUMUDI (L1236 different kinds of cravings or desires. This purity is not obtainable without the refinement arising from a long, careful and uninterrupted course of practice, hence the word Dina 'purity' includes (as a means to success) this practice also. This the fifth Success called 'Sada-muarta'. (236) The aforesaid thrce prima y successes' (three suppressions of Pain) are called, ' Prouoda', 'Mudita' and Modamana'. And these three with last five are eight forms of Success (237) Other people explain the text is follows :-(1) the perception of math, without the instrucAnother explara- toz of others, I cought about purely by tion of the Powers means of practices durms past lives, is what is the first 'success' me.dit by uhi, (2) And that which is obtained by listening to another person reading the texts of the Sankhya Philosophy, is the second success called 'Schda', because it follows solely from the verbal text (3) Where the truth is learnt from the study of the words and meaning of the Sirikhya texts in the course of regular residence at the Teacher's, -t is the third form of success, due to study, and is called 'adhyayana'. (4) The fourth consists in the attainment of wisdom by coming in contact with a friend who has already got at it. This form of Success distinguished by knowledge, is called 'Suhrtprupti. (5) Fifthly, Dana (Generosity) is said to be means to Success' because true wisdom is imparted by the teacher duly propitiated with gifts. The propriety of either interpretation we leave to the learned to judge; and we desist from pointing out the faults of others, because our business lies only in elucidating the cardinal doctrines of the Samkhya Philosophy. (238) The Disabilities of the Will arising from the 'reversion of Contentment and Success' thus become seventeen

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--L1)340] TRANSLATION 113 in number. It is well known that in the whole range of 'Subjective Evolution', Success is the most desired by all; and Error, Disability, and Contentment are impediments to Success; this is what is said in the words : " The aforesaid thrce are checks to Success." "The aforesaid three' are Error, Disabilty and Contentinent. And these act as curbs on the various forms of Success, --because they retard their progress: the Success being likened to so many elephants whose movement is curbed by the goad, * Ankus'a,' and thus being opposed to success the latter three are ever to be abandoned. 239) Objection:-"Granted all this. But it has been said that Evolution is for the Spirit's purpose. This purpose can he fulfilled either by the Subjective Esolution' or by Objective Evolution alone. Why have both the Evolu tions ?" -4.75wer -- Karika LII Without the 'Subjective', there would be no 'Objective', and without the 'Objective' Necessity of two- there would be no Subjective. Therefold creation fore, there proceeds two-fold evolution, the Objective' and the 'Subjective'. (240) The term * Linga' Objective 'stands for the Evolution out of the Rudimentary elements, and Bhava' * Subjective for the evolution out of the Will. The meaning of the Karika is that the Objective Evolution cannot manifest itself or accomplish the purpose of the Spirit without the Subjective Evolution': nor conversely can the latter manifest itself or serve the Spirit's purpose without the objective. Hence the necessity of a two-fold evolution, T.8

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114 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [L11241. That is to say, Experience, which is the purpose of the Spirit, is not possible unless there are the Necessity of the of the objects of experience and also the vehicle demental creation of experience in the form of the two bodies ( Subtle and Physical). Hence the necessity of the objective evolution;-conversely that same Experience is not possible without the organs of experience, in the shape of the Sense organs and the Internal organs; and these Necessity of the are not possible without Virtue and the intellectual creation * other Dispositions. Lastly, the Discrimina tive wisdom, which leads to the final End (Emancipation), is not possible without both these forms of Evolution. Thus is the need for both forms of Evolution established. (241) The possible objection of mutual interdepend ence is explained away on the analogy of The fault of reci. procal causality the seed and sprout, due to the fact of Evoluexplained as due tion having had no beginning in time, the to the eternality of creation my 'subjective' and 'objective evolutions at the beginning of the present cycle are due to the impluse of residual tendencies left by the corresponding evolutions of the previous cycle.--Thus the whole theory is free from difficulties. (242) The various forms of the subjective evolution' have been described; the author next describes those of the elemental (objective, material) evolution: Karika LIII The celestial 'evolution has eight forms, the 'ani mal' has five; the 'human' has only one The force of ele- form: thus in brief is the 'material' montal creation evolution.

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-LIV 247] TRANSLATION 115 sorts (243) The eight celestial forms are those pertaining to (1) the Brahma, (2) the Prajapati, (3) the The eight divine Indra, (4) Pitr, (5) Gandharva, (6) Yaksa, (7) Raksasa and (8) Pis'aca. (244) The five animal forms are cattle, deer, bird, reptile, and the immobile things. Five of the lower animals (245) Mankind is single, not counting its sub-divisions , Bruhmanas &c. as separate, as the Lodily Mankind single form is the same in all classes of men. Such, in brief, is the material evolution. Such objects as the Jar and the like,-though not having a 'body in the ordinary sense. --are all included under the category of the * Immobile': (246) The author next describes the three-foldness of this material evolution', based on the higher and lower degrees of intelligence, in the form of the higher, the 'middle' and the 'lower'. Karika LIV The 'higher' evolution abounds in the Sattva-attri w bute; the lower' evolution abounds The different divisions of beings " in the Tamas-attribute; and the 'Middle' based on the evolution abounds in the Rajas-attribute; predominance of the Attributes of -all these comprising the entire Uni verse, from Brahma down to the tuft of grass. (247) All the Heavenly regions-Bhuvah, Svah, Mahah, Jana, Tapas and Satya--abound in The six Heavenly the leavenly the Sattva-attribute.-The 'lower' evolution Regions abounds in the Tamas-attribute; that all

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116 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [LIV248 things from the cattle down to the Immobile things, abound in the Tamas-attribute, as full of . Delusion'. The regions of the earth-consisting of the seven Dvipas ( continents ) and Oceans--form the 'middle' evolution abounding in the Rajas-attribute, as it is full of pain and because in it actioris, righteous and unrighteous, are performed. The entire Universe is summed up in the phrase "from Brahma to the tuft of griuss"the 'tuft of grass' including the trees and such other things. (248) Having thus described the evolution, the author proceeds to show that it is the source of pain--a fact the knowledge of which would be conducive to that 'Dispassion' (Freedom fron attachment) which is belpful in attaining the Final Goal pain Karika LV Therein does the Sentient Spirit experience pain arising from decay and death, due to the The sources of non-discrimination of the Spirit from the body [or, until the dissolution of the subtle body], thus Pain is in the very nature of things. Therein'-in the body. Among corporeal beings the Pain of decay body is the vehicle of various forms of and death. the Pleasure, and yet the pain of decay and common lot of death' is the common lot of all. The fear all creatures of death, -" may I not cease to be; may I continue to be" &c.,-being common to man as well as io the smallest insect; and the cause of fear constituting pain, death is a source of pain.* * It may be worth noting here that Death in itself is not pain. It is only the fear (the fear of the unknown) that makes the thought of death so painful.

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-LV:51] TRANSLATION 117 (249) Objection :-"Pleasure and pain, (according to the Samkhya) are material and are the properties of the Will; as such how can these be said to belong to the Sentient Spirit ?" Answer - The term "Purusa," literally means "one who lies in the subtle body;" and this latter Explanation of of being connected with the Will and its prothe word Purusa perties, leads to the idea of the Spirit being connected with then (250) Question - How can pain which is related to the body be said to belong to the Spirit?. Reply:--"Due to the non-discrimination of the Spirit from Limit of the pain the body: the wpirit cognising ils **** from the body, mistakes the fluctuations of the latter for its own. Or the 341 in 3 . may be taken as pointing to the limit of the Spirit's pam--the meaning being, " Until the subtle body has ceased io be, the Spirit suffers pain." (251) The author next deals with the vifferent views that have been held regarding the cause of 'Evolution' or * Creation'. Karika LVI This evolution from the Will down to the specific The question as ion as elements, is brought about by the (modito the Maker of fications of) Prakrti. This work is the Universe done for the emancipation of each Spirit, decided and thus is for another's sake, though appearing as if it were for the sake of Nature herself.

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120 TATTVA-KAUMUDI (LVT1257- Further, God, being the Lord of the Universe, has all that He requires and, as such, in the creating of the world, He can have no selfish motive; nor can His action be said to be due solely to benevolence or pity; for pity consists in a desire for the removal of others' pains; but before creation, the Spirits would be without bodies, organs and objects as such, without pain; for the removal of what then would God's compassion be roused? And if the pain subsequent to creation be held to be the cause of creation, then we should be in the inextri. cable nooze of interdependence'. creation due to pity, and pity due to creation and again, if God were moved to creation by pity, then He would create only happy mortals, not mortals with variegated experiences. And if the diversity of men's experiences be attributed to their past deedo, then what is the necessity of postulating intelligent controller of such deeds? The mere absence of the control of ait intelligent agent would inean ( according to the opponent that the deeds of men could not have any activity, which would mean that their effects, in the shape of men's bodies, organs and objects could not be produced, -and the result of this would be that there would be no pain; so that the removal of pains would be very easy! (and there would be no ground for God's compassion). (257) As regards the action of the insentient Nature, on None of the the other hand, it is due neither to selfishness above objections nor to pity; and thus in this case, none of the apply to the case above incongruilies arise, the only motive of of Nature Nature is the fulfilment of another's purpose. Thus, therefore, the instance cited in the Kurika is quite appropriate. (258) It has been said "as if for its own purpose;" The author proceeds to explain this:" -

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-LIX360) TRANSLATION 121 Karika LVIII As people engage in acts to satisfy desires, so does The Spirit's end the Unmanifest (Nature) act for the the motive of Nature emancipation of the Spirit. 'Autsukya 'is' icchi,' desire Desire is satisfied and ceases on the attimaent i the desired object; the object is the purpose of the agent, because the end of an action is that which is desired The analogy is pointed. it. "Si us the Unmo.cfest ( Nature ) ait for the Emancipalwn of ihr Spirit" (259) Objection --"We grant that the purpose of the Spirit is the motive for the action of Nature, but whence the cessation of her operations ?" Answer - Karika LIX As a dancing giri, having exhibited herself to the The cause of the spectators of the stage, ceases to dance. cessation of so does Nature cease to operate when Nature's operations she has made herself mainfest to the Spirit. The word "Stage', -the place-unplies the spectators-the occupiers of the place. Having manifested herself, 1. e., having shown that her different modifications, sound, &c., are different from the Spirit. (260) Objection :--"We grant that the action of Nature is for the Sput's purpose. But she could surely expect some recompense for her pains, from the Spirit. - just as a servant does from his gratified master; and as such the action of Nature cannot be said to be entirely for another's purpose. Answer.

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122 TATTVA-KAUMUDI (LX3.. Karika LX Generous Nature, endowed with Attributes, brings about by manifold means, without Nature excepts no benefit to herself, the good of the Spirit, compensation who is devoid of Attributes, and confers no benefit in return. 'As a qualified servant accomplishes the good of his unqualified master-who is devoid of good qualities and confers no benefits, -hrough purely unselfish motives, without any benelut to himself; so does poor generous Nature, endowed with the three Attributes, benefit the Spirit without any good in return to herself. Thus the pure unselfishness of Nature's motres is established. (261) Objection :-" We grant all this. But a dancing girl having retired from the stage after her exhibition, returns to it again, if so desired by the spectators, similarly would Nature act even after having manifested herself to the Spirit." cinswer. Karika LXI Nothing is more modest than Nature, such is my The reason why conviction , once aware of having been Nature does not seen, she does not again expose herself revert to her actions to the view of the Spirit. By modesty here is meant extreme delicacy (of manners), the unbearability to suffer exposure to the Purusa's view. If a well-bred lady who is not to be seen even by the Sun, with her eyes cast down, happen to have her body uncovered by chance and thus seen by a stranger, she tries to hide herself in'such a way as not to be seen again; so Nature alsoeven more modest than such a lady-having once been seen by the Purusa (Spirit) will in no case show herself again.

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-LX11244] TRANSLATION 123 (262) Objection -"This may be so. But Purusa (Spirit), being devoid of Attributes and Modifications, how is any emancipation possible for him ? For emancipation consists in the removal of bondage ; and bondage being only another name for the Karmic residua imbued with dispositions and troubles, it is not possible for the unmodifying Purusa. And as the Purusa is devoid of action, it can have no migration--which latter is only another name for Rebirth. Hence it is meaningless assertion that 'Evolution 13 for the purpose of the * Purusu The author meets the above olvection by accepting it in the curse of winding up his disquisition Karika LXII . Thus verily no Spirit is bound, or emancipated: nor Bondage and does he migrate; it is Nature alone that release in reality having many vehicles is bound, or is apply to Nature released, or migrates. (263) Verily no Spirit is bound, nor does any migrate; nor is any einancipated. Nature alone, having many vehicles, is bound, migrates and is released. Bundage, migration and release are ascribed to the Spirit, in the same manner as defeat and victory are attributed to the king, though actually occurring to his soldiers, because it is the servants that take part in the undertaking, the effects of which-grief or profit -accrue to the king. In the same manner, experience and emancipation, though really belonging to Nature, are attributed to the Spirit, on account of the non-discrimination of Spirit from Nature, as has been already explained. So our doctrine is entirely sound (264) Objection .-"We understand that bondage, migration and emancipation, though really belonging to Nature, are ascribed to the Spirit ; but of what good are these to Nature herself ?" Answer :

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124 TATTVA-KAUMUDI LX111965 Karika LXIII Nature by herself binds herself by means of seven forms; and by means of one form, she Nature binds and releases herself causes deliverance for the benefit of the by means of her Spirit. own developments "Nature binds herself by means of seven forms"; i. c. by Virtue and other dispositions (all properties of the Will ) except wisdom For the benefit of the Spirit in the shape of Experience and Final Release, she releases herself by herself, by means of one form', i.e. by wisdom--by discrimination. That is to say, she does not again bring about the experience or emancipation of that same Spirit. Objection --"We have understood all this; what then ?". Karika LXIV Thus it is that from the practice of truth follows The form and wisdom in the form,-"I am not, naught character of dis- is mine, and not-I"-which is complete, wisdom pure on account of the absence of error, and absolute. criminative (265) The term "truth" stands for the knowledge of Truth.-From the practice of the knowledge of truth, in the formal manner described, through a long course of repeated, uninterrupted and devoted exercise,--there follows the wisdom, inanifesting the distinction of Spirit from Matter. All practice brings about the knowledge of the same object to which the practice perlains; so in the present case practice pertaining to Truth results in the direct perception of Truth. It is for this reason of its leading to Truth that the wisdom is called ' pure.'

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-LXIV 268 TRANSLATION 64 The purity of the (266) 'Why pure"?-"On account of the absence of Error." Doubt and Error are the two im. wisdom explained purities of wisdom; and as the above wisdom is free from these, it is called pure. This is what is meant by the term 'aviparyayat. Doubt consists in thinking as uncertain what is certain, and hence doubt also is a form of Error. Thus absence of Error' means the absence of both Doubt and Error (mistake); this absence of Error also is due to the fact of the wisdom relating to Truth. Absoluteness explained 125 * ". (267) Objection It may be that the knowledge of Truth follows from the said Practice, but the eternal tendency towards false knowledge is sure to bring about its results in the shape of false knowledge, which will lead to its inevitable effect, the miseries of birth and rebirth of which thus there would be no end." 1. e., In reply to this, it is added that the knowledge is 'Absolute', unmixed with error. Though tendency towards error is eternal, yet it is capable of being removed by the tendency towards the knowledge of Truth, culminating in that knowledge, even though it has a beginning in time. For, partiality towards truth is natural to the Will, buddhi, as declared by outsiders also (here, the Bauddhas). "No amount of contradiction can set aside the flawless knowledge of the true character of objects, for such is the partiality of the Will. (268) The form of the said knowledge is stated:-I am not, naught is mine, and Not-1. 'I am not knowledge 6 The form of the merely precludes all action from the Spirit; as is declared (by grammarians), "The root as (as in asmi) together with bhu and kr signify action in general." Hence all actions, external as well as internal, such as determination, self-consciousness, observation and apprehension-all become precluded from the

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126 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [LXIV 269 Spirit. And since there is no action of the Spirit, there arises the idea of Not-1; "I" here stands for active agency in general, such as in "I give", " I eat", "I offer libations", in all of which the active agent is represented by "I"; because wherein there is no action, there can be no active agent; hence it is rightly expressed as 'Not-1.' From this follows the idea that " Naught is mine ;" for it is only an active agent that can be a possessor: and hence the preclusion of action implies the preclusion of possession also. Or we may interpret the three forms in another way. The sentence "I am not," means that " I am the Spirit, not productive; " and because non-productive, "I have no action"-'Not l; and since without action, "I can have no possessions," hence "naught is mine." (269) Objection :-"Even after the knowledge of all this, there might be left something yet unknown, which would lead to Bondage." Answer:-"It is complete," 1 e. there is nothing left, unknown after the attainment of such knowledge as the above, which want of knowledge could lead to Bondage (270) Question:-"What is it that is acccomplished by the said knowledge of truth?" Answer: Karika LXV Thus (possessed of this knowledge) the Spirit, as a spectator, pure, at ease, beholds Nature, The cause of the which has ceased to be productive and cessation of Nature's operation has turned back from the seven forms of evolution, under the influence of the purpose of the Spirit). The two things for the production of which Nature had begun her action were experience and the perception of truth; so

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- XV271] TRANSLATION 127 that when these two have been produced there is nothing left to be produced by her; hence, Nature "ceases to be productive". "Under the influence of purpose"; i. e., by the force of discriminative Wisdom. The scven forms of Evolution - Virtue, Vice, Error, Dispassion, Passion, Power and Weakness--are all due to erroneous knowledge. Dispassion also as of those who have it through mere contentment is due to erroneous knowledge And this erroneous knowledge is removed by its opposite--true knowledge. And thus the cause, erroneous knowledge, being removed, its effects in the shape of the 'seven forms' are also removed, and thus is Nature ' turned back from the seven forms of coolution.' "At ease", 1.e inactive, "Pure", 1.6., unmixed with the unpurities of the Will due to Rajas and Tamas Attributes,though to the last moment the Spirit continues to be in slight touch with the Will abounding in the Sattva Attribute;--as otherwise no vision of the Nature in the said condition would be possible. (271) Objection -- " This may be so. We have nothing to say against your statement as to Nature ceasing to be productive. But Evolution has been said to be due to the connection (of Spirit and Nature); and this connection is only a form of capability; and the capability to experience constitutes the 'sentience' of the Spirit, as the capacity of being the object of experience constitutes the 'insentience' and 'objectivity' of Nature; and these two capabilities can never be said to cease; it cannot be said that they cease because there is nothing left to be done; because though one set of objects may have been experienced by the Spirit, there might be others of the same kind still to be experienced; as is found to be the case with the perception of sound and other objects of sense". (Thus no emancipation is possible). Answer:

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128 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [LXVI226 Karika LXVI "She has been seen by me", thinks the one and hence loses all interest; "I have been seen," thinks the other, and ceases (to wisdom for want act). Hence though their connection is still there, there is no motive for further No birth after attainment of of motive evolution (272) So long as Nature has not brought about discrominative wisdoin, she might continue to bring about the enjoyment of sound and other objects of sense; but she cannot do this after she has once brought about discriminative wisdom Because experience (enjoyment) is due to erroneous knowledge, and when this latter, the cause, has ceased under the force of wisdom, there can be no enjoyment; just as the sprout is not possible in the absence of the seed. It is only on account of the want of discrimination, that the Spirit regards as his own and enjoys the pleasing, displeasing and deluding modifications of Nature, the objects of sense,-the sound and the rest Similarly discriminative wisdom also, which is a modification of Nature, is regarded by the Spirit as for himself-only by reason of the want of discrimination. When however, right discrimination has been brought about, the connection of the Spirit with Nature ceases, and so he ceases to enjoy the things; nor is the Spirit by himself capable of bringing about discriminative wisdom, which is a modification of Nature Thus the Spirit who has attained to wisdom, cannot regard any purpose as his own. Further, experience and emancipation being the 'purpose of the Spirit, supply the only motive to the operations of Nature; but when these two have ceased to be the ' purpose of the Spirit, there is no motive for the operation. This is what is Because wisdom is a property of Buddhi which is an emanation from Nature.

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Vija74] TRANSLATION 129 meant by the words--" There is no motive for evolution." A "Motive' is that which moves Nature to act towards evolution: and no such motive is possible, when there is no 'purpose of the Spirit.' (273) Objection :-" We grant all this. But no oner would wisdom be attained than the body would fall off: and then how could the bodiless Spirit behold Nature ( as distinct from himself) ? If it be asserted that "emancipation does not follow immediately on the attainment of wisdom, on account of the unspent residuum of past deeds "--chen, we ask,--how is this residuum destroyed ? , If by mere fruition (1. e. by experience), then you tacitly imply the mability of wisdom alone to bring about emancipation, and hence the assertion that " emancipation follows from a knowledge of the distinction between the Manifest, the Unmanifest, and the Spirit," becomes meaningless. The hope 100--that * emancipation would be obtained on the destruction oi the residua of Karma, by means of experience extending to an uncertain period of time"-15 too sanguine ever to be realised." Answer : Karika LXVII By the attainment of perfect wisdom, Virtue and the rest become devoid of causal energy ; Reason why the vet the Spirit remains awhile invested body does not dissolve immedia- with the body, just as a potter's wheel tely on the attain- continues to revolve through the momenment of wisdom tum of the impluse previously imparted to it. T.9

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130 TATTVA-KAUMUDI (LXV11275. (274) When true knowledge appears, the 'Karmic residuum'-even though it is beginningless and its time of fruition is uncertain,-has its productivity destroyed and is unable to produce any 'fruit' in the shape of 'birth, life and life's experiences'. It is oniy when the soil of the Will' 15 watered with the waters of the 'Kles'as' (1. e. Ignorance, Egolis", Love, Hate and Clinging), that the * Karmic seeds' give ou: sprouts ; so that when the said soil is rendered barren ny reason of the waters of Ignorance and the rest having ren sucked up by the heat of the knowledge of Truth',- how could there be any possibility of the Karmic seeds Sprouting up? With this view it is said "Virtue and the rest recome vlevold of causal cnergy;"'--1., they cease to be causes. Even, so, when wisdim has been attained, the body continue for a while, on account of the previous impulse , just a-, ti en efter the action of the potter has ceased, the wheel connues to revolve on account of the momentum imparted :: it. In due time, however, when the impulse becomes exhausted, it beco nes inactive. In the continuance of the body, the impulse is supplied by such virtue and vice whose srution has already commenced; as is declared in S'ruti-"i Having exhausted the others by insans of experience, the soul citains beatitude" and "The delay is only so long as beatise is not attained" [ Chandogya VI, 1, 2). The 'impuls ( to wluch the continuance of the Body is due ) 15 in the r ant of that impulse which had been imparted by the Disappearing Ignorance, it is true that on account of the momentum of this inpulse the Spirit continues to be invested with the body for a lime. (275) Question -- "This may be so; but if the Spirit remains invested with the body by some sort of impulse, when will his Emancipation come about ?"

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LXIX376] TRANSLATION 131 Answer: Karika LXVIII When the separation from the body has at length Final beatitude be been attained, and by reason of the pur pose having been fulfilled, Nature ceases to act,--then he attains eternal and absolute Isolation The productivity of those actions, whose fruition has not commenced, having been destroyed, and those aiso whose fruition has commenced having been exhausted by experience,--the purpose having been fulfilled, Nat:ire desists from her activity with respect to that particular Spirit, who thus obtains eternal and absolute 'Isolation,' 1. e. cessation of the three kinds of pain. (276) Though the Philosophy has been established by reasoning, yet in order to inspire respect towards it, the precedence of the great Sage is stated : Karika LXIX This abstruse knowledge adapted to the fulfilment of the purpose of the Spirit, wherein The precedence (wherefore ) the origin, duration, and of Kapila dissolution of beings are considered, has been expounded by the great sage. "Absiruse",-- guhya'( lit. in a case ) i e. hard to be grasped by dull-brained persons. "By the great sage" 1. e. by Kapila. The feeling of reverence, thus aroused is strengthened by declaring that the doctrine is scriptural. "Wherein are considered, etc; 'in which knowledge means for the sake of which knowledge; as in the expression 'Carmani dvipinam hanti', the word 'carmani (lit. in the skin) is taken to mean for the sake of the skin, one

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132 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [LXX271 kills the tiger", -'Bhutanam; of living beings,-'the origin, duration and dissolution are considered:-which is done in the scriptures. (277) Objection:-"Let this be so: We shall respect the direct sayings of the great sage (Kapila); wherefore should we have every regard for the assertion made by Isvarakrsna ?" Answer: Karika LXX-LXXI This supreme, purifying (doctrine) the Sage imparted Importance of the to Asuri, who taught it to Pancas'ikha. by Science whom the philosophy was extensively propagated. Handed down through a long tradition of pupils, it has been briefly written up in the Arya metre by the noble-minded Is varakrsna who has thoroughly understood the philosophical doctrine. Purifying, purifying the Spirit from all evils causing the three kinds of pain. Supreme, i. e. the most important of all purifying Sage'--Kapila-Imparted to Asuri &c. (278) "Arya"--that which has arrived at truth, and one whose mind is such as 'noble-minded'. doctrines. (279) This philosophy is one organic whole in itself, nou a mere section--as it treats of all branches of knowledge: Karika LXXII The subjects that are treated of in the seventy distiches are those of the complete The sixty topics "Philosophy of the Sixty Topics,' excludof science ing the illustrative tales, and omitting the doctrines of other people.

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-LXX11279] TRANSLATION 133 The sixty topices are thus enumerated in the Rajas Vartika: 1 The existence of Nature (Karika XIV). 2 Its singleness (XIV); 3 Objectiveness (xi); 4 Distinctiveness (of Nature from Spirit) (xi); 5 Subordination (of Nature to Spirit) (XVII); 6 Plurality (of Spirits) (XVIII); 7 Disjunction (of Spirit from Nature in the end) (xx); 8 Conjunction (of Spirit and Nature in the beginning) (XXI); 9 Duration (XIX); 10 Inactivity (of the Spirit) (XIX); these are the ten radical categories. (In addition to these) are the five kinds of Error, (XLVII), nine of Contentment (L), and twenty-eight of Disability of the organs (xLix); these together with the eight forms of Power (LI) make up the sixty "topics". All these sixty topics are treated of in the above disticl:cs, which therefore form a complete Philosophy and cannot be said to be only a section thercof. Of the above (ten radical categories) sihgleness, objectivity and subordination relate to Nature; distinctness, inactivity and plurality to Spirit; and existence, disjunction and conjunction to both; and duration--i. e. continuance relates to the gross and subtle things. May this work of Vacaspati Mis'ra, Tattva-Kaumudi (the Moonlight of Truth), continue to please (cause to bloom) the clear (lily-like) hearts of good men ! Thus ends the Tattva-Kaumudi of Vacaspati Mis'ra. END

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TATTVA - KAUMUDI NOTES The first benedictory stanza -75112*i etc., is taken from AO (8.4). aao has changed the readings as follows -- (6) 7914: in place of F697:; (c) 37 da TqHIOTT A in place of Fish THTOTSTA; (d) gerai i 34672 in place of ERHAN YAMTAFISST: 1 The change was, of course, necessary in view of the idea of plurality of souls in Aicy, which is nct favoured by the readings of the upaniSad. The vedAntina explain this verse quite differently. TETTI has refuted the claim of the nices that this verse lays down the principles of the ficou system. For fuller discussion, see TIETHIST on Harrastara (1. AE. 3.2.c). It has already been pointed in the Introduction that this verse gave rise to the idea of the three Its. It is, therefore, in the fitness of things that this verse should have been chosen by vAca0 for maGgalAcaraNa. About kapila, Asuri, paJcazikha and IzvarakRSNa, see Introduction. efutter. The word ya stands for living beings according to arrit. Adhidaivika, according to goDa0, includes miseries due to cold, heat, wind etc., because these are due to supernatural powers. On Carathi , Davies remarks--"But in old time, gods of higher class, and not demons merely, were supposed to afflict men with disease and pain. In the Rig Veda (.i. 33, 7), Gritsamada prays to Rudra that he may be freed from his bodily pains, which he affirms to have been sent by the Devas or gods ( daivya)." (p. 15). ____ The reading adopted by gauDa0, vis., tadabhighAtake 1s more expressive of the pict idea of complete cessation of pain, than anat of argo ( See, S. N. S., 1, in. ). cf. fata. Guerreriarency Tru: ( FT. .?.?). The reading of 790

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI vis., tadavaghAtake does not materially differ from tadapaghAtake. Com. pare also Wilson, pp. 6-7; Davies, pp. 13-14, note on this reading. viSNupurANa describes the three du:khas in the following verses : adhyAtmiko'pi dvividhaH zArIro mAnasastathA / zArIro bahubhirbhedairbhidyate zrUyatAM ca saH // 2 // zirorogapratizyAyajvarazUlabhagandaraiH / gulmArzaHzvayathuzvAsachAdibhiranekadhA // 3 // tathAkSirogAtIsArakuSTAMgAmayasaMjJitaiH / bhidyate dehajastApo mAnasaM zrotumarhasi // 4 // kAmakrodhabhayadveSalobhamohaviSAdajaH / zokAsUyAvamAnAmAtsaryAdimayastathA // 5 // mAnaso'pi dvijazreSTa tApo bhavati naikadhA / ityevamAdibhirbhedaistApo hyAdhyAtmiko mataH // 6 // mRgapakSimanuSyAthaiH pizAcoragarAkSasaiH / sarIsRpAdyaizca nRNAM jAyate cAdhibhautikaH // 7 // zItavAtoSNavarSAmbuvaidyutAdisamudbhavaH / tApo dvijavarazreSThaiH kathyate cAdhidaivikaH // 8 // (6. 5) The reading set, ( found in some editions ), in the verse ake cenmadhu etc., has arke as its variant. On this bAlarAma remarks -ake iti pAThe tu-samIpe-gRhakoNe, iti vArtho bodhyH| vastutastu jaiminIyasUtrabhASye zabarasvAmibhiH pathi jAte'rke madhUtsRjya tenaiva pathA yathA madhvArthinaH parvataM na gaccheyurityabhidhAya 'arke cenmadhu vindeta' ityevamapanyAsAd arke-ityeva pAThaH sAdhIyAn // (p. 14, note 1). The quotation 'yana duHkhena sambhinnaM etc., is ascribed to zruti by vAca0. On this bAlarAma remarks- yanna duHkhena sambhinnam' iti bhaTTavArtikariti kecit , smRtiriyamiti vijJAnabhikSavaH, parimalAdiSu prAmANikagrantheSu zrutitvena vyavahArAdarthavAdarUpA zrutiriyamiti maadRshaaH|| (p. 16, note 3 ). The word eaf in this quotation has been variously

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-II] NOTES explained by different writers as temporary pleasure or heaven or salvation. See bAlarAma (pp. 39-40 ) who has dwelt exhaustively over this question. __ apAma somamamRtA abhUma etc., is from Rgveda VIII. 48. 3., and is fully quoted and explained by gauDa0, mAThara and jaya0 With the sense of this kArikA, cf. zrImadbhAgavata zrutaM ca dRSTavaduSTaM spardhAsUyAtyayavyayaiH / bahvantarAyakAmatvAt kRSivaccApi niSphalam // (11.10.21) evaM lokaM paraM vidyAnnazvaraM karmanirmitam / satulyAtizayadhvaMsaM yathA maNDalavartinAm // (11.3.20) It is interesting to compare --jaya- asyA AryAyA vakSyamANA yAH, sarvA evArthena bhASyasthAnIyA dRSTavyAH (p. 4 ), with the remark of Davies, quoted in the foot-note in the translation ( p. 5). The quotation of pakSazikha, vis., svalpaH saGkaraH etc., is found in full in vyAsabhASya on yo0 mU0 2. 13. See Introduction also. ___The reconciliation of vedikI hiMsA with the zruti text-mA hiMsyAt sI bhUtAni-, is an interesting topic which has taxed the ingenuity of all the orthodox systems of philosophy ( See, S. N. S., p. 5, in.; Sovani, p. 400 ). bAlarAma has discussed this question at length, quoting extensively from the standard authors ( See pages 24-36 ). na ca kAryatvenAnityatA phalasya yuktA, bhAvakAryasya tathAtvAt etc., ( para 14 )-Says an objector : Just as svarga has been declared to be Anitya, because it is an effect ( yadyatkArya tadanityam), similarly, this du:khadhvaMsa should also be anitya, because it is an effect, To this apao replies that this maxim of targra holds good in the case of positive effects only, and not in the case of negative effects like du:khadhvaMsa. But how can duHkhadhvaMsa be called Ale according to the picy philosophy, which advocates satkAryavAda? To this bAlarAma rephes-yadyapi sAMkhyanaye satkAryavAdAGgIkAreNa duHkhapradhvaMsasya mokSatvAbhidhAnaM vyAhataM, tathApi duHkhapradhvaMsapadenAtra du:khAtItAvasthAyA evaM tAtparyaviSayatvenAbhidhAnAt vyaahtybhaavo'vseyH|| (p. 43 ).

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI [11 Compare the notion of ghi according to the area philosophy -duHkhanivRttezcAtyantikatvaM samAnAdhikaraNaduHkhaprAgabhAvAsamakAlInasvaM. yugapa. dutpannasamAnAdhikaraNasarvAtmavizeSaguNadhvaMsasamAmakAlInatvaM vA, azeSavizeSaguNadhvaMsAvadhikaduHkhaprAgabhAvo vA / / ( upaskAra on vaizeSikasUtra 1. 4 ) The order of vyaktAvyaktazavijJAna is based on the procedure of cognition. The same order is observed in the following fi. &. -sthUlAt paJcatanmAtrasya (1.62); bAhyAbhyantarAbhyAM tezcAhakArasya / 1.63 ); tenAhakArasya (1.64); tataH prakRteH (1.65); and saMhataparArthatvAt puruSasya (1.66). Sovani is quite pertinent in pointing out the confusion with regard to the meaning of the word og.. Some call the mahAbhUtas as vyakta, whileas, the author of kArikAs seems to regard everything vyakta ( and, therefore, pratyakSayogya ), Except the pradhAna and puruSa. vAca0.agrees with the latter explanation, in his commentary on this pateit, but, changes his opinion in the comment on the 6th it. At the latter place he says -sAmAnyato dRSTAdanumAnAt atIndriyANAM pradhAnapuruSAdInAm pratItiH. He would seem to include mahattattva etc., by the word Adi (See bAlarAma p. 16 In.). In order to avoid the contradiction, we should interpre', the word Adi, according to vaMzIdhara, to mean the union between prakRti and puruSa. cf. AdinA ttsNyoggrhH| prakRtipuruSatatsaMyogA nityAnumeyA ityukteH (vaMzIdhara, p. 183) 1 See Sevani, pp. 401 and 405, and notes 36 and 37. In connection with Jacobi's remark that it 15 very strange that intellect should be regarded as a form of matter by the Samkhyas Y See Ent. Gott. Ind. p. 32 ), it is interesting to compare Da\vies (p. 17, 3n)-Modern Science, like the system of Kapila, makes intellect, a mere form of matter. "Mind, used in the sense of substance or essence, and brain, used in the sense of organ of mental function are at bottom names for

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-IV] NOTES the same substance." (Maudsley's Physiology of Mind, 3rd Ed., p. 38). The nature of puruSa is explained by candrikA as ajanakatve sasyajanya ityarthaH / AcavizeSaNena prakRtinirAsa:, dvitiiyenendriysaamaanyaadimiraasH| Unlike the naiyAyikas, the sAMkhyas maintain that sAmAnya 1s a product. On you as pure inward light, Davies quotes (p. 18, In. ) Hegel on Thought (Das Denken), in connection with the Absolute: "It is that light which lights; but it has no other content except that light." (Phil. der Rel., i. 117) [Translated from German by H. Sharma]. From Een (Ego) proceed not only the sprays, but everything material cognised by them. That is, the Ego (which is the l.principle) is the base of the reality of all our senseperceptions (Davies, p. 21, note 1), and consequently of all the existence. Davies quotes Schelling (System des Transcen. Idealismus, p. 60) in support of this idea--" If at all there exists Something Real as opposed to ideal, then that Something Real must be I, because it is the principle of all reality." (Translated from German by H. Sharma). This position, of course, differs from that of the a ir, who does not regard the reality of the I-principle ( 3EET) even, but that of the Pure Consciousness (1999),--the l-principle itself being imaginary and due to HIT. Distinction should be drawn from the vijJAnavAdI-bauddha also, who denies the existence of everything external, except consciousness. The Hieu en does not deny the external existence, but considers it to be a modified product of consciousness, in which it lies latent. cf. - an1994 augia: (mi AE. ?. 87.). IV Apart from the three Means of Right Cognition, viz., pratyakSa, anumAna and zaya, recognised by the sAMkhyakArikA, the commentators discuss the other Means of Right Cognition, recog

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI [IV nised by other schools. The aris materialist recognises only pratyakSa, the jaina and vaizeSika schools recognise pratyakSa and anumAna, the mAvas also recognise only two pramANas, but they are pratyakSa and your according to them. The followers of THIEF, the jaraneyAyikas, and the sAMkhya and the yoga systems recognise pratyakSa, anumAna and zabda. The oldest and the most modern naiyAyikA and the followers of the mahezvara school recognise upamAna in addition to the three named above. The mImAMsakas of prabhAkara school add arthApatti as the fifth. The mImAMsakas of kumArilabhaTTa school and the advaitavedAntinas recognise one more, vis., anupalabdhi or S . The number of us reaches eight in the case of the paurANikas who add saMbhava and aitiya to the list. Some tAntrika recognise aer also in addition to the above: others add afarar to the list, and thus the total reaches ten. The commentators have tried to show that all the seven Thrs, apart from the three recognised by the Fil, fall under the latter. 1. 394719 arao splits it up into URTET, 37TATA and Ta; ATST regards it to be THTA; jaya0 includes it under anumAna and zabda: gauDa includes it under zabda; and candikA under anumAna. 2. surga All the commentators include it under anumAna. 3. 37719 vAca. and jaya regard it as pratyakSa; mAThara includes it under anumAna. Although gauDas. remark-sambhavAbhAvapratibhatityopamAzcAptavacane, suggests its inclusion under 1784, yet another remark of his, vis., zuSkadhAnyadarzanAvRSTerabhAvo gamyate, would lead us -- to infer that he will have it under anumAna; aparent regards it as a help-mate of years, and, therefore, no independent TATT.

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-IV] NOTES 4. saMbhava vAca0, jaya0 and mAThara include it under anumAna; gaura and candrikA include it under zabda. 5. aitiya vAca. opines that if it is pronounced by a reliable person, then it is zabda, otherwise it is no pramANa; goDa and candrikA also include it under zabdaH mAThara includes it under anumAna. 6. pratibhA arao and arout do not mention it; jaya includes it under pratyakSa and anumAna, when it is correct, otherwise it is no pramANa; mAThara includes it under anumAna ; and goDa includes it under zabda. 7. ceTA Noticed only by candrikA and mAThara, and included under anumAna. Wilson is right in remarking that although the mImAMsaka do recognise six pramANas, yet gauDa0's remark that they are arthApatti, saMbhava, abhAva, pratibhA, aitiya and upamAna, is not correct; for saMbhava, aitiya and pratibhA are nowhere recognised as pramANas by the mImAMsakas; rather, "the author of zAkhadIpikA excludes ex. pressly saMbhava, pratibhA and aitiya from the character of proofs. " (p. 28 ). jaimini nowhere mentions the pramANas, but the six pramANas (vis., pratyakSa, anumAna, zabda, upamAna, arthApatti and abhAva ) are discussed by zabarasvAmin in his bhASya on mImAMsAsUtra I. 1. 5. prabhAkara does not recognise abhAva, but kumArila does. The word FATEQT ( in para 23 ) is a technical term of mImAMsA; cf. zrutiliGgavAkyaprakaraNasthAnasamAkhyAnAM samavAye pAradaurbalyamarthavi. prakarSAt (mI0 ma03. 3. 14 ). It means a name, the sense of which depends upon its derivation, unlike other proper names cf. AkhyA caivaM tadarthasvAt (mI0 sa0 3. 3. 13), and zAbarabhASya on itsamAkhyA sati sambandhe bhavati, yathA pAcako lAvaka iti / tatra pAcakazabda. mupalabhya pacatimA asya sambandha iti gamyate //

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI (IV. pramANa has been defined as the instrument of pramA. pramA 1s that state of mind which is free from doubt, mistake, indeci. sion and memory", and which arises from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. The result is the cognition by mind. But vAca0 says-bodhazca pauruSeyaH phalaM pramA. Ths mmght mean that the result of the mental state is cognition in the Spirit. Does it mean that the cognition arises in the spirit ? No, we reply-what happens is that when the Spirit is reflected in the mind, which has assumed the shape of the object with which the sense-organs come into contact, it (the Spirit ) also appears to be cognising. This is a kind of misapprehension arising from the mistaken identity between the Spirit and the mind. This is what is expressed in the I AS- 21 1417: gasta para939:' ( 11. 20 ) and feature AHTEVATI grand' (IV. 22). __Following the nyAyasUtra-tatpUrvakaM vividhamanumAnaM pUrvavat zeSavat sAmAnyatodRSTaM ca / (1, 1, 5), vAca0 first divides anumAna into three kinds. Again he gives another classification : anumAna vIta avIta or zeSavat pUrvavat sAmAnyatodRSTa The commentators differ in the explanation of these terms. aturan himself proposes two alternative explanations. (1) (a) qaQ-A priori or inference of effect from cause.--as orain from the clouds in the sky. (6) 99-A posteriori, or an inference of cause from effect, -as of rain from the flood in a river.

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-V] NOTES (c) Amaie-Commonly seen, cr based on Analogy,-- e. g., we observe that a particular man in one town now, is seen in another next day, because he has moved. Similarly, the Sun must also move, as he is seen at different places in the sky at different times. Or (2) (a) & If we have seen two things together in the past, then when we see one of them now, we infer the existence of the other also. For example, from smoke on the hill, we infer fire. (6) 1996-Inference by exclusion ( TATA asenJAETT FETHIOT HARTT: oitaa:). The question is--, under which of the seven categories (79, TOT Etc.) should we include zabda (sound)? Now, zabda cannot come under sAmAnya, vizeSa and the rest, and its inclusion under you has been denied. Therefore, by the law of the residue, 70% falls under ju. (c) sAmAnyatodRSTa-Where the relation of the vyApti is not within ordinary perception, there we take another object within ordinary perception and similar to the lo in question; and on this similarity or Commonness, we transfer the sea from the perceived to the unperceived instance. For instance, we have got to infer the existence of the Spirit. We do so on the basis of the qualities like the desire, etc. The desire, etc., are qualities. Qualities always reside in objects ( as we perceive in the case of form, taste and the rest ). Therefore, the desire etc., must also reside in some object; and that object is the Spirit The two alternative explanations given by appedita show that the meaning of these terms had become doubtful at his time. Cf. Principal A. B. Dhruva's paper--- Trividham anumanam', POC., Poona, pp. 251-280. vAsa. agrees with the second explanation of vAtsyAyana. But avIta or bheSavara according to vAca, is a negative reasoning.

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10 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [v vAtsyAyana's instance of zeSavat, vis. zabda is a guNa, 1s rejected by vAca0 in bis tAtparyaTIkA (p. 183, kAzIsaMskRtasIrIja ). According to him zeSavat or parizeSa stands for vyatirekyanumAna, The inference of zabda being a guNa 1s not a vyatirekyanumAna but anvayavyatiroka. Thecorrect example of 1960, therefore, is that the qualities'desire etc., reside in the Atman. These qualities cannot reside in pRthivI, jala, tejas and vAyu ; nor can they reside in AkAza, because the qualities of the latter are perceived by the external senseorgan (ear). Similarly the desire etc. being partajuts cannot be the qualities of dizA, kAla and manas-for the qualities of the latter three dravyas are sAdhAraNa. Thus ultimately the desire etc., reside in the nineth dravya, vis., Atman. So there beingno sapakSa of Atman It is an instance of vyatirekyanumAna. jaya0 and gauDa0 agree with the first explanation of vAkyAyana. goDa and mAThara explain zeSavat differently -samudrAdekaM jalapalaM lavaNamAsAtha zeSasyApyasti lavaNabhAva iti (godd0)||. liGgalibhipUrvakam-vAcadeg would read one more liGgi i. e. liGga liGgiAliGgipUrvakam . goDa has a curious explanation to offer-tadanumAnaM liGgApUrvakaM yatra liGgena liGgI anumIyate. yathA daNDena ytiH| liGgiApUrvakaM ca yatra liginnA liGga-manumIyate, yathA dRSTA yati, asyedaM tridaNDamiti / jaya0 agrees with it. It enumerates seven kinds of AFFIS which ought to exist between the for and the fit. They are (1) svasvAmibhAva as between rAjA and puruSa. (2) prakRtivikAra ,, , yava , saktu. (3) kAryakAraNabhAva , vatsa. (4) pAtrapAtrika parivRd , triviSTabdha. (5) sAhacarya cakravAka , cakavAkI. (6) pratidvandvi zIta uSNa. (7) nimittanaimittika .. bhojya , bhojaka. The conversation between Avavya and jaigISavya, referred to by vAca0, occurs in vyAsabhASya on yo. sU. 3. 18. The ayuktas mentioned by cAca. are (a) zAkyabhikSus or the Buddhist monks, described in the vivekavilAsa, vil 275 (as quoted in the sarvadarzanasaMgraha ) as dhanu

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-V] NOTES kRttiH kamaNDalumauMNDayaM cIraM pUrvAhnabhojanam / saMgho raktAmbaratvaM ca zizriye bauddha bhikSubhiH // (b) niryanthakas or the Jains, and (c) saMsAramocakas or the materialists. bAlarAma observessaMsAramocakA:-(saMsAramocakAdezca hiMsA puNyatvasaMmatA ) ityAbhihitA hiMsAdi. parAyaNAH ghaTabhaGge tadantarvartisalilavilayavad dehabhane tadantargatajIvabhaGga eva mokSa ityevaM buvaannaashcaarvaakvishessaaH|| (p. 82 ). 'tu zabdenAnumAnAd vyavacchinatti-As pointed above, the Buddhists and the followers of the astra school do not recognise zabda as a separate pramANa, but include it under anumAna. vAca0 says that the relation between a 4149 and its ps is not that of liGga and liGgin, as between dhUma and vahi. vAkyArtha, being only an object of cognition cognised by the atte, cannot be known by inference. upamAna. According to the naiyAyikas (prasiddhasAdhAt sAdhyasAdhanamupamAnam-nyA0 sU0 1 1 6), upamAna is that sentence which esta blishes a relation between a word and its sense. But, ac: cording to the sAMkhyas, a vAkya is not a pramANa, but the knowledge (jJAna) derived from the vAkya. It is the cittavRtti alone which is pramANa. So, upamAna cannot be a separate pramANa, but is included under anumAna. According to the mImAMsakaDa, upamAna is the sAdRzyajJAna (or the cognition of simlarity, as of go residing in the directly perceived gavaya). A man who saw a cow in the town, now observes a stay in the forest. At this moment he is reminded of the cow which is qualified by the similarity of may directly perceived. Ths is the phala of upamAna. vAca0 replies that this upamAna and its phala are both included under pratyakSa. For, sAdRzya is like the sAmAnya. Just as we have gotva in go, so we have gosAdRzya in go. And as we directly perceive gotva along with go, so we perceive gosAdRzya and gavayasAdRzya along with gavaya. Therefore, gosAdRzyajJAna (apamAna) and gavayasAdRzyajJAna (upamAnaphala ) both are pratyakSa. sAdRzya is not a relation ( like saMyoga ) which should reside on two objects; it is only bhUyo'vayavasAmAnyayoga, that is, the

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI existence of a large number of qualities of one object in another. This FET" is, thus, one like vita; and if it is perceived in o, then it is perceived in Tay also. spararat is Presumption. We presume the existence of living in outside the house, if he is not visible inside the house. But, the mImAMsaka objects-dezasAmAnyena gRhavizeSAkSepo'pi a: etc. He says that when we hear flera en: pregrafie, then the substratum of the existence of caitra 15 dezasAmAnya (or space in general), which includes the particular space of a also. Thus, it's non-existence in the TV is opposed to his existence in GTRIHTRY. And, in order to remove this opposition, we have to resort to arthApati. vAca0 replies that gRha (in which the non-existence of has been established by means of Right Cognition) cannot be included in TATATE. Similarly sa's non-existence in ( which is opposed to his existence in T ) cannnot be a case of opposition to his existence everywhere. Te is no garut, but is included under tre. For, 47919at is merely a modification of ms. But, says an objector, how can spare (a negation) be a (something positive)? Answer. Under pita were veronate PTOTTAT STORTIT: O o III. 13), 5TTA has defined Yrrono as BraTFUTTET ETTER quefortfargent Appa: TROTTA STA-i. e. modification is the manifestation of another characteristic on the removal of the previous characteristic of an object, which (object) always remains constant. So, when it was on the me, then it was sadvittIyapariNAma of bhUtala; and when there is no ghaTa, then it is the kevala or advitIyapariNAma of bhUtala. VI Things directly perceived by the senses nood not be taught by the 774, as they can be easily cognised by even an ordinary person. Now" things beyond the senses are not

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-VIII] un only those which are too subtle for organs of the sense, but those which are imperceptible by accident, as the fire in a mountain that smokes " ( Davies, p. 27). The latter is an Instance of pUrvavat anumAna, which vAcao regards to be as important for our inquiry as the . The most important kind of anumAna, from our point of view, is sAmAnyatodRSTa ( and zeSavat, which is not mentioned by the kArikA, but added by vAca0 ), which leads us to infer things which are too subtle for the organs of sense. But jaya0 rejects pUrvavat and zeSavat both (p. 9 ). NOTES VII pataJjali lays down six causes of anupalabdhi ( mahAbhASya IV. 1. 3). See Introduction. The eight causes of mentioned in the kArikA are reduced to four by jaya0 19 13: (1) dezazeSa includes atidUra and atisAmIpya. indriyaghAta and mano'navasthAna. (2) indriyadoSa (3) viSayadoSa saukSmya, and ( 4 ) arthAntaradoSa includes vyavadhAna, abhibhava and samAnAbhihAra. Sovani is right in remarking that all these can be reduced to two - indriyadoSa and viSayadoSa ( See p. 405). mAThara lays down the causes of anupalabdhi of asat ( non-existent) things even-- idAnImasatAM caturdhA bhavati / tatrocyate- prAkpradhvaMsetaretarAtyantAbhAvabhedAt...... evamiyaM dvAdazadhAnupalabdhiH / satAmaSTadhA hyasatAM caturthI // - VIII On the reading prakRtisarUpaM, Davies remarks---- Lassen has in the text svarUpaM ( having its own form ), from the sAMkhyakaumudI, which must be referred to intellect ( mahat ). All the Mss. but one have (like ), which the sense requires. In his translation he has " dissimile et simile". ( p. 27, 1n ).

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI IX vAca0 here lays down the opinions of ( 1 ) the bauddhas, ( 2 ) the naiyAyikas and the vaizeSikas, and ( 3 ) the vedAntins as pUrvapakSa. 14 [IX (1) The s maintain that existence comes into being from non-existence ( asata: sajjAyate ). (2) The naiyAyikas and the vaizeSikas maintain that an existent cause produces a non-existent effect ( sato'sajjAyate ). (3) The vedAntins maintain that the cause alone is existent, the effect being only an apparent change ( ekasya sato vivartaH na kAryajAtaM vastu sat ). All these views are fully discussed in the Introduction. jaya, upAdAnagrahaNAt vAca0 interprets grahaNAt as sambandhAt. But gauDa, mAThara and candrikA explain it as taking or seeking. S. N. S. observes that although * s explanation is simpler, yet apparently, the same idea is repeated in zaktasya zakyakaraNAt. bAca.'s explanation is also included in sarvasambhavAbhAvAt. "It is also to be noted that while upAdAnagrahaNAt emphasises the adequacy of the cause to the effect, zaktasya zakyakaraNAt looks at the adequacy of the effect to the cause; hence, the latter does not merely repeat the idea of the former. " ( S. N. S. p. 28, 1n ). kAraNabhAvAcca - jaya0 gives two explanations of this phrase-- kAraNasya sattvAdityarthaH / yathasatkAryamutpayate kimiti kAraNabhAvena kAryasya bhAvo bhavati / bhavati ca / tasmAcchaktirUpeNAvasthitamiti gamyate / athavA kAraNabhAvAditi kAraNasvabhAvAt / yatsvabhAvaM kAraNaM tatsvabhAvaM kAryam / yathA snigdhasvabhAvabhyastilebhyaH snigdhameva tailam, mRdo mRtsvabhAvo ghaTaH / / ( p. 12 ). mAThara and goDao agree with the latter explanation vAca0, on the other hand, explains it as kAryasya kAraNAtmakatvAt - -on account of the identity of cause and effect. tasmAdiyaM paTotpattiH svakAraNasamavAyo vA svasattAsamavAyo vA ubhayathApi notpayate etc. (para 75 ). After having disproved the naiyAyika's theory of origination of effect ( utpatti ), vAca0 proceeds further --Now, what is your utpatti ? Is it the samavAya ( Inherence ) of the effect in its cause? That is, is it the which is

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--X] NOTES 15 produced? If you say yes, then your produces only the 9 and not the effect. Or, do you mean to say that utpatti is the samavAya of sattA ( existence ) in the effect ? That is, is the genus presiding over the effect. It is by means of this (genus), that we call an existing object as existent. Just as is, because she is related to me, similarly, a satpadArtha is sat, because it is related to sattA. So, the other alternative of the naiyAyika is that what is originated is the samavAya (Inherence) of in the effect. Here also, as above, what is originated is samavAya and not the effect. Moreover, asks bAlarAma, how can you establish the relation of the non-existent with the existents? And, how again, can there be the samavAya of sattA in the asatU paTa, when there can be no relation between the existent and the non-existent objects? Thus, it will be seen that a T is related with the AvirbhAva of kArya. The opponent asks -- why should a kAraNa be not related with the rUpa of kArya ? vAca0 replies. -- Because AvirbhAva is a kriyA and rUpa is a guNa. A kAraNa can be related with kriyA only and not with guNa; otherwise, a kAraNa will not be a kAraNa. The very derivation of the word kAraNa - kriyate'neneti kAraNam - implies its relation with kriyA. X -, i. e., caused. or the evolved is caused. Cause, according to T, is of two kinds: (producer) and jJApaka (illuminator or indicator). pradhAna, buddhi, ahaGkAra and paJca's are the 's, as they produce effects. That is, buddhi, ahaGkAra and paJcatanmAtrAs are hetus and hetumats both, whileas, avyakta (i. e. pradhAna ) is only a hetu. The zApaka hetus are five-fold, viz., viparyaya, azakti, tuSTi, siddhi and anugraha. Now, viparyaya, azakti tuSTi and siddhi are the pratyayasargas (ie creations of Intellect), and thus they pervade all the twenty-threes. (But what is this anugraha ? ) Thus avyakta is only a kAraka hetu.

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16 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [x nityam-non-eternal, destructible. Destruction 1s the return of a product to its cause. cf.-nAza: kAraNalayaH (sAM0 sa0 1. 121). For, according to the theory of sarakArya, there can be no real destruction or annihilation. Tot is forry, because it has no firror to which it could return. avyApi- The twenty-three tattvas are not all-pervading, like Tita and gry; "each of these prir.ciples (tattwa) is not found in every form." (Davies, p. 34). But, is not the mahatatva all-pervading? To this vaMzIdhara replies--mahadAdeH svasvakAraNAvyApaka. svAdupacaritavyApakatvamityarthaH (p. 201),-the pervading-ness of mahat , etc., is secondary, as they do not pervade their causes. And as pradhAna has no cause to pervade, it is vyApi. __ sakriyam-parispanda means the action of leaving one body and entering another. vijJAna, on the other hand, says-skriytvmdhyvsaayaadiruupniytkaarykaaritvm| pradhAnasya tu sarvakiyAsAdhAraNyena kAraNatvAnna kAryaikadezamAtrakAritvam / na ca kriyA kamaiMva vaktuM zakyate / prakRtikSobhAt muSTi. zravaNena prakRterapi karmavattayAtra sakriyatvApatteriti ( 1. 124). On this bAlarAma remarks-kSobhAdipariNAmalakSaNakriyAyAH pradhAne satve'pi gamanAgamana. lakSaNaparispandAtmakakriyAyA asattvAnna prakRtAvativyAptiriti vyartho'yaM bhikSoH prayAsa iti bodhyam (p. 121). anekam-i. e, sajAtIyabhedavat, having a variety of similar objects: as a mango-tree has sajAtIyabheda, several other mango trees of the similar type. So, buddhi, etc., although alike, are different in different individuals. But furto explains it otherwise-anekatvaM sargabhedena bhinnatvam-sargadvayasAdhAraNyamiti yAvat / na punaH sajAtIyAnezavyaktikatvam, prkRtaavtivyaaptH| prakRterapi sattvAcanekarUpatvAt . The fallacy of vijJAna0 1s pointed out by bAlarAma-prakRteranekarUpatves pyanekavyaktikatvAbhAvena prakRtipratiyogikAnyonyAbhAvasya prakRtAvasambhavAt , kiJca -'ajAmekAm' iti zravaNAdaprAmANikaM prakRteranekavyaktikatvAbhidhAnamityasthAna eva vyAmoho bhikSoriti / (pp. 121-122). FFA-According to figo and Arst, it means, that which merges into its primary cause. In addition to the above explanaticn, to and Amito give another alternative explana

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-XI] NOTES 17 tion. viz., that which indicates, or which is the characteristic of car. This is the sense taken by a77. also. But start itself is a characteristic (liGga) of puruSa. It is for this reason that vAca. remarks-tar a a Paraty por gente para ena 19: On this, S. N. S. remarks that it " seems hardly adequate to the contrast intended between the evolved and the unevolved. (p. 32, in.) Why can there be no oragaraylangt between 1997 and gie, etc. ? Because, between these, the relation is Fhara (=identity or tAdAtmya ), and not saMyoga. There can be no saMyoga between the press and the qe produced out of them. But, will there be any in between gia and STEETT, etc. ? No commentator answers this, although, here also we can show that ahaGkAra, being a product of buddhi, stands in samavAya relation to buddhi. It is for this reason that gauDa0, mAThara and jaya0 explain the word avayava as zabda, rUpa, sparza etc., But they land themselves in another difficulty; for, the entire a i (vis., gis, 345FIT etc. ) cannot be called as TETRAITEAFT. If it be urged that these 75 and the rest do reside in a latent form in gfs and the rest, then it may be pointed out that $176 and the rest do reside in a latent form in gut also. Even arac, who tries to avoid this difficulty, has illustrated this szi as--ATE 1202187: 97896 saMyujyante evamanye'pi / T77H-Although, each of the twenty-three afats is subordinate to the other in the ascending order, yet, ultimately, all are subordinate to TBA. Again, although ga is indepen. dent in producing ahaGkAra, and the latter in producing the indriya and the FFAIATs, yet each one is ultimately dependent upon gaat, the fountain-head of all energy. XI PROCTA-The three gols or Attributes are the essence of prakRti; prakRti is nothing but these three guNas in equilibrium. N. 2

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18 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [XI The kinds of temperaments observed in living beings may broadly be divided into three spiritual, passionate and dull. Therefore, the site theory of three gors, although a mere hypothesis, is yet a very useful and appropriate hypothesis. Davies remarks-" In the system of Valentinus the Gnostic, all men and all substances are divided into three classes : (1) spiritual, (2) the vital and (3) the material ( Hylic). This corresponds to the guNas of kapila and is probably an importation from India." (p. 37, 2n. ) fang:-The view.point of the faranga area is that there is no existence of the external objects, except in mind. That is, concept and the object denoted by the concept are identical, because both are comprehended simultaneously. Things, which are not identical, are not necessarily comprehended simultaneously;"cf. 'sahopalambhAniyamAdabhedo niiltddhiyoH| bhedazca bhrAnti. vijnyaandRshytendaavivaadvye|| (sarvadarzana0,p. 32), vAcaspati's refutation of this view has been thus illucidated by bAlarAma yatra kilaikasminneva yoSipe vastuni raktadviSTavimUDhAnAM janAnAM vibhinnAni mukhAdijJAnAni jAyamAnAnyupalabhyante tatra pramAtRNAM parasparapratisandhAnAd vastvaikye'pi jJAnanAnAtvaM dRzyate / yadi hi vastu vijJAnAtmakaM bhavet tarhi vijJAnasyAsAdhAraNyAdanekavijJAnAlambanamekaM sAdhAraNaM vastu ma sambhavat / ataH vastusAdhAraNyopapattaye vijJAnAtiriktaM tadabhyupeyamiti / (p. 128 ). acetanam-buddhi ( intellect ) is merely an instrument of Pure Intelligence or cetanya, and not identical with it, because buddhi 1s a material product of prakRti. The phrase tadviparItastathA ca pumAn means that in some respects the Spirit is similar to guth and stout, and in other respect it is different from vyakta and adhyakta. Difference of puruSa from vyakta and avyaktavyakta and avyakta puruSa triguNa aguNa aviveki vivekI viSaya aviSaya

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-XI] NOTES puruSa hetumat vyakta and avyakta sAmAnya asAmAnya acetana cetana prasavadharmi aprasavadharmI Similarity of puruSa to vyakta and avyakta and difference of vyakta frorn avyaktavyakta avyakta ahetumat ahaMtumAn anitya nitya nitya avyApi vyApi vyApI sakriya niSkriya niSkriya aneka eka aneka Azrita anAzrita anAzrita liGga aliGga aliGga sAvayava niravayava niravayava paratantra svatantra svatantra It should be noted that gauDa0 and mAThara say puruSa ekaH, which 1s opposed to the doctrine of puruSabahutva. jaya0 andvAca0, therefore, rightly point out that puruSa is similar to vyakta with regard to anakatva. After discussing this point, Wilson concludes"Either, therefore, Gaurapada has made a mistake, or by his eka is to be understood, not that soul in general is one only, but that it is single, or several, in its different migrations; or, as Mr. Colebrooke renders it (R. A. S. Trans. Vol. I., p. 31). 'individual'. So in the Sutras it is said, that there may be various unions of one soul, according to difference of receptacle, as the etherial element may be confined in a variety of vessels' (I, 150). This singleness of soul applies, therefore, to that particular soul which is subjected to its own varied course of birth, death, bondage and liberation; for, as the commentator observes 'one soul is born, not another (in a regenerated body). The singleness of soul, therefore, as asserted by Gaurapada, is no doubt to be understood in this sense." (p. 65 )

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20 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [XII XII Jurs do not mean qualities residing in a substance, as understood in the 17 and as119systems. They are of the nature of substance; they are the constituent elements of prakRti. Hence, vAcadeg says-guNA iti parArthAH. That is, they are called Jots ( secondary ), because they exist for the Spirit and not for themselves. agrafi literally means 'device of science, and probably refers to the device of the mImAMsakas known as sthAna ( position or order ). So it will mean that prIti, aprIti and viSAda stand for sattva, rajas and tamas respectively. gauDa0, mAThara and jaya0 mention anyo'nyavRttayaH also, whileas vAca0 and candrikA add anyo'nya before and vRtti after abhibhava, Azraya, janana and mithuna each. vRtti according to vAca0, means kriyA (operation ). 540 explains that as gare agor artara.. According to gauDa0, anyo'nyavRttayaH means parasparaM vartante, i.e. are reciprocally present. AroT, however, seems to take afat in the sense of function. In a note on this word, Davies remarks-" means state, condition, or manner of being, and the meaning is that each yer may, in some circumstances, assume the nature of the others or be the same in effect." (p. 36, 1n. ) ___The quotation, anyo'nyamithunAH sarve, etc., ascribed to Agama by vAca0, is found in the 8th chapter of the 3rd skandha of devI. bhAgavata. goDa0 mAThara and jaya0 quote only one verse, vis., rajaso mithunaM sattvaM, etc., jaya0 ascribes this verse to viSNugItA, which it is difficult to identify, unless it stands for Eftiar=#irasiat. But there is no such verse in the wall. The verse found there is--TERETA HA yara HTZETI TG: APT 1974: FFA Freerer II (XIV. 10). We find a simular verse in the 37ha. parvan of the mahAbhArata-tamaso mithunaM sattvaM satvasya mithunaM rjH| rajasathApi FTA FEITE HEART Y 79: 11( 36. & ).

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--XII] NOTES XII ___ sAMkhyAcAryaH-stands for pazcazikha and others. vijJAna0 quotes 'paJcazikha on prItyaprItibiSAdAyarguNAnAmanyo'nyaM vaidharmyam (sAM. ma. I. 127 )"satvaM nAma prasAdalAghavAbhiSvaGgaprItititikSAsantoSAdirUpAnantabhedaM samAsataH sukhAtmakam / evaM rajo'pi zokAdinAnAbhedaM samAsato duHkhAtmakam / evaM tamo'pi 'midrAdinAnAbhedaM samAsato mohAtmakam / " arthata:-jaya0 and vAca. explain it as puruSArthataH, but gauDa takes it in the sense of sAdhanA, and mAThara explains it as kAryavazAt. Now, these guys, on account of their having the characteristics of anyo'nyAbhibhava, etc., assume different shapes. But, how do these guts perform functions of so different a nature ? In reply to this arao gives an example of a woman, who, according to him, illustrates all the different functions of the guNas. goDa0, mAThara and jaya0, on the other harrd, illustrate satva by a lady, THA by warriors and te by clouds. A virtuous woman ( and therefore, a sAttvika type ) pleases her husband, pains her rivals and deludes the passionate people. The brave soldiers ( and therefore, representing rajas ) of a king please their master, pain their opponents and delude the fugi. tives. The dark clouds covering the sky (and therefore, a tAmasa type ) please the people suffering from heat, rouse activity among the peasants and delude the lovers in separation. But, there is one difficulty. The 3 guNas ( = prakRti or mUlakAraNa ) assume various shapes by permutation and combination. This amounts to saying that the mUlakAraNa 1s not one but many. Now, how does this position differ from that of the vaizeSikas who also assume the plurality of causes? Cf.-nanvevaM mUlakAraNasya paricchimAsaMkhyavyaktikatve vaizeSikamatAdatra ko vizeSa iti cet-The reply is kAraNavyasya sparzAdirAhityameva / / 'zabdasparzavihInaM tu ruupaadibhirsNyutm| triguNaM tajagayoniranAdiprabhavApyayam // ' iti viSNupurANAdibhyaH // vijJAna ( I. 128 ). But are not these gors opposed to one another ? The reply is---yes. Still they unite for gearu, as wick, oil and lamp. The illustration is not a happy one, as we do not find any apparent opposition between taila, varti and dIpa in spite of

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI [XIII the attempt of candrikA; cf.-dIpopari telapatanena dIpanAzAt tailamapi dIpa. virodhi, evaM vartirapi svalpakena dIpanAziketi // For this reason vAca0 gives another example of this virodha,-vis., yathA vA vAtapitta. zleSmANa: etc., bAlarAma quotes a parallel passage from the devI. bhAgavata ( 3.9)-" "pradIpazca yathA kArya prakarotyarthadarzanam / vartistailaM yathAzci viruddhAzca parasparam // 29 // viruddha hi tathA tailamagninA saha saGgatam / tailaM vArte. virodhyeva pAvako'pi parasparam // 30 // ekatrasthAH padArthAnAM prakurvanti prdrshnm||" ( pp. 139-140 ). Really speaking, there can be no virodha of these gots in any evolved thing ( say, a human body ). If at all there could be any virodha, then it would be in the sAmyAvasthA i. e. prakRti. In no pariNAma of prakRti are the guNas in equal quantity. On the other hand, there is predominance of one over the others. So, there is to tulyabalatva in the vikAras. Cf. rUpAtizayA vRtyatizayAkSa paraspareNa virudhyante sAmAnyAni tvatizayaiH saha pravartante-(vyApta. bhASya on yo. mU. II. 15 ). atra ca mukhaduHkhamohA parasparavirodhina: etc.-Here vAca0 has in his view the attack of the vedAntin against the sAMkhya philosophy. According to the latter, all the objects (or evolved entities ) are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion. The vedAntin ( vAca0 himself ) retorts--AntarAH khalvamI sukhaduHkhamohaviSAdA bAhyebhyazcandanAdibhyo'tivicchinnapratyayavedanIyebhyo vyatiriktA adhyakSamIkSyante / yadi punareta eva sukhaduHkhAdisvabhAvA bhaveyustata: svarUpatvAt hemante'pi candanaH sukha:syAt / na hi candana. kadAcidacandanaH |............tsmaadmukhaadisvbhaavaa api candanakuGkumAdayo jAtikAlAvasthAapekSayA mukhaduHkhAdihetavo na tu svayaM mukhAdisvabhAvA iti ramaNIyam / / (bhAmatI on bra. mU. II. 2. 1). To this argu. ment arao ( as an exponent and defender of FITCH ) replies -svasvAnurUpANi sukhaduHkhamohAtmakAnyeva nimittAni kalpayanti / Although sukha, duHkha and moha are all present in every object, yet, they are not experienced simultaneously. For the experience of one or the other of these ( mukha, duHkha and moha ), they stand in need of excitant,causes, which themselves are of the nature of sukha, duHkha and moha. For example, sukha, for its own experience, stands in need of the predominance of which is of the nature of Arayut ( or ga ).

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=XVI] NOTES 23 XIV The difficulty lies in the expression tadviparyayAbhAvAt. goDa 0 and explain it as- on account of the absence of the contraries of traiguNya in the pradhAna, avivekyAdi resides in the pradhAna. vAcao offers an alternative explanation ---- on account of the absence of avivekyAdi in the contrary of vyakta, i. e., puruSa, avivekyAdi resides in the pradhAna and its constituents. candrikA adopts the second explanation. 4 also agrees with it. cf. traiguNyasyAbhAve'vivekyAdayorabhAvAt ( ? ) / na hi nirguNasya puruSasyAvivekyAdiH saMbhavati / tasmAt traiguNyAdevAvivekyAdiH siddhaH // ( p. 20 ). The explanation of gauDao, as rightly pointed out by S. N S. ( See p. 41, 1n.), renders the other half of the redundant, because, it simply repeats the same argument. XV and XVI The term stands for the diverse forms of the evolved which differ from one another. As compared with its effects, a cause is unlimited and thus unmanifest jaya 0 uses a curious expression, ( saMsargin ) for cause. It seems that the word stands for the union or contact of different effects in their cause; cf. - tasmAdeteSAmekena saMsargiNA bhavitavyam / yatraiteSAM saMsargastadavyaktaM kAraNamasti (p. 21 ). samanvaya = ekarUpatA, similarity, or ekajAtyanugama (i. e. belonging to one genus ), according to jaya0. gauDa 0 understands samanvaya in the sense of inference --' yathA vratadhAriNaM baTuM dRSTvA samanvayati, nUnamasya pitarau brAhmaNAviti / The explanation of samanvayAt ( tAM. sU. I. 131 ) as offered by vijJAna *, vis, upavAsAdinA kSINaM hi buddhayAditattvamanAdibhiH samanvayena samanugatena punarupacIyate ( ie intellect and the rest, emaciated by fast are again strengthened by food, etc. ), ' does not directly fit in this Karika, as rightly pointed out by Sovani ( p. 411 ).

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI (XVI kAraNakAryavibhAgAt-vAca0 understands the word vibhAga as 'emergence',-just as the jar, etc., emerge from the clay, etc. jaya0, mAThara and goDa0 explain it as "separation ' or dis. tinction ' between the functions of the cause and the effect; -just as you can bring water in a jar but not in clay. Thus, there is a distinction between a cause and its effect, because both serve different purposes ( pRthagarthakriyAkaraNAt ). But, it is difficult to understand how one can conclude from this argument that tasmAdasya kAraNena bhavitavyama. jaya here quotes the explanation of some other commentary ( which is not traceable) :-asmin vyAkhyAne, kAryatastadupalabdhermahadAdi tacca kAryam' ityanemavasiddhatvAdanyairanyathA vyAkhyAyate-yadupakaroti tat kAraNam, yadupakriyate satkAryama, tayovibhAgAt , upakAryopakArakabhAvAdityarthaH / yathAdhyAtmikAnAM bAyAnAM copakAryopakArakabhAvo, burddhikRta iva dRzyate tadasya kazcida vyavasthApitA [pAyatA] syAt , kuto'yaM vibhAga itynythaanupptteH|| ( pp. 21-22). ___avibhAgAt vaizvarUpyasya-According to vAca0, gauDa0 and mAThara, the term fat means 'merging ;-because this diverse evolved merges into the unevolved. 5770 also quotes the opinion of some unknown commentator who adopts the reading bhavibhAge, where avibhAga means laya. jaya0's own explanation is different. It takes AvibhAga in the sense of avibhakta, and ex. plains the phrase as--' because this diversity is produced out of unity.' cf. iha loke'vibhaktAdekasmAdikSudravyAdrasaphANitaguDakhaNDazarkarAdi. vaizvarUpyaM nAnAtvaM dRzyate......evamAdhyAtmikAnAM vAhyAnAM ca vaishvruupym| tasmA. deSAmavibhaktenekena bhavitavyam / (p. 22 ). pravartate triguNataH samudayAcca-According to vAca0 and jaya0, these two expressions indicate the two kinds of pravRttis of guNas, because guNas are in constant modification-cf. pariNAminityatA guNAnAm ( vyAsabhASya on yo. ma. IV. 33 ). The first kind of modification is that satva, rajas and tamas modify themselves as satva, rajam and tamas. Here, the sAmyAvasthA Is intact; there is no creation. But, when there is a viSamapariNAma (or samudaya ), we have creation. Here fra and the rest combine with one

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-XVII] NOTES another in different proportions, one predominating over the others. The other commentators take triguNataH and samudayAt both, as referring only to the creative activity of refa. XVII arefit:-Those who are contented or those whose aim is to get the nine kinds of gres (dealt with in 4 50). But apao here refers to only the five external (ara) gfes. The internal (AdhyAtmika) tuSTis are gaaned after the attainment of the discriminative knowledge of the Spirit and the non-Spirit. The internal gfes are not referred to here. Therefore, atao says-adhyaktaM vA mahAntaM vA, etc. The reading igarriera, adopted by Wilson, is not supported by so, who reads Featralg. Wilson's reading of the text is an obvious mistake (based upon, perhaps, the Fi. 7.- Tantecald, I. 140 ), as it is not supported by any commentary. ___ dRSTAntadRSTasarvadharmAnurodhena, etc. In order to prove that a saMghAta is arru, pop, etc., are given as an illustration.-- Just as Feli, Asana and the rest, being saMghAtas, are parArtha, so avyakta and its constituents are for another person, viz., gen. But in this illustration, para 15 zarIra, which is itself a saMghAta; and thus puruSa also becomes a Bata. On this atao remarks that if you go to establish the similarity of all the qualities found in a Eure with all the qualities found in a 97, then there can be no inference. The point is cleared in the m ains (Chowkhamba edn., pp. 344-345) and the organa matcrizinit ( Kashi Sanskrit Series, No. 24, p. 600 ). TheTart--is the strueral of gata, as a charioteer is that of a chariot. Question :-But, a charioteer is active, and your puruSa, being nirguNa-niSkriya, is not active, how can he become an Sprum? Reply :-It is not essential that only an

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI [XVII. active entity can move or urge anything. Sometimes mere proximity or contanct brings about activity, as we see in the case of iron and load-stone. Cf. tatsaMnidhAnAdadhiSThAtRtvaM maNivad (sAM. sa. 1. 96 ). Or, mere presence also can bnng about an activity, as in the case of a King. Cf. - na ca sarvatra tulyatvaM syAtprayojakakarmaNAm / calanena hyasiM yoddhA prayukta cchedanaM prati // 85 // senApatistu vAcava bhRtyAnAM viniyojakaH / rAjA sannidhimAtreNa viniyuGkte kadAcana // 86 // tasmAdacalato'pi syAJcalane kartRtAtmanaH / (kumArila's zlokavArtika on mI. sU. I. 5, Chowkhamba edn., p. 710). bAlarAma thinks that this argument about the AdhiSThAtRtva of puruSa answers all the criticisms brought forward by zaGkarAcArya in his bhASya on racanAnupapattezca and pravRttezca (bra. sU. II. 2. 1 and 2 ). svAtmani vRttivirodhAt-It is very succinctly explained by bAlarAma as follows-na sidhArAtmAnaM chinatti vahnirvAtmAnaM dahatIti bhaavH| anye tvAhuH-bhogyA dRzyA buddhayAdayaH etc. anye refers to those who cannot reconcile the niHsaGgatA of puruSa with his bhoktRtva. They would, therefore, explain bhoktA as draSTA. But the same objection can be brought against these people also.- 9 being niHsaGga can be a draSTA, only through buddhi; see vyAsabhASya on draSTA dRzimAtra: zuddho'pi pratyayAnupazyaH (yo. sU. II. 20 ). Similarly, he can be a bhoktA also through buddhi.-"evaM ca draSTutvavad bhoktRtvasyApi sambhavAdAyavyAkhyAnamapi samIcInameveti dhyeyam // " ( bAlarAma, p. 160 ). kaivalyArtha pravRttezca-mAThara assigns this pravRtti to pradhAna, whileas, 470 and others take this gafar as belonging to the 79 and the sages-AgamAnAM mahAdhiyAM ca //

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-XVIII) NOTES XVIII nikAya-The word is derived from ni + ci + ghaJ (saMgha cAnotarAdharye-pANini III. 3. 42 ), " in the sense of a multitude or assembly (of living beings possessing some common characteristics), but not merely a confused crowd of men." (S. C. Vasu's translation of siddhAntakaumudI, p. 347 ). 'nikAyaH = devamanuSyatiryagAdInAmanauttarAdharyeNAvasthitaH saMghAta:, tadviziSTAbhirityarthaH' iti tAtparyaTIkAyAmmizrAH ( bAlarAma, p. 161 ). On janma and maraNa, vijJAna says-janmamaraNe cAtra notpattivinAzI puruSaniSThatvAbhAvAt / kintvapUrvadehendriyAdisaMghAtavizeSeNa saMyogazca viyogazca bhogatadabhAvaniyAmakAviti ( sAM. sU. I. 149 ). na caikasyApi puruSasya dehopadhAnabhedAt etc.. The view of the vedAntin is that one and the same Atman assuines plurality on account of being conditioned by the different bodies. Cf. 'upAdhibhede'pyekasya nAnAyoga AkAzasyeva ghttaadibhiH| " " upAdhirbhiyate na tu tadvAn / " " evamekatvena parivartamAnasya na viruddhdhrmaadhyaasH|" (sAM0 sa0 / 150-152 ). mAThara sets the pUrvapakSa in the following words :-iha kecidAcAryA vedevAdina iti manyante-, eko'yaM puruSaH sarvazarIreSupalabhyate mnnisuutrvt| iha rasanAyAM yAvanto maNayasteSu sarveSvekameva satra pravartate / evaM mANabhUteSu zarIreSu kimekaH sUtrabhUtaH paramAtmA, Ahozcit jalacandravat puruSa ityeka eva bahuSu nadIkUpataDAgAdiSvivopalabhyate iti||Cf.ssimaannd (sAMkhyatattvavivecana, p. 13, Chow. S. S. No. 246 ):- "AkRtigarbhAzayabhAvasaGgatizarIravibhAgAlliGgabahutvAt sAMkhyAcAryAH kapilAmuripaJcazikhapataJjaliprabhRtayaH puruSabahutvaM varNayanti / vedavAdina AcAryA, hariharahiraNyagarbhavyAsAdaya ekamAtmAnaM, tathA ca zrutiH......... eka eva hi bhUtAtmA bhUta bhUte vyvsthitH| ekathA bahudhA caiva dRzyate jlcndrvt||" ( This verse from brahmavindUpaniSad, 1.2, is quoted by vijJAna also on sAM. su. I. 153). _But, does not this doctrine of puruSabahutva contradict the zruti which lay down the unity of soul ( i. e. Atmaikya )? The sAM. ma. says, No.-"nAdvaitazrutivirodho jAtiparatvAt (I. 154 ). These scriptures speak of one 1842 in the sense of class notion. vAca. also tries to reconcile the advaitazrutivirodha as follows

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI (XIX, XX-XXI- " ekatvazrutInAM ca pramANAntaravirodhAt kathaMciddezakAlavibhAgAbhAvena bhaktyAppu. pptteH| prakRtyekapuruSanAnAtvayozca zrutyaiva sAkSAt pratipAdanAta / 'ajAmekAM lohitazukakRSNAM bahvIH pramAH sRjamAnAM sruupaaH| ajo Teko juSamANo'nuzete jahAtyenAM muktabhogAmajo'nyaH // " (te. A. 6. 10) // " tattvavaizAradI, on yo. ma. II. 22. Further on, says the AIGT, if you are going to explain away this nAnAtva by upAdhis, then you will land yourself into another absurdity. For, as zarIra is the upAdhi of Atman, so the limbs ( avayavas) are the upAdhis of a body (a saMghAta ). And when we see the appearance and disappearance of the limbs in a body, will the easta call these phenomena the births and deaths of the same body? . .XIX,XX and XXI __mAdhyasthya or audAsInya 1s of seven kinds according to jaya:saptavighaM cAsyaudAsInyam / tathA coktam-pazyati zrRNoti sarva karoti sthiti prasaGgaM ca maapi| svato na parato...nobhayatazcApyudAsInaH // jaya0, further raises the question that if puruSa 1s madhyastha and akartA, then how is he a bhoktA ?-nanu ca yayakartA tatkathaM bhoktabhAvAdasti puruSaH? tathA cAhuHbAlahutAzanataravaH svayamakRtAnAM yathA hi moktaarH| puruSo'pi viSayaphalAnAM svayamakRtAnAM tathApi bhoktA / / iti / acetana cetanAvadiva liGgam etc. Intellect and the rest, although non-intelligent, seem to be intelligent, on account of the pro. ximity of the Spirit. Thus alone can the experience - I know' be explained. Although the entire activity belongs to the Attributes ( transformed into mahat, ahaGkAra and the rest ), yet, on account of its reflection in the Intellect, the really indifferent Spirit seems to be active. Cf. uparAgAt kartRtvaM citsAnidhyAt ( sAM. sU. I. 164). The Spirit in its turn transfers its intelligence to matter. This transference is thus illustrated by various commentators-'yathAnisaMyogAt lohmaannirityucyte| (jaya0) 'anuSNAzIto ghaTaH zItAbhiradbhiH saMspRSTaH zIto bhavati, animA saMyukta uSNo -bhavati / (mAThara) // yathAnyayasoH parasparaM saMyogavizeSAt parasparadharmavyavahAra

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NOTES -XXII] aupAdhiko yathA vA jalasUryayoH saMyogAt parasparadharmAropastathaiva buddhipuruSayoriti bhAva: / ( vijJAna0, sAM. sU. I, 164 ) // 29 akartRtva of puruSa is further supported by jaya * by the following quotation - pravartamAnAn prakRterimAn guNAMstamo'bhibhUto viparItadarzanaH / ahaM karomItyabudho'bhimanyate tRNasya kubjIkaraNe'pyanIzvaraH / This quotation is found in the tattvasamAsasUtravRtti (Chow. S. S. No. 246, p 124) and sAMkhya tatvavivecana' also ( ibid, p, 12 ) with slight variants. vAcao connects darzanArthaM (in puruSasya darzanArthaM kevalyArthaM tathA pradhAnasya ) with pradhAnasya, and kaivalyArthaM with puruSasya. The other commentators take the line as it stands, i. e. puruSasya darzanArthaM and pradhAnasya kaivalyArtham. While explaining 'vimuktamokSArthaM svArtha vA ' ( sAM. sa. II, 1). vijJAna * also connects kaivalya with pradhAna. XXII In the bhAgya ( on yo. sU. II 19 ) vyAsa describes the tanmAtras as the products of mahattattva ( - ete sattAmAtrasyAtmano mahataH SaDavizeSapariNAmAH). But there the should not be taken as the immediate cause ( i. e. producer ) of these tanmAtras. vyAsa has himself said at another place ( yo. mR, I. 45 ) that these tanmAtras are the products of ahaGkAra. mAThara and gauDao hold that these tanmAtras singly produce the mahAbhUtas. The other commentators hold that the each succeed. ing is produced from the combination of the preceding tanmAtras. For example, zabdatanmAtra and sparzatanmAtra produce vAyu: zabda tanmAtra, sparzatanmAtra and rUpatanmAtra produce tejas and so on. But this theory of vAca0 violates the orthodox paJjIkaraNa theory of the vedAntins. The point is noticed by kalpatarukAra, who sayssampradAyAdhvanA paJcIkaraNaM yadyapi sthitam / tathApi yuktiSTatvAdvAcaspatimataM zubham // pRthivyanalAtmatvaM gagane pavane 'pi cet / rUpavasva mahattvAbhyAM cAkSuSatvaM prasajyate ||

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30 TATTVA-KAUMUDI arddhabhUyastvataH kSityAdyavibhAvanakalpane / vyavahArayathAprAptA mudhA paJcIkRtirbhavet // anapekSya phalaM vedasiddhetyevepyate yadi / trivRtkRti: H zrutA paJcIkRtirna vacana zrutA // [XXIII ( quoted by vaMzIdhara in his comm on tattvakaumudI, p. 293 Chow. S. S. ). A gives a queer and fantastic derivation of the word ahaGkAra - catuHSaSTivarNai: parAdivaikharI paryantAbhidheyairyatkimapyabhidhIyate buddhayA samarthya tatsakalamAthantAkArahakAravarNadvayagrahaNeno paristhitapiNDAnukAriNA vindunA bhUti: - pratyAhAranyAyenAhaGkAra ityabhidhIyate / / XXIII gauDa 0 and mAThara curiously divide jJAna and vairAgya into two kinds-internal and external. Sovani is right in criticising this classification (p. 414 ), as jJAna means only pradhAnapuruSAnyatAjJAna in this, and not the knowledge of the a and the rest. Similarly, the Abhyantara - vairAgya (vis., pradhAnamapyatra svaprendrajAlasadRzamiti viraktasya mokSe soryadutpavyate ) is the principal vairAgya which leads to the also. For, who will be indifferent towards the worldly objects unless he is mokSecchu ? bAdarAma does not read garimA in his text of tattvakaumudI. Our edition of tattvakaumudI, jaya0, mAThara and gauDao mention nine kinds of aizvaryas although each one ( except vAca0 ) says aSTavidhamaizvaryam. It seems, therefore, thats text is the correct one. Our edition of tattvakaumudI and vaMzIvara's edition, however, combine Izitva and vazitva and thus make the total eight. jayao roads yatrakAmAvazAvitvam in place of yatrakAmAvasAyitvam, and derives it as - kAmenecchyAvazetuM zIlaM yasya sa yatrakAmAvazAyI / tasya bhAvaH yatrakAmAvazAyitvam / anekArthatvAt dhAtUnAM' zI ' biSTatau vartate /

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-XXV] XXV ahaGkAra is divided into three kinds ahaGkAra sAtvika or vaikRta NOTES sAttvika 1 manasa rAjasa or taijasa the eleven indriyas sanmAtrApazJcaka This is the scheme adopted by a and others. But vijJAna o (on sAM. sU. II. 18 ) would have ahaGkAra 24 tAmasa or bhUtAdi vaikArikastaijasazca tAmasazvetyahaM tridhA / ahaM tasvAdvikurvANAnmano vaikArikAdabhUt // vaikArikAzca ye devA arthAbhivyaJjanaM yataH / taijasAdindriyANyeva jJAnakarmamayAni ca // tAmaso bhUtasUkSmAdiryataH khaM liGgamAtmanaH / 31 rAjasa the ten indriyas paJcatanmAtrAs. In support of his classification, vijJAna0 quotes from some smRti tAmasa But this explanation is wrong; for a and Ia are inactive by themselves, and cannot produce anything unless helped by the mobile rajas. vaMzIdhara's explanation, viz.,--' samadhIndriyANi mano'pekSayA'lpasattvatvena rAjasakAryatvenaiva smRtiSu nirdiSTAnyatra tu vyaSTIndriyApekSayA'dhikasatvatvena sAtvikAhaGkArakAryatayoktAnItyavirodhaH / " is very lame ( See sAMkhyatatvakaumudITIkA of vaMzIdhara. Chow. S. S., p. 343; see further bAlarAma, pp. 177-178 and Sovani, p. 415 ) .

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32 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [XXVII XXVII The first phrase 3491H*, gives the general characteristic of the mind and the second phrase q*i : gives the proper function of the mind. gauDa0 interprets saMkalpakaM as pravRtti peggia, i. e., which determines the functioning of the two sets of spaces ). ara understands tega as @aqoratoarea progna 1. e. perceives the definite properties as belonging to the thing apprehended. jayadeg and candrikA agree with vAca0. What ajao means is that all the senses of perception cognise their respective objects vaguely, and this is Arame #cute or simple-perception. But as mere simple-perception of an object is of no use in our every-day life, so the help of mind is sought to give a defir.te and concrete shape to that percept. This is what is called flame TRUT or complex-perception The first is nAmajAtyAdiyojanAhInaM AlocanajJAnaM, and, therefore, Array; the second is 71AFICOIATTI Fri, and, therefore, savikalpaka. In his support. vAca0 cites asti yAlocitajJAnaM etc., from It's teara ( on 1. H. I. 4, verses 112 and 120, pp. 168 and 172, Chow. S. S.). The phrase a: qi gadirt risicareer I TETAATja, has been thus explained by TreTTO in his commentary on the above-ai fiatalgica BEUT EMTA TT That ma-, which is the same as fataTootfagura fazer of argo. S. N. S. is beside the point when he says that according to grao "mind explicates what is indeterminate, it does not add to the given material. But the verses cited by Vacaspati would suggest that forms and qualifications are created or added to the original perception by the mind." (p. 61 ). For, according to the author of the tamaa whose verses are quoted here, we have the knowledge of sAmAnya and vizeSa both in the nirvikalpaka stage; but this knowledge is not combined into a definite concept, as in the fame94. stage. We are cognisant of both, and spera in the Araras99stage, but separately; but we cognise

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-XXVIII) NOTES 33 ghaTatvaviziSTo ghaTaH in the savikalpaka stage. So, there is no new addition or creation of anything new by the mind. That this is the sense of gufto, is evident from his own verse in this context :-"nirvikalpakabodhe'pi yAtmakasyApi vstunH| grahaNaM lakSaNAkhyeyaM jJAtrA zuddhaM tu gRhyate // 118 // '' (p. 171 ). pArthasArathi explains itvyAtmakasya, sAmAnyavizeSAtmakasyetyarthaH / sAmAnyAvabhAso'pi pratItisiddha eva / na hi nirvikalpakenA'gRhItasya savikalpakenApi grahaNaM sambhavati, na vA'gRhIte sAmAnye vyaktyantare pratyabhijJA saMbhavati / tasmAt sAmAnya vizeSazca nirvikalpe'pi prakAzata eva etc. indriyaM ca sAdharmyAt-jaya0 remarks :-yathAnyadindraliGga tathA mano'pItyarthaH. But vAca0 criticises this view:-indriyAntaraiH sAttvikAhaGkAro. pAdAnatvaM ca sAdharmyam, na vindraliGgatvam / mahadahaGkArayorapyAtmaliGgatvenendriyatvaprasaGgAt / tasmAdvyutpattimAtramindraliGgatvaM, na tu pravRttinimittam / mAThara reads pAhyabhedAca in place of bAhyabhedAzca. This is noted by candrikA also. mAThara's reading is preferable, because the second line of the Artan lays down the reasons of the arrira of indriyas, the two reasons being, guNapariNAmavizeSAt and grAbhedAt . The question is--how can one 3TEFIT create these mania fold fys whose functions differ? This question is raised by udyotakara in his nyAyavArtika ( Chow S. S., p. 70)-yadi punarindriyANyekAtmakAni syuH, kAraNasvabhAvAnuvidhAnAdekAtmyAdviSayavyavasthA na syAt, sarve sArthamekaM vA sarvArthamati syAt / The reply to it is-guNapariNAmavizeSAt. Although ahaGkAra is one, yet the three guNas, accompanied by: 7 and 3rah, act and react upon one another ; therefore, the modified effects of ahaGkAra (i. e. the indriyas) differ in their functions. XXVIII mAThara reads rUpAdiSu in place of zabdAdiSu in the text:' bAlarAma also adopts this reading and observes :--cakSurAdikrameNa pUrvamindriyANAmabhidhAnAt 'zabdAdiSu ' iti pAThage na sanivezitaH / (p. 184, In.) N.3

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34 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [XXIX XXIX sAmAnyakaraNavRttiH prANAyA vAyavaH pnyc| Does the word karaNa stand for trividha antaHkaraNa or prayodazavidha karaNa? While vAca adbpts the former view all the other commentators agree to the latter interpretation, although From curiously says at one place -samastasyAnta:karaNasyetyarthaH / vijJAna also explains the word karaNa as anta:karaNa in his bhASya ( on sAM. sU. II 31 ). But vAca0, while commenting on samastendriyavRttiH prANAdilakSaNA jIvanam (yogabhASya on III 39), has given a different interpretation, vix., sa hi prayatnabhedaH zarIropagRhItamArutakriyAbhedahetuH sarvakaraNasAdhAraNaH yathAhuH 'sAmAnyakaraNavRtti prANANA vAyavaH paJca' iti / bAlarAma correctly points out the discrepancy. He suggests that yogabhASye'pi samastendriyazandenAnta:karaNatrayameva pAya, na tu bAlendriyapa, because in deep sleep when all the external sense-organs are dormant, we see the five vital airs functioning. Therefore, these vital airs cannot be said to be the function of external sense-organs. Xxx Cognition has been divided into three kinds in the sAMsya philosophy, vis., perception (pratyakSa ), inference (anumAna) and valid testimony (zabda). Now, in pratyakSa, the three anta:karaNas and one of the organs of sense,-all four seem to function simultaneously and gradually. But, according to the naiyAyika there are only gradual stages, which, however, are not observable on account of the swiftness of the different functions. Cf. jJAnAyogapayodakaM manaH (nyA. sU. III. 2. 57 ), ma yugapadaneka. kiyopaTamdheH (ibid, III. 2. 58 ), alatacakradarzanavat tadupalAdhirAzupta cArAta (ibid, III. 2. 59 ). For, according to the maiyAyikas, the mind 18 aparimANa. The followers of sAMkhya, on the other hand, regard the mind to be of madhyamaparimANa, and, therefore, there can be a yugapavRtti.

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-XXXII] NOTES 35 In the case of anumAna and zabda, only the three anta:karaNas function. They can operate simultaneously and gradually both, but they do not depend upon the cognition of senses at that particular moment. XXXI 37797 - Davies observes :- Akuta is glossed in the Petersb, Lexicon by Absicht ( = purpose), Antrieb (=motive). Colebrooke's translation is "incited by mutual invitation."... ......The meaning of "incitement to activity,"mentioned by Wilson, expresses more nearly the sense of a kuta ...... It is composed of a, to, towards, and ku, to cry. Gaudapada says that it means adarasambhrama ( respectful eagerness in action ).' (p. 68, In ). Davies is wrong in considering that is correct in applying this verse to the three internal organs only (See Davies, p. 68, in ). All the other commentators apply it to all the organs, for each and every say functions for goari. The spirit of the Hi. .., " Hata amar" ( 111. 56 ) and "FETTATE: THAT " ( 111. 57 ), goes directly against the theory of the areals, where no $is mentioned. Nor is the position helped by vijJAna's remark. vis, prakRtilInasya janyeITFT FATA: : HAN: Faila Tau 397747 09:' spune Sfat: fel. FTFHTE, FACUTETTEYE CETTETET Patrego: Il ........ hittaray. virodhastatrAha-IduzezvarasiddhiH sihA / sAnidhyamAtraNezvarasya sidvistu sarvaFATTY: 1 ( fi. &. III. 57). XXXII The three functions of seizing, retaining and manifesting are, as Davies rightly points outs ( pp. 69-70 ), common to all the organs. Thus "the organ of sight seizes and holds the impression conveyed by an external object and manifests it to manas." (ibid). According to it, ora and TOT

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI belong to karmendriyas and prakAzana to buddhIndriyas. mAThara ascribes AharaNa to indriyas in general, and dhAraNa and prakAzana to ahaGkAra and buddhi respectively. vAca0 followed by candrikA, would relegate AharaNa to karmendriyas, dhAraNa to buddhi, ahaGkAra and manas, and prakAzana to buddhIndriyas. 36 [XXXIII The word in the second half of this verse presents a difficulty vAcao takes dazadhA with AhArya, dhArya and prakAzya each. The objects seized by the s, being only five, are doubled by dividing them into divya and adivya. Similarly, the body which is retained by the era, is made up of five vital airs; but these are also f and, and so tenfold. The objects manifested by the s are also tenfold because of being divided into and varieties. I think there is another and better way of explaining the ft. The objects seized, retained and manifested are altogether ten, viz., five objects of organs of action and five objects of organs of sense. These ten are supervised by the three internal organs. XXXIII o explains why is not recognised as a separate category in the philosophy. According to the vaizeSikasUtra "aparasminnaparaM yugapazciraM kSipramiti viGgAni (II. 2. 6), kAla is one category which is divided into three parts-past, present and future, according to different circumstances. prazastapAda clarifies this point - " ekatve'pi sarvakAryANAmArambhakriyAbhinirvRttisthitinirodhopAdhibhedAnmaNivatpAcakAdivadvA nAnAtvopacAra:; that is, just as one and the same man is called a 9 or a in different circumstances, or just as one and the same piece of crystal assumes different colours according to the objects placed near it, so all the effects, though of one nature, become different under the different circumstances of beginning, ending, remaining and perishing. Thus, there is only one . To this ara repliesWhy should we first assume one and then assume differ

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-XXXVII] NOTES ent circumstances or imus to make this a multifarious ? Why should we not recognise the upAdhis only ? Cf. sa khalvayaM kAlo vastuzanyo'pi buddhinirmANaH zabdajJAnAnupAtI laukikAnAM byutthitadarzanAnAM EROFTET AUTO-Otomapy on III, 52. XXXIV anahta = non-specific, i. e., FATIS. Farata = specific, i. e., 99HT. qoyfenterTOTI getraTi 213141Charg-Here arao suggests that the viSayas of the karmendriyas (except vA ) are endowed with all the constituents of the five elements in some measure. But this will lead to accepting the theory of Torontot, which is opposed to arqo's view on ta XXII, where he says *779: zabdasparzarUparasaguNAH. Can a person not brees water with his hands? If so, then water must also be any17. See notes on Karika XXII and S. N. S., pp. 72-73 with footnotes. XXXV The word ant has been translated by S. N. S., as 'principal'. The translation is based upon go's phrase gitmeye Fortfa. I think that 'warder 'expresses the sense of art better than ' principal'. For, in spite of the fact that all the sense-organs bring their percepts to the port: Po, the latter itself receives these percepts for delivering them to go, as is clear from the next 1797. The criticism of S. N. S. would have been right of 3pa: tut were to retain these percepts for itself and not present them to the Spirit. Therefore, the three-fold 371: Fico acts as a warder for the Spirit and not as the principal ( one ). XXXVII arao interprets both the lines of this as the causes of the superiority of gf. eo, on the other hand, inter

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38 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [XXXVII prets the first line as the cause of the second;--because intellect brings about the entire enjoyment of the Spirit, there fore, it brings about also the discrimination between the Spirit and the Nature. Hroe quotes the following speech of ahaGkAra. ahaGkAro dhiyaM brUte mainaM suptaM prabodhaya / prabuddhe paramAnande na tvaM nAhaM na tajagat // mayi tiSThatyahaGkAre puruSaH paJcaviMzakaH / tasvavRndaM parityajya sa kathaM mokSamicchati // yo'sau sarvezvaro devaH sarvavyApI jagadguruH / dehIti padamuccArya hA mayAtmA laghuH kRtaH // mAThara further remarks-na hi bhagavataH kapilasya mate kimapi kartavyamanuSTheyatayA, kiM tu sAMga yAnAM paJcaviMzatitattvajJAnameva sAdharyeNa vaidharyeNa ca ni:zreyasahetuH / uktaM ca isa piba lala moda nityaM viSayAnupabhuja kuru ca mA zaGkAm / yadi viditaM te kapilamataM tatprApsyase mokSasokhyaM ca // This verse is more of tirade against the Aitor philosophy than an exposition. XXXVIII In para 185, read bhUtAnyAkAzAnilAnalasalilAvanirUpANi. Why tanmAtrAs are called avizeSas?-This has been explained by goDa0 and mAThara as devAnAmete mukhalakSaNA viSayA duHkhamoharahitAH, which is wrong. For, tanmAtrAs, being evolved out of triguNAtmikA prakRti, cannot be said to be devoid of du:kha and moha (%3 rajas and tamam). Therefore, the explanation of vAca0, vis., na caiSAM zAntatvAdirastyupabhogayogyo vizeSa iti mAtrazabdArthaH, is better. That is, all the Attributes are present in the tanmAtrAs, but they are not patent enough to be enjoyed. XXXIX The specific elements are divided into three divisions" (1) Subtle body: (2) those which are born of father and mother; and (3) gross substances or inorganic matter.........

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-XLI] NOTES It (subtle body) becomes 'specific' by the aggregation of the subtle elements which in themselves are 'non-specific' or diversified." (Davies, p. 76). But, according to 977o, p roti prentararaquarante: ( Kar. 40 );--the subtle body is called specific because it is endowed with the sense. organs possessed of the qualities of calmness, violence and delusion. XL ara-According to arzo, each Spirit is endowed with a subtle-body at the beginning of the creation. But according to #. #. Haga Ron ( III. 9 ), there is an aggregate of subtle bodies which is created in the beginning. Cf. farao. Progetti, e Fei Furtwater ru:. Then, how do the subtle bodies separate ? To this, the replies t ifatatara ( III. 10 )--they are separated or differentiated according to particular actions. On this fantae comments-yavapi sargAdau hiraNyagarbhopAdhirUpamekameva liGgam, tathApi tasya pazcAdvayaktibhedo vyaktirUpeNAMzato nAnAtvamapi bhavati / But, is not this idea of recograf foreign to fire ? According to this #1, the number of the constituents of Royait is eighteen, but according to 7, it is seventeen. fancto has ingeniously removed this discrepancy by saying-- ahaGkArasya ca buddhAvevAntarbhAva. / XLI A distinction should be made between fee and possa fie The latter is the vehicle of the former, which consists of thirteon principles, viz., intellect, ego, mind, five organs of sense and five organs of action, and which is referred to as 8417: go in the authority quoted by 979. . The reading of site and 7167 is fear fasta:, whileas atro has vinA vizeSa:. vAca. calls the sUkSmabharIra as vizeSa in Karika XL.

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI (XLII So vinA vizeSaiH means vinA sAmaH zarIraiH. But this is confusing because, to say that there (composed of thirteen principles) cannotlexist without sUkSmazarIra (composed of lir and paJcatanmAtrAs) is not logical. Eo's explanation is better when he says that for cannot exist without faites viz., the five subtle elements. candrikA gives a different opinion of sorne commentator :-kecitu sthUlazarIrAvazyakatvAbhiprAyakamidamiti varNayanti / tathA hi, liGga samudAyAtmakaM liGgazarIraM vizeSa: sthaladehe vinA nirAzrayaM sanna tiSThati, kintu sthUlazarIramAzrityaiva tiSThati / ato na liGgazarIreNa sthUlazarIrasyAnyathAsiddhiriti bhAvaH // XLIII According to argo and 590 dispositions may be divided like this bhAvAH prAkRtA; vakRtAH karaNAAyaNaH kAryAyiNa: The prAkRtabhAvas, which are innate, are of four kinds, vis., dharma, jJAna, vairAgya and aizvarya. They belong to kapila only. Those de. pending on the instruments (karaNAzrayiNaH) are eight viz., dharma, adharma, jJAna, ajJAna, vairAgya, avairAgya, aizvarya and anaizvarya. Those dispositions which depend on the effect or body (770i aftur:) are also eight, viz., five when the body is in the womb and three, i. e., childhood, youth and old age, when the body is outside the womb. goDa and mAThara, however, divide the bhAvas into three kinds-sAMsihika, prAkRta and vaikRta. dharma, jJAna, vairAgya and aipayaM are born along with kapila, so they are sAMsiddhika or cognate in his case; but they come to samaka, sanandana, sanAtana and sanatkumAra (the four sons of pe ) after their birth, and are therefore, flat or natural in their case. The arm or acquired dispositions re. side in ordinary human beings and depend upon the instruments and the effected body.

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XLVI] NOTES XLIV and XLV According to hrot, the mafic rises to the eight states by practising virtue. The states are all, qrs1Tacy, Den for fo, TTT, TTTH and are the gives Hity for faza, and yra nas been dropped in Wilson's text and ours, but is given in the Benares edition. By practising vice, the g utie sinks to the five states of qy. Test, ITfree and FUTAT. The prAkRtikabandha, according to vAca0, is due to the identification of the Spirit with amat itself; but are includes the eight kinds of evolvents (tras ) in this bondage. The a r t, according to arzo, is the identification of the Spirit with the farmarts of gaat (i. e. the evolutes); but according to her, this bondage is brought about by making the eight states, viz., the ATE, TF197 and others, as the summum monum. These three kinds of bondages are explained by atao at length in his Tareh on iTT 1. 24. The word gaat in afarsa:, stands for H erramira, according to atao; but, according to fire and Art. the word denotes gaTEETGERA177: XLVI For the criticisun of Keith, see Sovani (p. 424 ). This creation of intellect or "the conduct of the human understanding" (Davies, p. 84), distinguished by Ignorance, Incapacity, Contentment and Attainment, is divided into fisty kinds. fit and for illustrate all these four states by means of an example of post. There is facin, when you are in doubt, whether you are seeing a man or a post. There is open, when even after seeing the post clearly, you are not entirely free from the doubt. There is are, when you do not want to remove the doubt as to the identity of the post. There is FHA when you succeed in establishing the correct identity of th

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42 TATTVA-KAUMUDI '. [XLVI post. The explanation of apao is better. Ante is that which obstructs the path of the Spirit to liberation. "Incapacity (safn) arises from the imperfection of senses. Acquiescence or Contentment (fa) is a passive state of intellect. Perfection (Para) means perfect knowledge, not completeness in moral virtue." (Davies, pp. 84-85). XLVII facere or art is of five kinds :- parent, TT, TT, ano and aft, which are called 148, HIE. HETHTG, mfua and 37-4mther by the fifT. XLVIII tamas or avidyA 1s ceight kinds and arises on account of identifying the Spirit with Nature, Intellect, Ego, and the five subtle elements. ___ moha or asmitA is also of eight kinds. The gods and the rest consider the eight varities of Altainment or fares as the summum bonum. HETIC or T is of ten kinds and arises from the attach, ment to the objects of five senses; these objects are ten, five belonging to gods and five to human beings. a te or entre 18 of eighteen kinds, and arises froin the o hatred towards one or the other of the ten objects of sense a( mentioned above ) and the eight varieties of Attainment or C i ferras. anyatAmisra or abhiniveza 1s also of eighteen kinds and arises kifrom the fear of losing the eight fafes or the ten objects of besense. Or it may be the fear of death which might obstruct cathe enjoyment of these eighteen objects. Cl. # rufafara: forms: svarasavAhI kRmerapi jAtamAtrasya pratyavAnumAnAgamairasaMbhAvito maraNatrAsa na ECETA: GET ITT Arong: ayat (prerapa on .. sedl. 9). "ATUNITETSMA Fera I" (pro p. 51 ). me Thus, there are 62 kinds of fan980s.

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-L] 44 NOTES XLIX The quotation in apero, enumerating the list of the injuries to organs, is found with a variant ( gramm: for AT: ) in the sAMkhyasaMgraha ( Chow. S. S. No. 246, p 77 ). gauDa uses prasupti ( or paralysis) for kuSTha, and upajibikA for jaDatA. Cr. " jihvAyA jAbyam," in jaya0, p. 52. mAThara and goDa adopt gudAvarta for udAvarta ( = obstruction of bowels). ___ mAThara ( and not gADa0, as S N. S. says, page 91, in) reads AdhyAtmikyaH in place of AdhyAtmikA:. AdhyAtmikAH is grammatically wrong,asAdhyAtmika is derived from adhyAtma + Tham ("adhyAtmAdeSThamiSyate" vArtika on pANini IV. 3. 60). Atmani = adhyAra. is an avyayIbhAva compound in the sense of locative case, according to "avyayaM vibhAkti0" grofa II. 1. 6. Then the feminine termination in ( and not TAp ) is added to AdhyAtmika by the sUtra of pANini, " TiDDANa0' IV. 1. 15 and the form will be AdhyAtmikI. The names of external varieties of Contentment vary with different commentators:vAca0 jaya0 mATara gauDa0 pAram sutAram / tAram mutamaH supAram supAram sutAram pAram pArApAram lost sunetram sunetram anuttamAMbhaH anuttamAMbhaH samarIcam anuttamAMbhAsakam utamAMbhaH uttamAMbhaH uttamAMbhasikam mArIkam If arjana, rakSaNa, kSaya, bhoga ( or saMga, according to gauDa0 ) and fEAT are named in the order given above, then Meo calls the last two as arts and TTATHAA respectively, which is against the order observed by other commentators. My teacher, the late Mahamahopadhyaya P. Ramavatara S'arma has tried to explain these varieties of oft as follows :dhamArjanaduHkhapAraprApayitRtvAt pArAlyeyaM tuSTiH / ......... arjanadoSadarzame'pi

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___44 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [LI kadAcidrogAbhilASeNa pravRttiH syAt, rakSaNabhayArtasya tu pravRtteratitarAmasaMbhava iti tadIyAyAstuSTeH supAratA, kSayaM bhAvayataH kadAcit pravRttiH kadAcidapravRttiH iti tadIyA tuSTiH pArAvArAkhyA ( read pArApArAkhyA ! ), bhoge rogabhayaM bhAvayatastuSTiH svArthapareti tasyA uttaretarAmbhastvam, hiMsAdoSatastasyAstuSTestu kAruNya. mUlakatvAduttamAmbhastvam // bAlarAma, pp. 219-220. th No commentator has given the names of asiddhi; jaya0 which gives them-tAsAM cAsiddhInAM moSamuSNamAnaramityAyAH (?) saMjJA:-, has a defective reading. arao criticises the view of some writer in para 237. This view, as has been shown by me in my article (" Jayamangala and other commentares on the Samkhya-Karikas", Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. V, in, p. 429 ), belongs to jaya; this point is of great importance for the question of the relative chronology of the different commentaries. I have discussed it in my article referred to above. Following is the scheme of the division of Afes according to vAcaka 1. adhyayana 2. zabda 3. jaha 4. suhRtprApti 5. dAna boser cash fount 6. pramoda 7. mudita 8. modamAna The last three are the effects of all the remaining five sidll. together. natus mci

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LIV] NOTES While apa. construes BFT as fearea and refers by it to viparyaya, azakti and tuSTi, vijJAna (on sAM. mu. III. 44) explains akuza as 370* and refers by it to the three falas, viz. 56 ya and adhyayana, leaving suhRtprApti and dAna as of secondary importance. He criticises vAca0 as follows-kazcitvetAsAmaSTasiddhInAmaGkuzo nivAraka: pUrvavividho viparyayAzaktituSTirUpo bhavati bandhakatvAditi vyAcaSTe tanna / tuSTaya. bhAvasyAzaktitayA bAdhiryAdivat siddhivirodhitAlAbhena tuSTayatuTyoH siddhivirodhitvAsaMbhavAt . In reply to this it may be said that tuSTi and atuSTi are not mutually contradictory, but positive ris. See Sovani p. 427. LIL The word focus has been explained as haar greinar by rata (on fi. &. III 45 ). But this is iron correct. arg. is right in explaining it as referring to the objects of senses and the two bodies-subtle and gross. Davies remarks :"Some commentators make the linga itself to be Buddhi (intellect) and bhavas to be its conditions. The former interpretation (i.e.arao H. ) is preferable, for the linga, though formed of intellect and other internal organs, is yet something different from them. It is, moreover, conditioned by the state of a former life, which is due to 'intellect. (p. 90 ). LIV ___ sattvavizAla means where satva predominates. It may be asked why this state should not be the human goal, why should men hanker after het? To this the replies :3Tierenartignagrungy: ( F. &. III 52 ). fara explains it as-tatrApyUrdhvagatAvapi satyAmAvRttirastyatra uttarottarayoniyogAdayo'dhoyoni. Fra: Atsia arhit RA: This very idea is expressed in the next after. According to virgo there are sixteen forms of creations" that is, apparently, each of the four classes of beings

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-46 TATTVA-KAUMUDI proceeds from four modifications of nature; or from the invisible principles, from the subtile rudiments, from conditions or dispositions of intellect and from the gross elements. ( Wilson, p. 220 ). It seems that gauDa * takes deva, mAnuSa and tairyagyona ( = two, jaGgama and sthAvara ), and divides each of them into four classes, viz., abhautika, liGga, bhAva and bhUta. [LIV LV * patanjali also expresses the same idea - pariNAmatApasaMskAra -duHkhairguNavRttivirodhAcca duHkhameva sarvaM vivekinaH ( yo. sU. II. 15 ). Compare also, samAnaM jarAmaraNajaM duHkham (sAM. sU. III. 53 ). svabhAvena is explained by candrikA as svata eva sargo duHkharUpaH, vivekinAmiti zeSaH / mAThara reads atra in place of tatra, and samAsena in place of svabhAvena in the text. The former term he explains as triSu lokeSu and the latter as saMkSepeNa. candrikA quotes two yogasUtras in support of .. " LVI The illustration of a cook cited by vAca0 and the (sAM. mU. III 63 ) - viviktabodhAt sRSTinivRttiH pradhAnasya sUdavat pAke, has got this disadvantage that sada is cetana. The illustration of goDa0 viz., yathA kazcit svArthe tyaktvA mitrakAryANi karoti, has the same disadvantage. The second illustration of gauDa0, viz., tathA cotaM kumbhavat pradhAnaM puruSArthaM kRtvA nivartate, 19 better, because kumbha is nonintelligent. " this kArikA - " tadartha eva dRzyasyAtmA - madhyamaSTaM tadanyasAdhAraNatvAt ( II 22 ). LVII sAdhyavyabhicAra: / The syllogism of the pratipakSin is cetanAnAdhiSThitaM acetanaM pravRttizUnyam acetanatvAt rathAdivat the purport of .. ( II 21 ) and kRtArtha prati naSTa

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-LXI] NOTES 47 Now, the sAdhya is pravRtizUnyam. The siddhAntim says that we can show a case which is the reverse of your syllogism. That is, vetanAnadhiSThitaM acetanaM api pravRttiyuktam, acetanatvAt, kSavit / Here we have sAdhyavyabhicAra. Now, the pratipakSin says that your case does not bring about the fare, because, even in your case we shall assume as the cause of . To this the faf replies:-Your argument is not sound, because a cetana or prekSAvAn can act only with the motive of svArtha or But, it would be absurd to impute any motive to God, much less these two motives. mAThara, gauDadeg and jayadeg, interpret this kArikA as illustrating the pravRtti and nivRtti ( of pradhAna ) both while as vAca0 speaks of pravRtti only. LVIII autsukya means icchA; but it is only a blind instinct or activity, which is the nature of the three is in philosophy. It is not the of the s according to whom at is the quality of a sentient being. LXI This has given rise to a great controversy. With whom should we construe the word? Is it which feels that there is nothing sukumAratara than prakRti or is it prakRti itself which feels that there is nothing than myself? The first meaning is adopted by mAThara; vAca0 and gauDa would seem to mean that it is the author of the who feels that there is nothing sukumAratara than prakRti. The next difficulty is about the meaing of the term sukumAratA. jaya * explains it by 'subtlety', vAca0 and mAThara, by bashfulness, and o by enjoyability'.

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TATTVA-KAUMUDI [LXI Again, in the 59th kArikA, prakRti is compared to a naTI but here to a kulavadhU. As to the existence of another kArikA on the basis of gauDa0, see my foot-note to the text of the fast and introduction "punarna darzanamupaiti puruSasya"-vAca0 explains it as-apramattAM yarthanAM parapuruSAntarANi na punaH pshynti| This is not a good interpretation. goDa is much nearer the mark when he says-ahamanena parapuruSaNa dRSTAsmItyasya puMsaH punadarzanaM nopaiti| LXII yathA jayaparAjayo bhRtyagato etc., ( vAca0 ) is evidentely derived from vyAsabhASya-"yathA jayaH parAjayo vA yoddhA vartamAnaH svAmini vyapadizyate" ( yo. mU. I. 24 ) : LXIV The word tattvAbhyAsa, according to jaya0, goDa and mAThara, means the abhyAsa or practice of the itwenty-five tasva. vAca. clarifies this abhyAsa as tatvaviSayajJAnAbhyAsa, which leads to the realisation of the distinction between puruSa and prakRti. The following scheme shows the different interpretations of the phrases nAsmi, na me and nAhama, as given by various commentators. mAThara goDa0 jaya0 nAsmi ahaM kriyAvAn nAsmi tatvAni / nAhameva bhavAmi / sUkSmazarIre bhautike nAsmi / cana bhavAmi, api tu prakRtiH / na me na me svaamitaasti| na me tttvaani| na mama zarIrama, na mamedamapi tu yato'hamanyaH, prkRteH| shriirmnyt| nAham ahaM kartA na nAhaM tattvAnAm / ahaGkArarahito- nApyahaM prkRtiH| 'hm| vAca0

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-LXVII] NOTES The quotation-"nirupadavabhUtArtha, etc., " given by vAca0, 1s also found in this tattvavaizAradI on yo. sU. I. 50, where, vAcadeg reads ma bAdho'nAdimattve'pi in place of na bAdho'yatnavattve'pi. The meaning of the verse is-nirupadravaH yo bhUtArthaH, tadupalakSitaH svabhAvo yasya, tasya jJAnasya viparyayaiH, ayatnavattve'pi na bAdhaH, buddhsttpksspaattH| nirupadrava = free from all ( the ) flaws (of pravRtti, etc., according to the bauddhas). bhUtArtha = truth ( AlayavijJAna, according to the bauddhas ). viyaryayaiH = .contradictions ( in the shape of falanta, according to the bauddhas ). ayatnavattve'pi, etc., = although there is no effort to free this AlayavijJAna from the flaws of pravRttivijJAna, yet this AlayavijJAna 1s not contradicted because buddhi is partial to it. vAca0's introduction here favours the reading anAdimatve'pi, which will mean-"although viparyayavAsanA is anAdi." LXVI " evaM vivekakhyAtimapi prAkRtImavivekAdevAtmA 'madarthayam' iti manyate " / (arao, para 271 ) = on account of ignorance, the Spirit thinks that as the enjoyable products of Nature, viz., sound and the rest, are for my sake, so the discriminative knowledge brought about by Nature ( and hence a product of Nature ) is also for my sake. prayojanaM nAsti sargasya-The idea is that bhoga and viveka are for the purpose of the Spirit (i. e., gegris ). They urge the Nature into activity. But, after the Spirit has enjoyed the products of Nature and has attained the discriminative knowledge, there remains no other purpose of the Spirit. tot and apavarga are no more puruSArthas. So, in the case of this particular Spirit, and 379ai cannot urge the Nature into activity. - LXVII "bhogena vitare kSapayitvA'tha sampadyate" is brahmasUtra, IV. I.. 19. zaGkarA. cAya explains it as-anArabdhakAryayoH puNyapApayovidyAsAma kSaya uktaH, itaretvArabdhakArye puNyapApe upabhogena kSapayitvA brahma saMpadyate ' tasya tAvadeva ciraM pAvana vimokSye'tha saMpatsye' (chaandogy-6|14|2)|

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50 TATTVA-KAUMUDI [LXXVII LXXVII The ten maulikArthas are (1) pradhAnAstitva, (2) pradhAnekatva, (3) pradhAnasya arthavasvam (=viSa. yatA), (4) pradhAnasya anyatA ( = puruSAdbhedaH), (5)pradhAnasya pArArthyam, (6) anaikyam (= puruSabahutvam ), (7) viyogaH (= puruSAt prakRteH), (8) yogaH (=puruSeNa saha prakRtyAH ). (9) zepavRttiH ( = saMskAravazAt sthUlasUkSmazarIradvayasthitiH) and (10) akartRtvam ( = puruSasya ). For this quotation and rAjavArtika, see introduction.

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